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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Tunisian Constituent Assembly voted on the provisions
of its new post-revolution constitution, international media
reports—noting that the new constitution contains no express
reference to Islamic law—ebulliently declared that Tunisia had
rejected Islamic law and embraced secular civil law. 1 Shortly
thereafter, on the same day the rhapsodic headlines were printed,
the deliberation on the Tunisian constitution was suspended “after
a deputy claimed he had received death threats because a colleague
had accused him of being an ‘enemy of Islam.’” 2 The issue of
whether or not the Tunisian constitution would reference Islamic
law had, throughout the preceding year, been the focus of intense
and acrimonious debate within Tunisia and among international
actors with an interest in Tunisia’s post-revolution transition to
1. See RT, Tunisia opts for civil, not Sharia law as assembly votes on new
constitution (Jan 5, 2014), http://rt.com/news/tunisia-rejects-islam-law-196/; see
also AAP, Tunisia's assembly has rejected Islam as the main source of law as it
voted on a new constitution (January 5, 2014): “Tunisia's Islamist-dominated
constituent assembly has compromised in rejecting Islam as the main source of
law as it voted on a new constitution for the country that spawned the Arab
spring.http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/01/05/tunisia-mps-reject-islamlaw”
2. See Tunisia MPs reject Islam as law, supra note 1.
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democracy. 3 Therefore, when the new constitution omitted
mention of Islamic law, it was viewed in certain circles as a
triumph of progressive liberalism and, in others, a defeat of Islamic
legal principles. 4 This article, in analyzing the domestic civil law
in force in Tunisia, posits that, with regard to Tunisian civil law,
neither conclusion is entirely true. 5 To the contrary, for well over a
century, Tunisian civil law, a “mixed” civil law system which
incorporates elements of continental civil law derived from
European codes with Islamic law and Tunisian custom, has
regulated the ordinary affairs of Tunisians in a manner that is
consistent with both modern legal norms and the tenets of Islamic
law. 6
Illuminating this hybridity in Tunisian civil law is useful on a
number of levels. From an academic perspective, in the context of
Middle Eastern and North African civil law systems, recent
scholarship (quite rightly) has focused on the work of Abd alRazzaq Al-Sanhūrī, among the most accomplished comparative
lawyers of the twentieth century 7 and the chief architect of many
civil codes for countries in the Middle East and North Africa who

3. Aziz El Yaakoubi, Death threats disrupt Tunisia constitution debate,
Reuters, Jan 5, 2014: “Since the 2011 uprising, tensions over the role of Islam in
Tunisia and the assassination of two secular politicians by hardline Islamist
militants last year have widened divisions between Islamists and secular
parties.”
4. Id.
5. For an interesting discussion regarding the relevancy of such a clause,
known as a repugnancy clause, see Haider Ala Hamoudi, Repugnancy in the
Arab World, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 427 (2012).
6. There are numerous schools of Islamic law (or madhabs). Although the
Maliki madhab prevails in Tunisia, see HALIM RANE, ISLAM AND
CONTEMPORARY CIVILISATION 83 (2010), the Hanifi madhab is also very
significant. Other minority madhabs, such as the Ibāḍī madhab, can also be
found in Tunisia. See, generally, J.H. van Riel, The Ibāḍī Traders of Bilād alSūdān (Master’s thesis, The American University in Cairo, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, 2012). As this article will demonstrate, in those
areas where it draws on Islamic law, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and
Contracts draws most significantly from the Maliki and Hanafi madhabs.
7. See Amr Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative
Law in the Arab World (or How Sometimes Losing Your Asalah can be Good for
You) in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152 (2001).
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were achieving independence in the aftermath of World War I. 8
Sanhūrī’s work is notable for its masterful synthesis of European
and Islamic legal principles and has come to serve as the archetype
for Middle Eastern civil codes. 9 The Tunisian civil code, however,
is an interesting example of North African legislation which
predates Sanhūrī and which also seeks to reconcile Islamic law
with continental civil law based on European codifications 10—and
a model which has influenced subsequent codifications in North
Africa and the Sahel, specifically in Morocco and Mauritania. 11
The Tunisian legal experience, therefore, represents the genesis of
a unique version of Middle Eastern and North African legal
codification.
In addition, an understanding of Tunisian civil law can inform
analysis of the current political situation in Tunisia as many of the
ongoing post-revolution debates have revolved around the role of

8. Id.
9. Id. It is worth noting that continental civil law has always demonstrated
a unique capacity to be exported and assimilated into other legal milieus. Since
the advent of the modern civil code, civil law jurists (and comparativists) in
various places throughout the world have acted as “synthesists,” working to
create a civil code based on the French model but retaining a sufficient degree of
organic legal substance so as to be faithful to the legal traditions of the
jurisdiction. These “synthesists” include the Haitian-born Louisiana jurist, Louis
Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet, who, as early as 1806, along with another
jurist named James Brown, was charged with creating a civil code for what was
then called “the Territory of Orleans.” See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUIS
CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU LISLET, FATER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 80
(1996). As Professor Alain Levasseur demonstrates in his illuminative book on
the topic, Moreau-Lislet was given the task of creating a civil code based on the
laws in force in Louisiana at that time, the substance of which was Spanish in
origin. He was charged with this duty almost contemporaneously with the
promulgation of the Code Napoléon. Id. at 64. To accomplish this task, MoreauLislet was perhaps the first civil law jurist to synthesize the French civil code
with non-French law (the Spanish law that was at that time in force). In this
effort, “[a]nterior laws were repealed, so far only as they were contrary to or
irreconcilable with any of the provisions of the new.” Id. at 65. Such a method is
akin to the method used in crafting Tunisian civil law.
10. See Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine, Présentation in LIVRE DU
CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006
(Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006).
11. See Id.
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Islamic law in Tunisian society. 12 Understanding how Tunisian
civil law accommodates Islamic law can render the analysis of
such debates more meaningful by revealing the degree to which
constitutional references to Islamic law actually influence the
presence or absence of Islamic legal influence in contemporary
Tunisian legislation. A review of that legislation and its history
presents a far richer and more nuanced view of Tunisian law and
its sources and, importantly, gives reason for Tunisians of all
political and ideological stripes to find a measure of accord and
acceptance of their civil laws and their legal and philosophical
lineage.
II. TUNISIAN LAW AND ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The past decade or so has witnessed a marked increase in the
attention paid to legal systems in the Middle East and North
Africa. 13 Wars, revolutions, and the increasingly expeditionary
foreign policies of western governments in the 21st century (which
viewed foreign instability as a threat to domestic national security)
have drawn the study of these legal systems into the foreign policy
calculus of major countries seeking to promote stability or
otherwise assert influence in the region. 14 Most recently, the
challenges faced by countries in the region in the aftermath of the
12. See Library of Congress, The Role of Islamic Law in Tunisia’s
Constitution and Legislation Post-Arab Spring (Jan 31, 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/tunisia.php.
13. See CHIBLI MALLAT, IRAQ: GUIDE TO LAW AND POLICY XXI (2009):“A
search in American and British law journals yielded 250 entries for articles and
notes on Iraq since 2003. There was hardly a tenth that number over the
previous 50 years.” See also University of London SOAS,
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cimel/: “The Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law
was established in 1990 at the School of Oriental and African Studies in
recognition of the growing importance of law in both its Islamic and Middle
Eastern dimensions.”
14. For a discussion of the link between comparative law and stability
operations carried out by U.S. armed forces, see Dan E. Stigall, Comparative
Law and Stability Operations: A Basic Overview and a Few Thoughts on
Lésion,
Comparativelawblog
(21
May,
2010),
available
at
http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/comparative-law-andstability.html.

6

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

Arab Spring are beginning to draw attention to the legal systems of
North Africa and the Levant. 15 This is, in part, because the
deleterious effect of that series of revolutions on the domestic
institutions of affected countries has made those countries more
prone to “destabilizing ethnic and sectarian rivalries” 16 and “have
created opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned
space from which to destabilize the new governments and prepare
attacks against Western interests inside those countries.” 17 A major
issue of concern for these various regions is the way in which law
and legal institutions can effectively address the needs of
heterogeneous and pluralistic societies which must co-exist in the
context of a unified legal and national framework. 18 This is
especially true in those countries which are currently crafting new
constitutions, writing new legislation, and wrestling with the
complex issues associated with the proper role of religion and
religious law. 19 But such legal harmonization is a challenge at

15. See Islamic Law in Transitioning Arab Spring Countries Subject of June
4 Program, http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2013/13-091.html (noting that the Law
Library of Congress and the Library’s African and Middle Eastern Division
hosted a panel discussion on the role and impact of Islamic law in the
developing constitutions and laws of transitioning countries in the Middle
East/North Africa region in 2013.).
16. See Woodrow Wilson Center, U.S. Intelligence: Arab Spring Generated
Threats (March 15, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/usintelligence-arab-spring-generated-threats.
17. Id.
18. See Lally Weymouth, The Arab Spring’s Last Hope: An interview with
Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s largest political party,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/12/rachid_gha
nnouchi_interview_the_tunisian_leader_of_the_ennahda_party_on.html
(quoting Rachid Ghannouchi as saying: “I believe that Tunisia will be successful
in presenting a successful democratic model because we have a homogenous
society, with a small Jewish minority.”) See also Euro-Mediterranean Network
for Human Rights, The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring,
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/515009ac2.pdf (“The ‘Arab Spring’ is not only
‘Arab’. Due regard should be given to the role and contribution of the different
ethnic and linguistic minorities in the region, such as Amazigh, Kurds, and
many others who equally participated in the democratic uprising.”).
19. See Clark Lombardi, Fierce Contest: Constitutional Islam and the Arab
Spring,
World
Politics
Review,
08
October,
2013,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13280/fierce-contestconstitutional-islam-and-the-arab-spring: “The struggle between liberals and
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every level. As Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty notes: “Ordering
multiplicity without reducing it to sameness, admitting pluralism
without giving up on building common law with a common
measure for fair and unfair, can therefore seem an unattainable
goal.” 20
Developments in Tunisia are of particular interest due to the
fact that Tunisia, more than any other country in the region, is
emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries seeking a
successful transition to democracy. Tunisia, after all, was the
genesis and the epicenter of the Arab Spring (which began as the
“Jasmine Revolution”). 21 While outcomes throughout the region
have varied, in the aftermath of those tremorous spasms of discord
and political upheaval, commentators have noted Tunisia’s
relatively successful transition from autocracy. 22 This success is
due, in no small part, to the fact that Tunisia experienced a regime
change but retained its vital state institutions 23 and has, throughout
its process of transition, maintained relative (though imperfect)
stability whereas neighboring countries have not. 24 As a result,
Tunisia’s very real potential for success has redefined it on the

conservative Islamists often intensifies when constitutions are being drafted or
amended. The Arab Spring has thus ushered in an era of fierce contest.”
20. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 1
(2009).
21. See Tunisia and Democratic Transition, Global Brief (March 9, 2011).
22. See Judy Woodruff, Tunisia, birthplace of the Arab Spring, struggles to
reset
its
democracy,
PBS,
November
23,
2013,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/tunisia_11-25.html.
23. See QUERINE HANLON, THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
IN TUNISIA: A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION 5 (U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012).
24. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, Tunisia starts voting on new constitution,
Reuters, Fri Jan 3, 2014: “[Tunisia's] final steps to full democracy have been
widely watched as a possible model in a region where Egypt, Libya and Yemen,
which also ousted their leaders in 2011, are struggling with violence and
instability as well as resurgent Islamism.”
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world stage as a regional anchor, a lodestar for countries in
transition, and “the Arab Spring’s last hope.” 25
Central to Tunisia’s transition from autocracy to democracy is
the question of what law will apply and the sources from which
that law is to be derived. 26 The major focus of analysis and debate
in this regard has been on Tunisia’s new constitution,27 which,
after intense national debate, was formulated without reference to
Islamic law as a source of law. 28 Very little attention, however, has
been paid to the domestic civil law in force in Tunisia and the
sources of that law, the analysis of which demonstrates that Islamic
law remains part of Tunisian civil law. 29 While the retention of
Islamic law in the Tunisian legal corpus is most evident in its
Personal Status Code, which is based on a progressive
interpretation of Islamic law and Tunisian custom, 30 Islamic law is
25. See Weymouth, supra note 18.
26. See Asma Ghribi, Role of Islamic Law in Tunisian Constitution
Provokes Debate, Tunisialive, 22 March 2012,
www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/22/role-of-islamic-law-in-tunisian-constitutionprovokes-debate/#sthash.mgLeAjgP.dpuf.
27. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, supra note 24.
28. Heba Saleh, Tunisia finalises new constitution, FT.com, January 24,
2014,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b029551a-8498-11e3-b72e00144feab7de.html#axzz3FDLndjuM: “The document says that Islam is the
religion of the Tunisian state, but makes no mention at all of Islamic sharia law.”
29. See Lombardi, supra note 19:
The [Ennahda] party thus supported the adoption of a constitution that
did not explicitly require the constitution to respect Islam—preferring
to ensure that the constitution left room for Islamists to take power and
impose laws that reflected their understanding of Islam. Ennahda
appears, in fact, to favor a fairly liberal understanding of Islam, but one
could imagine a more conservative group taking a similar path.
See also Thousands rally demanding sharia law in Tunisia, AFP, Mar 16, 2012.
30. See Jane Adas, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code and Modernity
(Development and Human Rights, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
March 2007), at 42-43 (noting that “[e]lements of the code were promulgated in
a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia
was still under French control,” and that:
Mohamed Habib Cherif, minister of justice and human rights, observed
that the Personal Status Code is deeply anchored in Tunisian society,
where women have been an important presence since Queen Dido
founded Carthage. The godfather of the Personal Status Code was
Tunisian reformist scholar Tahar Haddad, who in 1930 published Our
Women in Religion and Society. Elements of the code were
promulgated in a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the
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also firmly entrenched in the ordinary civil law which regulates the
daily transactions of Tunisian citizens. Importantly, however, an
analysis of Tunisian civil law also demonstrates that the presence
of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil law has not been a
negative aspect or a harmful element, nor has Islamic law’s
presence in Tunisian civil law over the past century served to
significantly alter the physiognomy of Tunisian society into
something unrecognizable to Western secular sensibilities. To the
contrary, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law can
function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as part
of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived from
a multiplicity of sources. 31
This article, therefore, provides a focused analysis on Tunisian
civil law and its role in post-revolution Tunisia, specifically
focusing on the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts,
which, since its promulgation in 1906, has been described as “the
first durable codification of Tunisian civil law.” 32 Through an
analysis of the history, sources, and operation of Tunisian civil

Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia was still under French control. The 1956
Code, Cherif said, erased discriminatory traditions, such as customary
marriage and secret divorce, and reformed the judiciary by replacing
the Islamic, Christian and Jewish courts with a uniform, secular
system.).
31. See Seán Patrick Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project:
Crossing the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355 (2011)
(describing “mixed legal systems” as “diverse state laws [that] emerge from
different legal traditions, . . .”) Id. at 359-60, and noting that:
Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new. Within Europe,
law predated the state and the creation of genuinely national laws; a
legal “system” centered on the modern nation-state, and the elimination
of competing jurisdictions and marginalization of non-legal norms was
a very long historical process. Especially before the 19th century, there
were multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national traditions are
unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folklaws, summary and
discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular iura propria, the
Romano-canonical “learned laws” or ius commune, and other transterritorial iura communia (including feudal law and the lex mercatoria).
Id. at 356.
32. See Kamel Charfeggine, supra note 10.
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law, the article demonstrates that this body of law is remarkably
well-suited to the task of accommodating a diverse society, parts of
which might insist on or desire the application of certain Islamic
legal norms. 33 Moreover, it is a historically important document as
it is also an early example of legal fusion—“une tentative de
conciliation unique en son genre entre droits civils de pays
européens et droit civil musulman.” 34
A. Tunisian Legal History: A Brief Overview
Before delving too deeply into Tunisian legislation, it is worth
noting some key aspects of Tunisia’s legal history which have
served to shape and continuously influence the country’s legal
physiognomy. The geographic territory that we associate today
with the modern country of Tunisia 35 is one with a rich history of
diverse people and successive empires, all of which influence
modern Tunisia’s fascinating legal culture. The Punic Wars
brought Tunisia under the Roman Empire in 149 BC. 36 Tunisia’s
subsequent “integration into the Roman and Byzantine Empires led
to the Christianization of the region in the first several centuries
CE.” 37 Arab Muslim armies, however, “conquered Tunisia in the
33. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 293, 295 (2009-2010): “That the Muslim world is replete with political
institutions and leaders (described herein, in their multitudinous varieties and
approaches, as ‘Islamist’) who seek a greater role than this for the shari’a in the
affairs of the state is obvious to anyone even faintly familiar with the region.”
34. See Faouzi Belknani, Code des obligations et des contrats et la
codification in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES
CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 17 (Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006).
35. Although this article, for the sake of clarity, consistently refers to
“Tunisia,” it is important to keep in mind Professor Lisa Anderson’s admonition
that “it is an anachronism to refer . . . to “Tunisia” and “Libya” when discussing
the 19th century. Until they were occupied by the Europeans, these countries
were known by the names of their capital cities, Tunis and Tripoli.” LISA
ANDERSON, THE STATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN TUNISIA AND LIBYA,
1830-1980 at 13 (1986).
36. See The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs,
Tunisia:
From
the
Roman
Empire
to
Ottoman
Rule,
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/tunisia-from-the-roman-empire-toottoman-rule.
37. Id.
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late seventh century and initiated the spread of Islamic influences
throughout the country.” 38 Coextensive with that series of rulers,
Roman law prevailed in the early history of the territory known
today as Tunisia, until the Arab conquest in the 7th Century AD
effectively replaced Roman law with Islamic law. 39 During that
latter period, among the predominantly Muslim population, the
Maliki school of Islamic law became most prominent during the
Aghlabite dynasty, though a notable minority of adherents to the
Hanafite school also existed in the region. 40 Islamic law, however,
applied only to Muslims during this period. The Jewish population
was still governed by Mosaic law and Christians by ecclesiastic
law (which retained elements of Roman law). 41 Professor Faouzi
Belknani, a legal scholar who has served on faculties in both
Tunisia and Qatar, notes that, in the 12th century, Muslim jurists
compiled collections fatwas and juridical opinions on diverse
questions of law, 42 such as the Hanafite compilations of Alhindia
and Alamkîrya or the Malikite collection called Al-Mi’yâr by the
jurist al-Wanshârisi. 43
The modern administration of Tunisia began in the 19th
Century, 44 which saw the creation of multiple distinct jurisdictions
and courts, the applicability of which depended on the religion of
the party. For instance, Muslims had access to Malikite or Hanifite
courts, while Jews had access to rabbinical courts, etc. 45 As a
general matter, however, commentators note that, before 1885,
civil law in Tunisia was largely regulated by Islamic law. 46 It was
also during the 19th century that efforts to codify Tunisian law
began. The Civil and Penal Code promulgated in 1861 by Sadek
38. Id.
39. See Afif Gaigi, Tunisia in YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE
EASTERN LAW 417 (1994).
40. Id. at 417-18.
41. Id. at 418.
42. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12.
43. Id.
44. See Id. at 14 n.44.
45. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418.
46. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
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Bey contained provisions inspired by Maliki and Hanafi schools of
Islamic law, 47 but was short lived and was repealed by 1864. 48 In
1885, the promulgation of the Tunisian Code foncier marked the
beginning of a process of progressive diminution of Islamic law’s
applicability in Tunisia. 49 The momentum toward codification had
begun and would only garner force.
It is also worth noting that, in 1876, as the global movement
toward codification began, perhaps the most significant early
attempt at codification of Islamic law came with the promulgation
of the Ottoman code known as the Mejelle. 50 That compilation
would, however, have no immediate influence on the development
of Tunisian law and was never fully in force in the region today
associated with modern Tunisia—a region which, as noted, was
deeply immersed in its own legislative initiatives by the time the
Mejelle was promulgated. 51 In that regard, commentators note that
the Ottoman legal reforms of the late 19th century occurred
parallel to Tunisian legal developments, but did not have
significant impacts in Tunisia, which “retained substantial
autonomy under the rule of the Husaynid Bey. . . .” 52 Nonetheless,
as discussed further below, the Mejelle would come to influence
modern Tunisian civil law in later years.
In 1881, with the Treaty of Bardo, Tunisia’s period as a French
protectorate began. During this time, the Bey maintained power in
theory, but was effectively under the power of a foreign (French)
sovereign. 53 French legal influence became more pronounced in
47. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418.
48. Id. at 419.
49. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
50. Id. It is interesting to note that the Mejelle, though frequently
characterized as the first codification of Islamic civil law, is predated in Tunisia
by Sadek Bey's Civil and Penal Code of 1861.
51. See Maaike Voorhoeve, Judges in a web of normative orders: judicial
practices at the Court of First Instance Tunis in the field of divorce law 52
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam 2011), available at
http://dare.uva.nl/record/400650.
52. Id.
53. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 419.
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1883 after signing of the Treaty of Marsa formally established the
French protectorate and permitted France to directly undertake
legislative reforms. 54 This opened the door to far more expansive
and ambitious legal projects, among the first of which was an
effort to codify Tunisia’s civil and commercial law based on the
French model of codification, 55 an effort which, for its successful
completion, required a deep knowledge of continental civil law,
sensitivity to local Tunisian custom, and expertise in Islamic law.
This effort resulted in a remarkable piece of legislation which has
now been in force for well over a century.
B. David Santillana and the Synthesis of Civil Law and Islamic
Law in Tunisia
During Tunisia’s time as a French protectorate, the task of
developing a codification of Tunisian civil law ultimately fell on a
codification commission composed of four French scholars and a
Tunisian jurist named David Santillana. 56 Born in Tunis in 1855,
Santillana came from a Jewish family of European ancestry. 57
Commentators suggest that Santillana’s family fled to Tunisia after
the fall of Grenada and the expulsion of the Jewish population.58
Historical records note that his grandfather, David Diaz Santillana,

54. Id. at 419.
55. See Charfeggine, supra note 10.
56. Santillana is a notable figure in legal history, whose life and
circumstances paralleled, in interesting ways, that of Moreau-Lislet, in that both
were civil law jurists whose presence in the jurisdictions where they were to
have an impact was the result of displacement—making each something of an
outsider, but not without a definite link with and affinity for their adopted
jurisdiction. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 9, at 80.
57. See Nadhir Ben Ammou, L’Avant Propos De L’Avant-Projet De Code
Civil Et Commercial Tunisien in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES
OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 65 (Mohamed Kamel
Charfeggine ed. 2006).
58. Id. See also Jewish History Sourcebook: The Expulsion from Spain,
1492 CE, available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/jewish/1492-jewsspain1.asp: “In the spring of 1492, shortly after the Moors were driven out of
Granada, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain expelled all the Jews from their lands
and thus, by a stroke of the pen, put an end to the largest and most distinguished
Jewish settlement in Europe.”
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was born in Tunis in 1780 and served as a translator for the British
Consulate General. 59 His father, Moses Santillana, succeeded his
grandfather as consular interpreter 60 and became a close
companion of Richard Wood, the British Consul in Tunisia, who
saw to it that the younger David Santillana was educated in an
Italian school in Tunis. 61 Thereafter, Santillana studied law in
Rome and, after graduation, worked as an attorney both in Rome
and Florence, 62 though still playing a role in controversial legal
matters across North Africa, such as the legal defense of Ahmed
Orabi, an Egyptian military officer who staged a revolt against the
British and French presence in Egypt. 63
Cultivated in such a cosmopolitan and learned environment,
Santillana grew to become a comparative law scholar, a
practitioner, and an expert in Islamic law who understood the
potential for Islamic law’s viability in a modern context.64 As a
result, when the Commission for the Codification of Tunisian
Laws was established in 1896, Santillana was a natural choice to
preside over the commission along with four French legal scholars.
This commission would produce a draft civil code which would
eventually become enacted in part as the Tunisian Code of
Contracts and Obligations. 65 To create this remarkable piece of
legislation, Santillana and his team would draw on a plurality of

59. See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Reports from
Commissioners, Naturalization Commission, Appendix to the Report, at 9
(1869).
60. Id.
61. See Ammou, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. ALEXANDER MEYRICK BROADLEY, HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI AND HIS
FRIENDS: A STORY OF EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIANS 75 (1884) (referring to
Santillana as “one of the most accomplished living Arabic scholars”).
64. See Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law
in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 213-14 (1990) (quoting Santillana as
writing: “There is no doubt that the high ethical standard of certain parts of Arab
law acted favourably on the development of our modern concepts and therein
has its enduring merit.”).
65. See GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES
39 (1998).
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sources, namely the French civil code, 66 the German civil code,67
several schools of Islamic jurisprudence (especially the Malikite
and Hanafite schools), 68 and the Ottoman codification of Islamic
law known as the Mejelle. 69 Commentators also note that their
work was influenced by Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence,
and the jurisprudence of French courts which were active in
Tunisia during its time as a French protectorate. 70 The character of
the Tunisian code, therefore, is as diverse and cosmopolitan as its
principal author.
The creation of such a code—successfully addressing the needs
of so diverse a polity—was a complex endeavor. An analysis of his
work demonstrates that Santillana synthesized diverse sources of
continental civil law with Islamic law and Tunisian custom
through four primary methods. The first of these was by direct
incorporation of Islamic law and legal devices into the codal text.
The second method was through exploiting the natural parallelisms
that exist between Islamic law and continental civil law. In that
regard, scholars have noted that “Islamic Law is rooted in Arabic
and Middle-Eastern legal traditions, but through its evolution, it
has assimilated elements of Roman law.” 71 The third method used
by Santillana consisted of excepting Muslims from aspects of the
civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic law and,
thereby, permitting certain transactions between Muslims to occur
in a way that comports with Islamic law. The fourth method used
by Santillana involved imparting a religious dimension to
otherwise secular legal devices, a technique which, in the context
of Tunisia, naturally tilts in favor of Islamic law. The result is a
codification of civil law which, at the same time, adheres to the
66. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 18.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12.
70. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54.
71. See Ayman Daher, The Shari'a: Roman Law Wearing an Islamic Veil?,
3 HIRUNDO: THE MCGILL JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES 91, 92 (2005).
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modern civil law model inspired by the French civil code and is
also uniquely Tunisian.
III. THE TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
Tunisia’s unique legal history and development resulted in a
somewhat different approach to codification than what is seen
elsewhere in civil law jurisdictions. Rather than a single, cohesive
code governing all civil law—or even the “codal dualism” 72 that
characterizes countries in the Middle East and North Africa with
codes drafted by Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhūrī—Tunisian legal
development has been characterized by what has been called
“thematic codification.” 73 For instance, Tunisian property law is
now largely governed by the law of 12/2/1965 which enacted the
Code of Real Rights, 74 the Personal Status Code governs “personal
status law” such as marriage, divorce, and successions, 75 etc. As a
result, among the most notable aspects of the Tunisian Code of
Obligations and Contracts is its intensely subject-specific focus.
Centered, as its name implies, on the formation of obligations and
contracts, the Tunisian Code lacks provisions of broader
applicability to persons and things that characterize most modern
civil codes. In that regard, the Tunisian Code consists of only 1531
total articles which are divided into two books: Book I
(Obligations in General); 76 and Book II (Different Contracts and
Quasi-Contracts Relating Thereto). 77 Commentators have noted
72. For a discussion of “codal dualism,” see Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law:
Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 16, 47 (2006).
73. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40.
74. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 426.
75. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40. Given the diversification of codes in
Tunisia, it must be emphasized that the Tunisian Code of Obligations and
Contracts represents but one facet of the corpus of laws that comprise the
entirety of Tunisian civil law. It is, nonetheless, a critical pillar in the
architecture of the Tunisian legal system.
76. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book I (Arts. 1563).
77. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book II (Arts. 564 –
1531).
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that this division, in essence, divides the Tunisian code into a
“general part” and a “special part,” each of which reflects a
diversity of sources. 78
A. Sources of Law
As noted, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts is
derived from a plurality of sources, though a study of the manner
in which those sources are referenced or incorporated into the code
reveals a fascinating array of legislative feats and codal
compromises which were necessitated by the political environment
in which the Tunisian code germinated. Interestingly, in contrast to
the relatively meticulous and comprehensive approach which
characterizes the rest of the Tunisian code, the legal provisions
which concern the Tunisian code’s sources of law (those which
may be called upon in interpreting the code’s provisions) tend to
be somewhat recondite. In setting forth the sources of law that may
be drawn upon for the proper interpretation of codal provisions, the
Tunisian code states that, in applying the law, one shall give it no
other meaning than that resulting from the ordinary meaning of the
law’s provisions and the intent of the legislature. 79 The code
specifically states that “[w]hen the law is expressed in general
terms, it must be understood in the same sense.” 80 Likewise, where
the law reserves a particular case, it applies to all other cases which
are not expressly excepted. Where a case cannot be decided by a
specific provision of the law, a court may look to the provisions
governing similar cases. 81 If the solution is still in doubt, the
Tunisian code states that a court may decide according to “general
rules of law,” 82 a phrase which is conspicuously inexact and
nebulous.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 532.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 533.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 535.
Id.
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Both the phraseology and the location of these articles of the
Tunisian code are in striking discord with the articles addressing
sources of law in most other civil codes, including civil codes in
the Middle East and North Africa. In comparable codes, the
sources of law are generally set forth in Article 1 of the civil
code—an initial article which typically articulates a predictable
hierarchy of sources. 83 For example, the Libyan Civil Code, Syrian
Civil Code, Egyptian Civil Code, and Algerian Civil Code all
contain an initial article (Article 1) which governs the sources of
law and, in essence, states that the written provisions of the code
govern all matters. In the absence of written provisions, Article 1
of those codes uniformly states that courts may adjudicate matters
in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. 84 In the absence
of an Islamic rule on a particular matter, the Libyan, Syrian,
Egyptian, and Algerian codes permit courts to look to custom and
the principles of equity. 85
But the Tunisian code is different and does not reference
Islamic law as a subsidiary source of law, nor any other specific
body of law. In that regard, Tunisian courts have held that nothing
in the Tunisian code permits recourse to Islamic law as a source of
law, 86 and commentators have noted that the very ambiguous
reference in Article 535 to the “general rules of law” offers little
clarity with regard to other potential sources of law and may have
been a purposive ambiguity deemed necessary in this early
codification of Tunisian law. 87 Otherwise stated, it has been

83. See, e.g., LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (LA CIV. CODE) art. 1: “The sources of
law are legislation and custom;” LA CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a
particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound
to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice,
reason, and prevailing usages.”
84. See LIBYAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1, para. 2.; SYRIAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1.
85. Id.
86. See STÉPHANE PAPI, L’INFLUENCE JURIDIQUE ISLAMIQUE AU MAGHREB
235 n.1273 (2009).
87. See M. Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine, Esquisse sur la méthode
normative retenue dans l'élaboration du Code tunisien des obligations et
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suggested that this is a simple prudence, designed to allow the code
to take root and become integrated into Tunisian society. 88
Interestingly, Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi, in his excellent
work on post-conflict constitution drafting in Iraq, posits that when
formulating national legislation such as a constitution in a postconflict environment where key stake-holders may have
pronounced “identitarian commitments,” it is sometimes
advantageous for drafters to permit such legislative lacunae to exist
so that long-term solutions can be incrementally achieved. 89
[T]he solution well may be to proceed with constitution
making, but on particularly difficult problems—namely
those in which any view to the long term is likely to raise
the prospect of intractable disputes based on quite
inconsistent conceptions of statehood—to defer the
problem for later, incremental resolution. In other words,
on such matters of dispute, the solution might well be,
counterintuitively, to push the problem off in a manner that
will reduce the stakes. 90
Santillana seems to have taken just such an approach with the
Tunisian code insofar as it remains ambiguous as to which sources
of law may be invoked by Tunisian courts. There are, however,
other ways that a legal source can find influence in a civil code
beyond express references. Even where a code does not expressly
permit recourse to a certain body of law—such as Islamic law—
elements from a legal tradition may still find relevance by being

des contrats, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ. 421, 440
(1996):
Ambiguïté voulue ou ambiguïté dictée par la crainte d'une mise en
cause par les juges de l'œuvre d'unification législative du droit des
obligations réalisée pour la première fois en Tunisie? A moins qu'il ne
s'agisse que d'une simple prudence pour enraciner le nouveau code et
permettre son intégration en imposant le respect strict de ses
dispositions.
88. Id.
89. See HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT BARGAINING IN IRAQ 224
(2013).
90. Id.
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incorporated into the codal text or through more subtle
mechanisms which permit those sources to exude influence. This is
certainly true for Santillana’s work in the Tunisian code which
sought to incorporate Islamic legal principles and to blend those
legal rules with European legal norms, effectively fusing two
normative orders. 91
B. Formation of Obligations and Contracts
Belknani notes that the general provisions relating to
obligations in the Tunisian code are essentially drawn from the
continental civil law tradition. 92 Continental civil law, in that
regard, envisions an obligation as something more expansive than
simply a contract (though a contract can certainly form an
obligation). Deriving the concept of an obligation from Roman
law, civil law theorists have maintained that an obligation is “a
legal relationship that compels us to give, to do, or to not do
something.” 93 This allows for obligations that are bilateral (such as
contracts) but also for unilateral obligations by which only a single
party is bound. 94
In Roman law, according to a text by Gaius, all obligations
derive from contract, delict, and several other causes. On
that basis, the Corpus Juris asserts the existence of four
sources of obligations which, as universally accepted by
doctrine with almost no exception, are contracts, quasicontracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts. 95

91. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54: “Santillana explicitly referred to
the Ottoman Mecelle and Qadri Pasha’s works as sources of inspiration, as well
as Sahnun’s Mudawwana and Khalil’s Mukhtasar. When choosing between
different solutions from Islamic law, the principle that was closest to French law
was chosen.”
92. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 21.
93. A.M. DEMANTE, 3 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS
246 (1833).
94. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 248.
95. SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS, §1.6, at 10 (2001).
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The Tunisian code’s first article states that obligations are
derived from conventions and other declarations of will, quasicontracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts. 96 Similarly, under Tunisian
law, the elements necessary for a valid obligation are: (1) the
capacity to form an obligation; (2) a valid declaration concerning
the essential elements of the obligation; (3) a definite object that
can be the object of an obligation; and (4) a lawful cause for the
obligation 97—requirements which echo civil law based on the
French model and which adopt the continental civil law
paradigm. 98 It must be noted, however, that these rules are also
consistent with Islamic law which requires people entering into
contracts to be of sound mind, 99 a lawful object for contracts, 100
and which requires contracts to have a lawful cause. 101
Under Tunisian law, all persons have the capacity to form
obligations unless declared otherwise by the law 102 and, notably,
the Tunisian Code expressly states that religious differences
between muslims and non-muslims has no bearing on the capacity
to contract, nor do such religious differences impact obligations
between muslims and non-muslims. 103 Importantly, however, the
Tunisian code—as explained more fully below—contains a host of

96. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1. This article
is almost identical in substance to Article 1757 of the Louisiana Civil Code
which states that “[o]bligations arise from contracts and other declarations of
will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in
instances such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, unjust
enrichment and other acts or facts. LA CIV. CODE art. 1757
97. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 2.
98. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 252: “Ces conditions sont au nombre de
quatre: le consentement, la capacité, l’objet et la cause.”
99. MEJELLE, Art. 957 (“Infants, madmen and people of unsound mind
(Ma’tuh) are of themselves prohibited from dealing with their property”), and
Art. 966 (“When an infant has not understanding for business (Art. 943) even if
his guardian give him permission, his verbal dispositions of property are
fundamentally invalid.”).
100. MEJELLE, Art. 197 (“The existence of the thing sold is necessary”) and
Art. 199 (“It is necessary that the thing sold should be [permitted by law].”).
101. MEJELLE, Art. 211.
102. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 3.
103. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 4.
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provisions that provide for exceptions in the case of contracts
between muslims.
1. Unilateral Acts
Civil law doctrine recognizes, to varying degrees, the concept
of a unilateral act. 104 Planiol attributed the more modern approach
of permitting a unilateral declaration to form a binding obligation
to German jurists. 105 While a relatively recent innovation during
Planiol’s era, unilateral acts are now well-founded in modern civil
law doctrine. As Litvinoff noted, “under certain circumstances, the
law may attach consequences to a merely unilateral declaration of
will which is promissory in nature.” 106 Under Tunisian law, while
a mere promise does not operate to create an obligation, 107 a
promise made by posters or other means of advertising which offer
a reward to one who finds a lost object or accomplishes a task can
create an obligation, and is deemed to be accepted by those who,
even without having knowledge of the offer, find the thing or
accomplish the task. 108 In such circumstances, the author of the
promise is required to provide the promised reward. 109
Interestingly, while these provisions comport with the civil law
model, they are drawn more from the German model than the
French Code Civil and mirror quite closely the 1984 amendments
to the Louisiana Civil Code, which “adopted the German-oriented

104. The degree to which unilateral declarations are considered sources of
obligations varies among modern civil codes. See, e.g., Pablo Lerner, Promises
of Rewards in a Comparative Perspective, 10 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 53, 57 (2004):
If Puffendorf definitively installed the pactum as the central idea, it was
Domat who simplified the problem by putting forth the agreement as
the only expression of the autonomy of will. His ideas were adopted by
the French legislator, and so the French code does not recognize the
unilateral will as a source of obligation.
105. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 273 (9th ed., 1923).
106. LITVINOFF, supra note 95, at 13-14.
107. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 18.
108. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 19.
109. Id.
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solution, reserving the promise of reward only for the case of
performance of a specific fact.” 110
Tunisian law further states that the promise of reward may not
be revoked where the revocation occurs after execution has
begun. 111 One who has set a deadline for the completion of the task
envisioned by the promise is deemed to have waived the right to
revoke the promise until the expiration of the time limit.112 If
several people have accomplished the task at the same time, the
promised prize or reward is shared between them. 113 If they have
done it at various times, the award belongs to the first to
accomplish it. If they each accomplished a portion of the task, then
the reward is shared proportionally. 114 If the reward cannot be
shared but can be sold, then the price will be shared among the
beneficiaries. 115 If this price or reward is an object that has no
market value or can only be given to one person, then according to
the terms of the promise, the decision is made by drawing lots (“la
décision est remise à la voie du sort”). 116 This latter provision is
also taken directly from the German civil code, 117 thus
demonstrating Santillana’s reliance on a plurality of European civil
law sources when drafting the Tunisian code.
2. Contracts (Bilateral Acts)
The notion of a bilateral act, of course, dates back to ancient
times and was well-developed in Roman law. 118 Modernity and
110. Lerner, supra note 104, at 63.
111. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 20.
112. Id.
113. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 21.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See BGB, Art. 659(2):
If the act has been undertaken simultaneously by more than one person,
then each is entitled to an equal portion of the reward. Where the
reward cannot be shared due to its quality, or if, according to the terms
of the promise of a reward, only one person is to be given the reward,
then the matter is decided by drawing lots.
118. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333.
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commerce only increased the frequency of this method for forming
obligations. Writing in the 19th century, civil law jurist A.M.
Demante noted that, even during that era, the majority of
obligations were formed through the creation of contracts. 119 The
general rule in modern civil law is that a contract is formed by the
consent of the parties to the contract. 120 Consistent with this
theory, under Tunisian law, a contract is perfected only by
agreement of the parties on the essential elements of the obligation,
as well as on all other lawful clauses that the parties consider
essential to the agreement. 121 Barring a provision to the contrary,
changes by the parties by mutual agreement to the contract which
occur immediately after its conclusion do not constitute a new
contract, but are considered part of the initial agreement. 122 Even
so, a contract is not perfected when the parties expressly reserve
certain clauses to form the object of a subsequent agreement. 123
The agreement reached under these conditions, on one or more
such clauses, does not constitute the conclusion of a contract, even
if a preliminary agreement has been drawn up in writing. 124 In any
case, reservations or restrictions which are not brought to the
attention of the other party are not set aside or restrict the effects of
the declaration of intent as provided for in its apparent
expression. 125
C. Transfer of Obligations
Consistent with the continental civil law tradition, the Tunisian
civil code permits the transfer of obligations. As Litvinoff noted,
“[a]s an asset in his patrimony, the creditor or obligee may transfer
or assign the obligation to another if he so wishes. Also, the debtor
119. A.M. DEMANTE, 2 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS
246 (1831).
120. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333.
121. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 23.
122. Id.
123. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 24.
124. Id.
125. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 25.
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may substitute another person at his end of the relation. In both
instances the obligation remains the same, however.” 126 Under
Tunisian law, the transfer of rights and claims of an original
creditor to another person can take place, either pursuant to the
provisions of Tunisian law or pursuant to an agreement between
the parties. 127 Rights or claims that are not yet expired may be
transferred, 128 though such a transfer may not operate for future
rights. 129 Similarly, the transfer is considered null: where the right
or claim may not be transferred by virtue of its constitutive title or
by law; where it is intended that the rights or claims are of a purely
personal nature; or where the debt cannot be subject to seizure or
attachment—though when the right or claim is susceptible of being
seized with the concurrence of a party or to have its value
determined, the assignment of the right will be valued in the same
proportion. 130 The assignment of a claim includes the accessories
that are integral to the claim, such as privileges, with the exception
of those that are personal to the assignor. 131 It includes wages,
mortgages and sureties unless there is an express stipulation to the
contrary. 132
Notably, an assignment is also assumed to include accrued
interest unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. This latter
provision relating to interest, however, is not applicable between
Muslims.133 This exception pertaining to Muslims, of course, is
due to the provisions of Islamic law which disallow the charging of
interest in the course of transactions. 134 The authority for this
doctrine in Islamic law—which is not interpreted with precise
126. LITVINOFF, supra note 95.
127. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 199.
128. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 200.
129. Id.
130. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 201.
131. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 210.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ABDUR RAHIM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE
ACCORDING TO THE HANAFI, MALIKI, SHAFII AND HANBALI SCHOOLS 294-95
(1911).
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uniformity135—is from Quranic exhortations against the idea of
ribā (or interest) 136 and sunna in which the Prophet is reported to
have said as follows:
(Sell) gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand
to hand. 137
In permitting an exception to ordinary civil law for Muslims
where interest is involved, Santillana adopts a civil law concept but
in a way which permits compatibility with Islamic legal tenets.
D. Extinction of Obligations
The Tunisian code’s articles on the extinction of obligations
are drawn from civil law in that they incorporate civil law concepts
of remission of debt, novation, compensation, and confusion.
Notably, however, these articles also incorporate Islamic legal
concepts that provide traditional protections and limit the civil law
concepts to the extent their operability could transgress Islamic
legal boundaries.

135. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294:
The Hanafi doctors have interpreted the tradition to mean that
whenever an article belonging to the description of similar of capacity
or of weight is sold or exchanged for an article of the same species,
neither party is allowed to receive anything in excess of the quantity
sold by himself , in other words absolute equality in quantity is insisted
upon. The Shafi’is hold that the law of riba only applies to articles of
food and such things as constitute price, namely gold and silver.
136. YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE QUR’AN, THE
MUWATTA, AND MADINAN ‘AMAL 149 (2002):
Ribā, like zakat, was another situation where the general judgment in
the Qur’an as clear but the precise details problematic. The main
prohibition against ribā comes in Q 2: 278-9 where we read that those
who practice ribā should be aware that they have engaged in “a war
with Allah and His Messenger,” from which the “ulamā” derived the
judgement that those who engage in ribā and refuse to repent are, if
they have a power-base [are to be fought as rebels].
137. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294.
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1. Remission of Debt
A remission of debt, according to civil law doctrine, is a
unilateral act by which a creditor renounces his or her rights
against a debtor. 138 Such an act produces a liberation of the debtor,
extinguishing the debt and all accessory obligations pertaining to
the debt. 139 Tunisian law incorporates this concept, though alloyed
with Islamic legal concepts. Under Tunisian law, an obligation is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the obligation by a
creditor that is considered capable of making a donation. 140 The
remission takes effect as long as it has not been expressly refused
by the debtor. 141 Tunisian law also notes, however, that the
remission granted by an ill person to a third party during his or her
last illness is valid up to a maximum of one-third of what remains
in the succession after the payment of debts and funeral
expenses. 142 This latter provision is derived from Islamic law
which generally places a limit of one third of the estate on the
amount which a person may bequest (preserving the remainder of
the decedent’s estate for family members) 143 and, therefore,
placing cautionary limits on the ability of an ill person to alienate
property and extinguish debts in excess of that limit. For instance,
the Mejelle provides as follows:
If someone in his mortal sickness has given something to
one of his heirs and has died, if the other heirs do not allow
it, that gift is not good.
But if he has made a gift and delivered it to a person who is
not an heir of his, and a third of his estate is sufficient for
138. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 198.
139. Id.
140. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 350.
141. Id.
142. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355.
143. See, e.g., UN-Habitat, Islam, Land & Property Research Series, Paper
6: Islamic Inheritance Laws and Systems, at 10 (2005), available at
ww2.unhabitat.org/programmes/landtenure/documents/ILP%206.doc:
“[A]
Muslim’s ability to bequeath is restricted to only one-third of an individual's
estate under certain rules with the remaining two-thirds devolving according to
the compulsory inheritance rules.”
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the whole of the gift, it is good.
If it is not sufficient, and the heirs do not permit the gift,
the gift is good up to the amount, for which the third of the
estate is sufficient. The rest, the donee is compelled to
return. 144
The Tunisian code, therefore, incorporates the Islamic legal
limitation of “one third of the estate” into the civil law concept of
remission of debt and protections designed to maintain the
integrity of Islamic inheritance law. Otherwise, the Tunisian codal
language is largely consistent with other modern civil codes,
holding that the release of any debt in general and without
reservation cannot be revoked. 145 Special provisions, however,
exempt the finality of such remissions made by an heir in the case
of an inherited debt and where that remission was justified by
fraud or deceit on the part of the debtor or other people acting in
complicity with the debtor. 146 It is worth noting here, however, that
many continental civil law jurisdictions, likewise, maintain the
concept of “forced heirship” (deriving their rules in that regard
from Roman law) and similarly prohibit bequests in excess of a
certain portion of the decedent’s estate. 147 The Tunisian, Islamic,
Roman, and continental civil law rules tend to blur into one
another at such legal intersections.
2. Novation
The concept of novation is drawn from Roman law but was
adapted by civil law jurists throughout the ages so that it is
applicable to modern contracts and obligations. 148 Under Tunisian
law, novation is the extinction of an obligation due to the creation
144. MEJELLE, Art. 879.
145. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 356.
146. Id.
147. Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in
Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 60 (1941) (Noting that in Louisiana “as in
both French and Spanish law, excessive dispositions are not null, but are
reducible to the disposable quantum.”).
148. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 178: “La novation est un procédé d’origine
romaine mais qui s’est bien transformé depuis l’antiquité.”
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of a new obligation which is substituted for it. 149 Novation cannot
be presumed and, to the contrary, the desire for a novation must be
expressed. 150 Both the former obligation and the newly formed
obligation must be considered legally valid obligations for
novation to have effect. 151
The Tunisian Code provides that novation occurs in three types
of circumstances: (1) when the creditor and debtor agree to
substitute a new obligation for the former, which extinguishes or
changes the cause of the former obligation; (2) when a new debtor
is substituted for the former who is discharged by the creditor
(such a substitution may take place without the participation of the
first debtor); and/or (3) where, by the effect of a new commitment,
a new creditor is substituted for the former creditor, thus
discharging the debtor vis-à-vis the former creditor. 152 Such a
definition comports with the concept of novation as it appears in
modern civil codes based on the French model. 153
3. Compensation
Civil law doctrine maintains that when two people owe to one
another similar obligations, it is not necessary that each one pay
the other. Rather, it is simpler to consider each obligation
reciprocally extinguished up to the amount of the lesser debt. 154
Litvinoff notes that, in civil law systems based on the French
model, “[c]ompensation takes place by operation of law, that is,
independently of the will of the parties. The two obligations
extinguish each other reciprocally, to the extent of the lesser

149. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 357.
150. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 358.
151. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 359.
152. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 361.
153. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 1881: “Novation takes place when, by
agreement of the parties, a new performance is substituted for that previously
owed, or a new cause is substituted for that of the original obligation. If any
substantial part of the original performance is still owed, there is no novation.”
154. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 189; LA CIV. CODE art. 1893.
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object, as soon as they co-exist.” 155 In systems based on the
German model, in contrast, “compensation does not take place
automatically, but must be raised as a defense by the interested
party. . . .” 156
Tunisian law also recognizes this civil law concept, though
with a typically Tunisian variant on the theme. According to the
Tunisian Code, “[c]ompensation occurs when parties are mutually
and personally creditor and debtor of the other. It does not take
place between Muslims in cases where it would constitute a
violation of religious law.” 157 Santillana, therefore, again adopts a
civil law concept but permits an exception to it for Muslims insofar
as it might run afoul of the tenets of Islamic law. Otherwise,
Tunisian law permits that compensation may take place between
debts which have different causes or are of different portions.158
When the two debts are not of the same sum, compensation is
carried out up to a maximum of the lesser debt. 159 Consistent with
civil law doctrine, Tunisian law provides that compensation takes
place between debts of same kind and quality. 160 Tunisian law
requires that the two debts must be liquidated and presently due,
but it is not necessary that they be payable at the same place. 161
4. Confusion
Planiol defines the civil law concept of confusion as the union
of the two qualities of creditor and debtor in the same person (“la
reunion sur la même tête des deux qualités de créancier et de
débiteur”) and notes that this concept most frequently finds
application by the effect of a succession in which a creditor

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

LITVINOFF, supra note 95.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 369.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 377.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 373.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 374.
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inherits a debt. 162 Under Tunisian law, when the qualities of
creditor and debtor of an obligation is together in the same person,
there is a confusion of rights which eliminates the relationship
between creditor and debtor. 163 Consistent with civil law doctrine,
the Tunisian code provides that confusion may be total or partial,
depending on whether it occurs for the entire obligation or only a
portion. 164 When the cause that produces confusion disappears, the
credit-right is revived along with its accessories, for all persons,
and confusion is deemed to have never occurred. 165 The Tunisian
articles on confusion are scant, but maintain the civil law concept
without modification.
E. Vices of Consent
Continental civil law has traditionally held that “le dol, l’erreur
et la violence sont les trois causes qui vicient la volonté.” 166 As
civil law jurist Saul Litvinoff noted when explaining this concept:
Autonomy of the will is the basic idea that underlies the
doctrine of juridical acts implicit in the civil codes of
France and Louisiana. From the vantage point of that idea,
a person’s declaration of will produces the intended legal
effects when the consent it expresses is informed by a
reason, a cause, and is also free from interfering
circumstances that frustrate its intention. As clearly stated
in the Code Napoleon, consent is invalid when it has been
given through error, extorted by duress, or obtained by
fraud. When such is the case, though consent has come into
existence, it is impaired, defective, it is tainted by a vice
that affects its freedom. 167

162. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 197.
163. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 382.
164. Id.
165. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 383.
166. PLANIOL, supra at 105, at 165.
167. See Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an
Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
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Islamic law, likewise, has long held that fraud, 168 error, 169 and
duress 170 are grounds for rescinding contracts. These legal
provisions, therefore, form an area of comparative overlap between
Islamic law and continental civil law.
The Tunisian Code incorporates this framework for vitiation of
consent—though clearly drawing its provisions principally from
the French model. Accordingly, under Tunisian law, the consent of
a party is annullable when it is given in error, when induced by
fraud, and when it is obtained through violence. 171
1. Error
Error, under the Tunisian code, can give rise to rescission when
it is a legal error or a factual error. 172 With regard to legal error,
such an error may result in rescission when (1) it is the sole or
principal cause for the obligation; and (2) if it is excusable. 173 A
factual error, likewise, may give rise to rescission when it bears on
the identity, type, or quality of the object of the obligation.174
Simple errors in calculation, however, do not give rise to
rescission, but they must be rectified. 175
2. Violence
The vice of consent termed “violence” in the Tunisian code is
defined as “coercion without the authority of the law, and subject
to which one brings a person to perform an act to which he or she
did not consent.” 176 Violence, under Tunisian law, gives rise to
168.
52.
169.
32.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 20 and Art.
See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 29 and Art.
See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 232-237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 52.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 43.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 44 and 45.
Id.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 47.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 50.
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rescission when that violence was the principal cause for
undertaking the obligation and when—having regard to age,
gender, status of the person and their level of impressionability—
the violence consists of acts that are of such a nature that they are
likely to produce physical suffering, or profound mental suffering
(from fear, exposing that person’s honor or possessions to material
injury). 177
The fear inspired by the threat of prosecution or other legal
channels generally will not give rise to rescission under Tunisian
law unless the person making the threat does so in a way that
qualifies as legally cognizable violence (the sorts of willovertaking threats described above) and is done so in a way that
abuses the position of the threatened party by seeking to extort
excessive or undue benefits from him or her. 178
Violence gives rise to rescission of the obligation, even if it
was not exercised by one of the parties to the obligation 179 and
even if it was exercised upon a person with which the contracting
party is closely related by blood. 180 Reverential fear, however,
does not give rise to rescission of an obligation unless also
accompanied by serious threats or assault. 181
3. Fraud
Fraud gives rise to rescission when the tactics or nondisclosures of one of the parties, or a person who represents or is
complicit with that party, are of such a nature that without these
tactics or non-disclosures, the other party would not have
contracted. 182 The deceit practiced by a third party has the same
effect, when the party that benefits from that fraud had knowledge

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 51.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 52.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 53.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 54.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 55.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 56.

34

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

of it. 183 Fraud with regard to the accessories of the obligation and
which was not central to the obligation can give rise only to
damages and not rescission. 184
4. Additional Bases for Rescission
There is reason to rescind when the party who contracted was
in a state of drunkenness, which has troubled his faculties. 185 The
reasons for rescission based on the State of disease and other
similar cases, are subject to the discretion of the judges. 186
Under Tunisian law, lesion does not give rise to rescission,
unless it is caused by fraud by the other party, the other party’s
representative, or by one who acted for the other party. 187 The only
exception to this is when the injured party is a minor or is
incompetent, even though he or she would have contracted with
the assistance of his guardian or legal counsel in the manner
determined by law and although there be no fraud by the other
party. 188 Lesion is defined as any obligation entailing a price
differential beyond a third of the given price and the actual value
of the thing. 189
F. Contract of Sale
A review of the Tunisian provisions relating to the contract of
sale reveal an equally interesting blending of continental civil law
with Islamic legal precepts, both by incorporating requirements
that adhere to the Islamic law of sales and by creating strategic
exceptions where Islamic law and continental civil law diverge.
At the outset, the Tunisian code obviously incorporates
classical civil law concepts into its provisions on the contract of
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 57.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 58.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 59.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 60.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 61.
Id.

2014]

TUNISIAN CIVIL LAW

35

sale. In the continental civil law system, “a sale is a contract by
which a person, who is called the vendor, obliges himself to
transfer the ownership of a thing to another, whereas the other
person, who is the buyer, obliges himself to pay the value of the
thing in money.” 190 The necessary elements of such a sale are the
consent of the parties, a thing to be sold, and a price to be paid. 191
Modern civil codes around the globe maintain this basic concept of
the contract of sale. For instance, under the Louisiana Civil Code, a
“[s]ale is a contract whereby a person transfers ownership of a
thing to another for a price in money. The thing, the price, and the
consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection of a
sale.” 192
The Tunisian code incorporates this very model for the contract
of sale. Under Tunisian law, a sale is a contract by which one party
transfers ownership of a thing or a right to another contracting
party for a price which the latter obligates himself or herself to
pay. 193 A contract of sale is perfected between the parties, as soon
as there is consent of the contracting parties (one to sell and the
other to buy) and the parties agree on the thing, the price and the
other terms of the contract. 194 The Tunisian code, moreover,
requires that the selling price in a contract of sale must be
determined. A contract of sale cannot refer the determination of the
selling price to a third party or the price paid by a third party,
unless the price is known to the contracting parties. 195 The contract
may, however, refer to the fixed market price, or a determined rate,
or the average of the market prices, when it comes to goods which
do not have a variable price. 196 When the price is variable,
contracting parties are presumed to be referring to the average
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 462.
Id. at 464.
LA CIV. CODE art. 2439.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 564.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 580.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 579.
Id.
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market price. 197 These requirements are consonant with classical
continental civil law insofar as the price must be fixed, but seem to
gravitate more toward Islamic law in the rigidity of this
requirement. As Planiol notes, continental civil law has long
permitted the price in a contract of sale to be determined by outside
experts or arbiters, 198 and modern civil codes based on the French
model have permitted even more laxity with regard to prices set by
third parties and even courts. 199 Islamic law, in contrast, has more
adamantly required that the price be determined at the time of the
formation of the contract. 200 This is due to the prohibition on
gharar (the sale of “items whose existence or characteristics is not
certain, the risky nature of which makes the transaction akin to
gambling”). 201 Commentators note that a sale in which the price is
deferred is an example of gharar. 202 The Tunisian code, by
expressly disallowing the selling price to be determined by third
persons, thus, aligns more consistently with Islamic law than
continental civil law.
Islamic law’s influence on Tunisian law becomes even more
pronounced in its articles which hold that a sale is considered null
if it is for things that, by nature or circumstances, are unlikely to be
delivered to the purchaser; for example: the fish in the water, the
197. Id.
198. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 468, (1923): “La fixation du prix est parfois
chose difficile, et les parties conviennent de s’en rapporter pour son chiffre à
l’appréciation d’un ou de plusiers arbitres ou experts. Ce procédé est licite. . . .”
199. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2645: “The price may be left to the
determination of a third person. If the parties fail to agree on or to appoint such a
person, or if the one appointed is unable or unwilling to make a determination,
the price may be determined by the court.”
200. MEJELLE, Art. 237:“It is necessary that the price should be named at the
time of the sale (Bey`). Therefore, if the price of the thing sold is not mentioned
at the time of the sale, the sale is bad (Fasid).” See also MEJELLE, Art. 238: “It is
necessary that the price should be known.”
201. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PRACTICE 58 (2006).
202. Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical
Islamic Jurisprudence, 16 J.KAU: ISLAMIC ECON. 3, 8, available at
http://balmeena.kau.edu.sa/Files/320/Researches/50833_20970.pdf (noting that
“[d]eferment of the price to an unknown future date” is an example of a gharar
sale).
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bird in the air, the escaped animal. 203 This prohibition also relates
directly to the prohibition on gharar sales. Commentators have
noted that Islamic law, to varying degrees, has disallowed the sale
of fish in the water and escaped things. 204 “Other hadiths, still of
contemporary relevance, forbid the sale of a bird in the air, a fish
in the water, an escaped animal or slave, or anything else that the
vendor might be unable to deliver owing to lack of possession.”205
Perhaps even more strikingly, any contract of sale is, likewise,
considered null if it is between Muslims and for things declared
unclean by religious law (la loi religieuse) except the objects
which “religious law” has authorized for trade, such as animal
fertilizer for agricultural purposes. 206 Thus, Tunisian civil law
expressly incorporates Islamic law into its law regulating contracts
and prohibits contracts which would violate its precepts.
Under Tunisian law, the buyer acquires full ownership of the
thing sold, as soon as the contract is perfected by the consent of the
parties. 207 As soon as the contract of sale is perfected, the buyer
may dispose of the thing sold, even before delivery. 208 Likewise,
the seller may assign his or her right to payment, even before the
delivery of the thing, unless there is a contrary agreement by the
parties. 209 Such provisions align with continental civil law which
does not require delivery of the thing in order to have transfer of
ownership in a contract of sale. 210 Interestingly, however, the
Tunisian code provides that these latter provisions relating to
transfer of ownership prior to delivery are inapplicable with regard
to the sale of foodstuffs among Muslims. 211 As noted above,
203. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 571.
204. ABDULLAH ALWI HAJI HASSAN, SALES AND CONTRACTS IN EARLY
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW 80 (2007).
205. DAVID EISENBERG, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2.69 (2012).
206. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 575.
207. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 583.
208. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584.
209. Id.
210. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 141 (“La délivrance ou tradition n’est plus
aujourd’hui requise pour transférer la propriété[.]”
211. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584.
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Islamic law in regard to such contracts has very specific
requirements with regard to riba212 and, in this instance, the
Tunisian code seems to partially codify the sunna admonishing
believers to
[sell] gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand
to hand. 213
Moreover, Islamic law, as reflected in the Mejelle, is more
limiting with regard to what one may do before delivery of the
thing. The Mejelle permits a seller to “dispose of the price of a
thing sold before he has received it,” 214 and, in the case of
immoveable property that “the purchaser can sell to another, before
delivery, the property sold. . . .”215 Moveable property, however,
cannot generally be sold to another before delivery. 216 The
Mejelle, likewise, gives special significance to delivery in sales
involving things sold in quantities that are weighed and do not
suffer damage by division (such as corn) in that such a sale
becomes final when there is delivery and the amount delivered is
correct. 217 Otherwise, the buyer is given a right of option and may
annul the sale or purchase the lesser amount. 218 Under the

212. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN ALQYRAWANI, THE GIST OF THE TREATISE ON MALIKITE JURISPRUDENCE 84
(1994):
When grains, legumes, and preserved foodstuffs are bartered in kind,
the quantity received should be equal to the quantity given; no delay in
delivery is allowed in this exchange. It is forbidden to barter foodstuff
delivered immediately for foodstuff to be delivered at a subsequent
time, whether the exchange is in kind or not, whether the foodstuff is
perishable or not.
213. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294.
214. MEJELLE, Art. 252.
215. MEJELLE, Art. 253.
216. Id.
217. MEJELLE, Art. 223.
218. Id.
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Mejelle’s provisions, if there is excess in such a case, the surplus
belongs to the seller. 219
Belknani similarly highlights article 565 of the Tunisian code,
relating to the sale of a thing by an ill person on his or her
deathbed. 220 According to that article, the sale by an ill person on
his or her deathbed (“during his last illness”), where it is made to
one of his heirs with the intention to favor that heir (for example,
the thing is sold at a price much lower than the real value of the
thing) is governed by the provisions of article 354 of the Tunisian
code, 221 which, in turn, states that a remission of debt made by an
ill person on his or her deathbed to one of his heirs is valid only if
the other heirs ratify the act. 222 In contrast, the sale by an ill person
to a non-heir is governed by the provisions of article 355 of the
Tunisian code 223 which states that a remission of debt granted by
an ill person to a third party is valid up to a maximum of one-third
of what remains in the estate after the payment of debts and funeral
expenses. 224 Accordingly, under Tunisian law, such a sale could be
limited depending on what debts and expenses remain after the
death of the seller. Belknani notes that such a sale would be
considered mawküf under Islamic law, 225 and a review of Islamic
jurisprudence finds this provision of the Tunisian code to be
derived from the Mejelle:
If a sick person sells something to one of his heirs while he
is in his death sickness, it is dependent on the permission of
the other heirs, if, after the death of the sick person, they
give permission, it takes effect, if they do not give
permission, it does not take effect. 226

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 354.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 23.
MEJELLE, Art. 393.
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Similarly, the Mejelle provides that if a sick person while in his
death sickness sells something, for a price less than the value of the
thing and a third of his property “is not sufficient to provide for the
benefit, the purchaser is compelled to make good the reduction in
the price, and if he [does not] make [the reduction], the heirs can
annul the sale.” 227
In addition, Belknani highlights article 576 of the Tunisian
code, relating to the sale of a thing belonging to another, as an
example of Islamic legal doctrine being incorporated into the
Tunisian code. 228 According to this article, the sale of a thing
belonging to another is valid: (1) if the true owner of the thing
ratifies the sale; or (2) if the seller then acquires ownership of the
thing. Where the true owner refuses to ratify the sale, the purchaser
may ask for dissolution of the sale. The seller is liable for damages
when the purchaser was unaware at the time of the sale that the
thing belonged to another. The nullification of the contract,
however, can never be opposed by the seller due to the fact that the
thing belonged to another. 229
G. Contract of Exchange
Civil law jurist A.M. Demante, writing in the 19th Century,
noted that the contract of exchange is more ancient than the contact
of sale. 230 While continental civil law recognizes the contract of
sale, so does Islamic law, and the Tunisian code incorporates the
concept of this contract in a way that permits it to comport with
both legal traditions.
Under Tunisian law, a contract of exchange is a contract by
which each party gives to another, as property, a movable or
immovable thing, or an intangible right, against another thing or

227.
228.
229.
230.

MEJELLE, Art. 394.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 576.
DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 189.
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right of a similar or of a different nature. 231 This comports with
modern civil codes which retain this nominate contract and tend to
define it as “a contract whereby each party transfers to the other
the ownership of a thing other than money.” 232
Consistent with classical civil law, Tunisian law holds that a
contract of exchange is perfected by the consent of the parties. 233
When, however, the contract of exchange regards buildings or
other objects susceptible to mortgage, the provisions of the
Tunisan code dealing with immoveable property are applicable234
(namely the contract must be made in writing with a date that is
certain and will have no effect vis-à-vis third parties unless it is
registered in the registry of finance, subject to the special
provisions relating to registered buildings). 235
When the exchanged objects are different of values, the parties
are permitted to make up the difference through cash payments or
other objects, at that time or as a future sale. This provision has no
effect between Muslims when the exchanged objects are
commodities. 236 As with contracts of sale, this exception for
Muslims relates to the Islamic rules relating to the sale of
commodities and future contracts, which maintain very specific
requirements which are occasionally at variance with the
continental civil law rules. 237
H. Deposit and Sequestration
A deposit is a contract by which a person surrenders a chattel
to another person who undertakes to keep the deposited thing and
231. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 718.
232. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2660.
233. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719; DEMANTE,
supra note 93, at 189: “Dans les principes de notre Droit français ce contrat est
consensuel aussi bien que la vente.”
234. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719.
235. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 581.
236. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 720.
237. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN ALQYRAWANI, supra note 212.
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return it in its individuality. 238 A contract of deposit must be made
in writing if it is of a value exceeding one thousand dinars. This
rule does not, however, apply to a necessary deposit which is
defined as one that was forced by a fortuitous event or force
majeure event, such as a fire, a shipwreck or another event, the
proof of which may be made by any means, regardless of the value
of the object of the deposit. 239
A person making or accepting a deposit must have the capacity
to form obligations. 240 If, however, a person able to bind himself
accepts a deposit made by an incapable person, that person is
bound by all obligations arising from the deposit. 241
The depositary is answerable for any foreseeable loss or
damage to the thing when (a) he or she receives a salary for the
custody of the deposit; and/or (b) when he or she receives deposits
as a result of his or her status or according to his or her
functions. 242 The depositary is not answerable for loss or damage
caused (a) by nature or problems with the thing deposited or by the
negligence of the depositor; or (b) in cases of force majeure or
fortuitous events, so long as the depositary has not been already
put in default for failure to return the thing deposited, or so long as
the force majeure is not the depositary’s fault or the fault of
persons for which he is responsible. 243 Proof of force majeure or
defect of the things is the depositary’s burden, when the depositary
receives a salary for the filing or when he received the thing by
virtue of his status or pursuant to his functions. 244 Otherwise, the
depositary shall ensure the custody of the deposit, with the same
diligence that one would apply to things that belong to him. 245

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 995.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1003.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 998.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1021.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1022.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1005.
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Under Tunisian law, any agreement is void in which the
depositary would be held responsible for fortuitous events or force
majeure, except in certain circumstances, including those where
the depositary receives a salary. 246 This last provision only applies
between non-Muslims. 247 This exception for Muslims relates to
Islamic law governing the delivery of things for safe-keeping,
which generally hold a depositary liable for the destruction of the
thing entrusted to him, except for cases of fortuitous events or
force majeure. The Mejelle’s provisions on this topic, for instance,
provide that “if the contract for delivery [for safekeeping] has been
made for payment to be made for the safe keeping, in case it is
destroyed or wasted by a cause which it is possible to guard
against, it becomes a cause of compensation.” 248 When, however,
the loss is not something that could be guarded against, then the
general rule applies that “if it be destroyed or wasted without any
[fault] of the person who accepts it and without any fault in the
keeping of it, it does not become necessary to make
compensation.” 249 In providing an exception to the civil law rule,
the Tunisian code permits this Islamic rule to become operational
between Muslims.
I. Mandate
Under Tunisian law, a mandate can be special or general. 250 A
special mandate is one that is given for one or more specified
endeavors, or which confers only specific powers. 251 It gives
power to act in specified endeavors and matters necessarily
attendant thereto, according to the nature of the matter. 252 A
general mandate, in contrast, is one which gives the mandatary the
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1023.
Id.
MEJELLE, Art. 777.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1116.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1117.
Id.
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power to manage all the interests of the principal without limit, or
which confers broad powers without limit in a particular case. 253 It
gives the power to do all that is in the interests of the principal,
according to the nature of the case and the usage of trade, and
especially to recover what is due, to pay debts, to carry out
conservatory acts, to bring possessory actions, and even enter into
obligations to the extent necessary to carry out the affairs for
which the principal is responsible. 254
With regard to the sources of law used for the Tunisian rules on
mandate, Belknani highlights article 1163 as an example of the
integration of Islamic law into the Tunisian code. 255 According to
that article, the total or partial revocation of the mandate cannot
have effect toward third parties of good faith who have contracted
with the mandatary before the revocation, except for the principal’s
recourse against the mandatary. 256 When the law prescribes a
determined form for the establishment of the mandate, the same
form is required for revocation. 257
A review of the provisions of the Mejelle reveal similar
provisions regarding vekyalet—a contract in which a person
appoints another to conduct affairs on his or her behalf. 258 Those
provisions make clear that the excesses of the person so appointed
(the vekyl) do not prejudice third parties but, instead, inure to the
detriment of the vekyl. 259
J. Oaths (Les Serments)
Another area where the gravitational pull of Islamic law and
Tunisian custom is evident is in the rules governing oaths.
Continental civil law recognizes, among other things, the use of
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1119.
Id.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.100.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1163.
Id.
MEJELLE, Art. 1449.
E.g., MEJELLE, Arts. 1470-1471, 1479.
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oaths as a manner of proving the existence of facts relevant to civil
litigation. For instance, Article 1357 of the French Civil Code
provides for the use of judicial oaths (le serment). This has been
described as “a remnant of the formalistic medieval procedure”
which is used less frequently today. 260 There are three varieties of
such judicial oaths in French civil law: the decisory oath (serment
décisoire), the supplementary oath (serment supplétoire), and the
serment in litem or serment in plaids which deals with damages.
The first of these (the serment décisoire) is an oath
administered by one party to the other, upon which the result of the
action is made to depend. 261 The serment supplétoire is the oath
administered by the judge to one of the parties in order to
determine an issue. 262 The last variety (serment en plaids, or
serment in litem) is a kind of oath in which, under certain
exceptional circumstances, the judge may to administer to a
plaintiff in order to determine the value of the thing forming the
object of the action. 263
Tunisian law also recognizes two types of oaths for purposes of
establishing facts in civil litigation: (1) one which a party refers to
the other in order to make the case depend upon it (décisoire); and
(2) one which is brought ex officio by the judges to one or the other
of parties (supplétoire). 264 Although a lengthy discussion of these
devices is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that
Tunisian civil law incorporates them, but also imbues them with a
260. See PETER EMILIUS HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 358 (1967).
261. OLIVER EATON BODINGTON, AN OUTLINE OF THE FRENCH LAW OF
EVIDENCE 72-73 (1904). Writing in 1904, Oliver Eaton Bodington noted that
“the serment décisoire, or oath administered by one party to the other, may be
administered by any party who has proof to make in support of his demand, or
of his plea in defence.” Importantly, such an oath can be made in a variety of
judicial contests but can only be made in regard only to “things done by the
person himself, or at the doing of which he was present.” Bodington also noted
that French courts and commentators have universally held “that the oath can
only be administered in regard to facts which are of a decisive character, that is
to say, a character which shall determine the issue.”
262. Id. at 72-73.
263. Id.
264. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 492.
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religious dimension that does not ordinarily exist in continental
civil law. Specifically, Article 495 of the Tunisian code notes that
“[t]he oath must always be taken in the mosque on Friday or in any
other religious place which will be indicated by the party offering
the oath and in conformance with the religious sect of the
party.” 265 If the place where the oath must be taken is further than
three miles from the place where the Court sits, the part to which
the oath is referred may refuse to go there. Notably, the party who
refuses to be sworn in the indicated place is deemed to have
refused the oath. 266 Such provisions—requiring an oath to be taken
“in the mosque on Friday or in any other religious place”—imbues
this procedure with a religious element that gives recognition to the
role of religion in civil affairs.
K. Mouçakâte and Moughâraça
The Tunisian code’s inclusion of the Islamic concepts of
mouçakâte and moughâraça are also examples of how Islamic
influences can sometimes become dominant traits within the codal
text, especially in the code’s treatment of agricultural contracts. 267
With regard to the first of these, the Tunisian civil code
incorporates the device of a mouçakâte defining it as a contract by
which the owner of a crop which is ready for cultivation charges
another person, referred to as a colon, to do the necessary work of
picking or harvesting in exchange for a determined share of the
harvest. 268 This sort of arrangement is derived from the Islamic
legal arrangement with the same name, also transliterated as
musaqah or musāqāt, which is generally defined as a type of
contract in which “an owner of trees or crops entrusts his trees or
crops to a person to look after and water them until they bear fruit

265.
266.
267.
268.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 495.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 496.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 23.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1395.
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or ripen [in exchange for] a specific portion of such fruit or
crops.” 269
The Tunisian code also incorporates the device known as
moughâraça, which it defines as a contract which forms an entity
which has for its object the fruit trees or other crops with regard to
which one of the parties, known as the colon, is responsible for
their planting and care in exchange for an undivided share of the
land and soil and the trees or crops. 270 This is obviously derived
from the Islamic property device of the same name—also
transliterated as mugharisah or magharisah—which endows the
lessee with real rights and is typically defined as “a contract by
virtue of which an owner entrusts land to a person who undertakes
to plant it with fruit trees [in exchange for] receiving a portion of
the land.” 271
Professor Lisa Anderson provides some context for how such a
contract would order society in rural North Africa:
In both Tunisia and Libya, the Sahil was often home of a
contract known as the magharisah, in which property was
confided to a land-poor farmer for development; upon its
harvest, he was to receive half the land as his own. This
type of contract was particularly characteristic of the treecrop regions, where the first harvest of marketable produce
was sometimes decades from planting. The magharsi—the
developer—was tied to the landowner by numerous
personal obligations. During the tenure of the contract, he
was often obliged to ask for advances in money or in kind
from the landowner, much of which he would not be able to
return until the expiration of the agreement, and even then,
he might find himself better served by a renewal of the
contract than under the obligation to repay his debts. 272
Inclusion of such traditional Islamic legal devices demonstrates
the way in which Santillana sought to directly instill certain aspects
269.
(1979).
270.
271.
272.

See FARHAT J. ZIADEH, PROPERTY LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 70-71
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1416.
Id.
Anderson, supra note 35, at 45.
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of Islamic law into the Tunisian code and to preserve both a sense
of tradition, historicity, and legal continuity in its text.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tunisia is now emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries
seeking a successful transition to democracy. Its recent success in
completing its new, post-revolution constitution demonstrates its
leading role in the region. As such, legal developments within
Tunisia carry the potential for regional impact as other countries
seek to emulate its successful transition. 273 Political contention
relating to the role of Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia,
however, will not cease simply because a new constitution is now
in force. 274 Rather, the issues of concern to Islamists in Tunisia and
more secular Tunisians will continue to be debated in the corridors
of Tunisia’s newly democratic institutions. 275 Understanding that
debate as it relates to Tunisian law necessarily requires an
understanding of the domestic law in force in Tunisia, its sources,
and its compatibility with Islamic law.
As this article has demonstrated, the fact that Tunisia’s new
constitution contains no express reference to Islamic law does not
mean that Islamic law plays no role in Tunisia. 276 To the contrary,
an analysis of Tunisian civil law demonstrates the historic and
continuing presence of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil
law. Importantly, this influence—which spans the history of
modern Tunisia—has not been a negative aspect or a harmful
element. Rather, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law
can function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as
part of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived
273. See Woodruff, supra note 22.
274. See Ghribi, supra note 26.
275. See supra note 22; see also HAMOUDI, supra note 89, at 226: “Tunisia,
for example, appears deeply split between a moderate Islamist movement that
seeks a more enhanced role for Islam, and a strong secular movement
significantly influenced by Tunisia’s recent past, which regards such aspirations
with uncommon fear.”
276. See supra note 1.
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from a multiplicity of sources, 277 namely the French civil code, 278
the German civil code, 279 several schools of Islamic jurisprudence
(especially the Malikite and Hanafite schools), 280 the Mejelle, 281
Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of
French courts which were active in Tunisia during its time as a
French protectorate. 282 Equilibrium between continental civil law
and Islamic law was achieved in that code through direct
incorporation of Islamic law and Islamic legal devices into the
codal text; exploiting the natural parallelisms that exist between
Islamic law and continental civil law; excepting Muslims from
aspects of the civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic
law; and through imparting a religious dimension to otherwise
secular legal devices. The result is a codification of civil law which
adheres to the modern civil law model inspired by the French civil
code, but which is also uniquely Tunisian—and uniquely wellsuited to the task of ordering plurality in Tunisia in the aftermath
of the Jasmine revolution.
Understanding this aspect of Tunisian civil law informs our
understanding of the ongoing debates surrounding the role of
Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia and the significance of
constitutional references to Islamic law or the lack thereof. Islamic
law has, to some extent, been a part of Tunisian civil law for over
100 years and, because Islamic law is interwoven into the fiber of
Tunisia’s foundational legal texts, it will continue to be part of
Tunisian civil law under the aegis of the new constitution. As with
other countries, however, its compatibility with Islamic law and its
incorporation of traditional Tunisian legal devices in the context of
a modern civil code has doubtlessly contributed to its institutional
durability, and durable institutions of that nature will be needed to
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See Donlan, supra note 31.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54.
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maintain stability in a region undergoing such dramatic social and
political upheaval. As Béatrice Hibou noted in the preface to the
English edition of her excellent work on Tunisia entitled The Force
of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia:
What is happening in Tunisia is important, over and above
what this country in North Africa actually represents, with
its small population, lacking any income derived from
economy, energy sources or geopolitical clout, or any
dominant position in the region. These days it benefits from
the impact of the Tunisian ‘revolution’ on the rest of the
region, in Egypt, of course, but also elsewhere in the Arab
world and sub-Saharan Africa. But history has already
shown how this ‘little country’ could serve as an
example. 283
The fact that Tunisia’s mixed civil law system has persisted for
over a century (and remains a celebrated facet of the country’s
legal culture) provides reason for optimism as Tunisia moves
forward in its transition to democracy. Moreover, other countries
in the region may also benefit from the Tunisian experience—the
example of this “little country” which has changed the
physiognomy of the Middle East and North Africa at almost every
level—as they look to develop civil laws which are modern, yet
compatible with their legal traditions, customs, and Islamic legal
precepts. As noted in this article, it would not be the first time that
this small country on the Mediterranean coast illuminated a path
for others to follow.
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Scotland is typically regarded as a mixed jurisdiction based on
an assessment of its combination of civilian and common law
traditions. If this narrow definition of “mixture” is opened up, one
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will find several other traditions which are constituent parts of the
Scottish legal tradition. Those range from the seemingly remote
Celtic and udal law, through feudal and canon law, to the law of
the European Union and the European Convention on Human
Rights. An holistic approach to the question of mixture requires
that each of these traditions is accounted for, especially because of
the difficulties in assessing the legacy of any given tradition. Those
difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that legal traditions are
indiscrete or “impure”, having been the subject of influence,
modification, contamination, borrowing and so forth. They have
mixed with other traditions, and some have conveyed parts of
others. By focusing on the civilian and common law traditions, we
risk adopting a reductionist approach to the question of mixture by
essentially excluding vital parts of the story: which other traditions
were (or are) part of the mixture, which parts disappeared or were
subsumed into other traditions, which aspects of one tradition were
conveyed by another. An holistic approach also recommends that
the predominantly private law oriented focus of the literature is
opened up to analysis of public law and criminal law. That will
likely bring out further aspects which show that the pedigree of
Scots law is a mixture, not only of civilian and common law
ingredients, but also of other diverse traditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scotland is often described as a “mixed” jurisdiction. Whilst
some have claimed that it is the only such system in Europe, 1
others may disagree with that proposition.2 We are told, at any
rate, that Scotland is the oldest among those jurisdictions
comprising the world's “third” legal family. 3
1. Hector L. MacQueen, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence: Scotland,
29 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 309, 310 (2001).
2. See, for example, arguments advanced that Cyprus and Malta are also
mixed systems—see, respectively, Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as a Mixed
Legal System, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 37; and Kevin Aquilina, The Nature and
Sources of the Maltese Mixed Legal System: A Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde?, 4 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013).
3. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001); Mauro Bussani &
Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Liability Regimes of Europe – Their Façades and
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That may be so under a specific casting of the mixed
jurisdiction category, principally understood as one combining
civilian and common law traditions. In that sense, Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kötz argued that “Scots law deserves particular
attention from comparative lawyers as a special instance of the
symbiosis of the English and Continental legal traditions.” 4 That
may be understood within what has been said to be “characteristic
of mixed jurisdictions,” namely “to retain private civil law within a
surrounding system of Anglo-American public law.” 5 T.B. Smith
described the mixed jurisdiction as “basically a civilian system that
had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law
and has in part been overlaid by that rival system of
jurisprudence.” 6 Similarly, Niall Whitty described it as usually
meaning “a civilian system overlaid by the common law.” 7
Whilst this civilian and common law dichotomy would
inevitably place Scotland in a “mixed” category, it represents just
one perspective on the concept of “mixture”. If we reconsider what
it is that constitutes mixture, in particular by forcing the definition
open beyond a simple civilian and common law antithesis, might
we change our view of the extent to which Scotland is a mixed
jurisdiction, or whether it is a special case among jurisdictions in
being “mixed”?
The question becomes one of what, exactly, is being mixed? As
Esin Örücü has pointed out, not all mixed systems would be

Interiors in PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE 143 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon
Valentine Palmer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
4. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 204 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
5. BUSSANI AND PALMER, supra note 3, at 143.
6. T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed
Jurisdictions” in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 2-3 (A.N. Yiannopoulos
ed., Louisiana State Univ. Press 1965).
7. Niall R. Whitty, The Civilian Tradition and Debates on Scots Law,
TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG 227, 232 (1996).
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mixtures of the same ingredients. 8 This fact has not gone unnoticed
in the literature. Vernon Palmer proposed three principal
characteristics by which mixed jurisdictions might be identified.
First, they should be “built upon dual foundations of common-law
and civil-law materials,” and even although other systems “present
diverse mixes,” including traditions of religious law, indigenous
custom and so on, “common law and civil law [should] constitute
the basic building blocks of the legal edifice.” 9 Second, the
presence of these dual elements should be “obvious to an ordinary
observer.” 10 Third, there is a structural allocation of content: “the
civil law will be cordoned off within the field of private law, thus
creating the distinction between private continental law and public
Anglo-American law.” 11 Notwithstanding Palmer's definition,
which marks off the “mixed jurisdiction” from jurisdictions with
traditions otherwise mixed, the basic analytical framework still
draws on a civilian and common law dichotomy. 12
In Scotland, it is well documented that there is a mixture of
civilian and common law traditions. 13 However, if one were able to
reach into the legal system and remove the civilian and common
law components, would all of its content have been extracted? The
answer to that must be firmly negative. If one is receptive to the
footprint or legacy of other legal traditions in Scots law, they will
find them. Those other traditions, too, are part of the mixture; one
8. See Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or
Expansion?, 12 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2008).
9. PALMER, supra note 3, at 7-8.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. Palmer has acknowledged the limitations of a straight civilian and
common law dichotomy. He also outlined the difference in approach between
scholars studying mixture within the civilian and common law framework—
whom he described as “scholars in the classic mixed jurisdiction tradition,” and
those of a more liberal persuasion who may be regarded as legal pluralists. See
Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems – The Origin of the Species, 28
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 103 (2013).
13. See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal
Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 228
(1998); W.D.H. Sellar, Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of
Two Receptions, 4(1) EDIN. L. REV. 3 (2000); and Whitty, supra note 7.
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which is in Scotland revealed as much more diverse than the initial
hybrid of civilian and common law traditions may have suggested.
Moreover, even if those comprise the two principal traditions in
Scots law, it will be asked whether a quantitative approach is
appropriate.
This article considers the mixed quality of Scots law and the
Scottish legal tradition in four contexts, each of which is intended
to point to a deeper and fuller concept of mixture in the mixed
jurisdiction analysis.
The first is an historical perspective: if the civilian and
common law traditions are not the only traditions which have left a
legacy in the Scottish legal order, what others might be identified?
This section gives a brief and non-exhaustive outline of other
traditions which have featured in the evolving Scottish legal
tradition, namely Scottish common law, feudal law, canon law,
udal law, Celtic law, the Bible, and foreign maritime law.
Second, the argument is made that an “updated” view of mixed
jurisdiction must take account of the extent to which two major
streams of law have permeated Scots law in more modern times —
those of the European Union (EU) and the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). These cannot be excluded from the
analysis, and whilst they may constitute part of the mixture in any
jurisdiction to which they relate, that fact alone necessarily
distinguishes those jurisdictions from the majority of the world's
jurisdictions where neither EU law nor ECHR law is applicable.
Moreover, the particular character and structural features of EU
and ECHR law are such that they do not receive monolithic,
uniform application in each jurisdiction. They gain the colouring of
local institutional and normative features which vary among
jurisdictions.
The third aspect discussed is one of methodology: an holistic
approach is required for the question of mixed jurisdiction. It
should be asked whether a quantitative, or some other, framework
of analysis is preferred for evaluating whether and to what extent
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individual constituent traditions should feature in the discussion.
Consideration should be given to how one accounts for temporal
dimensions, how one addresses the question of legacy, and the
extent to which legal traditions are indiscrete or “impure”. This
section will reflect on these issues.
Fourth, it is suggested that the extent to which private law
analysis has dominated mixed jurisdiction scholarship has the
potential to misrepresent, or only partially represent, the nature of
the law and legal system in general. In particular, the discussion
may be said to take insufficient account of public law, criminal law
and other areas which lie beyond the field of private law. The risk
arises that jurisdictions are in general classified according to
definitions and analyses conducted along private law fault lines.
The suggested outcome is that, if and until other areas of law are
properly accounted for, it may be appropriate for the private law
literature to explicitly confine itself to private law, and be cautious
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal
system in general terms.
The view taken by this article is very much a general one
which aims to address Scots law and the Scottish legal system at
their widest extent. That position is purposely taken, both as a
response to the tendency of the mixed jurisdiction literature to
focus on a private law analysis, 14 and because there appears little
reason in principle to begin with a magnified view of any one
substantive area of law (such as private law) and to recede from
that point to a more general analysis. An alternative approach may
have been to move from the principal focus of the literature—
private law—out to a more general analysis, however that would
reinforce the notion that private law is the natural starting point for
the discussion, and the article seeks to contest that idea; at least
until (should one be forthcoming) a convincing explanation is
given as to why private law should be the main focus of an holistic
14.

See infra section IV.
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mixed jurisdiction discussion which can faithfully be said to
address the general law and legal system at large. The article
therefore raises a series of questions which it is hoped will feed
into a discussion on the proper parameters and methodology of the
mixed jurisdiction commentary.
By final word of introduction, this article is concerned with
“sources” in the sense of the pedigree of law—that is to say,
streams or currents of legal tradition. It does not discuss “sources”
in the sense of resources of law, such as legislation and the
common law, although these are often the media through which
legal traditions are conveyed.
II. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: HISTORICAL
In line with the principal orientation of the mixed jurisdiction
literature on a civilian and common law axis, the contemporary
debate on the mixed character of Scots law has primarily been
conducted on the same axis.
Even if the civilian and common law elements were the main
contributors to Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition as now
understood, it is perhaps surprising that such little attention has
been given to other contributing traditions in the context of a
mixed jurisdiction analysis. The accent on civilian and common
law elements is subject to a range of possible criticisms: it is too
simplistic an analysis; it is reductionist; it suggests that these are
pure and discrete traditions; it is a Eurocentric analysis (and
therefore ill-suited for application in a global comparative law
context); 15 and so on. The reductionist criticism is particularly
instructive because it points to the fact that in measuring a system
with a civilian and common law yardstick, the legacy of other
traditions is essentially left out of the discussion. That legacy may
manifest directly in the Scottish legal tradition, or even indirectly
15. Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South
East Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 49 (2002).
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through another tradition—including through the civilian and
common law traditions.
This section outlines some of the other traditions which jostle
for recognition of their own respective places within the Scottish
legal tradition. Rather than attempting to restate the effect of the
civilian and common law traditions in Scotland, the opportunity
will instead be taken to give an overview of traditions with a less
remarked footprint. The traditions identified are not exhaustive—
this is a necessarily brief overview, but should give a taste of the
plurality and variety of those traditions.
A. Scottish Common Law
When the “common law” is discussed in the Scottish context,
reference is typically made either to the common law tradition
deriving from England, or common law as a non-statutory resource
of law.
There is recognised to have been, however, a Scottish
“common law” in the sense of a more indigenous common law
tradition inherited in the mediaeval period. This likely comprised
significant elements derived from the English common law
tradition, but with Scottish usages, additions and innovations. This
would precede the main period of civil law reception in Scotland,
as well as the main period of common law reception.
The common law of Scotland 16 was a feature of the historical
circumstances of the kingdom, and whilst it would include aspects
of other legal traditions—such as English common law, mediaeval
Roman law and canon law influences—there is also recognised to
have been a body of “native Scottish customs,” the first known
reference to that “common law” being in a royal brieve from

16. Noting that the approximate geopolitical territory of Scotland as now
understood took shape from around the 9th to the 13th centuries. See also infra
note 90.
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1264. 17 This law was “common” in the sense that it derived from
customs common to the various peoples who together made up the
people of the Scottish kingdom. 18 The mediaeval Parliament of
Scotland not only enacted programmatic statutes, with their
connotations of positivity, but also expressed the accumulated
customs—the “common law”—of the realm. 19
Custom should be understood as an important source (or
expression) of “law” in earlier periods in Scotland; indeed, as it
was elsewhere in Europe. David Ibbetson identified three senses in
which the term “custom” (consuetudo) can be understood in the
context of mediaeval Europe. First, it refers in its least technical
sense to the way in which a social group orders its affairs; the way
in which things are done. Second, custom is distinguishable from
lex: whilst lex is written law (ius scriptum), custom is unwritten
(ius non scriptum). They are, however, complementary, in the
sense that lex can record customs, clarify them or recognize them
as authentic or authoritative. Third, custom is distinguished from
lex, but rather than being understood as complementary, lex
prevails: it conditions custom. 20
The importance of custom in the specifically Scottish context
comes through in several senses.
First, the kingdom was not socially or demographically
cohesive, at least to the extent that it would become: custom was
therefore about drawing out “the way things were done” from a
variety of social groups. Second, jurisdiction was scattered through
a broad array of courts, officials and other bodies. Their
jurisdiction was sometimes overlapping or even competing, and
they were not united in a defined jurisdictional hierarchy: practices
17. A.M. GODFREY, CIVIL JUSTICE IN RENAISSANCE SCOTLAND: THE
ORIGINS OF A CENTRAL COURT 18 (Brill 2009).
18. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22,
para. 359, Butterworths LexisNexis.
19. See GODFREY, supra note 17, at 18.
20. David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law in THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW 153-155 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard
Murphy eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
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and usages common to these fora could therefore be regarded as
customs in a broader sense. Third is the related fact that there was
no centralised, characteristically judicial forum until the
establishment of the Court of Session (or College of Justice) in
1532: until then, no single judicial institution had the capacity and
jurisdiction to regularize the application and implementation of law
throughout the kingdom. Underlying patterns or commonalities
therefore pointed to customs in the realm. Fourth, Parliament was
not purely a legislative body as now understood. Not only did it
perform an additional, adjudicative function, its statutes were not
always programmatic in nature. Instead, they often promulgated
and gave regularised form to existing customs. Finally, the
resources of law were not widely recorded in writing. The “way
things were done” would therefore embody a bottom-up,
constitutive approach to custom, rather than a top-down,
prescriptive approach expressed in legal writings.
The common law of Scotland was not confined to substantive
content, but necessarily entailed more structural aspects, especially
in the context of the emergence of a general framework or system
of jurisdiction across the kingdom. Mark Godfrey has written
extensively on this subject in the context of the emergence of the
Court of Session as a supreme civil court in Scotland in the 16th
century. 21 The ultimate normative authority of the monarch was
essentially the unifying factor in an array of jurisdictions, exercised
by a multitude of persons, officials and bodies, the jurisdictions of
which were, as noted, sometimes overlapping or even competing.
The common law would in this context emerge through common
practices or applications of law, or the manner in which remedies
were awarded. The various jurisdictions hung together under a
general governing role exercised by the King in Council and
Parliament, but the mediaeval common law context facilitated the
systematization of the legal order and its movement toward an
21.

See generally GODFREY, supra note 17.
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overall structure, both in terms of jurisdictional hierarchy and
structural coherence. 22 Hector MacQueen has powerfully argued
that the pleadable brieves of right, mortancestry and novel
dissasine occupied a central place in the development of a Scottish
common law, and that they were in use in Scotland (modelled on
English equivalents) from prior to 1300 until the 15th century or
later. 23
The main, early repository of the Scottish common law was the
Regiam Majestatem. Whilst based on the English text De legibus et
consuetudinibus regni Angliae attributed to Ranulf de Glanvill
(itself an expression of English common law), Regiam Majestatem
also incorporated materials from the Romano-Canonical tradition
and other early resources, 24 in addition to containing a significant
body of feudal material. 25 The date of origin of the text (or texts) is
disputed, though it may have been compiled in the early 14th
century, or even have been older in nature. 26 It is regarded as the
most important statement of Scots law in that period, though it is
supplemented by other texts including Quoniam Attachiamenta,
and the older, 13th century, Leges Quatuor Burgorum. Regiam
Majestatem has itself been referred to in a few cases from the 20th
and 21st centuries. It has, for example, been cited with reference to
guardianship, 27 testamentary succession, 28 reparation, 29 the

22.
23.

GODFREY, supra note 17, at 269.
See generally HECTOR L. MACQUEEN, COMMON LAW AND FEUDAL
SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCOTLAND (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1993).
24. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22,
para. 360, Butterworths LexisNexis.
25. Id. at paras. 366 and 551.
26. Id. at para. 360.
27. Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate, 1996 S.C. 301 at 323, per
Lord Clyde.
28. Clark's Executor v Clark, 1943 S.C. 216 at 223, per Lord Justice-Clerk
Cooper.
29. McKendrick v Sinclair, 1972 S.C. (H.L.) 25 at 56, per Lord Simon of
Glaisdale.
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criminal liability of married persons, 30 and the criminal offence of
rape. 31
B. Feudal Law
As noted, Regiam Majestatem contained a significant body of
feudal material, indicating the presence or legacy of feudalism in
this earlier period in Scotland. Whilst it is unclear when feudalism
arrived in Scotland, it may have been as early as the end of the
11th century, 32 though it has also been attributed to the reign of
King David I of Scotland, which spanned 1124-1153. 33 The idea
was that all land belonged to the Crown, and was “feued” out to
vassals, often capable of further “subfeuing”. This was in return for
services—originally of “men at arms” and produce, or of
commodities, and then for monetary payments called feu duties. 34
From the reign of David I onward, the reach of feudalism was
gradually extended in Scotland with the effect of strengthening
royal control over the territory. 35 Although there continued to exist
pre-feudal estates and lordships, and the campaign of
“feudalization” may have had less impact on lower levels of
society in the 12th and 13th centuries, 36 feudal charters could grant
rights of jurisdiction, particularly manifesting in regality and
barony courts (so-called “franchise courts”). 37 Although franchise
30. Miln v Stirton, 1982 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 11 at 11.
31. Lord Advocate's Reference No. 1 of 2001, 2002 S.L.T. 466 at para. 22,
per Lord McCluskey.
32. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA,
Conveyancing Reissue, Butterworths LexisNexis, para. 5.
33. Hector L. MacQueen, Tears of a Legal Historian, JUR. REV. 1, 4-7
(2003).
34. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA,
Conveyancing Reissue, para. 5.
35. MacQueen, supra note 33, at 5-7.
36. See id. at 14-17.
37. See, for example, THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal Procedure Second Reissue, paras. 20-22. Heritable
jurisdiction was substantially abolished by the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland)
Act 1746. On charter grants in a Scottish common law context, see, for example,
John Hudson, Legal Aspects of Scottish Charter Diplomatic in the Twelfth
Century: A Comparative Approach, 25 ANGLO-NORMAN STUD. 121 (2002).
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jurisdiction was regarded as being distinct from the grant of land
itself, with the jurisdiction being heritable, 38 feudalism clearly had
important consequences for the manner in which the law and legal
system 39 were organised.
The system of feudal tenure was not abolished until November
28, 2004. 40 Whilst the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland)
Act 2000 proclaimed that the “feudal system of land tenure, that is
to say the entire system whereby land is held by a vassal on
perpetual tenure from a superior is, on the appointed day,
abolished,” 41 this was in fact the end stage in a series of
abolitionary steps stretching back over several centuries. 42 In the
wake of feudal tenure came fresh legislation relating to title
conditions and tenemental properties, 43 dealing with specific
proprietorial issues which would arise on the abolition of feudal
tenure.
Kenneth Reid has described the legacy of feudal tenure in
Scotland as “less than might be supposed,” noting that the
abolition of feudal tenure brings “the most substantial reception of
Roman law in Scotland since the seventeenth century.” One
exception to this is the legacy of the affirmative real burden, 44 a
form of condition on the development of land, which Reid
described as “a permanent legacy of the feudal era.” 45

38. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal
Procedure Second Reissue, para. 20, Butterworths LexisNexis.
39. To the extent that it is legitimate to (i) speak of a single “system”, and
not of a mosaic of “systems”, at that time; and (ii) invoke the connotations of
uniformity and regularity associated with a “system”.
40. The date on which the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act
2000 took effect.
41. Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, s.1.
42. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 18,
para. 113, Butterworths LexisNexis.
43. Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003; Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004.
44. Kenneth G.C. Reid, Vassals No More: Feudalism and Post-Feudalism
in Scotland, EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 282, 300 (2003).
45. Id.
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C. Canon Law
Canon law has left a significant legacy on Scots law and the
Scottish legal system. Papal jurisdiction was exercised with regard
to disputes in Scotland from at least as early as 1170. 46 The Court
of Session (or College of Justice), established in 1532 as the
country's first (and surviving) central and characteristically judicial
institution, comprised a bench split equally between spiritual and
temporal appointees; 47 those in the former category being canon
lawyers. It was a rule, until 1579, that the President of the College
of Justice should be a prelate. 48 This distinction between spiritual
and temporal appointees survived until 1640. 49
Canon lawyers were also active among the practitioner cohort.
Some of these were particularly experienced, 50 and John Cairns
noted that by 1590 there had developed in Edinburgh a
professionalised central civil court patronized by an organised
legal profession “largely trained in the Roman and canon laws.” 51
A number of intrants to the Court had read both the canon and civil
laws predominantly at continental European universities, 52 though
it appears that canon law was in fact taught prior to civil law at the
University of St. Andrews. 53

46. See R.S. MYLNE, THE CANON LAW 9-10 (Morrison & Gibb 1912).
47. ROBERT KERR HANNAY, THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE 109 (William
Hodge 1933); and see also the College of Justice Act 1532.
48. HANNAY, supra note 47, at 107-109.
49. John W. Cairns, Historical Introduction to 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LAW IN SCOTLAND 86 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2003).
50. See, for example, JOHN FINLAY, MEN OF LAW IN PRE-REFORMATION
SCOTLAND 87 (Tuckwell Press 2000).
51. John W. Cairns, Academic Feud, Bloodfeud, and William Welwood:
Legal Education in St. Andrews, 1560-1611, 2 EDIN. L. REV. 158, 160 (1998).
52. HANNAY, supra note 47, at 146-147; John W. Cairns, Importing our
Lawyers from Holland: Netherlands Influences on Scots Law and Lawyers in the
Eighteenth Century in SCOTLAND AND THE LOW COUNTRIES: 1124-1994, 141142 (Grant G. Simpson ed., Tuckwell Press 1996).
53. William M. Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland in THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION IN SCOTLAND 19-20 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., Stair Society 1995).
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Cairns also noted that canon lawyers were assisting litigants in
secular disputes. 54 Indeed, canon law commanded persuasive
authority in the secular courts, 55 and canonical materials were
being cited in secular litigation as early as 1380. 56 Even though
canon law was regarded as the “fouler source” or “dunghill” in
some circles, 57 the institutional writer Sir Thomas Craig wrote that
whenever a conflict arose between canon and Roman law, the
former was preferred. 58
It has been said that the Scots law of marriage and testamentary
succession were based on canon law, 59 and that its influence on the
law of obligations was “positive and direct”. 60 The canonical
tradition is also thought to have significantly influenced civil
procedure in Scotland, 61 perhaps influenced by the practice and
procedure of the Sacra Rota Romana. 62 In sum, Lord Cooper wrote
of “the extent to which . . . Canonist traditions permeated the
thinking of Scottish lawyers,” and noted that the “immense debt
which Scots Law owes to Canon Law and Practice has never been
sufficiently acknowledged.” 63 The canonical tradition has also

54.
55.
56.
57.

Cairns, supra note 49, at 31, 46 and 69-70.
Gordon, supra note 53, at 23.
Cairns, supra note 49, at 45.
See David B. Smith, Canon Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF THE
SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF SCOTS LAW 188 (Stair Society 1936).
58. Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act, I, 18, 17.
59. J.J. Robertson, Canon Law as a Source in STAIR TERCENTENARY
STUDIES 113 (David M. Walker ed., Stair Society 1981).
60. W. David H. Sellar, Promise in 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN
SCOTLAND 266 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2004).
61. See Cairns, supra note 49, at 63-64; Gordon, supra note 53, at 19-22;
and J.J. Robertson, The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence with Particular
Reference to Scotland in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW 117-133
(David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Duncker & Humblot
1997).
62. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 121-125.
63. LORD COOPER, SELECT SCOTTISH CASES OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
xxii (William Hodge 1944).
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been described as “powerfully operative”, 64 “longlasting[, and] . . .
profound” 65 in the Scottish legal system.
D. Udal Law
Norse settlers arrived on Orkney and Shetland, two
archipelagos off the north east coast of the Scottish mainland,
around 800. Under their rule, the islands were subject to Norse
law, or “udal law”.
“Udal” derives etymologically from the Old Norse “ođal”,
meaning “ownership of inherited family property in which certain
rights belong to the kin.” 66 The term “udal law” is used in two
senses: narrowly, by reference to the specific regime of land
ownership from which it etymologically derives (sometimes
referred to as udal tenure); and more broadly, by reference to
Norse law as generally applied in Orkney and Shetland. 67
Udal law was maintained in Orkney and Shetland upon their
transfer to Scotland in the mid-15th century. As part of the
marriage arrangements of King James III of Scotland and
Margaret, daughter of King Christian I of Denmark, the latter
pledged the archipelagos in 1468 and 1469 respectively in lieu of a
dowry. Even although Scottish customs and culture had growing
influence on the islands, a parliamentary commission was of the
view in 1567 that they should be subject to their own laws. 68 The
contrary view was expressed by the Privy Council in 1611, which

64.
65.

HANNAY, supra note 47, at xiv and 107.
W. David H. Sellar, A Historical Perspective in THE SCOTTISH LEGAL
TRADITION 41 (New enlarged edition, Michael C. Meston, W. David H. Sellar &
Lord Cooper eds., Alden Press 1991).
66. Michael Jones, Udal Law and Contested Histories of Land Tenure and
Landscape in Orkney and Shetland, 66(3) LATVIJAS ZINATNU AKADEMIJAS
VESTIS 105, 109-110 (2012).
67. William Jardine Dobie, Udal Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY,
supra note 57, at 450; JONES, id. at 110.
68. T. THOMSON & C. INNES (EDS.), 3 ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF
SCOTLAND 41 (12 vols, 1814–1875).
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held that “foreign laws” were no further to be used in Orkney and
Shetland. 69
One of the characteristic features of udal tenure was the
allodial nature of land ownership, that is to say, its ownership by
the “udaller” or “odalsman” without service being owed to a
superior. This stood in contrast to the feudal system which was
widespread in Scotland. The udaller was, however, under strong
familial obligations with regard to disposition of land.
In addition to the udal or “odal”, which was the hereditary
estate itself, there were also common lands which belonged to the
community and were used for pasture, water and so on. These
appear to have been known as “commons” in Orkney and as
“scattold” or “scattald” in Shetland. 70 “Scat”, (from the Norse
“skattr”, meaning “tax” or “tribute”) was paid annually for the udal
lands in the form of butter, fish, oil and coarse cloth. 71 Land could
also be let by the udaller to a stranger for a payment of rent called
a “leigu-burdr”. 72
Although udal tenure is an outstanding feature of the Orcadian
and Shetlandic legal traditions, it did not exist to the complete
exclusion of feudalism. 73 In fact, feudalism came to increasingly
displace udal tenure, such as with the Crown's feuing of the islands
and inducing udallers to receive charters for the sake of having
written title 74—udal land titles were held rather by proof of
possession. Other aspects of udal law and custom were displaced,
such as the more feudalistic practice of primogeniture coming to
supersede partition as the udal mode of succession. 75

69. J.H. BURTON ET AL. (EDS.), 9 REGISTER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF
SCOTLAND 181-182 (38 vols., 1877–1970).
70. See W.P. DREVER, UDAL LAW IN THE ORKNEYS AND ZETLAND 11 (W.
Green 1914).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 1.
74. See id. at 4-6.
75. Id. at 7.
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Other characteristics of the udal legal tradition included rules
on prescription, 76 the mode in which proprietorial ownership was
passed, 77 a system of land measures (such as ouncelands and
pennylands) 78 and of weights and measures (such as pundlars,
lispunds and cuttels), 79 and the existence of a superior court called
the “law-thing” (under the presidency of a “law-man”), with the
decrees of island courts subject to review in Norway. 80
Much of this system of law has since departed, and the courts
have ruled against its application in a handful of cases. In 1890, for
example, the Court of Session denied that an udal custom, whereby
proprietors in Shetland could demand a share of the value of
whales stranded and killed on their land, had “the force of law.” 81
In an action brought by the Lord Advocate against the
University of Aberdeen, with regard to ownership of Pictish
antiquities excavated on St. Ninian's Isle, Shetland, the Court of
Session held that “the law or rule of Magnus was not still the law
of Scotland in the islands of Shetland.” 82 This referred to a code
attributed to King Magnus VI of Norway which was introduced
around 1274, which would (it was alleged) be determinative of
ownership; but it was not the sum of udal law. Of the state of udal
law in general, Lord Patrick said that “the position was long ago
reached where nothing could be said with certainty to remain of
that law save udal tenure of land, scat, which was the return for
udal lands, scattold, which was a right of commonty, and a few
weights and measures.” 83

76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 8-10.
78. Or perhaps “systems” in the plural, as some measures had different
values between the archipelagos, and it appears that land in Orkney was
subdivided into much smaller units such as merks, uriscops and yowsworths—
see id. at 14-15.
79. Or perhaps, again, “systems” in the plural.
80. See Dobie, supra note 67, at 451-455.
81. Bruce v Smith (1890) 17 R. 1000.
82. Lord Advocate v University of Aberdeen, 1963 S.C. 533.
83. Id. at 556, per Lord Patrick.
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In a case in which questions arose as to the legal status of the
seabed within the territorial waters around Shetland, the Court of
Session declined to find in favour of the applicability of udal law
to the seabed. 84 Although it was argued that in Norway the seabed
was subject to udal law in the same way as the foreshore, it was
held that there was no (domestic) authority supporting that
contention in Shetland. Udal law did not expressly deal with
ownership of the seabed. In addition, as udal land titles were
determined by proof of possession, rather than by writing, it
seemed contrary to principle to expect that udal tenure should
govern the seabed, which was permanently covered by sea water. 85
Whilst much of udal law has perished, udal tenure survives,
being recognised both in statute 86 and case law. 87 Furthermore, the
udal legal tradition may be said more generally to have resulted in
some local differences as to the application or applicability of law.
For example, there was judicial confirmation in 1907 that the
feudal law on salmon fishing rights did not apply in Orkney. 88
There may also be implications arising from udal tenure for rights
relating to the foreshore, cables, pipelines and fishing.
Udal law comprised an additional legal tradition which was
influential at least in one part of Scotland, and which does not fall
84. Shetland Salmon Farmer Association v Crown Estate Commissioners,
1991 S.L.T. 166.
85. Id. at 183, per Lord McCluskey.
86. Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, ss.2(1)(a)(v) and 3(3)(b);
Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, sch. 12, para. 39(2)(b);
Housing Benefit Regulations 2006/213, art. 2(1); Housing Benefit (Persons who
have attained the qualifying age for state pension credit) Regulations 2006/214,
art. 2(1); Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s.50(5). It is stated in the
explanatory notes to the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, at
para. 183, that “Skat is a tribute under udal tenure which equates to feuduty
under feudal tenure. In the case of skat, however, this would normally be
payable directly to the Crown. Payment of skat has survived only on Orkney and
Shetland”.
87. See, for example, Short's Trustee v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland,
1994 S.C. 122 at 128; Kaur v Singh, 1999 S.C. 180 at 187, 188 and 191; Yaxley
v Glen, 2007 Hous.L.R. 59 at 64; and Trustees of the Elliot of Harwood Trust v
Feakins, 2013 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 108 at 116. See also Lerwick Harbour Trustees v
Moar, 1951 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 46 at 48.
88. Lord Advocate v Balfour, 1907 S.C. 1360.
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within the civilian/common law framework. In addition, it had to
be conciliated with the law prevailing on the Scottish mainland,
and this engaged both the law and institutions of the Scottish
mainland.
E. Celtic Law
The content and extent of Celtic law observed in Scotland is
obscured by a lack of documentary evidence. Among the few
surviving documents are Adomnán's Law, from 697, which sets
out laws on armed conflict for the protection of women and noncombatants; 89 and the Book of Deer, which in addition to mainly
Christian texts, contains some records of grants of land.
Notwithstanding the paucity of surviving written material, David
Sellar has made a significant contribution to this otherwise littleremarked pasture of Scottish legal history.
Celtic law is understood as the law pertaining to communities
speaking a Celtic language, rather than any specific ethnic group as
such. Accordingly, Sellar noted that, of the four main peoples who
inhabited Scotland—namely the Scots, Picts, Britons and AngloSaxons 90—only two, the Scots and the Britons, were Celtic
peoples, and a third, the Picts, may have been to some extent. 91
Sellar has argued that “the story of Celtic law in Scotland did
not come to an abrupt end with the advent of feudalism.” 92 He
illustrated a number of instances in which Celtic legal tradition
appears to have made its way into the common or general law of
89. W.D.H. Sellar, Law and Institutions: Gaelic in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO SCOTTISH HISTORY (Electronic version, Michael Lynch ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
90. The Scots, of Dál Riata, were predominantly found in the western
coastal areas of Scotland. The Picts were mainly to the north of the River Forth
and in the east of Scotland. The Britons were found in Strathclyde and the
southwest of Scotland. The Anglo-Saxons were found in Northumbria,
straddling the area to the southeast of the River Forth and part of what is now
the northeast of England.
91. Sellar, supra note 89.
92. W.D.H. Sellar, Celtic Law and Scots Law: Survival and Integration, 29
SCOTTISH STUD. 1, 20 (1989).
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Scotland. For example, whenever the old regality and barony
courts were repledging their jurisdiction over inhabitants from
within their geographical jurisdiction whom had been accused
before other courts, there was a requirement for a person to act in
the capacity of a cautioner—in essence, a guarantor—called a
“culrath” (or variant spellings thereof). Sellar explained that this
represented a technical term of Celtic law, deriving from “cúl”
meaning “back”, and “ráth” a “pledge” or “surety”, the etymology
of the term providing a good explanation of its function in law.93
He cited a number of cases from the 16th century in which this
“culrath” was found, and an unsuccessful attempt at repledging as
late as 1700. 94
Another instance of Celtic legal tradition was that of tanistry,
namely, “[l]oosely defined . . . the name given to the system
whereby succession to office, typically the office of king or
chieftain, is open to various members, or to different segments, of
a ruling kindred, rather than descending by primogeniture down
the one line, as under feudal law.” 95 Sellar cited instances of
tanistry in Scotland from the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, 96 and
stated that it was a “long lasting legal concept” which was
“capable of being harmonized with others from a quite different
background,” including the tutor in both feudal and Roman law. 97
Sellar gave a number of other illustrations, arguing that “[s]uch
survivals are to be seen not as isolated curiosities, of antiquarian
interest only, but as part of the very fabric of a legal system one of
the outstanding features of which has been continuity with the
past.” 98 These suggest that Celtic law is another part of the mixture
within the Scottish legal tradition.
93. See id. at 15-16.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 20. See also W.D.H. Sellar, Marriage, Divorce and Concubinage
in Gaelic Scotland, 51 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GAELIC SOCIETY OF INVERNESS
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F. The Bible
The law of Scotland included part of the Bible. The most
notable example was the Incest Act 1567, which prohibited incest
by consanguinity and affinity with the degrees of relation “as is
contenit in the xviij Cheptour of Leuiticus.” That is to say, the 18th
chapter of Leviticus was directly incorporated as part of the Scots
law of incest. What is all the more remarkable is that this state of
affairs persisted until the repeal of the 1567 Act by the Incest and
Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986.
It is not the only example of reliance on Biblical sources in
Scots law. Sodomy and bestiality were punishable by death as
criminal offences, not due to criminalising legislation, but because
according to the Bible they constituted sins. 99 More recently, the
view was taken in a case from 1963 that two verses of the Book of
Exodus may have been made part of the law of Scotland by a
previous case with regard to liability for animals. 100 In addition to
these specific examples of reliance on the Bible, it has been argued
that Christian theological doctrine, and Calvinist Presbyterianism
in particular, significantly influenced Scots criminal law and its
particular brand of moralism. 101
G. Foreign Maritime Law
The High Court of Admiralty was one Scotland's central
courts, in existence until its jurisdiction was transferred to the
Court of Session by statute in 1830. 102 It commanded jurisdiction

464 (1978-1980), on evidence of Celtic secular marriage in Scotland until the
17th century.
99. Chloe Kennedy, Criminal Law and Religion in Post-Reformation
Scotland, 16(2) EDIN. L. REV. 178, 183 (2012).
100. Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Limited, 1963 S.C. 245 at 249, per
Lord Hunter; with reference to Milligan v Henderson, 1915 S.C. 1030.
101. See generally Kennedy, supra note 99.
102. Court of Session Act 1830, s.21.
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over prize, 103 maritime and admiralty affairs, both civil and
criminal.
It was stated by Thomas Callander Wade that the law
administered by the High Court of Admiralty was “the customary
law of the sea, and not necessarily the ordinary law of the land . . .
a sort of general law of the sea based on the jus gentium and
customs of seafaring men.” 104 These were formally expressed in
various codes, the most authoritative of which was said to have
been the 13th century105 Rôles d'Oléron, (of which there were
Scots translations 106) which had application throughout
Northwestern Europe. Edda Frankot argued that one can “assume
that the Rôles d'Oléron were part of the central body of medieval
Scottish law,” 107 and that although there is “no specific evidence
that the Rôles were adopted as the official Scottish sea law... that
the extant copies are all part of compilations of the main Scottish
laws does suggest that they were in common use throughout the
country.” 108 Wade also stated that the Lex Rhodia (used primarily
in the Mediterranean), incorporated in the Digest of Justinian, (and
therefore in “Roman law”), was “if not … authoritative, at least …
a useful guide.” 109 There may also have been knowledge in
Scotland of the Gotland or Wisby Sea Law, 110 primarily used in
the Baltic.

103.
104.

Prize jurisdiction is that over enemy property seized or captured at sea.
THOMAS CALLANDER WADE (ed.), ACTA CURIAE ADMIRALLATUS
SCOTIAE xix (Stair Society 1937).
105. See EDDA FRANKOT, “OF LAWS OF SHIPS AND SHIPMEN”: MEDIEVAL
MARITIME LAW AND ITS PRACTICE IN URBAN NORTHERN EUROPE 11 (Edinburgh
Univ. Press 2012).
106. Edda Frankot, Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby:
Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea in COMMUNITIES IN EUROPEAN HISTORY:
REPRESENTATIONS, JURISDICTIONS, CONFLICTS 164 (Juan Pan-Montojo &
Frederik Pedersen eds., Pisa Univ. Press 2007). See also FRANKOT, supra note
105, at 81-85.
107. Frankot, supra note 106, at 164.
108. FRANKOT, supra note 105, at 13.
109. WADE, supra note 104, at xix.
110. Frankot, supra note 106, at 164; though see FRANKOT, supra note 105,
at 88.
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The sources of maritime and admiralty law in Scotland were
considered by some of the institutional writers. Viscount Stair
noted that “the rule by which the Lords have always proceeded in
the matter of prizes hath been the law and custom of nations,” and
that “the Lords . . . do not exclude the defence of strangers . . .
though that be a rule by our custom, but do proceed according to
the common law of nations.” 111 George Joseph Bell stated that
Scots maritime law “partakes more of the character of international
law than any other branch of jurisprudence,” noting that “in all the
discussions on this subject in our Courts, the continental
collections and treaties on this subject, and the English books of
reports, have been received as authority by our Judges, where not
unfitted for our adoption by any peculiarity which our practice
does not recognize.” 112 He listed, by order of authority in that
regard: first, foreign maritime codes and laws (the Rhodian laws, Il
Consolato del Mare, the laws of Oléron and Wisby, the Ordinances
of the Hanseatic Towns, Le Guidon de la Mer, the Ordonnance de
la Marine, and the Code de Commerce); second, the decisions of
foreign maritime and mercantile courts (in particular the High
Court of Admiralty in England, the mercantile court of Genoa, the
supreme civil courts of Friesland, and the courts of Holland); and
third, the works of foreign writers in maritime law. 113
These suggest a broad array of non-Scottish sources in use in
maritime and admiralty causes in the Scottish courts, which do not
appear to align with a simple civilian/common law dichotomy.

111. STAIR, INSTITUTIONS, II, 2, 6; with the “Lords” (i.e. the Court of
Session) nevertheless observing treaties between the King and his allies, “in so
far as they differ from the common law of nations”.
112. GEORGE JOSEPH BELL, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND
AND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MERCANTILE JURISPRUDENCE 497-498 (5th ed.,
William Blackwood 1826).
113. Id. at 498-502. Several foreign sources are cited by A.R.G. McMillan,
Admiralty and Maritime Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra note 57, at
325.
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III. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: MODERN
There is another dimension to the concept of a mixed legal
system which has not gone unacknowledged in the literature, 114 but
which should be emphasised as potentially further disturbing a
simple civilian and common law dichotomy. That is the extent to
which two modern streams of law or legal tradition have
permeated the Scottish legal order: the law of the European Union
(EU) and the law on the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). Other “external” streams of law may be making their way
into Scots law, such as aspects of modern international law, but the
EU and ECHR dimensions have arguably had a particularly
extensive impact on domestic Scots law, and for that reason those
two streams of law will be selected for comment.
A. European Union Law
Scotland, along with the other UK jurisdictions, became
subject to the law of the European Communities upon the coming
into effect of the European Communities Act 1972. The norms,
processes and institutions of the European Communities were
gradually developed to the far-reaching extent of the European
Union of the present day. Through directives, regulations and other
legal instruments, much EU-generated law has filtered into and
shaped domestic law in Scotland, as it has elsewhere in the EU.
Moreover, the European Court of Justice serves as the highest
court in matters of EU law, its decisions serving both an
interpretive and adjudicative function with the potential to have
far-reaching consequences for domestic law.

114. See, for example, Örücü, supra note 8, at at 10, 12 and 14; and Chris
Himsworth, Scotland: The Constitutional Protection of a Mixed Legal System in
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS – PERSPECTIVES OF
EVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF
SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 120 (Jorge Costa Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds.,
Springer 2009).
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The substantive reach of EU law is wide, including such
diverse fields as education, employment, health and safety,
consumer protection, financial regulation, companies, competition,
intellectual property and data protection. It has also established
extensive frameworks relating to the free movement of persons,
goods, capital and services, which have implications across several
areas of law.
Whilst it is true that EU law does not regulate everything in the
domestic legal sphere, and that it is often implemented through
media of national law and institutions, as in the case of directives,
it cannot fail to be considered as a major source of law in the
evolving Scottish legal tradition. It brings, indeed, another legal
tradition to Scotland as manifested in the norms, systems,
processes, practices and institutions of the EU—a tradition which
is not confined to a single area of law. The civilian/common law
dichotomy is at risk of looking outdated in the context of such a
pregnant legal tradition as that of the EU; one which stretches
across much of Europe. The EU legal order indeed has great
potential for legal convergence or “harmonisation” across the
member state jurisdictions, buttressed by the judicial clout of the
European Court of Justice. 115 This is a major dimension which
must surely feature in a modern sources of law and legal traditions
discussion.
B. European Convention on Human Rights Law
The law and jurisprudence on the European Convention on
Human Rights is another distinct stream of law or emerging legal
tradition.
The ECHR was ratified by the UK in 1951, but was not
formally introduced into the domestic legal space until the
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. Under that regime,
115. This potential for legal convergence or harmonisation is sometimes
seen as a medium or catalyst by which a new European ius commune can be
achieved.
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courts and tribunals in the UK must “take into account” the
judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of the
European Court of Human Rights; 116 they must interpret primary
and secondary legislation in a manner that it is compatible with
Convention rights; 117 and they can declare that legislation is
incompatible with the Convention. 118 It is unlawful for public
authorities, which includes courts and tribunals, to act in a manner
that is incompatible with Convention rights. 119 If a Minister of the
Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for doing so, he
may by order make such amendments to legislation that has been
declared incompatible, as he considers necessary to remove the
incompatibility. 120
The human rights framework has had an additional dimension
in Scotland: Acts of the Scottish Parliament are deemed by the
Scotland Act 1998 to be “not law” to the extent that they
contravene Convention rights. 121 The ECHR indeed bears on the
very legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
The ECHR legal framework as implemented in the UK is thus
an overarching one, bearing on the way in which public authorities
conduct their activities, the way in which courts interpret
legislation, and even the way in which the Scottish Parliament can
legislate. There is, moreover, not only a statutory framework in the
form of the Human Rights Act, but an ever-growing body of
human rights jurisprudence both in the domestic courts and the
European Court of Human Rights. These stimulate a deep well of
human rights law and jurisprudence which does not appear to
resonate with a simple civilian/common law analysis.
Before the “traditions of law” part of this article is left behind,
there is an open question which should be posed: how would we
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Human Rights Act 1998, s.2.
Id. at s.3.
Id. at s.4.
Id. at s.6.
Id. at s.10.
Scotland Act 1998, s.29.
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characterise those great areas of law, especially statutory law,
which do not seem readily to correspond with the aforementioned
traditions? Are the many statutes which regulate fields as diverse
as pensions, social security, health and safety at work and road
traffic to be regarded as expressions of the (English) common law
tradition? Are they somehow connected to the civilian tradition?
Or are they in some other category, perhaps a more general
“modern statutory law” category, whether of Scotland or the wider
UK? Furthermore, what import might devolution hold for this: is
legislation of the Scottish Parliament spawning a nascent legal
tradition, distinct from that of the UK Parliament?
These questions, whatever their answers, lead into essential
issues of methodology.
IV. REQUIREMENT FOR AN HOLISTIC ANALYSIS
Whether or not it is correct to say that the civilian and common
law traditions are the dual foundations or building blocks of Scots
law, those are clearly only part of the story when it comes to
describing Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction. As Chris Himsworth
observed, “the Scottish system is inadequately described simply as
a mix of common law and civil law.” 122 Other traditions have
occupied their own place in Scottish legal tradition, including some
with considerable legacy, such as canon law. It is only by means of
an holistic analysis that we can achieve a more faithful statement
of the character of the law and legal system as a whole, beyond its
prima facie civilian and common law parts.
The first question to be clarified is one which goes to the heart
of the methodology employed in evaluating mixture in legal
traditions. If the principal traditions of law in Scotland are civilian
and common law in nature (and it would have to be shown how
that is so), then this might form the basis for an argument that
those should form the backbone of the analysis. Perhaps the Celtic
122.

Himsworth, supra note 114, at 122.
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or udal law traditions are not worth bothering about because they
seem so remote or marginal, or because their modern relevance
seems so slight. This is essentially a quantitative approach whereby
the analysis seems driven by a search for the size of a legal
tradition's footprint: the civilian and common law traditions merit
the most attention because theirs is the “largest” contribution.
It seems that even a quantitative approach must be at least
partly qualitative, however. In measuring canon law against feudal
law, for example, one must surely take account of the fact that the
canon law influence is arguably the more enduring—in civil
procedure, and so on.
If one insists on a strict definition of mixture, however, a
tradition seems worthy of attention whether its contribution is 50%
or 5%. Of course, we may be tempted, and even justified, in
affording the 50% more consideration than the 5%; but should we
then demote the 5% from our analysis, or from the principal axis of
assessment, simply because it is 5% and not 50%? It sometimes
appears that this is what happens in the mixed jurisdiction
literature, with traditions bearing a smaller footprint overshadowed
by a debate over which of the two major contributions, civilian or
common law, first penetrated Scotland, or which was the more
influential. A legal tradition is the sum of its constituent parts, and
any exclusion of its constituent traditions from the discussion is an
omission. It encourages an incomplete or distorted evaluation of
the receiving legal tradition.
A second issue in methodology is our attitude toward the
temporal aspect of the analysis. In particular, to what extent is, or
should, our approach be time-bound? Are we relaxed about
timelines, or eager to keep “updating” our evaluation of Scottish
legal tradition with each development? Should we, for example,
regard feudal law as a minor contributor to Scottish legal tradition
now that feudal tenure has finally been abolished? Should it have
been demoted in our analysis when the Abolition of Feudal Tenure
etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 came into effect? Or should it continue to
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feature prominently in our analysis because it still underpinned
land ownership in Scotland until quite recently, and indeed because
Scotland was remarkably placed in Europe in having a system of
feudal tenure in place at such a late date? Do we continue to
recognise the extent to which feudal law made land ownership in
Scotland distinctive, or look upon it as an historical artefact? If,
incidentally, we opt for an approach of continual updating, the time
may have come to challenge a straight civilian and common law
dichotomy as “outdated” in light of the aforementioned EU and
ECHR contexts.
The temporal dimension leads into another question: how do
we assess legacy? A meaningful contemporary analysis should
probably not be concerned with bygone traditions that were once
observed somewhere in the land we now call Scotland, but which
are firmly extinct. Instead, we should be concerned with those
which have left some footprint on Scots law or the Scottish legal
system.
The question of legacy is, however, far from straightforward.
How, for example, would we assess the legacy of feudal law in
Scotland? To what extent has the abolition of feudal tenure
diminished the feudal legacy? Clearly the active feudal component
of Scots law has waned, but does that signify a corresponding
diminution in legacy? It is perhaps too superficial to suggest that
the legacy of feudal law is present only to the extent that feudal
components are present, active and visible in the system.
Somewhere between the extremes of the defunct legal tradition,
and that which is still in obvious operation, is a grey area where a
tradition is no longer observed in its own terms, but the legacy of
which lingers on. To what extent has feudal law influenced the
Scottish legal tradition in the longer term? To what extent has it
bequeathed deeper conceptual, methodological or structural
elements to the legal order? How different would Scots law,
including property law and jurisdiction, look today had feudal law
never arrived on Scottish shores?
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The question of legacy is further complicated by another
phenomenon: legal traditions are not discrete. Aspects of one
tradition may, and are perhaps even likely to, inform, shape, alter
or influence others with which they have contact. They are and
have been incorporated into others. That is evident in the very
concept of a “Scottish legal tradition” embodying aspects of other
legal traditions,—civilian, canonical and so on. It is also evident
from the literature; Hector MacQueen and David Sellar wrote, for
example, that “from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages,
the common law of Scotland has been open to influence from both
the common law and the civilian tradition. It has been a ‘mixed’
system from the very beginning.” 123 In other words, the civilian
and common law traditions were both received into a third entity:
the Scottish common law. It was not the case that these two
traditions arrived in a vacuum, and that the two combined to
produce a Scottish legal tradition. Whilst that might seem obvious,
it is immediately apparent why it is unsatisfactory to measure
“mixture” by principal reference to the two received traditions
(civilian and common law), but not the receiving tradition (Scottish
common law).
The indiscrete or “impure” reality of legal traditions demands
that we revisit the temporal aspect. Consider, in particular, the
extent to which the timelines of the various legal traditions
overlap, and then the corresponding improbability that these
traditions would, or could, be kept discrete. Of the traditions
discussed in this article, the most ancient to be observed in
“Scotland” is Celtic law. This significantly predated the Christian
era, and as outlined, aspects of Celtic law survived in Scotland
until as late as the 17th century. By then, a number of other
traditions were already coexisting in Scotland. Feudalism may
have arrived as early as the end of the 11th century. A Scottish
123. H.L. MacQueen & W.D.H. Sellar, Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law in
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 289 (E.J.H. Schrage ed., Duncker & Humblot 1995).
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common law was in existence by at least the mid-13th century. It
has been said that this was modelled after English common law to
such an extent that it is “legitimate . . . to speak of a Reception.”124
Canon law commanded sufficient authority in Scotland to be cited
in secular cases by 1380. The Roman tradition may have begun to
indirectly influence Scots law from the 13th century, 125 and Scots
lawyers were being educated in civil law at continental European
universities from the 14th century. 126 Even before one folds the
udal, Biblical or diverse maritime legal traditions into the analysis,
the temporal overlap among these traditions is clear.
The coexistence or cohabitation of these traditions was unlikely
to be—indeed, was not—politely discrete. The picture that
emerges is not only one in which civilian and common law were
but two of several traditions; but one of, to adopt a fitting term
used by Örücü, “encounter and combination”. 127 The traditions
would perhaps inevitably compete, compare, borrow, lend,
analogise, innovate, imitate, overlap, contaminate; in short, mix.
This is borne out by some initial evidence which could form a
separate topic of research in its own right: the extent to which the
constituent traditions of Scots law were or are “impure”. As
crossovers, mutations and adaptations occurred, aspects of
traditions would be absorbed into others and even be conveyed by
them. Canon law may be taken as an example. Canon law was
heavily influenced by the Roman law tradition from as early as the
4th century, 128 and continued to be influenced in a variety of ways
in the centuries that followed. 129 The European ius commune was
essentially a product of cross-pollination between the canon law
124. Sellar, supra note 13, at at 6.
125. Gordon, supra note 53, at 15 et seq.
126. Id. at 19-20.
127. Örücü, supra note 8, at 5.
128. See JAMES A. CORIDON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 11-19
(Geoffrey Chapman 1991).
129. See, for example, JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 59-60
(Longman 1995); Robertson, supra note 59, at 112-115; and JOSEPH DODD, A
HISTORY OF CANON LAW 134-135 (Parker, London 1884).
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and Roman law traditions. 130 As such, the practise of canon law
often meant indirectly drawing on the Roman law tradition. In
other words, aspects of civilian tradition were conveyed through
canon law 131 before there was a more direct reception of the
civilian tradition in Scots law. Nevertheless, the canonical tradition
is excluded from the principal axis of civilian and common law
assessment in the orthodox mixed jurisdiction methodology.
Canon law is not alone in its apparent “impurity”. The Scottish
common law was, as noted, open to influence from the English
common law and civilian traditions, 132 and was also penetrated by
the canon law of arbitration. 133 The evolving Scots feudal tradition,
including its more formal and customary aspects, drew upon the
English feudal tradition, and may also have drawn upon traditions
from parts of continental Europe such as Normandy, Brittany and
Flanders. 134 It has also been argued to have been reinforced by the
Scottish common law and shaped by the European ius commune, 135
and the system of feudal tenure may even have incorporated
aspects of Celtic legal tradition. 136
Even the two great traditions often cast as adversaries, civilian
and common law, failed to be discrete: English common law, for
example, appears to have been influenced by civil law, canon
law, 137 and even Celtic law. 138 It is likewise implausible that civil
law stood insulated from the influence of other legal traditions, and
not least from the canonical tradition. The ius commune is just one
aspect of that. Accordingly, even although each tradition has been
130. ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 196
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
131. See David B. Smith, Roman Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra
note 57, at 172; and Robertson, supra note 61.
132. See MacQueen & Sellar, supra note 123.
133. GODFREY, supra note 17, at 363-364 and 373.
134. MacQueen, supra note 33, at 12-14.
135. See id. at 17-26.
136. See, for example, Sellar, supra note 92, at 6-7.
137. See, for example, David J. Seipp, The Reception of Canon Law and
Civil Law in the Common Law Courts before 1600, 13(3) OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 388 (1993).
138. See Sellar, supra note 92, at 13.
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separately identified and discussed in the foregoing part of this
article, this has been done for taxonomic convenience only, and
should not give the impression that these traditions were at all
times separate and discrete. They are separately identified
precisely to highlight the diversity of the Scottish legal tradition of
which they became constituent ingredients.
Even if it were the case that the civilian and common law
traditions were the two great streams which emerged from this
clutter of traditions, they were by that stage, whenever it could be
said to have occurred, quite impure. The extent to which they were
impure, or bore the marks of other traditions, is not for this
contribution to assess; but it is clear that the idea of a civilian and
common law template with which to measure the character or
imprint of Scots law becomes less plausible when these
considerations are taken into account. If aspects of one legal
tradition were mixed up with, or latent in, other legal traditions, the
question arises as to the point at which aspects of the former
tradition become aspects of the latter tradition. When one feature is
incorporated into a conveying or vehicular tradition, to what extent
is the bequeathing tradition removed from the equation? Has that
feature now passed into the claim (or even definition) of the
receiving tradition, or has it merely acquired the colour or veneer
of a conveying tradition?
Moreover, if aspects of one tradition become conveyed through
multiple traditions, how are we to characterise those elements? As
noted, the civilian tradition was not only received in its own right,
but also through canon law, and perhaps through other traditions;
even the English common law tradition. It becomes hugely
difficult to separate out all of the civilian strands from the
conveying traditions.
Further still, to the extent that civilian elements survive in
Scots law, they are collectively conveyed through Scottish legal
tradition. The civilian tradition is, of course, conveyed in other
jurisdictions, too, bearing the marks and idiosyncrasies of those
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conveying traditions. As such, which version of civilian tradition is
to be regarded as the “most civilian”? In other words, do civilian
elements not acquire and become bound up in their conveying
traditions such that it becomes decreasingly meaningful to speak
about a single civilian tradition? Or is the discussion purely
historical or genealogical, such that there is regarded as some end
point after which the civilian tradition is either “deceased” or
regarded as something different?
If therefore, the basic argument is that Scotland is a mixed
jurisdiction because it combines the civilian and common law
traditions, the concept of mixture is revealed as selective and
reductionist. First, as noted, Scots law also incorporates aspects of
other legal traditions. Second, even were it convincingly
demonstrated that its dual foundations or basic building blocks are
civilian and common law in nature, those foundations have
themselves been the subjects of mixing, distortion, contamination,
evolution and so on. Neither is purely civilian nor common law in
its own right. Third, the Scottish legal tradition, like all extant
traditions, is a living tradition. It evolves and undergoes change.
Even if it was the case that the civilian and common law
inheritances were the dual foundations or basic building blocks of
Scots law, they have not necessarily remained so. In particular, a
serious contemporary analysis cannot avoid accounting for the EU
and ECHR traditions, and considering the extent to which they
might dilute or further enrich the mixture of existing traditions.
Furthermore, serious consideration should be given to how a great
deal of modern statutory law is to be classified. Finally, the very
receiving of aspects of the civilian and common law traditions was
at least partly achieved by way of conveyance through other
traditions. Those conveying traditions are then excluded from the
basic dichotomy, even although they played a role in the very
manifestation of certain civilian and common law elements.
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Perhaps the civilian and common law dichotomy remains a
valuable tool in the comparative private 139 law context. Perhaps if
all systems were regarded as mixed, in its broadest sense, then one
of the principal tools of comparison would be discarded, and the
special nature of the mixed jurisdiction category lost.
However, the dichotomy faces significant methodological
challenges, and is at risk of tempting a distorted and exaggerated
picture of Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition. It also
arguably offers limited scope in a global comparative law context.
If the world is truly a patchwork, not only of civilian and common
law traditions, but of varying shapes and shades of canon, Celtic,
Norse, Norman, Islamic, Talmudic, Chinese, Adat, socialist, tribal,
customary law, and so on—how meaningful is a civilian and
common law dichotomous approach to the question of mixed
jurisdiction? Or is the mixed jurisdiction analysis intended for a
more limited, European and private law audience? 140 The very
nature of taxonomy may require that regarding every system as a
mixed system is against the spirit of the exercise, but the taxonomy
should not be any more reductionist than is unavoidable; either in
the sense of how many traditions are represented, or the extent to
which traditions are or can be regarded as pure or discrete.
If, however, there is still value in approaching questions of
comparative law by reference to a civilian and common law
yardstick, and in continuing to identify Scotland as one of the
quintessential mixed jurisdictions, that reference to mixture should,
at very least, not be perceived to exhaust the definition. It serves
just one analytical framework, which neither shows the full extent
of mixture within this particular mixed jurisdiction, nor which
properly scrutinises the other legal traditions which may constitute
part of the mixture, including those which played a role in
conveying or influencing civilian and common law ingredients.

139.
140.

See infra section IV.
Id.
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V. OVER-EMPHASIS ON PRIVATE LAW?
The literature discussing the detail and extent of Scotland's
mixed legal heritage has focused primarily 141 on private law. 142
It may be asked why it is that the topic of Scotland as a mixed
jurisdiction has been examined primarily in a private law context.
A plausible answer is simply that it has captured the interest of
private lawyers much more than that of public lawyers. As the field
receives more private law contributions, perhaps public and
criminal lawyers do not regard this as a subject for them, that they
have little to contribute to a field heavily aligned with a private law
analysis.
Perhaps there is a different, or additional, reason: if Scots law
is more distinctive from its English counterpart in the field of
private law than in public law, then private law may be the natural
focal point, because it is potentially where the distinctiveness
factor is at its most pronounced. 143 If that were the reason, or a
reason, the literature would benefit from clarification on this point,
and would in that case surely have to include more consideration

141. Though not exclusively. See, for example, a brief comment on public
law and criminal law in Sellar, supra note 13, at 8-9; a private law take on what
is typically conceived as a public law area in Hector L. MacQueen, Human
Rights and Private Law in Scotland: A Response to President Barak, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 363 (2003); and MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:
PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA, (Reinhard
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004), in
which there are references to human rights law in the chapter on nuisance by
François du Bois and Elspeth Reid. An exception to the general trend, which
comes rather from a public law perspective, is Himsworth, supra note 114, at
119-141; and see also Esin Örücü, Approaching Public Law as a “Mixed
System”, JUR. REV. 131 (2002).
142. See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Unjust Enrichment, Contract and
the Third Reception of Roman law in Scotland, 109 L.Q. REV. 663 (1993);
Evans-Jones, supra note 13; Robin Evans-Jones, Roman law in Scotland and
England and the Development of one Law for Britain, 115 L.Q. REV. 605
(1999); George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating Charges
and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2003); MacQueen, supra note 1;
Hector MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems, 13
RESTITUTION L. REV. 21 (2005); Whitty, supra note 7; and Zimmermann, Visser
& Reid, supra note 141.
143. This may be the suggestion of MacQueen, supra note 1, at 317.

88

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

of non-private law areas, such as public law and criminal law, in
order to arrive at such a conclusion.
We therefore find that the mixed jurisdiction discussion is
dominated by some quite particular attributes. First, the main focus
in terms of pedigree is on the civilian and common law traditions.
The contributors to the literature have certainly not been ignorant
of other traditions. 144 On the contrary, some have made significant
contributions on other legal traditions, such as Hector MacQueen
on the Scottish common law, 145 and David Sellar on Celtic law.146
However, for whatever reason, these have tended not to be folded
into the wider mixed jurisdiction literature.
Second, the main focus in terms of area of law has firmly been
that of private law. It is not that public law or criminal law aspects
have gone unremarked—again, we find these occasionally
mentioned in the literature. 147 However, the field is dominated by
private law oriented analysis. It is through a private law lens that
the evaluation of the mixed character of Scots law has been made.
These comments are not intended to diminish the valuable
work that has been invested in the private law literature. The
suggestion is rather that, if and until other areas of law are properly
accounted for, it may be appropriate for private law contributions
to explicitly confine themselves to private law, and be cautious
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal
system in general terms. Some of the scholarship has been
sensitive to this very point. Kenneth Reid and Reinhard
144. See, for example, acknowledgement of other legal traditions in Kenneth
Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann, The Development of Legal Doctrine in a Mixed
System in Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 49, at 2-3 and 7. Reid and
Zimmermann also described the “deeply entrenched and irreducible chasm
between the civil law and common law traditions” as “exaggerated”, and, even
within the “civil law systems”, such a dichotomy “is in danger of underrating
[their] diversity”—id. at 2-3. Notwithstanding these observations, the
contribution in question still primarily orientates its “mixed” analysis on civilian
and common law fault lines.
145. MACQUEEN, supra note 23.
146. Sellar, supra note 92, at 20; Sellar, supra note 98.
147. See supra note 141.
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Zimmermann, for example, were clear that the two-volume work
of which they were editors, A History of Private Law in Scotland,
was not a “full history of legal doctrine in Scotland,” but was
instead, “confined to private law and within private law to selected
topics from the law of property and the law of obligations.”148
What seems apparent is a potential usefulness of the mixed
jurisdiction category to comparative lawyers as a study in
approximating or conciliating civilian and common law traditions
in the private law sphere. 149 That is different, however, from a
general description of Scots law or the Scottish legal system as
“mixed”, whether in general or in terms of a mixture of civilian
and common law constituents, beyond the significant but limited
sphere of private law.
The orientation of the discussion in the field of private law may
be self-reinforcing, both a cause and an effect of further private
law contributions. Whatever the reason for the topic's principal
orientation toward private law, the paucity of non-private law
contributions cannot bode well for the probability that our
conclusions are sufficiently holistic. The discussion becomes
lopsided. The risk arises that the literature purports to describe, or
is taken to describe, the whole of Scots law and the Scottish legal
tradition; whilst in fact substantially discussing only private law
material. In other words, there is a risk that the mixed character of
Scots private law is extrapolated to the four corners of the legal
order; that the character of a part of the law is used to suggest the
character of the whole.
The literature is therefore in the odd position of having created
a restricted analysis (civilian vs. common law; private law) which
has been too liberally applied to the law and legal system at large.
The mixed pedigree of Scots private law is not in dispute, though
the extent to which it is mixed is disputed. Expanding the
148. Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 144, at 9.
149. See id. at 3-4, though the language used is still one of “legal systems”
rather than bodies of private law.
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discussion to one which embraces, rather than glosses over, public
law and criminal law will enrich the analysis and improve both its
accuracy and its holistic viability. Even were Scots public and
criminal law found to be plain expressions of some single legal
tradition (quite unlikely, of course), then we would at least know
that private law is where the mixed pedigree is found. What seems
more probable is that an evaluation of public, criminal and other
areas of law would reveal a further enriching mixture of traditions
which make up the Scottish legal tradition as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Scotland is a mixed jurisdiction in the sense that it combines a
mixed pedigree of legal traditions. It is well remarked that Scots
law includes inheritances from the civilian and common law
traditions, and often that combination is precisely why Scots law is
described as “mixed”.
However, the literature has tended to focus on the civilian and
common law traditions, often to the exclusion or significant
relegation of other constituent traditions. The mixture also includes
aspects of, at least, the Scottish common law, feudal law, canon
law, udal law, Celtic law, the Bible and foreign maritime law.
Holistic considerations may require that these other traditions are
folded into an analysis of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction; not
only because they coexist with aspects of the civilian and common
law traditions, but because these traditions have, for centuries,
mixed with each other. The traditions are neither discrete nor pure,
and have informed, influenced and shaped others. Some have
conveyed aspects of others. The extent to which the literature has
focused on the civilian and common law traditions is at risk of
insufficiently recognising or accounting for these phenomena.
The orthodox civilian and common law dichotomy may also
struggle to deal with EU law and ECHR law as two modern
streams of law which are not only making substantial headway in
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Scotland, but in other jurisdictions too. Are EU and ECHR law
civilian or common law in nature? Are they, themselves, mixed in
pedigree? Or are they neither? The same questions may be asked
of large areas of modern statutory law.
The picture of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction is one of a very
mixed jurisdiction; one which has received and been influenced by
a number of indiscrete legal traditions. Comparative lawyers may
still find value in upholding Scotland as a quintessentially mixed
jurisdiction in the private law sphere, combining civilian and
common law traditions, but these traditions bear the marks of each
other, and of other traditions which they have encountered.
Furthermore, even if they were found to account for a majority of
the mixture, they comprise just part of a wider array of heritages
which, together, make up the Scottish legal tradition.
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ABSTRACT
Currently, in Spanish Law, civil status is a concept under
discussion in regard to its definition, its content, the enumeration
of possible civil statuses, and even its very subsistence as a
category. The processing given to civil status in the corresponding
Laws of the Civil Registry is especially important as precisely this
Registry has the main, although not sole, objective to officially
verify the “acts” or “facts concerning the civil status of persons,”
although other legal facts, which are not classifiable as such, are
also recorded. The interdependence of both concepts means that it
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is advisable to have combined treatment of both as regards this
theme. The Law 20/2011, of July 21, on the Civil Registry (LCR
2011), has entailed a substantial change of structure and
management regarding these matters. Besides, there are several de
facto situations that can have an entry in the new system which
cause the concept of civil status lose its identity, and perhaps, its
utility.
I. APPROACH
Civil status is a concept under discussion in regard to its
definition, its content, the enumeration of possible civil statuses,
and even its very subsistence as a category. This is due to the
absence of a legal definition of civil status, aggravated by the
diversity of situations it refers to, which makes its delimitation
particularly difficult.
In a first approach to the concept, the term status refers to the
state—with legal importance—of persons in society, or, in other
words, to their legal situation in society. In fact, the concept has its
origin in the status of Roman Law, or position in which each
person stood in society, depending on whether he was free, a
freedman or a slave (which marked his status libertatis), or
whether he was a Roman citizen, a foreigner or Latin (status
civitatis), or whether he was alieni iuris or sui iuris (which
describes his situation in the family, determining the status
familiae). In this regard, there is a well-known Roman aphorism
persona est homo statu civili praeditus.
The idea of status has continued throughout the centuries,
adapting to the changes which have affected, among other areas,
freedom (on the abolition of slavery) or the family (due to the
evolution of the content of parental authority, which ceases to be
understood as subjugation to the father). As well as freedom,
citizenship and family, throughout the centuries, other parameters
were used at different times and also marked a status, such as sex,
religion or whether or not one is a member of the nobility.
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However, neither the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (Código
Civil, hereinafter C.C.) nor any law in our system defines the
concept of civil status, nor do they include an enumeration of civil
statuses although they refer to the term in several norms, even
assigning certain legal consequences to them, which compose a
certain common system.
Thus, we find the term civil status in several bodies of law:
a) In article 39 of the Spanish Constitution, on referring to the
equality of mothers under the law “regardless of their civil status,”
identifying it, in this case, with the vulgar meaning of civil status,
with reference to marriage according to which it is possible to have
the civil status of a single or married person, a widow or widower,
separated or divorced person.
b) Article 9.1 C.C. states the norm of Private International
Law, which stipulates that the personal law of natural persons—
which is determined by nationality—“capacity and civil status”
will prevail; article 244.4 C.C., which prevents a person who
carried out “actions regarding civil status” with the minor or
disabled person from being a guardian; articles 325 to 332 C.C.,
concerning the Civil Status Register (currently repealed by the
Law on the Civil Registry of 2011 1), order that the “acts
concerning civil status” are registered in the Register kept for this
purpose; and article 1814 C.C., which stipulates that it is not
possible to compromise on “the civil status of persons.”
c) The Law on Civil Procedure of 2000 (LCP), 2 which
stipulates that in the “rulings on civil status . . . res iudicata will
have effects as regards all as from the registration or annotation in
the Civil Registry” (article 222.3.II LCP, and in article 525.1,
according to which “In no case will they be susceptible to

1. Law 20/2011 of July 21, on the Civil Registry [hereinafter LCR 2011]
of July 21, B.O.E. n. 175, Jul. 22, 2011.
2. Law 1/2000 of January 7, on Civil Procedure [hereinafter LCP], B.O.E.
n. 7, Jan. 8, 2000.
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provisional execution: 1. The rulings issued in proceedings on . . .
civil status . . . .”)
d) The Criminal Code 3 classifies the offence of usurpation of
civil status (article 401).
e) In the international area, although there are systems of other
countries which have dispensed with the concept, reference can be
made to several international conventions, particularly the work of
the International Commission on Civil Status (I.C.C.S.), an
intergovernmental organization, of which Spain is a member,
created in 1948 in order to foster international cooperation in this
regard, with special importance, inter alia, in the notarial area. The
United Nations also continues to take it into account for the
purposes of the World Programme of the United Nations in Order
to Improve Vital Statistics, approved by the Economic and Social
Council through Resolution 1307/1968, and for the International
Programme for Accelerating and Improving the Vital Statistics and
Civil Registration Systems, of 1991. In addition, in the European
area, the Green Paper of the European Commission 4 is notable,
with the title “Less Bureaucracy for Citizens: Promoting Free
Movement of Public Documents and Recognition of the Effects of
Civil Status.”
Beyond mere terminology, the processing given to civil status
in the corresponding Laws of the Civil Registry is especially
important as precisely this Registry has the main, although not
sole, objective to officially verify the “acts” or “facts concerning
the civil status of persons” (article 1 of the provisional Law of the
Civil Registry of 1870, 5 article 1 Law of the Civil Registry 1957, 6

3. L.O. 10/1995 of November 23, on the Criminal Code, B.O.E. n.281,
Nov. 24, 1995.
4. COM (2010) 747 final.
5. Civil Registry Act of June 17, 1870.
6. Law of June 8, on Civil Registry [hereinafter LCR 1957], B.O.E. n. 151,
Jun. 10, 1957.
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and in similar terms, article 2.2 LCR 2011 7), with multiple
references to the term throughout their respective articles.
Civil status is recorded in the Civil Registry (we must
remember, the Civil Code eloquently called this the Civil Status
Registry) although in the Civil Registry, other legal facts are
recorded which are not classifiable as such. The interdependence
of both concepts means that it is advisable to have combined
treatment of both with regards to the theme of this treatise.
II. CONCEPTS OF CIVIL STATUS AND CIVIL REGISTRY
A. The Concept of Civil Status
From the perspective mentioned, we can consider that civil
status is a legal concept which includes personal situations, with a
certain stability and permanence, evaluated by the legislator as
relevant, and, due to this, with the same legal system.
1. The Same Legal System?
In fact, this intended common system of civil status is reduced
to two aspects, which, as we shall see throughout this theme, are
not treated uniformly, which casts doubt on the continuance of the
category.
These two aspects, simply stated, are as follows:
a) the state actions, which is the generic manner which
doctrine uses to refer to judicial actions in order to assert civil
status, either by declaring those already existing (declaratory
actions), or by modifying them precisely by the ruling resulting
from this action (as occurs with disability, where the ruling would
have constitutive value); in fact, the procedural aspects are those
which, in a fashion, have imposed the notion of civil status on the

7. Supra note 1.
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legislator and on doctrine so that the theory of civil status started as
a theory of state actions, 8 and
b) the peculiarities of the proof of civil status, marked by the
evidentiary privilege which is attributed to the resources provided
by the Civil Registry, will be seen in the terms below.
It is not possible to speak of a common system regarding the
acquisition and loss of civil statuses as some of these are attributed
due to the existence of one or several legal facts (e.g., in the case
of Spanish nationality acquired by ius sanguinis, due to the fact of
being born to a Spanish progenitor); others are judicial creations
(e.g., the judicial modification of the capacity to act can only be
done by a ruling, which is of a constitutive nature); others are the
result of a declaration of the will of the persons concerned (e.g.,
marriage or the recognition of a child out of wedlock), etc.
2. The Influence on the Capacity of the Person to Act does not
Form Part of the Concept of Civil Status
From the definition of civil status as explained above, it can be
deduced that unlike in previous epochs, currently it is not a
common characteristic of civil statuses to affect the capacity to act.
The classical definition of civil status by Federico de Castro, as
the “legal quality of the person due to his special situation (and
consequent condition as member) in a legal organization, and, as
such, this characterizes his capacity to act and the environment of
his power and responsibility”, 9 according to the historical records
and the legal provisions in force at the time, this supposes that civil
status determined the capacity of a person to act. At that time, for
example, the situations of husband and wife determined their
capacity in regard to the matrimonial economic system,

8. JOSÉ LUIS LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., I-2 ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL
25 (6th ed., Dykinson 2010).
9. FEDERICO DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, 2 DERECHO CIVIL DE ESPAÑA 70
(Civitas 1949; rev. ed., 1984).

100

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

specifically restricting the capacity of the wife to act, even
regarding her own exclusive goods.
At the present time, and especially after Law 11/1981, of May
10
13, on the modification of Civil Code regarding filiation, paternal
authority and the economic system of the marriage, the unity of the
concept “does not lie in its influence on the capacity to act but in
its defining value of the basic legal situation of the person in
society, besides and beyond the sole aspect of his capacity.” 11
Indeed, some civil statuses influence the capacity to act, such
as those derived from age or the possible legal modification of this
(i.e., disability); however, others, such as marriage or filiation, do
not affect this capacity at the present time.
B. Concept of Civil Registry
As has been said, it is advisable to mention the concept of Civil
Registry in these initial sections, among other things, because the
question of the enumeration of civil statuses has to be connected
with the list of facts and acts which can be registered in the Civil
Registry, the terms of which will be given below.
The Civil Registry is the instrument for the verification and
publicity of the legal facts, and acts regarding the civil status of
persons, and of those others which do not refer to civil status, are
determined by the law.
Registration is currently regulated by Law 20/2011, of July 21,
on the Civil Registry (LCR 2011), 12 which entailed a substantial
change of structure and management with regard to the system of
the previous Law (Law of the Civil Registry of June 8, 1957, LCR
1957 13), in force until the entry into force of the LCR 2011, which
took place three years after its publication in the official register
10. B.O.E. n. 119, May 19, 1981.
11. ANTONIO GORDILLO CAÑAS, CAPACIDAD,
ESTABILIDAD DE LOS CONTRATOS 56 (Tecnos ed., 1986).
12. Supra note 1.
13. Supra note 6.
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(Boletín Oficial del Estado), therefore, on July 22, 2014. The LCR
2011 would be reformed through the Draft Bill of the Law on the
Integral Reform of Registries (LRIR), by virtue of which and in
regards to the Civil Registry, would also be assumed by the
Property Registrars.
With the LCR 2011, changes were made:
1) From a Registry controlled by Judges to a Registry
controlled by specialized civil servants (Property Registrars,
according to the aforementioned project).
2) From a register of facts, which were registered in the
respective sections of the Registry (1st: Births and General, 2nd:
Marriages, 3rd: Deaths, 4th: Guardianships and Legal
Representations), which made it necessary to have a complex
system of internal cross-references between the books of the four
existing sections, changing to a system in which these sections
disappear, as this was a register of persons. The Law of the Civil
Registry establishes an individual registration system based on a
single personal file which shows the civil record of each person
from birth, and the registration will be assigned a Personal Code,
which will serve for all the processing which the person needs to
carry out with the Civil Registry. Most of this processing can be
made electronically. In any case, in the new system, Public
Administrations will have access to the registration information
required for the exercise of their functions.
3) From a Registry which responded to the concern for the
territorial verification of the aforementioned facts concerning the
persons, and which gave rise to a territorially-dispersed structure,
this transformed into a single electronic registry for all of Spain, in
which the application for registration and the registration itself can
be carried out at any of the General Offices of the Civil Registry,
regardless of the place in which the facts which can be registered
occur.
Although the organization of the LCR 1957, based on the
registrations made by Judges and divided into four sections, is
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destined to disappear, a long process of the execution of the
restructuring is still expected. In addition, the procedures and files
initiated prior to the entry into force of the new Law, as well as the
questions concerning the books not digitalized (Transitory
Provisions 4 and 5 LCR 2011 14), will continue to be regulated by
the LCR 1957; thus, it is advisable to know its system and general
lines.
The changes made by the LCR 2011 do not affect the function
of the institution, which continues to be the official confirmation—
with the effects and the objectives applicable in each case—of the
facts and acts which refer to the civil status of persons and the
others determined by Law.
This affirmation requires two considerations:
a) In fact, the ultimate purpose of the Registry is the official
confirmation, thus, its registrations have a confirmation or
declarative value. However, precisely due to their official nature,
this makes it possible to have a means of quickly and simply
proving civil status, and they constitute a title of legitimation of the
exercise of the rights which result from each condition or specific
civil status of the person in the form shown in the entries of the
Registry.
In other cases, the Registry serves for more than just
confirming or declaring facts, as is necessary in order to constitute
a new civil status: in these cases, registration has constitutive
value. This will be dealt with below.
b) Until a short time ago, although the Civil Code has
continued to refer to the “Civil Status Civil Registry”), 15 for a long
time, this Registry has included personal data and circumstances
other than those included in the concept of civil status. The design
of the new Civil Registry stipulates an area of application even
more extensive than that stipulated by the LCR 1957, regarding

14. Supra note 1.
15. See arts. 325 to 332 C.C., derogated by the LCR 2011.
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facts and acts which can be registered, which distances it from the
strict limits of the traditional civil status, as we shall see.
III. ENUMERATION OF CIVIL STATUSES
There is no unanimity as regards which facts or situations must
be considered to be civil status and which are not, since, as was
stated above, there is no legal enumeration; thus, some authors
restrict civil statuses to those derived from the permanent social
links of citizenship or of a regional nature and family situations.
The Laws of the Civil Registry (of 1957 and 2011) have lists of
facts and acts which can be registered and which can be considered
as possible enumerations of civil statuses, but the headings of the
articles recognize that not everything contained therein are civil
statuses: as was stated, all those which exist are there because if
they are considered to be civil statuses they must appear in this list
due to the finality of the Civil Registry—precisely, the official
confirmation of civil status—but not all are there because there are
simple legal facts which are not civil statuses. This was already
stated in article 1 LCR 1957, 16 but it is even clearer in the LCR
2011: “The Civil Registry is intended to officially confirm the facts
and acts which refer to the civil status of persons and the others
determined by this Law.” 17 Article 4 adds that:
Access to the Civil Registry is possible for the facts and
acts referring to identity, civil status and other
circumstances of the person. Therefore, the following can
be registered:
1. Births. 2. Filiation. 3. Name and surnames and their
changes. 4. Sex and change of sex. 5. Nationality and place
of residence. 6. Emancipation and the benefit of legal age.
7. Marriage. Separation, annulment and divorce. 8. The
legal or agreed matrimonial regime. 9. Paternal – filial
relations and their modifications. 10. The legal
modification of the capacity of persons, as well as that
which derives from insolvency proceedings of natural
16. Supra note 6.
17. Article 2.2 LCR 2011, supra note 1.
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persons. 11. Guardianship, and other legal representations
and their modifications. 12. The acts related to the
constitution and regime of the protected private assets of
disabled persons. 13. Self-defence and preventive powers
of attorney. 14. Declarations of absence and demise. 15.
Death. 18
Considering all of these, the following civil statuses related to
those above are considered to be the following:
1) Marriage, depending on the whether the civil status is
single, married, widower, widow, divorced or separated.
2) Filiation, in wedlock, out of wedlock or by adoption, so that
the person is a son, daughter, father or mother.
3) Nationality (Spanish or alien).
4) Civil residence (the residence of common law, Aragon,
Catalonia, etc.).
5) Age, by virtue of which, a person is a minor, of legal age or
an emancipated minor.
6) The judicial modification of the capacity to act which can
determine the civil status of the disabled person (now called a
person with judicially modified capacity), and in the environment
of State legislation, that of prodigal.
As can be deduced from the heading of article 4 of the LCR
2011, some items mentioned are not civil statuses, but refer to
identity (No. 3 should be noted here), others are circumstances of
the person which determine his very existence (Nos. 1, 15), or the
regime of their goods in the event that they are married (No. 8), or
of their legal guardianship if their capacity has been judicially
modified (No. 11), or the recourse to certain mechanisms offered
by legislation when there is a disability, which does not necessarily
entail that the capacity to act is affected (Nos. 12 and 13).
There is no unanimity with regard to the quality of civil status
of sex (No. 4), of prodigality, of the declaration of insolvency, and
even disability (the three are related to No. 10), and declared
18. Supra note 1.
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absence (No. 14). We will return to these questionable civil
statuses below as it is advisable to first examine those concerning
the possible legal characters and regimes of civil statuses.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL STATUSES
Despite the difficulty involved in establishing clear criteria on
what is and what is not civil status, we should mention some
common features of these:
1) Personal character, in the sense that civil status is united to
and classifies the person. Due to this, this is noted in the Civil
Registry in the margin of the birth registration of each person
(LCR 1957), or in the current system (LCR 2011) on the individual
sheet or registration.
This personal character means that:
a) Every person has one or other status classification (he is
Spanish, alien or stateless; emancipated or not emancipated, etc.)
and the person has several compatible statuses (he is Spanish, with
civil residence in Aragon, emancipated, married, etc.).
b) This immediately affects personality; therefore, it is of a
personal nature and deserves protection similar to the person. In
fact, de Castro stated that although civil status is not a “legal
right”, it is a “personal legal situation” and an attack against it or
ignorance of it are illicit so that, if either of these economically or
morally cause damage, they must be compensated by the person
causing the damage through article 1902 C.C. 19 It must be added
that subsequent to the work of Federico de Castro, the Criminal
Code of 1973 classified offences against the civil status of persons
in articles 468 et seq., 20 referring to the supposition of birth and the
substitution of babies, the usurpation of, and the holding of illegal
marriages. Current regulation, the result of the reform carried out

19. DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, supra note 9, at 72.
20. Decree 3096/1973 of September 14, publishing the Criminal Code,
B.O.E. n. 297, Dec. 12, 1973.
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in 1995, only maintains the offence of usurpation of civil status; 21
however, it introduces a Part on the offences against family
relationships 22 in which neither the concept nor the term civil
status are used.
c) Civil status has a very personal character in the sense that: 1)
civil statuses do not form part of inheritance and, therefore, they
are not transmitted iure succesionis to the heirs, without prejudice
to the fact that, in specific cases, the law attributes the possibility
for the heirs of a person concerned to once the person has died; and
2) that the creditors could not exercise these rights by subrogation
(article 1111 C.C.), e.g., claiming the paternity of their debtor in
order to try to more easily recover what is owed to them.
d) The personal character is compatible with each civil status
having consequences regarding estates: e.g., the recognition of a
minor entails the obligation of the father to feed him, the minor
becomes his heir to the legitimate part of the estate, etc. These
consequences concerning estate do not have the same
characteristics of civil status, and, consequently, can, for example,
be the subject of a transaction (Ruling of the Supreme Court of
October 13, 1966). 23
2) The character of public order as the condition of the person
is of interest to the very structure of the community, insofar as it
indicates the person’s position and legal meaning. This feature
determines that the norms regulating civil status are of a
compulsory nature, transaction is not possible (article 1814 C.C.)
nor is submittal to arbitration (article 2 of Law 60/2003). 24
Generally, it is possible to speak of the unavailability of content,
which is not incompatible with a certain degree of freedom of
action with regard to some of the facts determining civil status. 25 It
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Supra note 3, at art. 401.
Supra note 3, at Tit. 12.
S.T.S., Oct. 13, 1966 (Roj. 972/1966).
B.O.E. n. 309, Dec. 26, 2003.
Juan Roca Guillamón, Comentario al artículo 2 in COMENTARIOS A LA
LEY DEL REGISTRO CIVIL 100 (Thomson-Reuters-Aranzadi ed., 2012).
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also justifies the need for the intervention of the Prosecutor’s office
in the proceedings concerning civil status (article 3.6 of the
Organic Statute of the Prosecutor’s Office, according to which it
corresponds to the Prosecutor’s office “To take part in proceedings
concerning civil status in defence of legality and the public or
social interest” 26), as well as the very system pre-constituting an
official proof of civil status provided by the registration in the
Civil Registry, as we shall have occasion to see.
3) General character which determines the efficacy erga
omnes, to the extent that it has to be respected by all, and its
guardianship remains under the protection of the State, which
supposes that if one is married or emancipated, this is with regard
to all and not only some. Another point is that for determined
purposes, this erga omnes character makes it depend on the
registration of the ruling which determines this status in the Civil
Registry.
4) Other authors add, as a consequence of the character of
public order, the note regarding security, stability and a certain
permanence of civil status, which does not mean that civil status
cannot be modified, but it is subject to certain formalities or
guarantees, such as declarations made before the competent civil
servant or before a judge, etc. (articles 20, 73.3, 120, 317 C.C.). 27
Furthermore, although one’s civil status can be modified within
certain limits, the civil status of another cannot be changed as it is
considered that civil status is inherent to the person; only in
determined circumstances is this allowed. For example, the legal
representative of a minor or disabled person can choose a
determined nationality for the minor or disabled person (article 20
C.C.), and, precisely due to the character we are examining, only
with special precautions and guarantees, such as judicial approval.

26. Law 50/1981 of December 30, B.O.E. n. 11, Jan. 13, 1982.
27. Mª ÁNGELES PARRA LUCÁN ET AL., CURSO DE DERECHO CIVIL I:
DERECHO PRIVADO. DERECHO DE LA PERSONA, 392 (4th ed., Colex 2011).
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With arguable criteria, which led to debate, the Courts have
also permitted that, on behalf of the disabled person, the legal
representative can exercise the action of separation (Ruling of the
Constitutional Court 311/2000, of December 18) and even the
action of divorce (ruling of the Supreme Court of September 21,
2011 28). From the promulgation of Law 15/2005, of July 8, 29 the
exercise of neither of these actions requires the allegation of
causes. This exercise of action entails the automatic change civil
status; in this case, it is supposed that the precautions of judicial
approval, etc., are included within the marriage proceedings.
V. CHARACTERISTICS OR PRINCIPLES WHICH REGULATE THE CIVIL
REGISTRY
At the beginning of this theme, mention was made that the
common legal system of civil statuses is that which refers to the
actions of status and the proof. In both cases, the Civil Registry has
a fundamental role so that, in order to correctly classify this
system, it is necessary to have a general view of the principles
which inspire the functioning of the Civil Registry, extracted from
the LCR 1957 and the Regulations of the Civil Registry of 1958
(RCR 1958) 30 temporarily in force, and expressly formulated in the
LCR 2011.
A. The Principle of Legality
Applied to the Civil Registry, the principle of legality is shown
in the classification powers attributed to the person responsible for
the Civil Registry; until now, this was a Judge and in the new Civil
Registry, a “qualified civil servant”, who, according to the Draft
Bill of the Law on the Integral Reform of the Registries, will be a
property registrar.
28. S.T.S., Sep. 21, 2001 (Roj. 5855/2011).
29. Law 15/2005 of July 8, B.O.E. n. 163, Jul. 9, 2005.
30. Decree of November 14 on the Regulation of the Civil Registry
[hereinafter RCR 1958], B.O.E. n. 296, Dec. 11, 1958.
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In fact, the LCR 2011 does not mention classification but
verification and examination (article 13) and of control of legality
(articles 30 to 32), although this may be considered classification
in the sense of “activity of an eminently legal nature, . . . which
consists of a judgment of value, an appreciation of the factual
circumstances, carried out with the objective of adopting the
decision to register, not register or suspend the registration.” 31
Thus, article 13 of the LCR 2011 stipulates that: “Those
responsible for the Civil Registry will ex officio verify the reality
and legality of the facts and acts whose registration is intended as
results from the documents which accredit and certify these, in any
case, examining the legality and precision of these documents.”
This question is developed in a specific chapter, dedicated to
the control of legality (articles 30 to 32 of the LCR 2011), which
entails, as was done by the previous legislation, the “legality of the
extrinsic forms of the document,” but also the “validity of the acts
and the reality of the facts contained therein” (article 30.2.I). In
the same chapter, it is stipulated that, in the examination of the
applications for registration and declarations, “the identity and
capacity of the applicants or declarers will be verified and, if
applicable the authenticity of the signature will be checked”
(article 31).
This control is preceded or accompanied by the duty to care for
the concordance of the Registry and extra-registry reality which is
also imposed on the person responsible for the Registry (article
16.1 LCR 2011, including the Presumption of precision, which we
will deal with below). In this regard, as explained by the
Prosecutors’ Council: “The need to ensure the concordance of the
registration expression of the facts of civil status which could be
registered and the reality of these facts required that any fact which
could be registered was registered; that the registration expression
of the fact was a true reflection of this fact and, that only legally
31. Consejo Fiscal, Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de la Ley del Registro
Civil 2011 at 31-32 (http://www.fiscal.es).
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efficacious were registered through formally correct entries. This
was determined by the triple requirement of integrity, reality and
legality of the Civil Registry which transcends all registration
legislation.” 32
B. The Principle of Official Nature and Obligatory Registration
Article 14 of the LCR 2011 includes the principle of official
nature and provides that:
Those responsible for the Civil Registry must make the due
registration when they have the required certificates. The
natural and legal persons and the organisms and public
institutions which are obliged to foster registrations will
facilitate those responsible for the Civil Registry with the
data and information required to carry these out.
If the registration legislation of 1957 and 2011 imposes
carrying out this activity ex officio on the person responsible for
the Civil Registry, the procedural legislation imposes a concordant
and complementary task on the judges of civil law who issue
rulings which can be registered. Thus, the LCP imposes the ex
officio communication of the rulings of the Civil Registries:
When applicable, the rulings and other resolutions issued in
the proceedings referred to in this Part will be
communicated ex officio to the Civil Registries in order to
make the corresponding entries. On request, these will also
be communicated to any other public registry for the
purposes applicable in each case. 33
Despite the fact that that the initial expression may lead to
understanding something else, this article imposes the obligation to
communicate the rulings and proceedings which might be relevant
for the registrations contained therein to the Civil Registry, and

32. Consejo Fiscal, supra note 31, at 26.
33. Article 755 LCP 2000, supra note 2.
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this is to be done immediately once the resolution which must be
registered has been issued and published. 34
This principle of an official nature, which we have just
described, is the only one which openly contrasts with the principle
of the Property Registry, where the principles of rogation and
voluntariness of registration govern, except in regards to the goods
and rights of the Public Administrations, regardless of whether
these are of the public sector or estate, with regard to those
stipulated in the obligatory registration, as per article 36.1 of Law
33/2003, of November 3, on the Assets of the Public
Administrations. 35
Moreover, the point of view imposed by the new law should
not be ignored as it recognizes the “right of registration” of the
facts and acts which refer to identity, civil status and other personal
conditions which the law stipulates (article 11.b LCR 2011),
complemented by the right “to foster the registration of determined
facts and acts intended for the protection of minors, persons with
judicially modified capacity, persons with disabilities and elderly
persons” (article 11.i LCR 2011), understanding that, in many
cases, it will not be the persons referred to who take care of the
effectiveness of their right to registration.
C. The Principle of the Registry’s Publicity
The registration or recording of the facts and legal acts related
to the lives of persons in the Civil Registry is intended to provide
publicity of the same.
In this regard, the finalities which the Civil Registry achieves
require that the registration be public, that is to say, that its content
be accessible or knowable by all those which the legal system
considers to be the holders of a legitimate interest.

34. JULIO BANACLOCHE PALAO, COMENTARIOS
ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL 1273-1274 (Civitas ed., 2001).
35. B.O.E. n. 264, Nov. 4, 2003.
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1. Legitimized Access to the Data Contained in the Civil
Registry
a. Access to the Data
Legitimate interest exists, by definition, in the data itself. Thus,
article 15 LCR 2011 designs a principle of the Registry’s publicity
stressing its aspect as the right of the citizen in regard to his data:
“1. The citizens will have free access to the data which appears in
their individual registrations.” This is also designed as one of the
subjective rights recognized by the Law: “The right to access the
information requested regarding the content of the Registry, with
the limitations stipulated in the present Law” (article 11.c)
b. Access of the Public Administration in Order to Carry Out
their Functions
After the reference to the right to access one’s own data, article
15 LCR 2011 states that, “2. The Civil Registry is public. The
Administrations and civil servants can access the data contained in
the Civil Registry in order to carry out their functions under their
own responsibility.”
Access is facilitated in article 8.2 of this law, through the use of
electronic means:
In the exercise of their competencies and under their own
responsibility, all the Administrations and civil servants
will have access to the data which is recorded in the single
Civil Registry with the exceptions related to the specially
protected data stipulated in this Law. This access will also
be made through electronic procedures with the requisites
and technical prescriptions established within the National
Interoperability Scheme and the National Security Scheme.
It seems to be necessary to establish some type of control or
requisite to be complied with by the civil servants who intend to
access the information contained in the Civil Registry, delimiting
the very wide content of the indeterminate legal concept “carrying
out their functions.” Of course, the information of the private
persons which the Public Administration gathers for the
aforementioned carrying out of their functions cannot be made
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public indiscriminately. The idea could be expressed that all those
who require this information—the Notary to authorize a document,
the Registrar to register it, the Procurator’s office in order to carry
out the work entrusted to it involving checking and monitoring,
etc.—may have all the information, both quickly and simply, but
only those who really need it for the protection of a person with a
disability, or for their own interest if this is related to the
information, may have it. The mention that the action of civil
servants in this regard is carried out “under their responsibility”
(articles 8.2 and 15.2 LCR 2011) lays the bases for control of
possible excesses in this regard, but a posteriori.
c. Access to the Data of Others by Private Persons
If the data is the person’s own data, we have seen that article
15.1 LCR 2011 proclaims the free access to this data by the holder.
Logically, the system changes if the data is of another person. In
this case, article 15.3 of the LCR 2011 provides that, “Registration
information may also be obtained through the publication
resources stipulated in articles 80 et seq. of this Law when they
refer to a person other than the applicant on condition that the
identity of the applicant appears and there is a legitimate interest.”
In this case, the knowledge of the data by private persons
requires a reasonable justification, and not mere curiosity or the
indiscriminate publication of information which is of no interest to
the public. For this reason, there exists a legitimate interest.
In this case, the question is not only to delimit this
indeterminate concept of legitimate interest, but to determine who
is to accredit this.
In the system provisionally in force (although it is true that it is
a precept at regulation level), there is a presumption that: “The
interest in knowing the entries is presumed for whoever requests
the certification.” 36

36. Article 17.II RCR 1958, supra note 30.

114

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

There continues to be data especially protected based on the
constitutional right to personal and family privacy, which will be
subjected to the system of restricted access (articles 15.4, 83 and
84 LCR 2011), which are adoption or unknown filiation,
rectification of sex, marriage in secret, the reasons for the deprival
or suspension of parental authority, the changes of surnames
authorized when the applicant concerned is the victim of gender
violence, or other legally authorized changes of identity. In these
cases, there are no restrictions if the person concerned applies for
this. The LCR 2011 also expressly recognizes “the right to privacy
in relation to specially protected data subjected to the system of
restricted publicity” (article 11.e).
2. Formal and Material Aspects of the Registry’s Publicity
In this context, the concept of publicity, as it has been
consolidated in mortgage legislation, includes formal and material
publicity. This is transferable to the area of the Civil Registry, with
the necessary due adaptations.
a. The Principle of Formal Publicity
The LCR 2011 includes two formal publication instruments:
1) Electronic certification (although it may be issued
exceptionally by non-electronic means), and
2) Access to the registration information by the Administration
when it acts in the exercise of its functions and under its
responsibility (articles 80 to 82 of the LCR 2011).
Furthermore, the latter is conceived “as the preferential
instrument of publication so that, only in exceptional cases, must
the citizen submit certifications of data of the Civil Registry”
(Preliminary Recitals IV LCR 2011), which, as can be appreciated,
entails a change of conception of the formal publicity. It is not the
person concerned who has the burden of proof of the facts of the
civil status, thus obtaining the evidence of the Civil Registry, but it
is the Administration which must and may directly access the data.
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b. The Principle of Material Publicity
The most characteristic principle of Registry’s publicity, as
explained by Lacruz Berdejo when referring to the mortgage
principles, is that which refers to the effects of the registration and:
[I]s in turn traditionally broken down into another two
principles: one, of legitimation, which states the exactness
of the Registry to the benefit of the holder registered unless
there is evidence otherwise. The other is that of public
witnessing or publicity in the strict sense, in favour of the
acquirer in good faith.
In the words of Jerónimo González:
Once the principle of publicity is focused from this
substantive or substantial point of view, it has two aspects,
one positive and the other negative, depending on the truth
of the registration declarations or their irreproachability.
That is to say, the registration is exact as it corresponds to
the full, legal reality, as it is complete. What is registered is
real, and there is nothing beyond the registration of this
nature. 37
Now an analysis must be made whether such principles and
presumptions govern the functioning of the Civil Registry in
general. To do this, we will start from the distinction made by the
doctrine of positive value and negative value of the Civil Registry.
As regards the positive value applied to the registration, mention
must be made of its usefulness as a means of proof, as certification
of legitimation and constitutive certification, and as regards the
negative value, this brings up whether the absence of registration
can give rise to a special protection of the third parties who ignore
the change of civil status, which has occurred in reality and is not
yet registered.

37. Both quotations (LACRUZ BERDEJO and JERÓNIMO GONZÁLEZ) in JOSÉ
LUIS LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., III BIS ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, DERECHO
INMOBILIARIO REGISTRAL 41-42 (2d ed., Dykinson 2003).
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D. Presumption of Exactness and Positive Value of the
Registration as a Means of Proof and Certification of Legitimation
1. Presumption of Exactness
Regarding the Property Registry, based on article 38 of the
Mortgage Law, 38 it has been said that if it is presumed that the
content of the Register is exact, the registration holder is
legitimized, as holder, to act in the development and in the process
(Lacruz Berdejo). 39
Likewise, although not in an identical manner, in the case of
the Civil Registry, the LCR 2011 starts from a presumption of
exactness, which brings to mind the stipulations in article 38 of the
Mortgage Law: “It is presumed that the facts registered exist and
the acts are valid and exact while the corresponding entry is not
rectified or cancelled in the form stipulated in law” (article 16.2
LCR 2011).
This presumption is a consequence of the compliance with the
obligation which the person responsible for the Civil Registry has
in order to care for the concordance between the data registered in
the Registry and the reality beyond the Registry (article 16.1). In
order to ensure the continuity of this concordance and the
exactness, “When the acts and facts registered in the Civil Registry
are challenged, the rectification of the corresponding entry must be
sought” (article 16.3).
2. Positive Value of the Registration as a Means of Proof
As a result of this presumed exactness and the concordance of
what is registered and what is real, the registration has the
character of “full proof of the facts registered” (article 17.1 LCR
2011). We will analyse this question more thoroughly as regards
the proof of civil status.
38. Decree of February 8, on the official Mortgage Law, B.O.E. n. 57, Feb.
27, 1946.
39. LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., supra note 37.
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3. Positive Value of the Registration as Certification of
Legitimation
If the content of the Register is exact, the holder of the
registration is legitimized, as such, in order to act in the transfer
and in the process in accordance with its content; therefore, the
registration also functions as certification of legitimation.
The Civil Registry is the certification of legitimation par
excellence of civil status. The registration institution is conceived
so that whoever exhibits the corresponding certification or
certifications does not have to do anything else: he will be a
legitimate, illegitimate or adoptive child, his marriage will be
valid, etc. and whoever opposes the consequences of each of these
statuses will assume the burden of proof to demonstrate the
invalidity or non-existence of the respective certification of
attribution. Thus, the principle of legitimation included in articles 1
and 38 of the Mortgage Law for the Property Registry may be
transferred to the area of the Civil Registry by stating that the
registrations of the Civil Registry are under the protection of the
courts. These take effect while their inexactness is not declared by
the means established in the Law so, that for all legal purposes, it
is presumed that the facts registered exist and belong to their
holder in the form determined by the respective entry. The
presumption of reality and legality of the fact registered is iuris
tantum so that the dispensation of proof for the holder and the
consequent onus probandi for the opponent contributes to
facilitating the legal process. 40
It must be added, in general, that the registrations and their
respective certifications have the character of a public document
for the appropriate effects (article 7 LCR 1957), as whoever issues
them—“The Person Responsible and, by delegation, the Secretary”
(article 17 RCR 1958)—who is “a competent public employee
40. Jesús Díez del Corral Rivas, Comentario a los artículos 1 a 8 Ley del
Registro Civil in IV-2 COMENTARIOS AL CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMPILACIONES
FORALES 35-36 (Edersa 1996).
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with the formalities established by the law” (article 1216 C.C.),
and “civil servants legally empowered to bear witness in the
exercise of his functions” (article 317.5 LCP). Classifiable as
public administrative documents are those which give proof as
regards third parties or inter partes, in the terms and conditions
stated in article 1218 C.C. 41
E. Presumption of Integrity and Negative Value of the Registry:
Ineffectiveness of What is not Registered
In the mortgage area, the presumption of integrity of the
Property Registry is deduced from the content of article 32 of the
Mortgage Law, in relation to articles 13, 29 and 37 of this Law,
and from this, it follows that what the Registry does not contain or
publish at the time of acquisition is considered non-existent.
Consequently, what is not registered does not harm a third party.
In contrast, in the area of the Civil Registry, the principle of
integrity is not used for regulation, “nor is it necessary to the extent
that the fundamental finality of the registration institution is to
achieve a means of proof of status quickly and simply, without
discarding the possibility of other means of proof;” 42 the legislator
is aware that the changes of civil status may occur in the reality of
extra-registration with full validity and efficacy. That is why the
Preliminary Recitals of the LCR 1957 stated that, “The Civil
Registry does not have the presumption of integrity and, therefore,
does not constitute proof of negative facts.”
Consequently, in the area of the Civil Registry, the principle of
ineffectiveness does not play a part either (“what is not registered
does not damage third parties”), as this principle is based on the
presumption of integrity of the content of the Registry, which
occurs in the case of the Property Registry. Although it leaves the
question open, we are reminded of this by the 2nd Resolution of the
Department of Registries and Notaries of January 28, 2008:
41. Díez del Corral Rivas, supra note 40, at 32.
42. Consejo Fiscal, supra note 31, at 37.
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. . . [T]he determining fact of a specific civil status may
have occurred extra-Registry and is not even recorded in
the Civil Registry, which does not mean that this is
unknown by the person affected or the holder of this
specific civil status, regarding whom all the implicit effects
take place, but the question is whether this civil status
which is not registered may not damage bona fide third
parties.
Certainly, no direct answers can be found to the question
posed neither in the LCR nor in its Regulations. 43
The LCR 2011 surprisingly includes a presumption of integrity
and a principle of ineffectiveness, both in article 19:
1. The content of the Registry is presumed to be complete
as regards the facts and acts registered. 2. In the cases
legally stipulated, the facts and acts which can be registered
in accordance with the prescriptions of this Law will be
effective against third parties from the time that they access
the Civil Registry.
However, it is immediately appreciated that the mention which
article 19 makes of the presumption of integrity is circumscribed
exclusively to the facts and acts registered, which, in the opinion
of the Council of the Judicial Power is not, despite the title of the
article, only a reaffirmation that:
. . . [T]he Civil Registry does not have the presumption of
integrity and, therefore, this does not constitute a proof of
the negative facts . . . . As an example, articles 70.4 and
73.2 of the Draft Bill include the legal system stipulated in
article 18 [in the LCR 2011, article 19] as regards tacit
emancipation or independent life, the authorization of age
and the legal measures regarding the custody or
administration and regarding surveillance and control of
these guardianships. 44
Integrity of the facts and acts registered is, therefore,
presumed, rather than those of the Registry as a whole. That is to
43. Ministerio de Justicia, Resoluciones de la Dirección General de los
Registros y del Notariado (Registro Civil), Boletín de Información, Ano LXII,
Sup. 2, n. 2074, Dec. 1, 2008, at 339.
44. Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Informe al Anteproyecto de Ley del
Registro Civil 2010, 35-36 (http://www.poderjudicial.es/).
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say, it is not that the Registry is presumed to be complete in itself
in such a way that what is not registered does not damage third
parties, but that what is already registered is presumed to be full
and complete. Thus, it does seem clear that the new LCR is not
intended to change the state of things by introducing an authentic
presumption that the Registry is complete, and, therefore, exhausts
the legal reality regarding the facts or acts in its area; if such a
presumption existed, the consequence should be that it also serve
as proof of negative facts in such a way that what is not registered
is not effective against third parties.
What is certain is that, on the one hand, in regard to negative
facts, proof is not established, but, only the declarations with the
value of simple presumption continue to be upheld, 45 to which we
also refer when speaking of proof.
On the other hand, the coherent consequence with a principle
of integrity is the effectiveness of what is registered and the
ineffectiveness of what is not registered. What the LCR 2011
provides regarding effectiveness or ineffectiveness is that, in the
cases in which a law states, with regard to a fact or a specific legal
act, if it is not registered it is ineffective; such a legal consequence
of substantive legislation is, we should say, “endorsed” by registry
legislation. This does not contribute any rules on effectiveness as it
is limited to making a dynamic legislative referral and to making,
if appropriate, the commencement of the consequence of
effectiveness. Not even on this point is the mention useful as it is
not clear what “from when they access the Civil Registry” 46 means
since this may refer to the application for or actually the making of
the entry. Taking all of this into account, the new law does not
seem to contribute much, but can, however, create certain
confusion.
Apart from this, if it is said that effectiveness against third
parties begins from when they access the facts and acts in the Civil
45. Chapter 3 of Part IX, arts. 92-93 LRC 2011, supra note 1.
46. Article 19.2 LCR 2011, supra note 1.
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Registry; until that time, they are ineffective. However, according
to article 19, it is only “In the cases legally stipulated.” But apart
from these cases, it seems that the rule continues to be the same: in
the Civil Registry, what is not registered (except for the cases of
constitutive registration) exists and takes effect in regard to third
parties, including bona fide third parties.
VI. LEGAL REGIME OF CIVIL STATUS
Apart from the common characteristics examined, the
maintenance of the notion of civil status is of an eminently
instrumental nature, insofar as there are common aspects of its
practical legal regime.
The first of these concerns the aforementioned actions of status
and the second concerns its proof.
A. The Actions of Status—Especially, the Need for the Registration
of the Rulings on Civil Status in the Civil Registry so that they May
Be of an erga omnes Nature
With regard to civil status, judicial rulings may be involved:
e.g., on separation of married couples, or emancipation by judicial
concession judicial; some civil statuses are even constituted
through rulings—this occurs, for example, with disability. The
actions which commence the judicial proceedings that tend to
achieve a specific pronouncement on civil status are called actions
of status.
We have already seen some questions concerning these:
1) in the LCP, they do not receive autonomous treatment, but
in connection with the special processes on capacity, filiation,
marriage and minors (articles 748 et seq. LCP), which are
processes related to determined actions of status;
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2) the Prosecutor’s office must intervene in these proceedings
in defence of legality and the public or social interest (article 3.6
Organic Status of the Prosecutor’s Office 47 and article 749 LCP);
3) in these processes, it is not possible to conduct transactions
(article 1814 C.C.) nor, we now add, renounce or accept the same,
and desisting is limited to certain cases;
4) the provisional enforcement of these rulings is not possible
(article 525 LCP, expressly referring to “civil status”).
These are procedural questions, whose in-depth study is not
relevant now, but we are going to take time to deal with the
specific point of the registration of the rulings in the Civil Registry
which are a result of these actions of status
In general, the rulings produce their effects as material matters
judged from the time that they are definitive, and from that time,
they affect “. . . [T]he parties to the process in which the ruling is
issued and their heirs and successors . . .” as provided generally for
the material res iudicata in article 222.3.I LCP.
However, and as an exception to the general rule, the second
and third sub-sections of article 222.3 LCP establish cases of
extension of the res iudicata to subjects who have not been parties
in the previous litigation. Specifically, in the “rulings on civil
status, marriage, filiation, paternity, maternity and disability and
reintegration of capacity, the res iudicata will take effect as regards
all as from the registration or annotation in the Civil Registry.” 48
This extension erga omnes of the res iudicata is based on the
idea that nobody can have a civil status in relation to determined
persons and lack this as regards others, and it means that:
a) Third parties not legitimated (to exercise the action of status
in question) must observe the civil status recognized in the ruling,
and
b) Those legitimated are forbidden to initiate a second process
on the same question.
47. Supra note 26.
48. Article 222.3.I LCP, supra note 2.
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In fact, article 222.3 LCP does not suppose an absolute novelty
as there were already articles which provided for the recording in
the Civil Registry of several judicial resolutions on civil status: on
the separation of married couples (article 83 C.C.), divorce (article
89 C.C.), filiation (articles 112 et seq. C.C.), disability (the
repealed article 214 C.C.) and guardianship (article 218 C.C.).
What must be stressed is that “for the first time it is said that it is
necessary to have the confirmation of these types of resolutions in
the Civil Registry so that the effect of res iudicata occurs as
regards all.” 49
Apart from this, could the aforementioned article 222.3 LCP be
used to base a possible generic effect of ineffectiveness of what is
not registered in the Civil Registry? It seems impossible to speak
of a generic principle of ineffectiveness in this sense, and there is
no sufficient basis to support the possibility that the third party
might take advantage of the intended ineffectiveness in order to
prevent the annulment of a legal transaction made with the
disabled person, for example, on the day following the date on
which the ruling is issued, arguing that it was not registered.
It is revealing that the LCR 2011 does not mention
ineffectiveness in the case of registration of the modification of
capacity (article 72), but does so, however, in the registration of
guardianship and its modifications (article 73.2): “These
resolutions will only be effective as regard third parties when the
due registrations have been made.” In this final sub-section, this is
incorporated and reproduced in the registration legislation; the
LCR 1957 did not contain this pronouncement of article 218.II
C.C., expressed in positive terms.
The lack of registration of the ruling, especially considering the
mandate of 755 LCP, continues to be anomalous or “pathological”
49. Juan José Pretel Serrano, La publicidad del régimen económico
matrimonial. Relaciones entre el Registro Civil y el Registro de la propiedad in
DERECHO DE FAMILIA Y REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD 225 (Centro de Estudios
Registrales ed., 2002).
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regarding coordination between official organisms: it is supposed
that the rulings on disability are automatically communicated to
the Civil Registries, and, even more so, with the new systems of
entries with electronic format and storage systems
In this regard, in its report, regarding the Draft Bill of the Civil
Registry, the Prosecutor’s office proposed that “[it is] the
obligation that the Court or Tribunal Secretaries who have issued a
definitive judicial result of the modification of capacity, is
electronically forwarded to the office of the Civil Registry, with
the finality that any alteration of the capacity of a person be
immediately registered in the Civil Registry.” 50Article 34 LCR.
2011 has included this suggestion regarding the entries of judicial
resolutions and, in general, provides for civil status, that:
The Court Secretary of the organism which has issued a
resolution whose resolution must involve an entry in the
Civil Registry as it affects the civil status of persons, must
be sent by electronic means to the office of the Civil
Registry, as testimony of the judicial resolution referred
to. 51
B. Proof of Civil Status and Attribution of Legitimation
The second common aspect in the legal regime of civil status
concerns the evidence.
Frequently it is necessary to prove that a determined civil status
is held or not held. The most characteristic evidence is that
provided by the Civil Registry, whose function is, precisely, the
official confirmation, with the effects and the ends in each case of
the facts and acts which refer to the civil status of the persons and
those others determined by Law. In fact, registration in the Civil
Registry has had and has the character of privileged evidence as
regards civil status.

50. Consejo Fiscal, supra note 31, at 42.
51. Article 34 LCR 2011, supra note 1.
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1. Registration in the Civil Registry
The character of privileged proof which is attributed to the
registration in this Registry (traditionally included in 2 to 6 of the
LCR 1957), means two things: the first is that it is only permissible
to accredit the facts that are possible to register and those
registered, and the second is that the content of the Registry is
under the custody of the courts so that it may only be rectified by a
definitive judicial ruling. 52 According to de Castro, this is justified
by the fact that “this is a question of pre-constituted evidence
within the legal period of time and by the legitimated person
(before contestation, the affirmation is not suspicious), under the
guarantee of criminal sanction and the control of registration
classification.” 53
The LCR 2011 attempted to draw attention to the doctrine
accrued in the years since the LCR. 1957 was in force and confers
on the registration the character of “full proof of the facts
registered” (article 17.1). Following the traditional tendency on
this point, article 18 of this law clarifies that the other possible
efficacy of the registration, the constitutive registration, will only
occur “in the cases stipulated in law.” That is to say, the
registration serves primarily and fundamentally to prove the civil
status and to prove this with the characteristic of fullness, but it
may also serve to constitute a new civil status (for example, in the
case of the acquisition of nationality).
The classification as full, applied to the proof, which did not
appear article 2 of the LCR 1957, does not contradict the
possibility that the registration is challengeable, but it refers
fundamentally to the “legal privilege of evidential exclusivity of
civil status” which the Civil Registry has (as stated by , among
others, the Resolution of the Department of Registries and Notaries

52. Articles 3-4 LCR 1957, supra note 6.
53. DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, supra note 9, at 572.
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of June 25, 2007 54), and which has its logical complement in the
principle of the judicial safeguard of the registration entries.
However, this must take into account that:
1) In the case of inexact or erroneous registration, the judicial
challenge is admitted, for which, logically, other means of extraregistration proof can be provided; a challenge which requires the
commencement of the rectification of the entry (article 16.3 LCR
2011: “When the acts and facts registered in the Civil Registry are
challenged, the rectification of the corresponding entry must be
sought”), and
2) In article 17.2 LCR 2011:
In the cases of lack of registration or in which was not
possible to certify the entry, other means of proof will be
admitted. In the first case, an essential requisite for its
admission will be the accreditation that, previous or
simultaneously, the registration omitted or the
reconstruction of the entry is commenced and not only the
mere application.
2. The Annotations and their Informative Value
As opposed to the full proof of registration, there is another
type of entry in the Civil Registry, annotations, which have simply
informative value (article 38 LCR 1957 and article 40 LCR 2011).
They lack the efficacy of full and excluding proof which
characterizes registration. Thus, the facts and acts informed of in
these types of entries may be proved by other means.
3. The Declarations with the Value of Simple Presumption
As we shall see in the corresponding themes, there are
determined civil statuses which are only recorded in the Civil
Registry insofar as they are acquired as derived, or are the subject
of change, etc. Thus, the nationality acquired by ius sanguinis and

54. B.O.E. n. 188, Aug. 7, 2007.

2014]

CURRENT TRENDS IN SPANISH LAW

127

maintained throughout time may never be achieved expressly in
the Civil Registry.
In cases like these and in general, when these involve civil
statuses which are not expressly recorded in the Civil Registry, this
does not have the basis to provide the proof which will make the
registration possible. Thus, for some time, the Civil Registry
governmental records are reviewed and utilized in order to declare
with the value of simple presumption determined circumstances
related to civil status (article 96 LCR 1957), among which are
nationality and original residency, the domicile of stateless
persons, or any status not recorded in the Registry. These
declarations are also taken into account in the LCR 2011 (articles
92 and 93), and are the subject of obligatory annotation, which
does not add more value to these than that of stating the existence
of this presumption.
Declarations which, as is stated in the Resolution of the
Department of Registries and Notaries of January 28, 2008, 55 “tend
to achieve the proof of the negative facts of the civil status,” but do
not have the value of proof of the facts and acts registered, but
rather of presumption: the possibility that of dispensing with the
proof of the presumed fact for the party which this fact favours,
with no need to prove “the certainty that the indicative fact the
presumption is based on has been established through admission or
proof.” 56 In this case, it comes from a governmental record and
this presumptive value is applied to this result.
4. The Possession of Status
The possession of status is the continued appearance of
filiation or marriage accepted by all as real, which may also exist
in relation to the other civil statuses. 57

55. Supra note 43.
56. Article 385.1 LCP, supra note 2.
57. LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., supra note 8, at 30.
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The Supreme Court has stressed that the possession of status is
a question of fact, to be freely appreciated by the Courts of Frist
Instance, and the specific circumstances must be taken into account
(rulings of the Supreme Court of November 5, 1987 and of
February 2, 1999, 58 among others). Traditionally, the requisites of
nomen, tractatus, fama are required. For example, if the matter has
to do with possession of the civil status of a son, he will have the
surnames of the progenitor, they have the normal relationship of
father and son, and it is publicly known that they are father and
son. The possession of status according to these parameters is
evident in repeated acts, carried out continually and in public, and
it is not necessary that the acts showing such possession be very
numerous nor carried out at all times with full publicity. It must
last for a certain time, even when its actual existence at the time it
is invoked is not required, and it is sufficient that it be recorded in
the recent past (rulings of the Supreme Courts of February 16,
1989; of May 20, 1991, and of November 14, 1992, 59 among
others).
It is not a matter of acquiring civil status by continued
possession (a type of usucapio of civil status) but of demonstrating
a civil status which exists when there is no registration, it is not
known where the registration is (it is not known where the birth or
marriage is registered), or its exactness is arguable.
In connection with what has been seen regarding the character
of privileged proof of the registration, it is understood that it is
only possible to resort to the possession of status as a means of
proof in its absence, serving as a basis for completing its omission
or to obtain a declaration with the simple value of presumption.

58. S.T.S., Nov. 5, 1987 (Roj. 6988/1987) and S.T.S., Feb. 2, 1999 (Roj.
578/1999).
59. S.T.S., Feb. 16, 1989 (Roj. 1063/1989), S.T.S., May 20, 1991 (Roj.
2554/1991), and S.T.S. Nov. 14, 1992 (Roj. 8458/1992).
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In turn, it may also serve as a basis for obtaining the
rectification of the Civil Registry if there is a problem of the
exactness of the registration.
It is frequently used together with other factors in judicial
proceedings in order to obtain a ruling which declares civil
status—for example, a declaration of paternity.
Although it is fundamentally used in cases of filiation and
marriage, there are also examples of possession of status in legal
residence and nationality (Resolutions of the Department of
Registries and Notaries of July 3, 1967 and of October 28, 1986 60).
VII. DOUBTFUL CIVIL STATUS
Having seen the characteristics and judicial regime of civil
status, we must now approach the classification as a civil status of
some situations which are put forward as doubtful, and which we
will deal with under this heading, and the crisis and continuance of
the category, which will be dealt with under the final heading.
A. Sex as Civil Status
We have seen that one of the registrations mentioned is sex,
with its possible change (article 4.4 of the LCR 2011). It must be
remembered that, besides its aspect of identity, the condition of
male or female has been considered as civil status for a long time
precisely because the woman had her capacity to act in some areas
conditioned or limited due to being a woman.
The principle of constitutional equality in article 14
Constitución Española (CE), focused on the negative and
unjustified discrimination due to sex, has been included in several
laws which have eliminated such discrimination: in the civil area,
the laws of May 13, 1981 and July 7, 1981 and expressly, the Law

60. B.O.E. n. 172, Jul. 20, 1967 and B.O.E. n. 273, Nov. 14, 1986.
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of October 15, 1990, 61 in application of the principle of nondiscrimination due to sex; with general scope, outstanding is
Organic Law 3/2007, of March 22, 62 for the effective equality of
women and men.
Essential legislative differentiations are maintained, for
example, in the determination and actions concerning paternity and
maternity, due to the different roles of the man and the woman in
the conception, gestation and birth. Furthermore, precisely because
it is the woman who gestates and gives birth, attending to this
circumstance, the Constitution does not stipulate in vain the
integral protection of mothers (article 39 CE), with no reference to
fathers. In order to adapt reality to the principles of equality, the
legislator introduced some affirmative action in favour of the
woman, tending to compensate this circumstance in order to
achieve real equality. Measures which are the result of the
ratification by Spain (in 1983) of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 63 of
1979, which encourages the States to take “special measures of a
temporary nature aimed at speeding up de facto equality between
men and women,” which has caused our Constitutional Court to
consider as constitutional some measures which, apparently, would
be discriminatory toward men (rulings of the Constitutional Court
of July 16, 1987, of January 24, 1995, and May 14, 2008, 64 this
last one is in relation to Organic Law 1/2004, of December 28, 65
on the integral protection against gender violence, which considers
that the physical, psychical and moral integrity of the woman as
member of a couple is insufficiently protected).
61. Law 11/1981, of May 13, B.O.E. n. 119, May 19, 1981; Law 30/1981 of
June 7, B.O.E. n. 172, Jul. 20, 1981; and Law 11/1990, of October 15, B.O.E. n.
250, Oct. 18, 1990.
62. B.O.E. n. 71, Mar. 23, 2007.
63. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, A/RES/34/180 (18 Dec 1979).
64. S.T.C. 126/1987, B.O.E. n. 191, Aug. 11, 1987; S.T.C. 16/1995, B.O.E.
n. 50 sup., Feb. 28, 1995; and S.T.C. 59/2008, B.O.E. n. 135 sup., Jun. 4, 2008.
65. B.O.E. n. 313, Dec. 29, 2004.
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However, in general terms, it can be said that once the
limitation to the capacity of the woman to act due to her sexual
condition has disappeared, this condition, or that of the male are
not civil statuses as such, but indications of identity.
As such, mentions of identity have traditionally been possible
to alter through governmental rectification proceedings in the Civil
Registry, in the cases of material error on consigning the sex, and
in the cases of physical intersexuality (anatomical conformation
which does not correspond to the chromosome conformation),
defined subsequently differently from what is consigned in the
entry (article 93.2 LCR 1957).
The problem has arisen, not in these cases which we can call
errors, but in cases of sex change, in the cases of trans-sexuality,
and, specifically, in regard to the possibility, manner and effects of
consigning these sex changes in the Civil Registry. Precisely
because it was a transformation with regard to the previous
situation, and partly because sex continued to be considered as
civil status, in order to consign this change in the Registry, the
application of the regime of actions of status was required so that
only through a judicial ruling (and not simple registration
proceedings) was it possible to obtain this change in the registered
identification of sex. Besides this, sex thus transformed was
considered to be fictitious, and as such it prevented the application
of all the consequences which would result from the new sexual
condition. Thus, a female transsexual who at chromosome level is
male could not marry a male: in this regard, among others, the
Resolutions of the Department of Registries and Notaries, of
January 21, 1988, of October 2, 1991, of December 29, 1994, of
June 18 and 21, 2001, 66 and the Rulings of the Supreme Court of
July 2, 1987, of July 15, 1988, of March 3, 1989, and of April 19,

66. Resolution of Jan. 21, 1988 (RJ 1988/215); Resolution of Oct. 2, 1991
(RJ 1991/8611); Resolution of Dec. 29, 1994 (RJ 1995/1574); and Resolution of
Jun. 18, 2001 (BIMJ 1889-1900) and June 21, 2001 (BIMJ 1901).
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1991, 67 which considered the marriage contracted by a transsexual
with a person of the same original sex as null.
However, in two resolutions of 2001 (January 8 and 31), 68 the
Department of Registries and Notaries admitted this possibility on
condition that the transsexual had obtained a registration
rectification through a judicial ruling, based, among other
arguments, on the fact that the pronouncements against the rulings
of the Supreme Court which had been obiter dicta and did not
constitute case law.
The admission by Law 13/2005, of July 1, 69 of the marriage
between persons of the same sex, from the point of view of
positive law, eliminates the debate on the question of transsexual
marriage.
However, in order to solve the problem of marriage, Law
3/2007, of March 15, 70 goes much further as it permits registration
rectification of the mention of sex in the cases of trans-sexuality
with no need for a judicial ruling, once the applicant accredits the
following, among other points:
a) that a gender identity disorder has been diagnosed, with
discordance between the morphological sex or
physiological gender initially registered and the gender
identity felt by the applicant or psychosocial sex, as well as
the stability and persistence of this discordance, . . . and b)
that the person has been medically treated for, at least, two
years in order to accommodate his physical characteristics
to the corresponding sex claimed. It is not necessary that
the medical treatment included sexual reassignment surgery
(article 4.1).
Therefore, governmental proceedings are sufficient if the
resolution is effectively positive and it agrees to the rectification of
67. S.T.S., Jul. 2, 1987 (RJ 1987/5045); S.T.S., Jul. 15, 1988 (RJ
1988/5722); S.T.S., Mar. 3, 1989 (RJ 1989/1993); and S.T.S., Apr. 19, 1991 (RJ
1991/2725).
68. Resolution of Jan. 8, 2001 (RJ 2001/2568) and Resolution of Jan. 31,
2001 (RJ 2001/5095).
69. B.O.E. n. 157, Jul. 2, 2005.
70. B.O.E. n. 65, Mar. 16, 2007.
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the registration mention of the sex, it will have constitutive effects
from the time of its registration in the Civil Registry:
2. The registration rectification will permit the person to
exercise all the rights inherent to his new condition. 3. The
change of sex and the name agreed will not alter the
holding of the rights and legal obligations which might
have corresponded to the person previous to the registration
of the registration change. 71
Thus, the change of sex differs from other questions such as
disability, which, although it is partial and limited to the minimum
aspects, requires a judicial ruling; which also: a) if it is upheld, is
of a constitutive nature according to the majority of doctrine, and
b) it must be registered in the Civil Registry, which is an act of
improper execution.
Law 3/2007 is applicable to the cases which were pending
resolution such as the Ruling of the Supreme Court of September
17, 2007, 72 on the fact that a surgical operation is not required;
from this ruling, the more than doubtful character of the civil status
of the sexual condition can be deduced, in the light of the loss of
importance of the condition of man and woman as a judicial
situation, and the inapplicability of the of the regime of actions of
status in the sense that it is not unavailable, but may undergo
registration rectification at the discretion of the person
concerned. 73
B. Prodigality, the Declaration of Insolvency and Disability
1. Prodigality
The declaration of prodigality limits the capacity of the person
to act, and, for this reason, he is subjected to a limited guard
system: guardianship (article 286 C.C. and 760.3 LCP). The
71. Articles 5.2 and 5.3, Law 3/2007 of March 15, supra note 70.
72. S.T.S., Sep. 17, 2007 (Roj. 5818/2007).
73. See also the ruling of the Supreme Court of July 18, 2008 (Roj.
3962/2008).
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prodigal does not suffer limitations in the personal area, and the
limitations he suffers in the area of estate are only inter vivos. For
this reason, insofar as it is a judicial modification of the capacity of
the persons, it is possible to consider it to be civil status. However,
it is curious that it is not mentioned in the list of either of the two
Laws of the Civil Registry (1957 and 2011). At least at the present
time, this may be due to the fact that some legislation, in particular,
Aragonese legislation which explicitly states that “prodigality will
have no other effect than to be the reason for incapacitation when
the requisites of the previous section are present” (article 38.3
Code of Local Jurisdiction Law of Aragon 74), that is to say, when
wasting and squandering assets is the result of “persistent illnesses
or deficiencies of a physical or psychical nature which prevent the
person from governing by himself” (article 38.2 Code of Local
Jurisdiction Law of Aragon). If this presupposition does not exist,
the capacity to act in the estate area cannot be limited as a measure
to protect the interests of others although it can permit the adoption
of measures for insurance and obligatory enforcement of family
duties: assistance in the marriage, bringing up the children, food
among relatives, etc. In fact, according to the third transitory
provision of Aragonese Law 13/2006, of December 27, on the Law
of the person:
1. From the entry into force of this law, nobody can be
declared to be a prodigal. 2. The persons declared to be
prodigals on the entry into force of this Law will continue
to be regulated by the norms of the previous legislation, but
they can judicially apply for the reintegration of their
capacity. 75

74. D.L. 1/2001 of March 11, on the Código del Derecho Foral de Aragón,
B.O.E. n. 63, Mar. 29, 2011.
75. Third Transitory Disposition, Law 13/2006 of December 27, B.O.E. n.
23, Jan. 26, 2007.
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2. The Declaration of Insolvency
Once insolvency is declared in accordance with Law 22/2003,
of July 9, 76 the debtor will have his economic powers modified, in
the sense that these are: a) intervened by the insolvency receivers if
the insolvency is voluntary, or b) possibly suspended if it is a
necessary insolvency, and in this case he will be substituted by the
insolvency administration.
Despite the fact that this limitation is registered in the Civil
Registry on the sheet or register of the debtor (No. 10: “The
judicial modification of the capacity of the persons. . . which
derives from the declaration of insolvency of natural persons 77),
the fact that, on the one hand, it is not a stable situation as it may
terminate at any time by an agreement between the debtor and his
creditors, and, on the other hand, it is intended fundamentally for
the benefit of the creditors (which makes it possible to understand
that there are no reasons of public order), makes the Supreme
Court consider that insolvency is not a civil status (rulings of the
Supreme Court of June 30, 1987 and October 14, 2005, 78 referred
to bankruptcy, whose regime is now unified with that of
guardianship).
3. Incapacitation and the Measures for Safeguarding the
Person with Disability
One of the traditionally classified civil statuses constituted
differently from other civil statuses by judicial ruling is that of the
incapacitated person. Nevertheless, some authors do not include
the judicial modifications of the capacity to act among civil
statuses; as we have seen, these are circumscribed to those derived
from the permanent social links of citizenship or regionality and
those derived from family situations.
76. B.O.E. n. 164, Jul. 10, 2003.
77. Article 4.10 LCR 2011, supra note 1.
78. S.T.S., Jun. 30, 1987 (Roj. 4548/1987) and S.T.S., Oct. 14, 2005 (Roj.
6181/2005).
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Apart from the fact that the Convention of the Rights of
Persons with Disability 79 does not at any time refer to
incapacitation, but to the “adequate and effective safeguard
measures” (article 12), even less so, it conceives these as
configuring its own civil status. It must also be taken into account
that, as will be seen in the corresponding theme, there is a doctrinal
and professional sector which considers that the Convention of the
Rights of Persons with Disability proscribes, as contrary to judicial
equality, the difference between judicial capacity and the capacity
to act, and judicial incapacitation, and, therefore: a) in the case of
the capacity to act, this should be mentioned simply, as stated by
the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability as “the
exercise of judicial capacity” (article 12), with regard to which
measures may be taken which provide the aforementioned
adequate and effective safeguards for this exercise, but without
limiting the same, and b) regarding the process of incapacitation,
this current of thought proposes its substitution by a system of
supports for the free taking of decisions, in the case of persons
with disability who require this.
In the European environment, the Green Paper of the European
Commission80 in order to promote the recognition of the effects of
civil status certificates, only lists as civil statuses: birth, marriage
and death, with no reference to incapacitation or the modification
of the capacity to act.
In recent years, legislative interest is focused on incapacitation,
which tends to be reduced to a minimum in the cases strictly
necessary and which continue to be effectively considered to be
civil status, but in the regulation of measures for the support of
persons with disability. Measures which are the subject of publicity
in the Civil Registry, 81 through different types of entries are:
79. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disability, A/RES/61/611 (13 Dec. 2006).
80. Supra note 4.
81. SOFÍA DE SALAS MURILLO, LA PUBLICIDAD DE LA DISCAPACIDAD EN EL
REGISTRO CIVIL (Thomson-Reuters-Aranzadi 2012).
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register of judicial modifications of the capacity of persons to act,
with the corresponding assignment of the regime of legal
guardianship (articles 72 and 73 LRC 2011); annotation—without
probative value—of the situations of natural disability which are
accompanied by de facto guardianship (article 40.3.9th LRC 2011);
register of the protected estates of persons of persons with
disability, who do not necessarily have to be disabled (article 76
LRC 2011); register of the preventive powers of attorney (article
77 LRC 2011), and, finally and more recently, register of the
assistance, incorporated to the Civil Code of Catalonia (article
226-7 of Law enacting Book II of Catalan Civil Code, Llei
25/2010, de 29 de juliol). 82
The new conceptions of disability involve:
[A] new judicial approach to these and this leads to the
security and permanence sought with the configuration of
82. The Preamble of this Catalan Law gives an interesting account of the
policy underlying these alternative measures for the support of persons with
disabilities:
Along with the provision which allows not to establish guardianship if
a power of attorney was granted in anticipation of a loss of capacity,
changes regarding de facto custody are a reflection of the new model of
personal protection established by the second book. This model is
guided by the idea that incapacity is too drastic a remedy and that it
sometimes shows little respect for the natural capacity of the protected
person. It is for this very reason that Chapter VI includes a new
instrument of protection, assistance, aimed at the adult who needs to
care for his person or property because of a non-disabling decrease in
his physical or mental faculties. Personal protection is thus not
necessarily linked to cases of lack of capacity: it also includes
instruments, based on the free development of the personality, which
serve to protect persons in situations such as aging, mental illness or
disability. This instrument can also be very useful for certain vulnerable
groups for whom incapacity and the implementation of a regime of
guardianship or curatorship seem disproportionate, such as persons
affected by mild mental retardation or other persons for whom, due to
the kind of impairment they suffer, traditional instruments are not
appropriate to meet their needs. In line with the guidelines of
Recommendation R (99) 4, of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, of 28 February 1999, and with the existing
precedents in various neighbouring legal systems, it was considered
that this model of protection, parallel to guardianship or curatorship,
could be more appropriate. Moreover, this trend also inspires the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
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incapacitation as a civil status of the person terminating and
being transformed into ballast which prevents the flexibility
which the persons with disability require for the protection
that integrates them into society. Thus, conserving the
conception of civil status for the most extreme cases, we
understand that agile mechanisms must be sought which
permit carrying out the protection and assistance of persons
with deficiencies in their participation in the judicial world,
which, one way or another, affect their self-governance
without affecting their civil status. 83
4. The Declaration of Absence
The judicial nature of absence, as is seen in the corresponding
theme, is arguable: before the reform Civil Code of 1939, the
majority opinion was that declared absence was a modifying
reason for the capacity of the person. This opinion cannot currently
be maintained as, according to the current drafting of article 188.2
C.C., purchases made by a third party from the person absent show
that he conserves his capacity to act.
Regardless of the effect on the capacity to act, its character of
civil status has been defended in the light of the wide range of
judicial consequences which occur at the personal and estate level
of the person absent. There are authors who recognize the
importance of the effects of the declaration of absence, and they
understand that this is not a question of civil status but of a
disconnection between the person and the assets administered by a
representative, which has a reflexive effect on the capacity of the
person to act. Counter to the usual character of civil status, the
possibility is added of removing the effect of the declaration at any
time, based on presumptions and uncertainties so that the matter
can be re-examined whenever it is necessary.

83. Cristóbal Francisco Fábrega Ruiz, Realidad y nuevos horizontes de la
guarda de hecho de las personas con autogobierno limitado in HACIA UNA
VISIÓN GLOBAL DE LOS MECANISMOS JURÍDICO-PRIVADOS DE PROTECCIÓN EN
MATERIA DE DISCAPACIDAD 335, note 232. (S. de Salas Murillo, coord., El
Justicia de Aragón 2010).
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VIII. CURRENT SITUATION OF THE CATEGORY AND THE CONCEPT OF
CIVIL STATUS: CRISIS OR SURVIVAL?
For some decades, doctrine has shown the ambiguity of the
scope and meaning of civil status in our legislation due to the
reasons already explained and others we shall see below.
A. Vagueness of the Concept
On the one hand, civil status as a category no longer affects the
capacity to act, although there are cases in which this capacity is
affected by some of the civil statuses, such as the status of minor or
disabled person, it is not affected by others, such as marriage. As
this common denominator does not exist, gathering such diverse
situations as nationality, family status, age or disability in the same
category inevitably leads to a vague and imprecise concept, whose
unity lies solely, as was stated above, in its value for defining the
basic judicial situation of the person in society. This is why some
authors have abandoned the concept, 84 and others recognize that
the law continues to use it with this meaning. This must continue
to be taken into account, but conceptually it is a dispensable
concept, to the extent that it adds little to the specific regulation of
each of the situations of the human being.
These doubts are evident from the fact that the LCP: 85 a) does
not take into account a specific regime for the actions of status, but
for determined processes which affect situations traditionally
framed in civil status (the special processes of Part I of Book IV on
capacity, filiation, marriage and minors), and b) when it speaks of
the impossibility to submit the lawsuits on these matters to
transaction (articles 748 to 781 LCP), nor does it mention the term
civil status.

84. CARLOS LASARTE ÁLVAREZ, I PRINCIPIOS DE
GENERAL Y DERECHO DE LA PERSONA (10th ed., Marcial
85. Supra note 2.

DERECHO CIVIL. PARTE
Pons 2004).
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It is true that it maintains the term when it takes into account
two specific specialties related to the scope of the res iudicata
(article 222.3) and of the execution of judgments (article 525.1.1),
as was seen above. However, we have also seen that what is
relative to the scope of the res iudicata is not clear, recalling what
is relative to the confusing regime of article 222 LCP.
Despite everything (the LCP in those two articles), and the
LCR 2011 (and the Bill for the Integral Reform of the Registries)
continue to use the concept of civil status and, due to this, the
interpreter cannot dispense with this, although must acknowledge
the “elasticity of the concept” and its “historically variable
content,” 86 or its instrumental nature. 87
B. Disassociation of Civil Status and the Civil Registry
In the processing of the LCR 2011, it was put forward that the
concept be discarded, and probably this would have been the
appropriate time to do so considering the conceptual proximity of
civil status and Civil Registry. The General Council of Judicial
Power understood this to be so in the report on the Bill, for this
law: “Perhaps the legislator must make an effort in this regard and
dare to define the legal concept of civil status once and for all or
dispense completely with the use of this term.” 88
Nevertheless, the law (LCR 2011) decided to conserve the
express reference to civil status, but it must be recognized that the
broadness of the mention “other conditions of the person” 89 could
give the sensation—at least from the standpoint of the positive
law—that it is practically unnecessary to continue using this
concept.
In this law, the concepts of Civil Registry and civil status are
disassociated, perhaps even more strongly: the function of the
86.
87.
88.
89.

LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., supra note 8, at 393-94.
Roca Guillamón, supra note 25, at 97.
Consejo General del Poder Judicial, supra note 44, at 54.
Article 11.b LCR 2011, supra note 1.
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Registry continues to be that of official confirmation, with the
appropriate effects and the finalities of the facts and acts which
refer to civil status of persons in each case, but also “to those
others which are determined by the Law”. 90
This disassociation of civil status and the Civil Registry had
already begun previously—although it is true that, until a short
time ago, the Civil Code continued to talk of the “Registry of civil
status” 91since, for some time, this Registry has admitted much data
and many personal circumstances independent of the concept of
civil status. If the last two Laws of the Civil Registry (of 1957 and
of 2011) are examined, the Civil Registry is not nor has been
solely a Registry of civil status, as the Civil Code seemed to say,
but has admitted other facts, which is why it is called simply the
Civil Registry.
What refers to disability is a proof of this; thus, the Civil
Registry wished to admit entry to concepts or institutions which
function apart from disability, and, therefore, a possible change in
civil status. 92 The design of the new Civil Registry stipulates an
area of application even wider than the area stipulated by the LCR
1957 with regard to facts and acts which can be registered. This
circumstance distances it from the strict limits of traditional civil
status.
If the Bill for the Integral Reform of the Registries is approved,
the difference will be even more marked as the registry would
admit questions as distant from the category of civil status as life
or accident insurance or pension schemes.
C. Civil Status is Compatible with the Maintenance of Groups or
Social Categories
It is true that the notion of civil status has, on occasions, been
identified with the idea of social stratification or classification.
90. Article 39, LCR 2011, supra note 1.
91. Cf. arts. 325 to 332 C.C., repealed by the LCR 2011.
92. Cf. infra Part VII.B.3.

142

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

This is scarcely in accordance with the current configuration of a
democratic society, and this would be a new incentive to abandon
the category. 93 Nevertheless, this is not an impediment to its
survival for several reasons:
a) The equality of all persons before the Law, with no
distinctions, determines the fact that, today, civil status only refers
to certain specific qualities such as marriage, age, disability,
nationality, and not others such as race, social class and sex,
which, from a constitutional point of view, would be inadmissible
as they go against the dignity of persons and the principle of
equality (articles 10 and 14 of the European Constitution). 94 In this
regard, the LCR 2011 starts from the:
[U]nequivocal acknowledgement of dignity and equality
has supposed the progressive abandonment of judicial
constructions from past epochs which configured civil
status based on social status, religion, sex, filiation or
marriage. A Civil Registry coherent with the Constitution
must assume that persons, equal in dignity and rights, are
its only reason for existence, not only from an individual
and subjective point of view but also in their objective
dimension, as members of a politically organized
community. 95
The fact is that, although the grouping of persons who are in
the same personal situation subjected to the same legal regime
may suggest the idea of social classification by status, currently,
the judicial consequences of civil status, as well as its judicial
treatment must be controlled by the principle of constitutional
equality (article 14 of the CE); a principle, which, as is known,
does not prohibit any inequality, but rather the differences of
unjustified or discriminatory treatment, and even permits positive
discrimination (in the case of women, for example, intended to
obtain real equality).
93. ENCARNA ROCA TRÍAS, Comentario al artículo
DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL 228 (Ministerio de Justicia ed., 1991).
94. Roca Guillamón, supra note 25, at 97.
95. Preamble LCR 2011, supra note 1.
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b) It is not correct to limit status to those involved in belonging
to a determined social community in our current legal system even
though historically this was so. This means that they are not
limited to those related to status familiae and civitatis, nor are they
identified as a category with any social compartmentalization.
c) The recent tendencies regarding human rights mark out
groups and collectives requiring special protection, such children
and persons with disabilities, for whom international conventions
and several norms have approved specific protection regulations.
Some have observed here “new civil statuses”. 96 There are
doubtful aspects, such as the fact that the recognition of the
“degree of disability”, for the purposes of Legislative Decree
1/2013, of 29 November, approving the revised text of the General
Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and their Social
Inclusion, 97 and the qualification of the “dependence”, for the ones
of the Law on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for
Dependent Persons, 98 are administrative declarations, in principle
without civil effects, which do not have access to the Civil
Registry99—besides the fact that, as such administrative
resolutions, at least in principle, the regime LCP would not apply
to these. However, for the purposes which we are now analysing, it
is an irrefutable fact that there is no opposition in current law to
introducing legislative differences, designing their own regime
tending to facilitate the real equality of these collectives. In fact,
the Preamble of the LCR 2011 expressly refers to the fact that “in
this Law both the Convention of the Rights of the Child of
November 20, 1989, ratified by Spain on November 30, 1990, and
the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities of
96. LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., supra note 8, at 28-29.
97. B.O.E. n. 289. Dec. 3, 2013.
98. Law 39/2006 of December 14, B.O.E. n. 299, Dec. 15, 2006.
99. In fact, some people have obtained the administrative declaration of a
certain “degree of disability” (expressed in percent), whose ability to act,
however, has not been modified, and vice versa. The same applies to the
classification of the “dependence”. In this sense, we must remember that none of
these procedures, even the judicial modification of capacity are compulsory.
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December 13, 2006, ratified by Spain on November 23, 2007 is
incorporated.”
D. Civil Status and de facto Relations
Another factor which blurs the limits of civil status, which has
been shown by Parra Lucán, is the fact that, in the social reality,
purely de facto situations occur, parallel to judicial relationships
but apart from its legal regulation: de facto unions, de facto
separation, de facto emancipation, naturally disabled persons and
their de facto guardianship, etc. 100
It seems clear that, although there are determined legal
consequences (for example, article 319 C.C. for de facto
emancipation, or the varied Autonomous Community Laws on
unmarried stable couples) these situations are not civil status, nor
does the regime of civil status apply to them.
However, the process of transforming judicially what is
intended to be de facto, which, in principle, is a contradiction, and
even reaches the Civil Registry. Thus, the reform carried out by
Law 1/2009, of March 25, 101 to article 38 LCR 1957, introduced
the possibility to annotate: “At the request of the Prosecutor’s
office or any person concerned, . . . with simply informative value
and with the statement of their circumstances: . . . 6. The existence
of a de facto guardian and the judicial means of control and
surveillance adopted as regards the minor or presumed disabled
person.” 102 In the same regard, article 40 LCR 2011 admits
(“These may be annotated . . .”) the registration annotation of the
de facto guardianship.
This is one of the most blurred points in our legislation and on
which gives rise to more interpretational problems.
The first of these derives from the initial perplexity arising
from giving registration publication, even if this is informative, to
100. PARRA LUCÁN, supra note 27, at 394-96.
101. B.O.E. n. 73, Mar. 26, 2009.
102. Article 1, Law 1/2009, supra note 101.
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what is considered to be a de facto situation, whose publication
seems to derive from the public notoriety of this. The conflict has
already arisen regarding the administrative registration of
unmarried stable couples: not in vain, the registration in these
Registries is an essential requisite in the majority of Autonomous
Community legislations in order to obtain the “judicial nature” of
these non-marriage unions for the purposes of the application of
the corresponding legal (administrative and civil) measures. In this
regard, article 304 of the Code of Civil Law of Aragon 103 imposes
the obligation to register the stable couple “in a Registry of the
Government of Aragon so that the administrative measures
regulated in this Law be applicable to it, as well as being annotated
or mentioned in the competent State legislation if the State
legislation stipulates this.” In contrast, Chapter IV of Part III of the
new Second Book C.C., dedicated to “the stable cohabitation of the
couple” does not require, at least in the legal text, registration in
any administrative Registry.
However, besides the administrative registers, it is certain that
neither in the LCR 1957 nor in the new LCR 2011, its annotation
or mention in the Civil Registry is stipulated despite the fact that
there was a Bill in 2003 on the reform of the LCR in order to
permit the access of a stable union of couples or a common law
marriage in the Civil Registry104 and that, in the processing of the
current law (LCR 2011), an amendment in this regard was
proposed. 105 In the Bill of 2003, it was considered that this access
was the most adequate means to make the constitutional principle
judicial of security effective in the area of stable unions or
common law couples, and, among other measures, it was proposed
that the Second Section of the Civil Registry be called “Marriage,
103. Supra note 74.
104. Congreso de los diputados, Draft Law proposed by Parliament
122/000306 [BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, Serie B, nº. 351-1, Jul. 15,
2003].
105. Senado, Amendment nº. 2 GPMX [BOCG, Senado, Jul. 7, 2011, nº. 74,
and Jul. 21, 2011, nº. 81].
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Stable Union or Common Law Couple.” This initiative did not
prosper and, as was noted, the new LCR does not stipulate the
registration mentioned.
The panorama is clearly different in the case of de facto
guardianship, whose access to the Civil Registry is open from Law
1/2009 and endorsed in the LCR 2011, with no need to have
administrative registers for this purpose.
Once the Civil Registry is legislatively open to de facto
custody, the second problem lies in the way to prove the existence
of this, which is closely linked to another problem—a basic
problem—which is the concept of de facto custody and the
extension which must be given to this. This is not the right
scenario for an in-depth analysis of these questions, but it does
serve, at least, to show the intricate and diffuse relationships
between all these institutions.
As it stands, we are witnessing the opening of the Civil
Registry to these factual situations, although it is true that the
essential role of the official verification of these is not complied
with, but rather only an informative role, which, for the purposes
we have seen in this regard, reaffirms the separation of the Civil
Registry and civil status.
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ABSTRACT
This article is on the hidden state interest that article 52(§1) of
the Chinese Contract Law protects and the questionable
applicability of freedom of contract to Chinese state-owned
enterprises (hereafter “SOEs”). In common law, fraud and duress
make a contract voidable. In Western civil law jurisdictions,
including Louisiana, fraud and duress make a contract relatively
null. Article 52(§1) of the Chinese Contract Law renders a contract
induced by fraud and duress absolutely null (null and void if using
common law terminology) when state interest is harmed. At the
same time, according to article 54 of the Contract Law, fraud and
duress only make a contract relatively null just like in Western
laws. The situation is further complicated by article 58 of General
Principles of Civil Law (hereinafter “G.P.C.L.”), which renders all
civil juristic acts absolutely null when induced by fraud and duress.
To understand when a contract is null or annullable one has to
reconcile these three statutory provisions and figure out what the
state interest article 52(1) refers to. This article attempts to
demystify this state interest through a historical survey of the
evolution of contract law in the communist regime in China in
comparison with the similar path Soviet civil law had gone
through. If it simply means public interest, Chinese law is no
different than the western counterparts. If it means something
different, a secretive enlarged state power to declare nullity and
invade freedom of contract might come with this law. Given the
principal-agent relationship between the state and SOEs regarding
the ownership rights of SOE assets, the absence of a sufficiently
competitive market, the incentive incompatibility between the state
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and SOEs, an enlarged state power over contractual autonomy is
therefore implied and justified. This article suggests that such a
state interest be state-owned enterprises’ financial interest, which
is different from public interest. As a result, freedom of contract
shall not be applicable to Chinese SOEs when ownership rights
and a competitive market are missing, and a different interpretation
of nullity law should be adopted to protect SOEs’ financial
interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Western civil law jurisdictions, a contract that violates the
law, public policy or morality is absolutely null. 1 A contract that
was entered into through fraud or duress is relatively null: 2 it is
valid unless the victim of the wrongdoing asks to have it annulled.3
There is good reason for the distinction. If a contract violates the
law, public policy or morality, it should not be valid whether the
parties wish it to be or not. If a contract is induced by fraud or
1. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 381 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford 1998).
2. There is a conceptual difference between common law and civil law that
can be reflected in the choice of terminology between voidable and relatively
null. Common law contract law concerns the enforceability of a promise and the
voidability of the contract is raised by the promisor as a defense to bar the
enforcement of a promise. In civil law, a relatively null contract is valid until
declared null by a court upon the request of the aggrieved party. China adopted
the civil law approach and requires, when certain circumstances warrant a
revocable contract, the aggrieved party to request the court to have a contract
annulled or revoked. See Chinese Contract Law art. 54. Therefore, in this article,
I refer to contracts induced by fraud and duress as “relatively null contracts” in
conformity with the civil law tradition. Also, as appeared in the official
translation of Chinese contract law, the term “null and void” was adopted to
correspond to the concept of “absolutely nullity” in the mainstream civil law. In
this article, I will quote the term “null and void” in reference to “absolutely
null”. The contracts that are relatively null are phrased literally as “revocable
and modifiable” contracts in Chinese statutes. Chinese law gives the aggrieved
party not only the option to nullify such contracts as they are “revocable”, but
also the power to modify the contract if they can reach agreement with the party
at fault.
3. For example, under German law, a declaration of intention that is
induced by fraud or duress, and therefore not genuine, is only voidable. See
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] art. 123 (Ger.). Under French law,
error, violence, and deceit are vices to consent, making the contract relatively
null. See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1109, 1110, 1113, 1116 (Fr.).
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duress, it should be valid only if the victim so chooses. A buyer
may have been fraudulently induced to pay 100 for goods with a
market value of 80. In this case, he should be able to withdraw
from the contract and get restitution damage- return the goods and
get the 100 back. But, if the market price suddenly jumped to 120,
he should be able to enforce it. He should also be able to enforce it
if the goods are unique and worth more than 100 to him personally.
When relative nullity exists, why should the law allow the
aggrieved party to determine the validity of the contract rather than
declare the contract null and void ab initio? Clear classification of
nullities had not been achieved by Roman law. 4 The modern
classification of nullities and the widespread recognition of relative
nullity in the civil law world owes to the rise of freedom of
contract and will theories as a result of the 19th century liberalism
and laissez-faire capitalism. 5 The reasoning behind relative nullity
is usually that party will know his own interest better than the court
and courts shall not interfere with contracting parties’ free will, as
dictated by the principle of freedom of contract. The wills of the
contracting parties and their consent that relative nullity law tries
to protect were not the central theme of contract law before the
19th century. However, since the rise of will theories and freedom
of contract, the classical contract theory has “the tendency to
attribute all the consequences of a contract to the will of those who
made it.” 6 As a result, “the primary function of the contract came
to be seen as purely facultative, and the function of the court was
merely to resolve a dispute by working out the implications of
what the parties had already chosen to do.” 7
4. The detailed accounts of the historical confusions can be seen in
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 679 (1990); see also Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking
the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 665 (2014).
5. The relevant provisions in French Civil Code are a typical product of
this movement. See supra note 2.
6. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 404
(Oxford 1979).
7. Id. at 408.
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The core of freedom of contract is to give binding force to
whatever is mutually agreed between the contracting parties. 8
Thus, to ensure freedom of bargaining, which was regarded as “the
fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress” 9 by the 19th
century economists, courts shall not step in to rectify an unfair
bargain “since the force of competition will ensure fairness in
terms and prices.” 10
When the vice of consent in a contract only affects the interest
of the contracting parties, nullity of contract can only be asserted
by the party shouldering the negative consequence of this defect.
The aggrieved parties are the only class of people the law of
relative nullity is trying to protect, and the law gives them the
option to confirm the act. Whenever they decide to confirm the
validity of a defective contract that does not impair public or bona
fide third party’s interest, they are acting in their own interest, and
they are in a better position than the court to estimate the
consequence of annulling a contract for themselves. In addition to
protecting freedom of contract, the rules of relative nullity also
operate to guarantee the safety of transactions. They give an
incentive for parties to engage in business transactions by assuring
them of their power to rescind the contract on their own initiative
barring circumstances where the contractual defects will interfere
with the interest of the public or a third party.
The unrestricted role the rise of capitalism and 19th century
liberalism placed on the will has undoubtedly declined as so
declared by Gilmore and Atiyah. 11 According to them, the destiny
8. Article 1134 of the French Civil Code describes this principle as such:
“contracts legally formed have the force of law for the parties who made them.”
Chinese law adopted the idea of contractual freedom for the first time in 1999
through art. 4 of the Contract Law: “The parties have the right to lawfully enter
into a contract of their own free will in accordance with the law, and no unit or
individual may illegally interfere therewith.”
9. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 214 (Oxford 1991).
10. ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 405.
11. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ohio State
Univ. Press, 1974); ATIYAH, supra note 6.
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of freedom of contract is closely related to that of general theories
of contract law, and neither of the two existed before the 19th
century. The role of freedom of contract has been declining when
the dominant role of the general theory of contract was gradually
taken over bit by bit by the rise of protection of consumer interests
in transactions where the bargaining powers are extremely
unequal, limitations placed by special contracts such as the
adhesion contracts, the emergence of regulatory law, and
sophisticated commercial contracts that will allow parties to opt
out of the requirements what freedom of contract would expect.
Still, in the west as in most parts of the world, freedom of contract
as a doctrine survived these attacks and is widely respected outside
the particular areas of the contract law mentioned above.
Nevertheless, contract law certainly predates capitalism and
will theories and principles such as equality in exchange,
commutative justice, and fairness guided contractual transactions
in pre-commercial societies and post commercial but pre-capitalist
civil law without the will theories. 12 With all the difficulties and
discredits mentioned earlier, does every industrialized society have
to have contract theories that are based solely on the will and
autonomy? Shall freedom of contract be applied to all human
societies regardless of any features in its economy or are there
certain prerequisites a society must entail for this doctrine to be
justified and therefore become desirable?
This investigation on the relative nullity of contract in Chinese
law serves as a test to examine whether freedom of contract,
borrowed from the West and recognized as a fundamental principle
of Chinese contract law, should be preconditioned on certain
prerequisites such as the existence of private ownership and the
availability of a competitive market. More specifically, I hope to
test whether freedom of contract is applicable to Chinese state12. See generally James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies
and in Western History in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW (J.C.B. Mohr ed., 1997).
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owned enterprises (SOEs) by investigating whether Chinese SOEs
are afforded the option the relative nullity law provides
theoretically to all contracting parties. I am of the opinion that, if
freedom of contract is not applicable to China or Chinese SOEs, it
is only reasonable that a different kind of relative nullity law
should be adopted in China to serve the economic features unique
to China.
In China, given the nuances arising from the innerconsistencies of various statutory provisions, the question whether
a contract is absolutely null or relatively null is unclear. 13 At first
sight, the law seems contradictory. Contracts are governed by the
Contract Law enacted in 1999. Article 54 provides that, as in
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract
by fraud or duress may have it annulled or modified. Article 52
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and
administrative regulations” (§5).
If article 52 merely meant that a contract is null and void when
it is illegal or offends public policy or morality, Chinese law would

13. Western civil law scholars have raised the possibility of adding a third
category of nullity, namely, mixed nullity for civil juristic acts or contracts that
do not fit neatly within the traditional dichotomy of nullity. See Scalise, supra
note 4. In determining the validity of contract or civil juristic act, Chinese law
does introduce a third category: effect-to-be-determined contract or act, to put
the legal effect of a contract or civil juristic act entered with inadequate civil
capacity on hold pending on the confirmation or denial of the party with
adequate capacity. The most relevant example is that a joint venture agreement
between a Chinese domestic enterprise and a foreign enterprise is subject to state
approval. Before such approval, the agreement is considered neither a valid nor
an invalid contract. This situation is common in foreign investment transactions
where thestate will have paternalistic power over the validity of the contract. For
example, in the United States, the President has the power to suspend or prohibit
foreign acquisitions on the grounds of national security. See 50 U.S.C. app.
§2170(d). This article focuses solely on the tension between relative and
absolute nullity under Chinese law, and therefore consciously avoids the
complications mixed nullity would add to Chinese nullity law.
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be like that of Western jurisdictions. In the case of fraud or duress,
a contract would be relatively null at the instance of the wronged
party. In the instance of illegality or immorality, the contract would
be absolutely null. But then there would have been no need for the
statute to provide that a contract is absolutely null, not only when it
violates the law, but when “the use of fraud and duress damage the
interest of the state” (§1) or “malicious collusion committed to
harm the state interest” when the contract neither “harms the public
interest” (§4) nor violates any “laws” or “administrative
regulations” (§5).
Suppose, however, that all contracts were deemed to affect the
“interest of the state” or the “public interest.” As we will see, that
was the official view before the introduction of elements of market
economy in China. To the extent that view still prevails, every
interference with the contracting by fraud and duress would
“damage the interest of the state.” All contracts entered into by
fraud or duress would be absolutely null under article 52(§1). But
then, article 52(§1) would conflict with article 54, which provides
that contracts are annullable for fraud and duress, yet only at the
instance of the wronged party.
The law on the nullification of contracts induced by fraud or
duress has been further complicated by article 58(§3) of the
G.P.C.L., 14 which was enacted in 1986 to provide general
14. Article 58 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China (GPCL—Adopted April 12th, 1986 and Effective January
1st, 1987) provides that:
Civil juristic acts in the following categories shall be null and void:
(1) those performed by a person without legal capacity for civil
conduct;
(2) those that according to law may not be independently performed by
a
person
with
limited
capacity
for
civil
conduct;
(3) those performed by a person against his true intentions as a result of
fraud, duress or exploitation of his unfavorable position by the other
party;
(4) those performed through malicious collusion are detrimental to the
interest of the state, a collective or a third party;
(5) those that violate the law or the public interest;
(6) economic contracts that violate the state's mandatory plans; and
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provisions that were intended to operate as the Book I of the future
Chinese Civil Code. Contract is regarded as a subcategory of “civil
juristic acts” (Rechtsgeschäft) in civil law jurisprudence. Article 58
lists all the circumstances where a civil juristic act is deemed null
and void. This laundry list covers all the circumstances under both
article 52 and article 54 of the 1999 Contract Law without
recognizing annullable civil acts. Under article 58(§3), a civil
juristic act is null and void when a manifestation of intent is
violated by fraud, duress and exploitation of the victim’s
unfavorable position. The literal interpretation of this article would
possibly mean fraud and duress will make a civil juristic act
absolutely null regardless of whether the state interest is harmed,
which conflicts with the two Contract Law articles mentioned
above.
Perhaps, the most direct and effective way to assess the
situation is to examine how courts interpret this provision in
practice. However, this was not feasible until very recently. For
many years, Chinese cases had not been available and accessible to
general public and even the practitioners. In fact, most judicial
opinions had been regarded as state secrets and made available
only to the parties and court personnel. Only in the past few years
had the newly-established search engines and legal research
database started providing a select amount of cases to the public.
For this project, up until the summer of 2013, I was only able to
locate 23 cases decided under article 52 but none of the cases cited
article 52(§1). In spring 2014, with more cases becoming
accessible from the databases, I have identified 99 cases that cited
article 52(§1). Through all these cases, one can easily detect the
fact that courts are splitting on two issues: whether the state

(7) those performed under the guise of legitimate acts conceal
illegitimate purposes.
Civil acts that are null and void shall not be legally binding from the
very beginning.
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interest here is equivalent to public interest or the SOE’s interest; if
and when state interest really means SOEs’ interest, whether SOEs
are afforded the option to keep the contract when there is a defect
in consent induced by fraud or duress. I would like to suggest that
such a hidden interest be the financial interest of SOEs that is
different from public interest or any other interest law or public
policy should protect in a market economy. Nevertheless, such
interest should be otherwise protected given the absence of a
sufficiently competitive market, and incentive incompatibility
between the state as the owner of state assets and SOEs as the
agents of the state. Also, I would like to argue that state should
only exercise this enlarged power to declare the nullity of contract
on the court’s own initiative when there is neglect of duty, where
the situation warrants no reasonable ground to justify the SOE
management’s failure to revoke the contract – the option afforded
by article 54.
Determining which contracts are relatively null and which are
absolutely null under Chinese law is not simply a matter of
reconciling the three statutory provisions. It is a matter of
reconciling the role of the state and the role of contracting parties
in an economy which is in part state managed and in part market
driven. To understand such a battle over contract autonomy, one
has first to figure out what this secret state interest the Chinese
laws are trying so hard to protect is. To see what is at stake, one
must consider the role that contract and contract law played before
and after private markets were introduced in the communist China.
II. CONTRACT LAW UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME
A. 1950-1981: The Total Denial of Private Law and Freedom of
Contract
1. The Economic Logic behind Nationalization
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949, private ownership of land and industry was gradually
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eliminated in order to implement the heavy industry oriented
economic strategy. Following the massive nationalization of
industry and commerce and the establishment of the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), a free and competitive market was gone and
the price distortion emerged to artificially lower the cost in
developing heavy industry. Such price distortion made it
impossible for the state to evaluate the SOEs’ management
performance by using profit rate as the primary indicator, as it has
been used in a market economy. Under these circumstances,
without an effective governance model, the incentive
incompatibility and information asymmetry between state and
SOEs would not permit SOEs to have either the autonomy or
business incentive in contracting.
The fact that communist China was founded upon a low level
of industrialization and a backward economic structure made the
government designate the development of heavy industry a
priority, especially given the economic embargo due to the
international disapproval of the new government and military
threats China faced at the time. 15
The profit generated by the same capital in light industry was
270% of that generated in heavy industry in 1957. 16 If given a
choice, private investors likely had much less incentive to invest in
heavy industry, therefore not meeting state expectations.
Therefore, the nationalization of heavy industry and the
replacement of privately-owned enterprises with SOEs became the
alternative. Also, in order to reduce the production costs of heavy
industry, it was essential to bring down the living costs of
industrial workers. 17 Given the fact that private investors would
have had no incentive to invest if the prices had to be distorted to
serve the heavy industry, light industry was also nationalized. 18
15. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN, FANG CAI & ZHOU LI, CHINESE STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES REFORM 23 (The Chinese Univ. Press 2001)
16. See id. at 23.
17. See id. at 24.
18. See id.
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Following nationalizations, prices were distorted. A
competitive and free market was no longer available. The
implementation of state economic plans was considered the top
priority for SOEs rather than profit maximization. All this
appeared to be reasonable, since in a highly centrally planned
economy, both profits and deficits can be artificially attributed to a
particular industrial sector or a monopolized enterprise with the
purpose of achieving the government’s economic agenda. In such
an economy, profit can no longer serve as an indicator in the
evaluation of the business performance of SOEs. 19 When the
market was gone, so was market competition. Without market
competition, SOEs acted as monopolies in their designated regions.
Profits and deficits can be easily manipulated by the state’s
decisions in price setting, prioritizing the development of an
industry, or the manufacturing of certain products. It followed that
the incentive to maximize profits should not even be permissible
for the fear that SOE managers might try to intercept the
production residuals at the expense of the implementation of state
economic plans. 20 Nevertheless, the incentive incompatibility
between the state as the owner of the state assets and SOEs as the
managers of the state assets still existed. To protect the state from
managers intercepting industrial residues and misappropriating
state-owned assets, and to supply the lack of sufficient information
in evaluating enterprise performance, it was required that the state
be deeply involved in the daily operation of SOEs, which further
took away the business autonomy and incentive of SOEs.
In the rural areas, the land reform took place which allowed the
peasants to take over land from the landlords by force rather than
by law or administrative decrees. Land ownership was since then
monopolized by state and village collectives. Socialist agricultural
communes were established in 1958 upon the enactment of the
Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
19. See id. at 116.
20. See id.
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Communist Party to bring about the agricultural collectivization
and state monopoly of crops. The commune supplied all the
economic resources and means of production equally to its
members for free.
As a result of the ownership reform, the only type of ownership
desired and allowed in the country’s economy was public
ownership. 21
When private ownership disappeared in industry and
commerce, and freedom of contract was completely taken away
from enterprises, contract law was no longer considered private
law and contracting became a mere documentation of state
economic plans.
Together with nationalization and as part of its ideological
campaign, the Chinese Communist Party followed the Soviet
Union’s experience in “casting out all prerevolutionary law” in
order to “create a new heaven and a new earth.” 22 As a result, all
pre-existing laws enacted by the Nationalist Government such as
the Civil Code were regarded as evil and something to be
eliminated. 23 Both private economy and private contractual
transactions lost legal legitimacy. With contracting parties losing
all financial incentive to enforce a contract, nullification was no
longer an issue. As a result, contracts other than economic
contracts were either not regulated by law or outlawed entirely.
The Chinese economic system in this period of time imitated the
militant commune system operated in Soviet Union from 1918 to
1921 when private ownership and contract rights had been totally
denied. The later Chinese economic reform resembles the New
Economic Policy adopted by Soviet Union after the failure of the
militant commune system. During both reforms, private ownership
21. Of course, private ownership had to still exist in reality, especially when
it came to personal property.
22. See JEROME ALAN COHEN, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 324 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1970).
23. See MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 2006).
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and private market were reintroduced along with the resurrection
of legal institutions based on the civilian tradition. However, much
like what happened later in China, the Soviet Union continued to
exercise a central control over the economy and retained extensive
powers to protect the state financial interest in the economy,
thereby largely interfering with freedom of contract.
2. Militant Communism in the Soviet Union
Militant Communism was a period of time from 1917 to 1921
when the Soviet government was fighting the civil war against its
domestic opponents and foreign intervention. During this period of
time, the Soviet government established a communist social order
through massive collectivization and attempted to use central
economic planning to replace markets. 24
A series of fundamental legal and institutional changes began
in 1918 that allowed the government to be the “exclusive owner of
land, industrial and commercial establishments, and the only
producer and distributor of commodities”. 25 The Soviet Union
proclaimed its status as a communist country and at the same time
destroyed the legality of private ownership. The right to contract
disappeared along with property rights.
On November 30th, 1918, the Statute on the Judiciary
abrogated all older laws. 26 On February 19th of the same year, all
private land ownership was abolished. 27 Transactions regarding the
right to use land were also prohibited. 28 Massive confiscations and
nationalization took place. In 1918, several decrees annulled
inheritance rights, stocks, bonds, and confiscated savings. 29
Banking, insurance and foreign trade were also subject to
24.
1946).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See VLADMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 10 (Univ. of Michigan Press
Id.
See id.
See id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
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government monopolies. 30 By June 1919, copyrights and patents
became subject to government monopoly. 31
The government ownership of land and monopoly of crops and
grains was enforced through the establishment of socialist
agriculture communes. Special military detachments were sent to
villages to collect the crops. 32 Peasants could only keep the crops
and grains needed for their bare consumption. The surpluses above
those needed for consumption had to be delivered to the
government at “fixed prices equal to confiscation”. 33 All private
trade in food was forbidden. 34
The Supreme Economic Council was established in 1917 to
manage all the state owned enterprises and confiscate private
enterprises. In 1920, in order to inhibit the undesirable growth of
the private businesses, the council issued an order nationalizing
“all industrial establishments employing ten or more workers, or
even five or more workers if with motorized installations.”35
Following the massive confiscation and governmental regulations,
from 1918 to 1920, all business initiatives were barred as were
private property rights.
Soon enough, the omnipotent state role replaced the private law
and the rigorous state planning left no place for contracting.
According to Goikhbarg, private law such as contract law was
almost entirely absent during the period of militant communism
with one exception, the contract of a village with the shepherd of
the community herd. 36
In 1921, a famine ended militant communism. The New
Economic Policy was introduced and a Russian Soviet Federative
30. Id.
31. November 26, 1918, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(R.S.F.S.R.) Laws 1918, text 900.
32. April 22, 1918, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1918, text 432; June 11, 1920,
R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 295; March 13, 1922, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1922, text
266.
33. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 468.
34. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1917–1918, text 346, §19.
35. R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1920, text 512, §546.
36. See GSOVKI, supra note 24.
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Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Civil Code was enacted in 1922,
heavily influenced by the German Civil Code. Starting in May
1922, some confiscated properties were returned to former
owners. 37 Any new confiscation was prohibited for the future. 38
3. The Total Denial of Private Ownership and Contract Law as
Private Law in China
As had happened in the Soviet Union after 1917, rigid state
planning took place in China in the 1950s, leaving no place for
autonomy in contracting.
As in the Soviet Union, given the fact that all means of
production were now controlled by the government on behalf of
every citizen, the only legally permissible contracts became
economic contracts. As a consequence, only SOEs and government
organs were allowed to contract. 39
Nevertheless, the nationalization of means of production and
private ownership along with the repudiation of all preexisting
contract laws did not mean that no rules were in place to regulate
contracts. It is said that, “up to 1958, 66% of 4000 regulations
dealt with the national economy.” 40 Most remaining laws
regulating contract were provisional decrees that were enacted to
implement the state economic plans. 41 For example, contracting
was regulated by Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See the Administration Council Commission of Finance and Economy,
Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between Government
Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives arts. 2–5 (1950), See MO ZHANG,
supra note 23, at 3.
40. Gene T. Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contracts in Communist China,
53 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (1965).
41. The author is not arguing that there were no customs or informal local
rules that might have been dealing with contracts in the civil law sense in
Chinese society. However, whatever informal rules and dispute resolution
mechanisms that might have been available before the economic reform at the
end of 1970s, they were unofficial rules not recognized by the state and the
activities that they dealt with were not regarded as contracting by the state until
1999 when contract law was finally defined as civil law.
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Made between Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and
Cooperatives (hereinafter “Provisional Methods”), which was
issued in 1950 by the Commission of Finance and Economy under
State Council (the equivalent of the Supreme Economic Council in
the Soviet Union).42 In 1963, the Commission on Finance and
Economy issued another administrative regulation titled Tentative
Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts
(hereinafter “Tentative Methods”). Other Ordering Contract
Regulations were issued during this period.
Under the Provisional Methods, a contract was an economic act
subject to state control. 43 The aim of such contracting activity was
to distribute the resources and products according to rigid state
economic plans and to satisfy every citizen’s quota. This is akin to
a system in which the state is a big company that employs every
citizen and everyone lives for free without drawing a salary.
During this so-called “lawless” era, the validity of contract was
not even a practical legal issue and was never worth fighting for.
Therefore, there was no mention of the nullity of contract in the
Provisional Methods and Tentative Methods. The purpose of
contracting was to “ensure the conscientious implementation and
all-around fulfillment of the state plan.” 44 In accordance with this
principle, parties entered into contracts not to maximize their
profits but to serve the state interest. No legal rights were vested in
the hands of contracting parties. It can be inferred that no contract
could be entered into except to carry out the state economic plan.
In such a context, it made sense that parties would not have to bear
the risk of financial loss. Actually, at that time, all businesses were
owned by the state, which provided 100% of the enterprise

42. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 3.
43. See id.
44. See the Administration Council Commission on Finance and Economy,
Tentative Methods Regarding Mining Products Ordering Contracts art. 2 (1963).
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equity. 45 Each individual business entity had neither an
independent budget nor independent financial status. 46
As Pitman B. Potter described:
Enterprise budgets were fixed and were generally
unaffected by the nonfulfillment of contracts. Enterprise
managers bore very little responsibility for losses caused by
nonperformance of contracts, since such losses were
generally made up by the state, either through an
adjustment of the aggrieved party’s planned production
quota or by directly absorbing the deficit suffered by the
aggrieved party. 47
Under the 1950 Regulations, all contracts had to be registered
at the People’s Banks, 48 if the payment could not be processed
immediately, and contracts, upon conclusion, had to be filed with
the superior government and its economic commission, and also
filed in the record of the department of treasury. 49 Compulsory
dispute resolution mechanisms were in place before a contract
dispute could be adjudicated by a court. Disputes regarding to
nonperformance or breach of contract would have to be first
submitted to a higher governmental authority for mediation since
all businesses were owned by the state, and operated in the same
way as a government agency.
If both parties were from the same province or circuit, their
disputes had to be submitted to the higher level government’s
economic commission. 50 If the parties were from different
provinces or circuits, the disputes had to be submitted to the

45. Capital structure of SOEs include 100% of state equity and zero debt.
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 52 (Routledge 2005).
46. See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW OF CHINA,
LEGITIMATION AND CONTRACT AUTONOMY IN THE PRC 32 (Univ. of
Washington Press 1992).
47. Id. at 27.
48. The People’s Bank is the central bank of China and the regulatory body
of China’s financial institutions.
49. Provisional Methods on Contractual Agreement Made between
Government Agencies, State Enterprises, and Cooperatives art. 10 (1950).
50. See id. at art. 10.
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economic commission under the central government. 51 A suit
could only be filed in court when such arbitration or mediation
from the higher authority could not solve the disputes. 52 Even
when a suit was eventually filed in court, it would probably not
concern the validity of contract. At first, government-run
businesses had no concern whether a contract had been concluded
legally, and whether the parties’ declaration of intention was
genuine. Since contracting was merely a form for recording state
economic plans, contracting parties signed contacts simply to
implement the executive order from higher government authorities,
which excluded any autonomous intention on the part of the
parties. Therefore, vices of consent, such as fraud and duress, as
understood in Western law, did not really violate a contracting
party’s consent. Moreover, even if fraud and duress did violate one
contracting party’s financial interest, the loss suffered by the
innocent party would be borne by the state and the unjust
enrichment that resulted would also be absorbed by the state.
The major dispute a court might be dealing with in that time
would be the failure to perform a contract. When this happened, a
contracting party could not choose the form of remedy, and no
monetary damages were available. The primary remedy was
always specific performance. 53 When there was a late delivery, the
remedy would probably “take the form of an apology and a
promise to deliver as soon as possible.” 54
Therefore, from 1950–1981, Chinese contract law was pure
public law. The Western idea of freedom of contract, which is
based on theories of will and the declaration of will, was not even
remotely applicable in China. 55 If German contract law can be

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id.
See POTTER, supra note 46, at 42.
Id.
See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 1, at 326.
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criticized for “containing only a few drops of social oil,” 56 Chinese
law, at that time, could be said to contain nothing but “social oil.”
4. 1981–1999: Fraud and Duress Make a Contract Null and
Void
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of
China Central Committee Meeting, held in 1978, changed the
direction of Chinese economy. The “Reforming and Opening Up”
policy was adopted at this meeting. The lawless era ended as soon
as China reopened its door to the world in 1979. The first contract
law statute, called Economic Contract Law (E.C.L.), was drafted in
1980 and became effective in 1981. The E.C.L. was the law that
governed domestic contracts. Another statute, the Foreign
Economic Contract Law, was enacted to regulate contracts entered
into with foreign parties. A third statute, the Technology Contract
Law, was also adopted to govern technology related contracts. The
concepts of private ownership and private economy were no longer
prohibited and were reintroduced as “a supplement to the socialist
economy”. 57 As a summary of the previous administrative
regulations, the E.C.L. was an essential component to carry out the
rigid state economic plan while at the same time allowing the
increased autonomy that an open market and private ownership
economy required. The E.C.L. was enacted with the purpose of
“ensuring the fulfillment of state plans.” 58 Further, following this
non-civil law definition, the E.C.L. allowed only legal persons to
be the parties to an economic contract. 59 Under this article,
economic contracts were defined as “agreements between legal
entities for the purpose of realizing certain economic goals and
specifying each other's rights and obligations.” 60 While
maintaining the concern with economic law, certain features of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See BASIL S. MARKESINIS, GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT 45 (Hart 2006).
See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China art. 11.
See Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China art.1
See id. art. 2.
Id.
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civil law emerged for the first time in the legislative history of the
People’s Republic of China. The contracting party, for the first
time, had a lawful interest in contracting 61 and contracting parties’
autonomy in contracting was recognized and protected. 62 Along
with increased autonomy, enterprises began to have independent
financial status and to bear contractual liabilities. Still, by the time
of the E.C.L.’s enactment, the effect of a planned economy was
dominant and the hard-won autonomy was very limited. The state
was still responsible for setting the market prices for products
according to planning. According to the E.C.L., the contract price
could only be negotiated when the state policy permits. 63
As a result, the concept of the nullification of contract was
introduced for the first time. The E.C.L., however, did not
distinguish relatively null contracts from absolutely null contracts.
It annulled the contracts that might be deemed relatively null under
French and German law. 64 According to the E.C.L., all the
following contracts are deemed null and void:
(1) contracts in violation of the law or state policies and plans;
(2) contracts signed through the use of fraud, coercion or similar
means;
(3) contracts signed by an agent beyond the scope of his power of
agency, or contracts signed by an agent in the name of his principal
with himself or with another person whom he represents; and
(4) economic contracts infringing on the interests of the state or the
public interest. 65
The striking effect of this article was that violation of state
plans was one of the grounds to rescind contracts, and the
61. Id. art. 1.
62. Id. art. 5. This article provides: “Economic contracts must be made
according to the principles of equality and mutual benefit, agreement through
consultation and compensation of equal value. Neither party is allowed to
impose its will on the other, and no unit or individual is allowed to interfere
illegally.”
63. Id. at art. 17(3), art. 23. Prices for both sales and lease contracts can be
negotiated by parties when prices are not set by the State.
64. See id. art. 7.
65. Id. at art. 7.
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existence of fraud and duress made a contract absolutely null rather
than relatively null. Also, acting beyond the scope of authority
rendered a contract null without recognizing later ratification by
the principal as a cure for nullity. This clear cut solution as to
defective contract was a reflection of the strong sense of protection
of state economic interest under which the protection of private
parties’ interest was secondary. By this time, freedom of contract
was not yet introduced. Also, protecting the safety of transaction
and bona fide third party were significantly outweighed by
safeguarding the state interest.
Though state control had been somewhat relaxed to leave room
for a private economy and private market, the planned economy
remained dominant. It might sound unsophisticated, by modern
continental civil law standards, to deprive the parties from contract
autonomy and to regard all annullable contracts as already null and
void. Nevertheless, it was an understandable result given the
historical context in China at that time in which the state had to
intervene and declare a contract null when the majority of legal
persons, as SOEs, didn’t have contractual autonomy and business
incentive to enforce their contractual rights on behalf of the state.
In the early stage of the economic reform, the state’s financial
interest in carrying out the economic plans without interference by
fraud and duress was superior to the protection of the small scale
privately owned enterprises’ business autonomy in deciding
whether to annul a contract when their consent was violated. After
all, the overriding purpose of contracting was to meet the needs of
the production and business operation under the mandate of the
state plans. 66 Many times, contracts had to be concluded under the
quota provided by the state and the conclusion of the contract had
to be authorized by a higher government authority. 67
66. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 32 (Quoting SU HUIXIANG,
OF ECONOMIC CONTRACT LAW 3–5 (Liaoning People’s Press 1990)).

THEORY

67. See id. at 48. This situation happens when the business transactions
concerning products and items fall within the scope of state mandatory plans.
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On the other hand, in contrast to the West, where contracting is
a result of business judgment, the majority of the contracting
parties in China were simply carrying out the daily tasks assigned
by higher authorities. Therefore, it made sense to consider fraud
and duress as offenses to public policy and harms to public
interest. In Western law, contracts in violation of public policy or
morality are universally regarded as absolutely null or void.
Moreover, given the fact that when the E.C.L. was enacted,
virtually all business entities allowed to contract at that time were
owned by the state, and consequently no private interest could
have been harmed by the state intrusion in nullifying all contracts
concluded by fraud and duress. At the beginning of the economic
reform, private parties were simply not within the purview of the
E.C.L.
As a contract under the E.C.L. was not essentially a civil
juristic act, and no private interest was involved, the only party
bearing the loss caused by fraud and duress was the state.
Therefore, it seemed reasonable for the state to interfere with the
validity of all such contracts and to rescind them.
5. 1993–1999: The Emergence of a Market Economy and the
Obsolescence of the E.C.L.
a. Emergence of Private Ownership
Starting in 1980, a private economy first appeared among the
peasants’ households when a land tenure system named the Land
Contract Responsibility System was established. The state
allocated the cultivated land to peasant families. Families, as the
basic units, were responsible for producing a certain amount of
grain according to their assigned quota. Farmers were also allowed
to keep the surplus as their own when exceeding the quota. The
emergence of surplus created trade markets within each village
neighborhood that sold exclusively agricultural products. This
reintroduction of private ownership gave the farmers an incentive
to produce more. Private ownership was soon extended to urban
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cities where privately owned business households were allowed to
operate. Such business entities were owned by individuals and
their families, without employees outside the family. 68 This smallscale business economy was favored by the Communist Party. A
party policy would soon allow these privately owned businesses to
hire employees, under the cover name of training “apprentices.”69
However, according to an administrative decree issued by the State
Council, the number of employees such privately owned
businesses were allowed to hire could not exceed seven. 70 This
limit was placed to make sure that private business could only
operate on a small scale so that state ownership would still be
dominant and the foundation of communism would not be
threatened. However, over the next few years, this restriction was
not strictly enforced, and economy based on private ownership
grew rapidly.
b. State-Owned Enterprise Reform to Allow Autonomy and
Incentives
The state-owned enterprise reform in China differs from
similar reforms in Eastern European and Latin American countries
where massive privatization took place. 71 The Chinese SOE reform
has been mainly about allowing SOEs to acquire limited business
autonomy and benefit from economic incentives rather than
divesting SOEs and introducing a sufficiently competitive and free
market. Admittedly, allowing economic motive improved SOE
performance and efficiency, whilst a mere increase of autonomy
and incentive does not guarantee the continued improvement of

68. In Marxism, capitalists, as business owners, obtain undue surpluses
from the exploitation of their employees. Employment with private employers
was deemed as an inherent feature in the capitalism that should not be allowed
in communist China.
69. Implementing Rules on Urban Individual Business Households art. 4
[城乡个体工商户管理条例Cheng Xiang Ge Ti Gong Shang Hu Guan Li Tiao
Li].
70. Id.
71. See generally WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS (Oxford Univ.
Press 1995)
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SOE performance. 72 Moreover, the pre-existing incentive
incompatibility and the information asymmetry between the state
and SOEs were not effectively addressed in the economic reform.
State interference with freedom of contract is still necessary to
effectively prevent SOEs from maximizing their own interest that
can be incompatible with the state economic goals.
Following the expansion of autonomy in the privately-owned
business, starting in 1984, a similar trend occurred among stateowned enterprises as well. On May 10th, 1984, an administrative
decree entitled “Provisional Regulations concerning the Expansion
of Autonomy for State-owned Industrial Enterprises” was issued
by the State Council. Several measures have been taken since then
to allow more autonomy in the operation of state enterprises and to
motivate employees. According to the decree, the SOEs were
allowed to sell their above-quota production at their discretion and
could even sell 2% of the planned production quota. 73 For the
goods at the SOEs’ disposal, SOEs can set the price within the
range of 20% less to 20% above the state price. 74 This was a
change in the over-centralized price control in China. In 1979,
there were 256 industrial products whose prices were subject to
mandatory state planning. 75 By 1984, this number was reduced to
60. 76 The trend has continued: the products whose prices are set by
the state now account for only 5% of those in the market.

72. Behavioral studies have shown that performance is not always
proportional to economic motive. And SOE reform in many other countries have
reached the consensus that, besides improving incentive structure, successful
SOE reforms also come with introducing competitive and free markets, toughen
SOE financial budgets, and divestiture of SOE ownership, etc. See WORLD
BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS, supra note 71, at 5. As a result, mere
increase of incentive doesn’t lead to better performance of SOEs.
73. Provisional regulations concerning the expansion of autonomy for
state-owned industrial enterprises (Quoted in SHAHID YUSUF, UNDER NEW
OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 56 (Stanford
Univ. Press (2006)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Another effort to motivate the SOE workers is to link their
work performance with profits and abolish their employment
tenure. The decree also allowed up to 3% of industrial workers to
receive merit raises 77 and by 1988, 60% of industrial workers were
subjected to a wage scheme that links their salaries to the profits of
the SOEs. 78 Also, starting in 1986, a new system was adopted to
deny life time employment to employees newly hired by the
SOEs. 79
The business autonomy of SOEs was further promoted by the
contract responsibility system, which was adopted in 1987.80
Under this system, SOEs will sign a performance contract with the
government, whose terms will extend for at least three years. These
contracts were all written negotiated agreements specifying
business goals for the SOEs to achieve within a given time
frame. 81 This scheme allows the SOEs to retain a large share of the
profits and arrangements were made to divide the cash flow
between the SOE and the government. 82
After over a decade of SOE reform, business autonomy greatly
increased as a result, nevertheless, such autonomy was still limited
and under the supervision of the state. As a survey conducted in
1994 suggested, daily operational rights had been delegated to
most of the SOEs while the autonomy to make major business
decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, investment, authority
to conduct international trade was reserved to a small percentage of
the SOEs. 83 According to this survey, 94% of the SOEs had
acquired autonomous decision making rights of production and
operation, 90.5% had acquired product sales rights, 95% acquired
product sales right, 86% had acquired the wage and bonus
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 61.
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allocation rights, 73.6% had acquired product pricing rights while
on the other hand, only 25.8% of SOEs had acquired import and
export rights, 46.6% had acquired asset disposing rights, 39.7%
acquired the joint operation and acquisition rights. 84
Still, the benefits of the increased autonomy is limited by the
facts that prices are still not completely determined by market,
state policy burden and corporate social responsibility results in the
overstaffing in virtually all SOE, which still hinder the efficiency
of SOEs. Without a sufficiently free and competitive market in
place, profit cannot serve as a sufficient information indicator of
SOE performance. The budget constraints on SOEs are not hard
enough and bank loans are still available upon request with interest
rates well below the market rates even when the banks are well
aware that this is risky lending. Moreover, the fact that the state
was the only or majority shareholder made it impossible for these
SOEs to adopt effective corporate governance structure.
As a result, the increased autonomy of SOEs is still not the
same as that of privately-owned enterprises in the West.
c. Introduction of Socialist Market Economy
To reflect and support these unstoppable changes in the
country’s economic system, the concept of socialist market
economy was introduced by the Party in 1993 at its 14th Central
Committee Meeting. Since then, in theory, means of production
and products should be now distributed by the market rather than
state planning.
As a result of these changes, a private interest now exists in the
economic contracts, and privately-owned businesses have acquired
the right to contract.
To facilitate the transformation of a planned economy to
market economy, the E.C.L. was amended in 1993; the Company

84. Id. (Quoting TAO SONG ET AL., MULTI-PERSPECTIVE THOUGHTS OF 40
ECONOMISTS ON THE SOE REFORM 91).
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Law of China was also adopted in the same year. 85 The amended
E.C.L. added peasant households and private-owned business
households as parties who are allowed to enter into economic
contracts. 86 Also, in the amended article 7 of the E.C.L., violation
of Communist Party economic policy was no longer a cause
leading to nullity, which signified the end of planned economy.
The then-newly enacted Company Law did not limit legal persons
to SOEs and therefore opened the floodgate to allow privatelyowned enterprises to register as corporations and assume the status
of legal persons. 87
The law regarding nullity remained unchanged, allowing the
state to step in even in cases where there should be relative nullity
and therefore a possibility of confirmation of the contract by the
aggrieved party. This still allows the state to invade the contract
autonomy.
Now that private parties have the financial incentive in
contracting, as in the West, when both parties to the contract are
privately owned entities, this approach to invalidity can no longer
be justified. As we have seen, the contract law of Western
jurisdictions is based on the principle of freedom of contract. As
noted in the Introduction, it allows the victim of fraud or duress to
protect his own interest by choosing whether the contract will or
will not be annulled. The privately-owned companies are legal
persons who have stronger incentives to protect their own interests
than the state. As such, they are in a better position to make
decision as to whether a contract should be annulled.
It is legitimate for the aggrieved party to have the option to
exercise the right to rescission when only their interest will be
affected by the decision. It is true that, in China, the majority of the
economy is still government-owned, and that SOEs play a more
85. Before the promulgation of Company Law, there were two separate
statutes dealing with state-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises
separately.
86. See Economic Contract Law art. 2 (1993).
87. See Company Law of the People’s Republic of China arts. 2–3 (1993).
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important role in the economy. 88 Nevertheless, in a market
economy, contractual autonomy should extend to them as well.
The state-owned enterprises are no longer established for the sole
purpose of implementing state policies. Most of them are for-profit
and operate under the leadership of their own management rather
than government authorities. Of course, the latter keep a
supervising power over the management, through the authority of
the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC)89, various ministries and financial
regulatory bodies. Still, they are market participants whose
interests should receive only as much protection as private parties.
It has been argued that, in the market economy, state-owned
enterprises’ interests are not equivalent to state interest. 90
III. FROM 1999 TO THE PRESENT: CONTRACTS ANNULABLE FOR
FRAUD AND DURESS WHEN NO STATE INTEREST IS INVOLVED
A. Contract Law in General and the Invalidity of Contract
In response to the rapid social and economic changes, the
uniform Contract Law of China was enacted to replace the three
separate statues and came into force in 1999. It is a fairly
westernized statute that retains only a few of the ideological
features of socialism. The new law protects the state interest in
private transactions, but cautiously.
88. 120 Centrally owned SOEs account for 62% of the Chinese GDP and
the total value of their fixed assets amounts to 120% of the Chinese GDP (Data
available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n258203/n259490
/13878095.html). See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National)
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65
STAN. L. REV. 697, 735 (2013).
89. State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) was created in 2003 to exercise state’s shareholder rights within the
SOEs. SASAC has the authority to appoint the management personnel,
supervise major management decision-making and the use of state-owned assets.
See国务院关于机构设置的通知（国发〔2008〕 11 号）
[State
Council’s
Notice on Agency Creation] (Guo Fa (2008) No.11).
90. See 隋彭生 《合同法要义》134页 中国政法大学出版社 （2003）
[SUI PENG SHENG, ESSENCE OF CONTRACT LAW 134 (Press of China Univ. of
Political Science and Law 2003)].
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It is the first post–1949 law that defines contract law as an area
of civil law 91 and contracting as a voluntary act. 92 The law also
confirms the equal status of the contracting parties and allows
natural persons to enter into contracts. 93 For the first time, the law
would deal with the manner in which offers are made and
accepted. 94
The tension between articles 52 and 54 of the 1999 law was
pointed out in the Introduction. Article 54 provides that, as in
Western jurisdictions, a party who was induced to enter a contract
by fraud or duress may have it nullified or modified. Article 52
provides that a contact is “null and void” if it “is concluded
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the
interests of the State” (§1); if it “harms the public interest” (§4); or
if it “violates the compulsory provisions of the laws and
administrative regulations (§5).” To summarize the general rules, if
a contract was entered into through fraud and duress, it may be
annulled or modified upon the aggrieved party’s request 95 unless a
state interest is involved; in that event the contract is void ab
initio. 96 As discussed earlier, if the state were deemed to have an
interest under article 52 whenever a contract was made through
fraud and duress, all such contracts would be absolutely null, and
article 54 would be pointless. If the state were deemed to have an
interest, and a contract to be null, only if fraud and duress violated
some independent law or regulation, article 52(§1) would be
pointless. If neither article is pointless, there must be some
circumstances in which fraud and duress violate a state interest and
some in which they do not. Article 54, as we have seen, protects
party autonomy in a way that article 52 does not. The question then
91. See Contract Law art. 2.
92. See Contract Law art. 4. This is the Chinese expression of freedom of
contract.
93. See id. at art. 2.
94. See generally, id. at arts.14–31.
95. See Contract Law art. 54.
96. See Contract Law art. 52 (§1).
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is what protection party autonomy should receive in the present
Chinese economy?
Further, the situation can be complicated by the courts’
interpretations of G.P.C.L. article 58(§3), which, as mentioned in
the Introduction, has rendered all civil juristic acts induced by
fraud or duress absolutely null since 1986. Will the interpretation
of this provision change the law on invalidity of contract formed
through fraud or duress?
B. Party Autonomy and the Validity of Contracts
In practice, party autonomy is gaining more and more respect.
Although article 52(§1) allows a court to declare a contract formed
through fraud and duress to be null when a state interest is harmed,
in practice, this power is hardly ever exercised on the court’s own
initiative. Also, no judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court
and no case accessible by research suggest what the limits of this
power should be. Neither is there any existing judicial
interpretation as to whether the interest of SOEs constitutes a state
interest under article 52(§1).
Several positions regarding the meaning of article 52(§1) have
been taken by scholars. The first position is that the interest of
SOEs is not deemed to be a state interest; only fraud and duress
that violate criminal law qualify as fraud and duress that damage a
state interest. 97 The basis for this position is that Code of Criminal
Law does penalize the manager of a state-owned enterprise when
he or she was defrauded into entering a contract due to a neglect of
duty, and the result was a heavy loss to the state. 98
The second position is that a state interest includes political,
economic and security interests of the state but not that of stateowned enterprises. 99 Only when the content and purpose of the

97. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134.
98. See Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China art. 167.
99. See MO ZHANG, supra note 23, at 170.
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contract induced by fraud or duress violate the public interest of
the society will the contract be regarded as null and void. 100
The third position is that “for the article 52(§1) to apply, the
harmful effect of the contract on the innocent party whose interests
represent those of the state must be so serious that no reasonable
person in the position of the innocent party would elect to confirm
the contract.” 101
The fourth position is that:
[I]n reality, there are many circumstances where contracts
are used for the purpose of misappropriating state assets
and therefore infringing upon state interest. However, due
to victim’s fear of being held liable or insensitivity to the
loss of state assets, heavy loss of state assets might be
resulted. If such contracts are not categorized as void per
se, it is not sufficient to protect state assets. 102
A consequence of the first two positions is that the “state
interest” in question is only a term interchangeable with “public
interest,” and that article 52(§1) does nothing more than rephrasing
article 52(§4). The third and fourth positions, however, seem to
provide an alternative by claiming that the state interest is that of
parties who represent the state and manage the state assets.
Accordingly, a state interest under article 52(§1) means the interest
of state-owned enterprises other than the public in general.
To solve this puzzle, I propose a three-step analysis. The first
step is to determine whether there is a state interest in a private
transaction entered into by a state-owned enterprise despite the
leading opinion that there is not. If there is a state interest, the
second step is to determine when that interest can be harmed by act
of fraud or duress in the formation of a contract. The third step is
100. 梁慧星 《民法总论》179页 法律出版社 [HUIXING LIANG, GENERAL
THEORIES OF CIVIL LAW 179 (3d ed., Law Press 2007)].
101. See BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 182, (Sweet & Maxwell Asia
2002).
102. 胡康生 《中华人民共和国合同法释义》79，80页 法律出版社
（1999）[HU KANGSHENG, INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE CONTRACT LAW 79–
80 (Law Press 1999)].
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to determine when such a state interest should be considered
“harmed” and under what circumstances the harm should be
remedied by declaring that the contract is null. Is there state
interest existing in private transactions that can be threatened by
fraud and duress?
1. Is there a State Interest in Private Transactions?
Yes, there is a state interest in private transactions when at least
one contracting party is a state-owned enterprise. There is a state
interest because the state is a shareholder of a business enterprise.
It used to be the case, as described earlier in this article, that the
state was the sole owner of all businesses. Government ownership
was the only legitimate ownership until the policy of reform and
openness. Now, there is an increasing number of privately-owned
enterprises, and in the stock market, there are state-owned
companies listed in which less than a majority of the shares are
tradable to prevent the state assets from going into the private
sector. As long as there is financial investment from government,
the investments in these companies constitutes state assets, which
are threatened by fraud and duress.
Yet the consequence is not that the state should always
intervene to protect its interests. Although the state has an interest
in protecting its assets, as a market participant, the state must
respect the autonomy of the parties in entering into a contract. The
state interest might be protected by interfering with party
autonomy. Yet, if the state nullifies every contract in which it has
an interest, the new recognition of contractual autonomy and
freedom of contract by 1999 Contract Law will again disappear on
Chinese soil since the state will be making the decision on behalf
of the contracting parties.
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2. What Interest is Article 52(§1) Protecting that can be
Harmed by Fraud and Duress in Contract Formation?
In my opinion, the only interest of the state that needs to be
protected from fraud and duress in a contractual transaction is the
SOEs’ interest, which represents the state’s pure financial interest
rather than public interest.
Public interest is a universal ground for nullity of contracts.
However, this interest doesn’t need protection from article 52(§1).
When the public interest is harmed, the contract can easily be
nullified on the ground of illegality, violation of public policy or
morality as suggested by laws in virtually all other jurisdictions.
These grounds are also available in §2–5 of article 52. According
to these subsections, a contract will be declared null, if the contract
is a sham transaction that harms the public interest or violates the
mandatory laws. In any event, if the state interest in question falls
within the state’s political, economic, or security interest—leaving
aside its interest in state-owned enterprises—such an interest will
be protected by article 52(§4) and (§5) rather than article 52(§1).
In addition, in the context of socialist market economy,
separation of SOEs from government has been regarded as one of
the core elements of SOE reform. Accordingly, the public policy
should be to treat SOEs equally as a market participant and to
reduce SOEs’ hidden advantages as much as possible. The public
policy here should be to prevent state from acting at the same time
both as a referee and a player. The financial interest of the SOE
therefore shall not be regarded as equivalent to a state or public
interest.
Admittedly, the Criminal Code penalizes the managers of stateowned enterprises for neglect of their duties if they allow
themselves to be defrauded into making contracts that result in
“heavy losses of the state interest.” 103 It does not penalize making
a contract with a state-owned enterprise by the use of fraud.
103. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 167.
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Consequently, defrauding a state-owned enterprise is not a
violation of law that will make a contract null and void under
article 52(§5). There is no reason why, if the manager is penalized
for bad business judgment and gross negligence, the contract itself
should automatically become null. Consequently, in this context,
fraud and duress do not in themselves qualify as violations of
criminal law. 104 Moreover, contract law, being part of the civil law,
is not the appropriate forum to protect the state interest from
criminal conduct or conduct that violates the public interest.
On the other hand, as the sole or majority shareholder of the
SOEs, the state has had a long standing financial interest in
contracts made by state-owned enterprises ever since the time of
the planned economy.
To understand what state interest in China can be harmed by
fraud and duress, it is better to start by asking the question “why
don’t Western civil laws protect the state interest from fraud and
duress and make such contracts null and void?” The answer is that,
if fraud or duress violates law and public policy, the contract will
automatically be null and void. Nevertheless, a court will sit on its
hands when the only interest harmed is the private interest of a
private party. The reason is that without the existence or with very
limited existence of the state-owned companies, the state
presumptively has no or little interest in private transactions unless
law is violated or public order is offended. In China, given the
socialist features of its economic system, the state does have an
ownership interest in the private contract transactions entered by
state-owned enterprises. There will be no difference in each civil
law jurisdiction’s treatment towards fraud or duress that violates
criminal law or other statutory provisions, or when an absolute
simulation or a sham transaction takes place— such contracts will
be deemed null and void. The only interest China has that the

104. See SUI PENG SHENG, supra note 90, at 134.
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capitalist counterparts do not have is the state’s pure financial
interest in SOEs’ interest in private transactions.
This enlarged power of the state to intervene to annul private
contracts can be traced back to article 30 of 1922 Civil Code of
R.S.F.S.R., which states: “A civil juristic act made for a purpose
contrary to law, or in fraud of law, as well as a transaction directed
to the obvious prejudice of the State, shall be invalid.” Though this
provision is not exactly the same as article 52(§1), they both annul
contracts to protect the same interest – the financial interest of the
state and SOEs. Under this Soviet Civil Code article, an otherwise
legal contract that is directed to the obvious prejudice of the state is
absolutely null. The Soviet case law and jurisprudence tend to
suggest that the range of contracts that were deemed to be directed
to the obvious prejudice of the state covers was larger than those
covered by article 52(§1).
Most scholars have agreed that it was a device to guard against
the undesirable growth of private business and that it was enacted
in conformity with Lenin’s instruction “to enlarge the interference
of the State with the relations pertaining to private law and to
enlarge the right of the government to annul, if necessary, private
contracts.” 105 Another scholar, T.E. Novitskaya , refers to this
device as “an effective weapon in the hands of the Soviet
state.” 106The right of the state to interfere with any contracts made
in any area of civil law created a tool to avoid consequences
disadvantageous for the socialist economy. In a Russian Supreme
Court case, the court annulled sales contracts solely because SOEs
had an interest in the objects for sale. 107 Such annulments were
based on the “socially announced purpose of use” of the object. 108
In another case the high court annulled a lease and thereby
interfered with a party’s property right because the property right is
105. See GSOVSKI, supra note 24, at 426.
106. T.E. NOVITSKAYA, GRAZHDANSKIY KODEKS R.S.F.S.R. 1922
[R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code of 1922] 86 (Moscow State Univ., Moscow 2002).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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not absolute under the civil code, and the economic interest of the
SOE prevailed over the property right. 109 It can be inferred that had
the SOE been defrauded or under duress in contract formation, the
Soviet courts would have annulled the contract to protect the
financial interests of the SOE. Also, what makes this device more
powerful than article 52(§1) is the legal sanction: when a contract
is annulled under article 30, damages for unjust enrichment will be
collected by the state rather than the innocent party. 110
3. The Judicial Responses
Chinese courts are confused as to what the state interest refers
to and do not fully understand the distinction between absolute
nullity and relative nullity.
My observations are based on the study of 122 cases decided
under article 52.
Courts appear to be careful about declaring a contract to be
absolutely null and certainly have not done so without a request
from the innocent party. Courts seem to go by the checklist under
article 52. They declare the contract valid if none of the
circumstances under article 52 apply and no party requested that
the contract be rescinded.
Also in the majority of cases decided under article 52, contracts
were annulled under either article 52(§4) or article 52(§5) for
violation of the public interest or of a mandatory law. It is
noteworthy that in most of the cases that cited article 52(§4), the
courts never cited article 52(§1) or article 52(§2) at the same time,
where both provisions mention state interest. It is clear that in the
opinion of many courts, the state interest in question is not the
public interest but rather something else. There is a significant
number of cases where courts cited article 52(§1)–(§5) as authority

109. Id. at 87.
110. See R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code art. 147.
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to nullify a contract without reference to a specific subsection or
without providing any explanation.
Among these cases, only a few were decided under article
52(§1) and article 52(§2) where the state interest is identified. Is
the state interest under article 52(§2) the same as the state interest
under article 52(§1)? Given the logical structure of the article,
most likely the state interests in both these provisions refer to the
same thing – the SOEs’ interest. The only difference between the
two provisions is that when only one party committed the wrong in
contract formation, article 52(§1) is applicable to annul the
contract; when both parties collectively committed the wrong,
article 52(§2) is applicable. Also the level of state interference will
be upgraded when both parties are at fault: the state will annul the
contract when either state interest, collective interest (meaning the
rural villages’ interest) or a third party’s interest, is harmed.
The cases show that several Chinese courts do distinguish state
interest from public interest and acknowledge that the state interest
was really the SOEs’ financial interest. One district court openly
admitted that whenever an SOE’s interest is harmed, the state
interest is therefore harmed. 111 In this case where the court cited
article 52(§2), the plaintiffs were state-owned pharmaceutical
companies that entered into an agreement with two advertising
firms after the two firms prevailed in the bidding process.112
However, the plaintiff’s employees had leaked the confidential
information in the course of the bidding process to help the
defendants succeed. The court, in its opinion, stated that “the
employees of the two plaintiffs and two defendants committed
malicious collusion and therefore harmed the two plaintiffs’
interests. Given the fact that the two plaintiffs are state-owned
enterprises, when their interests are harmed, the state interest is
harmed.” In another case decided under article 52(§1), where a
111. San X Pharmaceutical JSC v. Ya Advertising LLC. 2010, Shen Luo Min
Er Chu Zi No. 3X4X (citation partially omitted).
112. Id.
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state-owned pharmaceutical company was defrauded by another
pharmaceutical company, the court annulled the contract, citing
article 52(§1) as the only authority, rather than using article 54.113
Here, the plaintiff and appellant, a state-owned company, had sued
in damages for non-performance, making no claim for dissolution.
The claim was dismissed but the court declared the contract null on
the basis of article 52(§1), though without explaining what the
state interest was. The only possible state interest at stake here was
the SOE’s financial interest. It is obvious that, according to both
the trial court and appellate court, the SOE didn’t have the option
to uphold the contract and sue in damages for non-performance
even though it might be more beneficial for the state and the SOE
to maintain the contract and obtain expectation damages. In a third
case, it was asserted that a malicious collusion took place between
the immediate past manager and legal representative of a stateowned gallery, the Gallery of Shenyang Municipality, and a
pharmacy that had been a lessee leasing space within the
Gallery. 114 It turned out that the manager kept the official stamp
after he left office and produced a lease that was a counterfeit
which renewed the lease for three years and lowered the rent from
1.15 million RMB to 0.8 million RMB. 115 The Gallery asked to
have the contract annulled because “the conspiracy resulted in the
loss of a state-owned enterprise.” 116 The trial court upheld the
validity of the contract based on the doctrine of apparent
agency. 117 The appellate court sided with the Gallery and annulled
the contract citing article 52(§2) because “the interest of Gallery of
Shengyang Municipality is harmed.” 118 No reasoning or
113. Henan Middle Pharmaceutical Company v. Dong Xueling & Hubei
Hualong Pharmaceutical Company 2011, 郑民二终字第1327号 [Zheng Min Er
Zhong Zi No.1327].
114. Shenyang Gallery v. Shenyang Taiyuan Street Pharmacy 2005, 沈民
（2）房终字第847号 [2005 Shen Min (2) Fang Zhong Zi No.847].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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explanation was given to identify one of the three interests listed in
article 52(§2). There was no collective or third party interest
involved, thus leaving only one logical explanation: the court must
have been of opinion that the Gallery, as an SOE, represented the
state interest. Therefore, it is fair to say that these courts are at least
of the opinion that the state interest protected by article 52 is
identical to the state-owned enterprise’s interest.
The courts, however, are not unanimous. In another case, the
court did not nullify the contract even though the state-owned
hospital was defrauded in a licensing agreement for a patent and
had claimed rescission of the contract based on article 52(§1). 119
The hospital could no longer request nullification on the basis of
article 54, due to the one-year prescription. Nullity remained
possible on the basis of article 52(§1) where contracts that are
absolutely null are imprescriptible according to a recently
published Supreme Court case. 120 The court’s only line of
reasoning was that “a state-owned enterprise’s interest is not the
equivalent of state interest” and therefore article 52(§1) was not
applicable. 121 It is worth mentioning that victims of fraud or duress
try to use article 52(§1) as a last resort to nullify a contract when
the one-year prescriptive period for annullable contracts runs out
and the victims happen to be SOEs. 122
4. When is the State Interest Harmed, and under what
Circumstances shall the Article 52(§1) Power be Exercised?
My answer to the third question is that the state or a third party
can only step in to have a court declare a contract formed under
fraud or duress to be null when the situation is so deleterious that
119. Tao Zhenhai v. Liaohe Oil Field Center Hospital 2006, 沈民四知初字
第65号 [2006 Shen Min Si Zhi Chu Zi No.65].
120. Guangxi BeiSheng Co. Ltd v. Beihai Weihao Real Estate Development
Co. Ltd 2005, 民一终字第104号 [2005 Min Yi Zhong Zi] (Published in May,
2013).
121. See supra note 119.
122. See Contract Law art. 54.
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the failure of the state-owned enterprise to seek restitution
constitutes a neglect of duty. Such strings must be attached to
prevent the state from abusing its power, and thereby harm the
safety of transactions. In addition, it is not always in the state’s
own financial interest to rescind a contract made under fraud or
duress.
If the state tried to seek annulment of every contract induced
by fraud or duress on behalf of the state-owned enterprises, the
state-owned enterprises would lose their autonomy as market
players to make a business decision in their best interest. Stateowned enterprises would then be pure government agencies rather
than business entities. After all, since a government-led market
economy has been established in China, private transactions are no
longer mere forms in which state supplies are operated. Stateowned enterprises now have independent financial status and
independent management. Such intrusion, if allowed, would
greatly discourage commercial transactions because people would
be more concerned in making contracts where a third party or the
state can step in and declare it null without their consent.
Also, as previously described, it might be in the state’s
economic interest to enforce a contract even though it was made by
means of fraud or duress. The reasons might be that expectation
damages for non-performance are greater than reliance damages
that may be granted in addition to nullity, or that some market
change made it beneficial to enforce such a contract. Also, the
object of the contract might simply be of great subjective value to
the state-owned enterprise, and therefore creates a legitimate
reason for the company to enforce it regardless of fraud or duress.
Therefore, in my opinion, the enlarged state power to annul
contracts can only be exercised when there is neglect in the
performance of a duty and that neglect is so severe that no
reasonable businessman would choose to enforce the contract after
knowing of the fraud or being released from duress.
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Further, state intervention can be justified by the lack of a
sufficiently free and competitive market and the lack of a sufficient
information indicator to evaluate the SOE performance.
We discussed the aggrieved party’s incentive to act in its best
interest in evaluating the financial consequences of nullification.
Even though reforms have been carried out to invigorate SOEs, the
state-owned enterprises are not sufficiently business-driven. The
absence of effective shareholding and corporate governance results
in a lack of management accountability. Managers in state-owned
enterprises are more like government employees than businessmen
and are short of personal incentive and financial stake in running
the business. Throughout the SOE reforms around the world, it has
been observed that “bureaucrats typically perform poorly in
business, not because they are incompetent, but because they face
contradictory goals and perverse incentives that can distract and
discourage even very able and dedicated public servants.” 123
In China, SOE managers receive salaries that are comparable
to government employees with similar bureaucratic ranks, and
directors and officers can be laterally transferred to other
government agencies in the event the SOE goes bankrupt.
Therefore, unlike privately-owned businesses, profit maximization
is never the top priority of these government-employed
businessmen who are tasked to carry out state policies and held
accountable only to the state. Since these quasi state-officials are
not nearly as motivated as private entrepreneurs, since they are not
accountable to shareholders for their grossly negligent business
decisions, one may expect poor judgment when it comes to decide
whether a contract should be nullified. 124
Also, given the bad experience China had had during the
economic reform in giving SOE managers too much autonomy and

123. See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 3.
124. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu
Zi No. 57 (1992)]
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incentive 125 and the incentive incompatibility that the reform fails
to cure with both the policy induced burden and absence of a
competitive market, this situation is unlikely to improve in the
foreseeable future. Despite the introduction of a market economy,
the state, as the owner of the SOEs, has its own policy agenda that
needs to be carried out by SOEs, which is often incompatible with
normal business incentives. For example, SOEs often have to carry
out policy burdens such as the “policy-induced over-staffing” in
order to assist the state in “resettling the redundant workers”. 126
Also, as the main forces in pursuing the state economic objectives,
SOEs still don’t have the complete autonomy in choosing their
production direction. 127 Price distortion still exists to serve the
state development strategies. 128 Unlike in the West, profit alone
usually does not accurately reflect the efficiency and diligence of
the management. It is possible that a poorly managed enterprise
can still generate significant profits due to the lack of competition
and superficial entry barriers created by government. Under such
circumstances, if the state totally keeps its hands off SOE
management decision making, it is possible for the manager to
125. Jian Chen, in his book Corporate Governance in China, described one
of the lessons:
Contract responsibility systems were introduced in most large and
medium-sized state industrial enterprises during 1986–1997. The
system was officially intended to place government ownership at arm’s
length to enterprise management, so allowing more decision making
space (business autonomy) to the latter. In the contract, the firm hands
over an agreed amount of annual profit and tax for which they have
contracted. It was permitted to retain a proportion of any surplus it
achieved above the contract level. Also, the firm guaranteed to invest to
increase asset value and to develop technology by an agreed amount,
using retained profit during the contract period. But substantial
collusion soon emerged between the directors, and the heads of the
supervising government departments, leading to widespread corruption.
The directors found that it was easier or quicker to reward themselves
by transferring the firm’s assets to their own firms. The lesson was that
it was not feasible to relinquish control to the firm’s managers in
attempt to improve performance.
See JIAN CHEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 38–39 (Routledge 2009).
126. See JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 114.
127. See id. at 119–120.
128. See id. at 145.
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neglect the management duty to effectively protect state-owned
assets and the SOE’s financial interest without being noticed by the
state, if the state, as the majority shareholder, only looks at the
usual information indicators as in the West.
These endogenous features inherent in Chinese economy
warrant the state’s supervisory role over the SOEs. In response to
the incentive incompatibility, information asymmetry, and liability
disproportionality discussed above, it is legitimate for the state to
nullify otherwise annullable contracts when affording the SOE
management the option to confirm a contract that would harm the
state’s interest in the SOE. Nevertheless, a court cannot rescind an
annullable contract on its own initiative when neither party is an
SOE. If both parties are private companies, then no such state
interest will be involved. The state should not intervene, no matter
how serious the consequence of fraud or duress is, and how big a
financial loss the innocent party suffers.
Also, the state should not be able to rescind an annullable
contract where the only aggrieved party is an SOE but there is a
reasonable business choice not to rescind it. This may be in order
to benefit from a market change or to obtain greater damages, or
because the contract has a reasonable subjective value to the
aggrieved party.
C. Further Confusions Caused by Article 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L.
As mentioned above, G.P.C.L. article 58(§3) adds to the
complexity of the puzzle this article tries to resolve.
Though the G.P.C.L. assume their status as the highest law in
the realm of civil law, as a general law, it is trumped by special
laws such as contract law statutes, should any conflict exist. The
GPLC govern civil juristic acts, of which contracts are a category.
Every time a contract is induced by fraud or duress, a potential
conflict between the Contract Law and the G.P.C.L. arises.
Presumably, this outdated law should either be no longer
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applicable or only applicable to civil juristic acts other than
contract, in application of the civilian principle that special rules
take precedence over general rules (specialia generalibus
derogant). This would keep article 58(§3) away from further
confusing the conflict between article 52 and article 54 of the
Contract Law. However, an examination of 35 cases decided under
article 58 in the past 23 years reveals a different story. It appears
that when an SOE is harmed by a civil juristic act induced by fraud
or duress, article 58(§3) merely extends the article 52(§1)
protection of SOEs’ financial interest afforded to the civil juristic
acts by imposing the absolute nullity of civil juristic acts when
induced by fraud or duress. Also, a court might use article 58(§3)
to enlarge its contract nullification power and infringe the
autonomy established by article 54 of the Contract Law, by
considering the contract simply as a civil juristic act rather than
characterizing it as a contract.
For contracts entered into between 1986 and 1999, when
nullifying economic contracts formed under fraud or duress, courts
usually cited both G.P.C.L. article 58 and E.C.L. article 7. 129 This
was probably because contracting was deemed both a civil juristic
act and an economic contract. When nullifying contracts between
individuals where the contracts did not fall within the regime of the
E.C.L., courts only cited G.P.C.L. article 58. 130 In a case decided
in 1992, a sale of an apartment between two individuals was
nullified because of a fraudulent misrepresentation by the
defendant. 131 The act of sale was deemed a civil juristic act rather
than a contract and therefore was annulled under G.P.C.L. article
58(§3) rather than under the special contract law. The court did not
explain why this sale was not a contract. Most probably, because
only juristic persons or business entities were allowed to enter into
129. See (1992) 渝经上字第377号 [Yu Jing Shang Zi No.377 (1992)].
130. This is contrary to the traditional view that contracts between
individuals were not regulated before 1999.
131. 浙江省金华县人民法院（1992）白民初字第57号 [Zhe Bai Min Chu
Zi No. 57 (1992)].
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economic contracts and because the sale did not comply with rigid
form requirements under the E.C.L. 132, the E.C.L. was not
applicable to the case.
For contracts entered into from 1999 to present, in theory,
courts are supposed to apply article 58 (§3) to nullify civil juristic
acts that are not regarded as contracts. 133 In such cases, these
juristic acts induced by fraud or duress are absolutely null, and
therefore can be nullified on the court’s own initiative. For
example, in a 2005 Supreme Court case, a company in the business
of international trade deceived a state-owned bank into issuing
letters of credit through a series of misrepresentations when
applying for the letters. 134 The court held that the issuance of such
letters of credits was null because they were civil juristic acts that
fall within the scope of article 58(§3). 135 Article 58(§3) is used as
an extension of the article 52(1) power into the state-owned bank’s
issuance of letters of credit.
Also, in several private loan disputes cases, courts unanimously
treated the signing of an informal acknowledgement of debts
(“IOU”) under the threat of physical violence 136 and a payment by
the wife of the alleged debt of the husband when the wife was
defrauded by a falsified IOU 137 as absolutely null juristic acts.
These annulments were based solely on article 58(§3).
However, courts sometimes use article 58(§3) as a vehicle to
annul contracts for fraud or duress, without mentioning article 52
132. For example, under the E.C.L. art. 3, an economic contract should be in
writing. Article 12 lists a series of main provisions that should be included in an
economic contract.
133. For example, when a person made a will under duress, to nullify the
will, the court has to apply art. 58(§3) of the G.P.C.L. rather than art. 54 of the
Contract Law.
134. See（2005）民四终字第21号 [Min Si Zhong Zi No.21(2005)].
135. Id. In the West, a letter of credit is regarded as a contract. However, in
China, courts are not certain whether the letter shall be defined as a contract. In
this case, the court seemed to be convinced that the letter of credit was a civil
juristic act that was not a contract.
136. See (2009) 浙台商终字第98号 [Zhe Tai Shang Zhong Zi No.98
(2009)].
137. See (2008) 豫驻民三终字第417号 [Yu Zhu Min San No.417 (2005)].
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or article 54 of the Contract Law, thus preferring the general law to
the special law. This preference is generally a distinction without a
difference since the victim usually requested the court to nullify
the transaction anyway. Nevertheless, sometimes courts tend to
nullify contracts on their own initiative when the victim of fraud or
duress might in theory choose to perform the contract regardless of
relative nullity.
In a case decided in 2009, the plaintiff filed suit to have the
court annul a settlement agreement signed by him under duress. 138
In this case, the plaintiff and defendant were fathers of a newlywed couple who were having disputes over each other’s share of
the wedding expenses. 139 The defendant brought over 40 relatives
and hooligans to the plaintiff’s house. The group not only beat the
plaintiff but also forced him to sign a settlement agreement.
Without addressing the possibility that this agreement may be
considered a contract, the court treated it as an absolutely null civil
juristic act, solely based on the application of article 58(§3). 140
IV. CONCLUSION
In contrast with Western civil law systems in which contract
law theories are based on freedom of contract and the expression
of the will, the post–1949 Chinese contract law is based on a
system in which government ownership of the economy dominates
and the market is not yet free and competitive. Upon China’s
adoption of a market economy, the role of contract has been slowly
and reluctantly moving from public economic law, which
emphasizes state regulatory control, to private civil law, which
requires contractual autonomy and more limited state interference.
The SOE reform that has allowed SOEs more autonomy, but has
not yet provided the solution to cure the incentive incompatibility,
information asymmetry, and liability disproportionality between
138. See (2009)甘民初字第2902号 [Gan Min Chu Zi No. 2902 (2009)].
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the state and SOEs. Under these circumstances, freedom of
contract, though adopted by the Chinese Contract Law, will be
abused by SOEs at the expense of the state if made applicable to
them without additional strings. The interference with freedom of
contract, as exemplified by Contract Law article 52(§1), is a
reasonable solution to prevent the abuse. Nevertheless, such a state
intrusion must be restricted and narrowly tailored to permit the
rescission of contracts only when rescission was not sought due to
a neglect of a duty by those in charge of state-owned enterprises.
Despite my arguments, it remains uncertain, as we have seen
from the various cases, how the Chinese courts interpret this state
interest in practice. Foreign corporations, when conducting
business in China and contracting with Chinese state-owned
enterprises, should know that the validity of their contracts may
depend on such an extensive state power when state interest is at
stake. The scope of this power might be as narrow as this article
proposes: it might extend to the state-owned enterprises’ interest
under extreme circumstances. Yet, it might also be broadly applied
to protect SOEs’ financial interests under ordinary circumstances
and SOEs might not be afforded the option to keep the contract
when it was induced by fraud or duress. Another possibility is that
article 52(§1) will be applied to protect other state interests. In that
event, however, article 52(§1) will merely be a paraphrase of the
protection of public interest under article 52(§4), as in all the
Western legal systems in which violation of public order is a
ground for absolute nullity of contract.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE

Volume 5 of the Journal of Civil Law Studies published several
titles of the Louisiana Civil Code in English and in French. This
included the Preliminary Title and the general law of obligations,
namely three titles of Book Three: Obligations in General (Title 3),
Conventional Obligations or Contracts (Title 4), and Obligations
Arising without Agreement (Title 5). Representation and Mandate
(Title 15) and Suretyship (Title 16) were published in Volume 6.
We are now publishing Sale (Title 7) and Exchange (Title 8). The
translation, made at the Center of Civil Law Studies, was revised
with the assistance of Dr. Matthias Martin, Université de Lorraine
(France), during his visit at the LSU Law Center in the spring of
2014. 1
Plusieurs titres du Code civil de Louisiane furent publiés en
anglais et en français dans le Volume 5 du Journal of Civil Law
Studies : le Titre préliminaire et les trois titres du Livre III
couvrant la partie générale du droit des obligations : Titre III (Des
obligations en général), Titre IV (Des obligations conventionnelles
ou des contrats) et Titre V (Des engagements qui se forment sans
convention). Les Titres XV (De la représentation et du mandat) et
XVI (Du cautionnement) furent publiés au Volume 6. Nous
publions ici les Titres VII (De la vente) et VIII (De l’échange),
dont la traduction, faite au Centre de droit civil, fut révisée avec le
concours de M. Matthias Martin (Docteur en droit, Université de
Lorraine) durant sa visite au Law Center de la Louisiana State
University au printemps 2014. 1
1

For a general presentation of the translation project, see Olivier Moréteau, The
Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD.
97-104 (2012); Le Code civil de Louisiane, traduction et retraduction,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW (2014),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11196-014-9391-8.
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BOOK III. OF THE
DIFFERENT MODES OF
ACQUIRING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THINGS
(…)
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LIVRE III. DES DIFFÉRENTS
MOYENS DONT ON
ACQUIERT LA PROPRIÉTÉ
DES BIENS
(…)

TITLE VII. SALE
[Acts 1993, No. 841, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1995]

TITRE VII. DE LA VENTE
[Loi de 1993, n° 841, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1995]

CHAPTER 1. OF THE
NATURE AND FORM OF THE
CONTRACT OF SALE

CHAPITRE 1. DE LA NATURE
ET DE LA FORME DU
CONTRAT DE VENTE

Art. 2438. In all matters for
which no special provision is
made in this title, the contract of
sale is governed by the rules of
the titles on Obligations in
General and Conventional
Obligations or Contracts.

Art. 2438. Dans toutes les
matières pour lesquelles aucune
disposition spéciale n’est prévue
dans ce titre, le contrat de vente
est régi par les règles des titres
Des obligations en général et
Des obligations conventionnelles
ou des contrats.

Art. 2439. Sale is a contract
whereby a person transfers
ownership of a thing to another
for a price in money.
The thing, the price, and the
consent of the parties are
requirements for the perfection
of a sale.
Art. 2440. A sale or promise
of sale of an immovable must be
made by authentic act or by act
under private signature, except as
provided in Article 1839.
Art. 2441. [Reserved]

Art. 2439. La vente est un
contrat par lequel une personne
transfère à une autre la propriété
d’une chose en échange d’un
prix en argent.
La chose, le prix et le
consentement des parties sont
requis pour parfaire une vente.
Art. 2440. Une vente ou une
promesse de vente d’un
immeuble doivent être constatées
par acte authentique ou par acte
sous seing privé, sous réserve
des dispositions prévues à
l’article 1839.
Art. 2441. [Réservé]

Art. 2442. The parties to an
act of sale or promise of sale of
immovable property are bound
from the time the act is made, but
such an act is not effective
against third parties until it is
filed for registry according to the
laws of registry. [Acts 2005, No.
169, §2, eff. July 1, 2006; Acts

Art. 2442. Les parties à un
acte de vente ou à une promesse
de vente d’un bien immobilier
sont liées à partir du moment où
l’acte est fait, mais un tel acte
n’a d’effet à l’égard des tiers
qu’à partir du moment où il est
déposé pour enregistrement
conformément aux lois relatives
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2005, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 13, §1,
eff. Nov. 29, 2005]

Art. 2443. A person cannot
purchase a thing he already
owns. Nevertheless, the owner of
a thing may purchase the rights
of a person who has, or may
have, an adverse claim to the
thing.
Art. 2444. [Repealed. Acts
2012, No. 277, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2012]
Arts. 2445-2446. [Reserved]
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à l’enregistrement.[Loi de 2005,
n°169, §2, en vigueur le 1er
juillet 2006 ; loi de 2005, 1ère
session extraordinaire, n°13, §1,
en vigueur le 29 novembre 2005]
Art. 2443. Nul ne peut
acheter une chose dont il est déjà
propriétaire. Cependant, le
propriétaire d’une chose peut
acheter les droits d’une personne
qui a, ou peut avoir, une
prétention contraire sur la chose.
Art. 2444. [Abrogé par loi de
2012, n° 277, §1, en vigueur le
1er août 2012]
Arts. 2445-2446. [Réservés]

CHAPTER 2. OF PERSONS
CAPABLE OF BUYING AND
SELLING

CHAPITRE 2. DES
PERSONNES CAPABLES
D’ACHETER ET DE VENDRE

Art. 2447. Officers of a
court, such as judges, attorneys,
clerks, and law enforcement
agents, cannot purchase litigious
rights under contestation in the
jurisdiction of that court. The
purchase of a litigious right by
such an officer is null and makes
the purchaser liable for all costs,
interest, and damages.

Art. 2447. Les professionnels
attachés à un tribunal, tels que
les juges, les avocats, les
greffiers et les agents chargés de
l’application des lois ne peuvent
pas acheter de droits litigieux en
contestation dans la juridiction
dudit tribunal. L’acquisition d’un
droit litigieux par un tel
professionnel est nulle et rend
l’acquéreur responsable de tous
les dépens, dommages et intérêts.

CHAPTER 3. OF THINGS
WHICH MAY BE SOLD
Art. 2448. All things
corporeal or incorporeal,
susceptible of ownership, may be
the object of a contract of sale,
unless the sale of a particular
thing is prohibited by law.
Art. 2449. [Reserved]

CHAPITRE 3. DES CHOSES
QUI PEUVENT ÊTRE
VENDUES
Art. 2448. Toutes les choses
corporelles ou incorporelles,
susceptibles d’appropriation,
peuvent faire l’objet d’un contrat
de vente, à moins que la vente
d’une chose particulière n’ait été
interdite par la loi.
Art. 2449. [Réservé]
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Art. 2450. A future thing
may be the object of a contract of
sale. In such a case the coming
into existence of the thing is a
condition that suspends the
effects of the sale. A party who,
through his fault, prevents the
coming into existence of the
thing is liable for damages.

Art. 2450. Une chose future
peut faire l’objet d’un contrat de
vente. Dans un tel cas, la
survenance de la chose est une
condition suspensive des effets de
la vente. Une partie qui, de par
sa faute, empêche la survenance
de la chose est responsable des
dommages et intérêts.

Art. 2451. A hope may be
the object of a contract of sale.
Thus, a fisherman may sell a haul
of his net before he throws it. In
that case the buyer is entitled to
whatever is caught in the net,
according to the parties'
expectations, and even if nothing
is caught the sale is valid.

Art. 2451. Une espérance
peut faire l’objet d’un contrat de
vente. Ainsi, un pêcheur peut
vendre un coup de filet avant
qu’il n’ait lancé celui-ci. Dans ce
cas, l’acheteur a droit à tout ce
qui est pris dans le filet,
conformément aux attentes des
parties et même si rien n’est pris,
la vente est valable.

Art. 2452. The sale of a thing
belonging to another does not
convey ownership.
Art. 2453. When the
ownership of a thing is the
subject of litigation, the sale of
that thing during the pendency of
the suit does not affect the
claimant's rights. Where the
thing is immovable, the rights of
third persons are governed by the
laws of registry. [Amended by
Acts 1878, No. 3; Acts 1993, No.
841, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995]
Arts. 2454-2455. [Reserved]
CHAPTER 4. HOW THE
CONTRACT OF SALE IS TO
BE PERFECTED

Art. 2452. La vente d’une
chose appartenant à autrui ne
transmet pas la propriété.
Art. 2453. Lorsque la
propriété d’une chose fait l’objet
d’une action en justice, la vente
de cette chose pendant l’instance
n’affecte pas les droits du
demandeur. Lorsque la chose est
un bien immobilier, les droits des
tiers sont régis par les lois
relatives à l’enregistrement.
[Modifié par la loi de 1878, n°3 ;
loi de 1993, n° 841, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1995]
Art. 2454-2455. [Réservés]
CHAPITRE 4. DE LA MANIÈRE
DE PARFAIRE LE CONTRAT
DE VENTE

Art. 2456. Ownership is
transferred between the parties as
soon as there is agreement on the
thing and the price is fixed, even
though the thing sold is not yet
delivered nor the price paid.

Art. 2456. La propriété est
transférée entre les parties dès
qu’il y a accord sur la chose et
que le prix est fixé, quoique la
chose vendue n’ait pas encore
été livrée ni le prix payé.

Art. 2457. When the object
of a sale is a thing that must be

Art. 2457. Lorsque l’objet de
la vente est une chose qui doit
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individualized from a mass of
things of the same kind,
ownership is transferred when
the thing is thus individualized
according to the intention of the
parties.

être individualisée parmi une
multitude de choses de la même
espèce, la propriété est
transférée lorsque la chose est
ainsi individualisée
conformément à l’intention des
parties.

Art. 2458. When things are
sold by weight, tale, or measure,
ownership is transferred between
the parties when the seller, with
the buyer's consent, weighs,
counts or measures the things.
When things, such as goods
or produce, are sold in a lump,
ownership is transferred between
the parties upon their consent,
even though the things are not
yet weighed, counted, or
measured.

Art. 2458. Lorsque les choses
sont vendues au poids, au
compte 2 ou à la mesure, la
propriété est transférée entre les
parties lorsque le vendeur, avec
le consentement de l’acquéreur,
pèse, compte ou mesure les
choses.
Lorsque les choses, telles
que des marchandises ou des
denrées, sont vendues en bloc, la
propriété est transférée entre les
parties lors de leur
consentement, même si les choses
n’ont pas encore été pesées,
comptées ou mesurées.

Art. 2459. [Reserved]

Art. 2459. [Réservé]

Art. 2460. When the buyer
has reserved the view or trial of
the thing, ownership is not
transferred from the seller to the
buyer until the latter gives his
approval of the thing.

Art. 2460. Lorsque
l’acquéreur a réservé la vue ou
l’essai de la chose, il n’y a
transfert de propriété entre le
vendeur et l’acquéreur que
lorsque ce dernier approuve la
chose.

Art. 2461. The sale of a thing
includes all accessories intended
for its use in accordance with the
law of property.

Art. 2461. La vente d’une
chose inclut tous les accessoires
destinés à son utilisation
conformément au droit des biens.

Art. 2462. [Reserved]
Art. 2463. The expenses of
the act and other expenses
incidental to the sale must be
borne by the buyer.

2

Art. 2462. [Réservé]
Art. 2463. Les frais de l’acte
de vente et les autres frais
accessoires sont à la charge de
l’acquéreur.

NdT : Compte apparaît dans le Digeste où il est traduit par erreur par tale, traduction de conte. Le mot tale a été
repris dans les versions successives du Code civil, y compris lors de la révision de 1993 visant à mettre le Code civil
en harmonie avec le Chapitre 2 du Code de commerce uniforme.
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CHAPTER 5. OF THE PRICE
OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE

CHAPITRE 5. DU PRIX DANS
LE CONTRAT DE VENTE

Art. 2464. The price must be
fixed by the parties in a sum
either certain or determinable
through a method agreed by
them. There is no sale unless the
parties intended that a price be
paid.
The price must not be out of
all proportion with the value of
the thing sold. Thus, the sale of a
plantation for a dollar is not a
sale, though it may be a donation
in disguise.

Art. 2464. Le prix doit être
fixé par les parties et consister
en une somme d’argent certaine
ou déterminable selon une
méthode convenue entre elles. Il
n’y a pas vente si les parties
n’ont pas entendu qu’un prix soit
payé.
Le prix ne doit pas être hors
de toute proportion avec la
valeur de la chose. Ainsi, la
vente d’une plantation pour un
dollar n’est pas une vente, mais
ce peut être une donation
déguisée.

Art. 2465. The price may be
left to the determination of a
third person. If the parties fail to
agree on or to appoint such a
person, or if the one appointed is
unable or unwilling to make a
determination, the price may be
determined by the court.
Art. 2466. When the thing
sold is a movable of the kind that
the seller habitually sells and the
parties said nothing about the
price, or left it to be agreed later
and they fail to agree, the price is
a reasonable price at the time and
place of delivery. If there is an
exchange or market for such
things, the quotations or price
lists of the place of delivery or,
in their absence, those of the
nearest market, are a basis for the
determination of a reasonable
price.
Nevertheless, if the parties
intend not to be bound unless a
price be agreed on, there is no
contract without such an
agreement.

Art. 2465. Le prix peut être
laissé à la détermination d’un
tiers. Si les parties ne
parviennent pas à se mettre
d’accord sur le choix ou la
désignation du tiers, ou que celui
choisi ne peut ou ne veut faire
l’estimation, le prix peut être
déterminé par le juge.
Art. 2466. Lorsque la chose
vendue est un meuble
habituellement vendu par le
vendeur et que les parties ne se
sont pas prononcées sur le prix,
ou ont décidé de se mettre
d’accord ultérieurement sans y
parvenir, le prix sera un prix
raisonnable au temps et au lieu
de la délivrance. S’il existe une
bourse ou un marché pour de
telles choses, les cours ou les
listes de prix du lieu de
délivrance ou, en leur absence,
ceux du plus proche marché,
servent de base pour la
détermination d’un prix
raisonnable.
Toutefois, si les parties
entendent ne pas être liées tant
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qu’elles ne se sont pas mises
d’accord sur le prix, il n’y a pas
de contrat.

CHAPTER 6. AT WHOSE RISK
THE THING IS, AFTER THE
SALE IS COMPLETED

CHAPITRE 6. DE LA
PERSONNE SUPPORTANT LES
RISQUES RELATIFS À LA
CHOSE, UNE FOIS LA VENTE
CONCLUE

Art. 2467. The risk of loss of
the thing sold owing to a
fortuitous event is transferred
from the seller to the buyer at the
time of delivery.
That risk is so transferred
even when the seller has
delivered a nonconforming thing,
unless the buyer acts in the
manner required to dissolve the
contract.

Art. 2467. Le risque de perte
de la chose vendue en raison
d’un événement fortuit est
transféré du vendeur à l’acheteur
au moment de la délivrance.
Ce risque est ainsi transféré
quand bien même le vendeur a
délivré une chose non conforme,
à moins que l’acheteur agisse de
la manière requise pour résoudre
le contrat.

Arts. 2468-2473. [Reserved]

CHAPTER 7. OF THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE
SELLER
Art. 2474. The seller must
clearly express the extent of his
obligations arising from the
contract, and any obscurity or
ambiguity in that expression
must be interpreted against the
seller.
Art. 2475. The seller is
bound to deliver the thing sold
and to warrant to the buyer
ownership and peaceful
possession of, and the absence of
hidden defects in, that thing. The
seller also warrants that the thing
sold is fit for its intended use.
Art. 2476. [Reserved]
Art. 2477. Delivery of an
immovable is deemed to take
place upon execution of the

Arts. 2468-2473. [Réservés]

CHAPITRE 7. DES
OBLIGATIONS DU VENDEUR

Art. 2474. Le vendeur doit
exprimer clairement ce à quoi il
s’oblige en vertu du contrat. Tout
pacte obscur ou ambigu
s’interprète contre le vendeur.
Art. 2475. Le vendeur est
tenu de délivrer la chose vendue
et de garantir à l’acheteur le
droit de propriété et la
possession paisible, ainsi que
l’absence de vices cachés. Le
vendeur garantit également que
la chose vendue est adaptée à
l’usage auquel elle est destinée.
Art. 2476. [Réservé]
Art. 2477. La délivrance d’un
immeuble est réputée avoir lieu
dès la signature de l’écrit qui
transfère la propriété.
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writing that transfers its
ownership.
Delivery of a movable takes
place by handing it over to the
buyer. If the parties so intend
delivery may take place in
another manner, such as by the
seller's handing over to the buyer
the key to the place where the
thing is stored, or by negotiating
to him a document of title to the
thing, or even by the mere
consent of the parties if the thing
sold cannot be transported at the
time of the sale or if the buyer
already has the thing at that time.
Arts. 2478-2479. [Reserved]

[Vol. 7

La délivrance d’un meuble
s’opère lors de sa remise à
l’acheteur. Lorsque les parties en
conviennent ainsi, la délivrance
peut avoir lieu d’une
autre manière, telle que la
remise des clefs des bâtiments
qui contiennent la chose, ou la
remise d’un document valant
titre de propriété sur la chose, ou
même par le seul consentement
des parties si la chose vendue ne
peut être transportée au moment
de la vente ou si l’acheteur
l’avait déjà en son pouvoir à ce
moment-là.
Arts. 2478-2479. [Réservés]

Art. 2480. When the thing
sold remains in the corporeal
possession of the seller the sale is
presumed to be a simulation, and,
where the interest of heirs and
creditors of the seller is
concerned, the parties must show
that their contract is not a
simulation.

Art. 2480. Lorsque la chose
vendue reste en la possession
physique du vendeur, la vente est
présumée être une simulation. De
ce fait, lorsque les intérêts des
héritiers et des créanciers du
vendeur sont en cause, les
parties doivent montrer que leur
contrat n’est pas une simulation.

Art. 2481. Delivery of
incorporeal movable things
incorporated into an instrument,
such as stocks and bonds, takes
place by negotiating such
instrument to the buyer. Delivery
of other incorporeal movables,
such as credit rights, takes place
upon the transfer of those
movables.

Art. 2481. La délivrance de
choses mobilières incorporelles
matérialisées dans un titre, telles
que des actions et des
obligations, a lieu par la
négociation du titre à l’acheteur.
La délivrance des autres meubles
incorporels, tels que les droits de
créance, a lieu lors de leur
transfert.

Art. 2482. When at the time
of the sale the seller is not in
possession of the thing sold he
must obtain possession at his cost
and deliver the thing to the
buyer.

Art. 2482. Lorsqu’au
moment de la vente le vendeur
n’est pas en possession de la
chose vendue, il doit en obtenir
la possession à ses frais et la
délivrer à l’acheteur.

Art. 2483. The cost of
making delivery is borne by the
seller and that of taking delivery
by the buyer, in the absence of
agreement to the contrary.

Art. 2483. Les frais de la
délivrance sont à la charge du
vendeur et ceux de l’enlèvement
à la charge de l’acheteur, s’il n’y
a eu stipulation contraire.

Art. 2484. Delivery must be

Art. 2484. La délivrance doit
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made at the place agreed upon by
the parties or intended by them.
In the absence of such agreement
or intent, delivery must be made
at the place where the thing is
located at the time of the sale.

se faire au lieu convenu ou voulu
par les parties. En l’absence
d’accord ou de volonté en ce
sens la délivrance doit se faire
au lieu où se situe la chose au
moment de la vente.

Art. 2485. When the seller
fails to deliver or to make timely
delivery of the thing sold, the
buyer may demand specific
performance of the obligation of
the seller to deliver, or may seek
dissolution of the sale.
In either case, and also when
the seller has made a late
delivery, the buyer may seek
damages.

Art. 2485. Lorsque le
vendeur ne délivre pas la chose
vendue ou ne la délivre pas à
temps, l’acheteur peut demander
l’exécution en nature de
l’obligation de délivrance du
vendeur, ou la résolution de la
vente.
Dans les deux cas, l’acheteur
peut demander des dommagesintérêts, y compris lorsque le
vendeur a délivré la chose
tardivement.
Art. 2486. [Réservé]

Art. 2486. [Reserved]
Art. 2487. The seller may
refuse to deliver the thing sold
until the buyer tenders payment
of the price, unless the seller has
granted the buyer a term for such
payment.
Art. 2488. [Reserved]
Art. 2489. The seller must
deliver the thing sold in the
condition that, at the time of the
sale, the parties expected, or
should have expected, the thing
to be in at the time of delivery,
according to its nature.
Art. 2490. [Reserved]

Art. 2487. Le vendeur peut
refuser de délivrer la chose
vendue jusqu’à ce que l’acheteur
offre le paiement du prix, à
moins que le vendeur ne lui ait
accordé un délai pour le
paiement.
Art. 2488. [Réservé]
Art. 2489 Le vendeur doit
délivrer la chose vendue dans
l’état dans lequel, au moment de
la vente, les parties s’attendaient
ou auraient dû s’attendre à ce
qu’elle soit, compte tenu de sa
nature, lors de la délivrance.
Art. 2490. [Réservé]

Art. 2491. The seller must
deliver to the buyer the full
extent of the immovable sold.
That obligation may be modified
in accordance with the provisions
of the following Articles.

Art. 2491. Le vendeur doit
délivrer à l’acheteur la
contenance complète de
l’immeuble vendu. Cette
obligation peut être modifiée
selon les dispositions des articles
suivants.

Art. 2492. If the sale of an
immovable has been made with
indication of the extent of the
premises at the rate of so much

Art. 2492. Lorsque la vente
d’un immeuble a été faite avec
indication de la contenance, à
raison de tant la mesure, mais
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per measure, but the seller is
unable to deliver the full extent
specified in the contract, the
price must be proportionately
reduced.
If the extent delivered by the
seller is greater than that
specified in the contract, the
buyer must pay to the seller a
proportionate supplement of the
price. The buyer may recede
from the sale when the actual
extent of the immovable sold
exceeds by more than one
twentieth the extent specified in
the contract.
Art. 2493. [Reserved]
Art. 2494. When the sale of
an immovable has been made
with indication of the extent of
the premises, but for a lump
price, the expression of the
measure does not give the seller
the right to a proportionate
increase of the price, nor does it
give the buyer the right to a
proportionate diminution of the
price, unless there is a surplus, or
a shortage, of more than one
twentieth of the extent specified
in the act of sale.
When the surplus is such as
to give the seller the right to an
increase of the price the buyer
has the option either to pay that
increase or to recede from the
contract.
Art. 2495. When an
immovable described as a certain
and limited body or a distinct
object is sold for a lump price, an
expression of the extent of the
immovable in the act of sale does
not give the parties any right to
an increase or diminution of the
price in case of surplus or
shortage in the actual extension
of the immovable. [Amended by

[Vol. 7

que le vendeur est dans
l’incapacité de délivrer la
totalité de la contenance
exprimée au contrat, le prix doit
être diminué
proportionnellement.
Lorsque la contenance
délivrée par le vendeur est plus
grande que celle indiquée au
contrat, l’acquéreur doit verser
au vendeur un supplément de
prix en proportion. L’acquéreur
peut se désister de la vente
lorsque la contenance réelle de
l’immeuble vendu excède de plus
d’un vingtième la contenance
indiquée au contrat.
Art. 2493. [Réservé]
Art. 2494. Lorsque la vente
d’un immeuble a été faite avec
indication de la contenance, mais
pour un prix global, l’expression
de cette mesure ne donne lieu à
aucun supplément de prix en
faveur du vendeur, ni à aucune
diminution proportionnelle du
prix en faveur de l’acquéreur, à
moins d’un surplus ou d’un
déficit de plus d’un vingtième de
la contenance exprimée dans
l’acte de vente.
Lorsque le surplus est tel
qu’il donne droit au vendeur
d’augmenter le prix, l’acquéreur
a le choix ou de payer ladite
augmentation ou de se désister
du contrat.
Art. 2495. Lorsqu’un
immeuble qualifié de corps
certain et limité ou de fonds
distinct est vendu pour un prix
global, l’expression de la
contenance dans l’acte de vente
ne donne aucun droit aux parties
d’augmenter ou diminuer le prix
en cas de surplus ou de déficit de
la contenance effective de
l’immeuble. [Modifié par la loi
de 1871, n˚ 87 ; loi de 1993, n˚
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841, §1, en vigueur le 1er janvier
1995.]
Art. 2496. [Réservé]

Art. 2496. [Reserved]
Art. 2497. When the buyer
has the right to recede from the
contract the seller must return the
price, if he has already received
it, and also reimburse the buyer
for the expenses of the sale.

Art. 2497. Lorsque
l’acheteur a le droit de se
désister du contrat, le vendeur
doit restituer le prix s’il l’a déjà
reçu et aussi rembourser
l’acheteur des frais de la vente.

Art. 2498. L’action du
vendeur pour une augmentation
Art. 2498. The seller's action
du prix et l’action de l’acheteur
for an increase of the price and
pour une diminution du prix ou
the buyer's actions for diminution
pour la résolution de la vente en
of the price or dissolution of the
cas de déficit ou de surplus
sale for shortage or excessive
excessif de la contenance de
surplus in the extent of the
l’immeuble vendu se prescrivent
immovable sold prescribe one
par un an à compter du jour de
year from the day of the sale.
la vente.
Art. 2499. [Reserved]
Art. 2499. [Réservé]
CHAPTER 8. EVICTION

Art. 2500. The seller
warrants the buyer against
eviction, which is the buyer's loss
of, or danger of losing, the whole
or part of the thing sold because
of a third person's right that
existed at the time of the sale.
The warranty also covers
encumbrances on the thing that
were not declared at the time of
the sale, with the exception of
apparent servitudes and natural
and legal nonapparent servitudes,
which need not be declared.
If the right of the third
person is perfected only after the
sale through the negligence of
the buyer, though it arises from
facts that took place before, the
buyer has no claim in warranty.
Art. 2501. [Reserved]
Art. 2502. A person may
transfer to another whatever

CHAPITRE 8. DE L’ÉVICTION
Art. 2500. Le vendeur
garantit l’acheteur contre
l’éviction, qui est la perte ou le
danger de perte par l’acheteur
de tout ou partie de la chose
vendue du fait qu’un tiers était
titulaire d’un droit sur la chose
au moment de la vente. La
garantie couvre aussi les sûretés
réelles sur la chose qui n’ont pas
été déclarées au moment de la
vente, mais elle ne couvre pas les
servitudes apparentes et les
servitudes non apparentes
légales et naturelles, qui ne
nécessitent pas d’être déclarées.
Si le droit du tiers ne devient
parfait qu’après la vente du fait
de la négligence de l’acheteur, et
même si cela résulte de faits
antérieurs, l’acheteur ne dispose
d’aucune action en garantie.
Art. 2501. [Réservé]
Art. 2502. Une personne peut
transférer à une autre des droits
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rights to a thing he may then
have, without warranting the
existence of any such rights. In
such a case the transferor does
not owe restitution of the price to
the transferee in case of eviction,
nor may that transfer be
rescinded for lesion.
Such a transfer does not give
rise to a presumption of bad faith
on the part of the transferee and
is a just title for the purposes of
acquisitive prescription.
If the transferor acquires
ownership of the thing after
having transferred his rights to it,
the after-acquired title of the
transferor does not inure to the
benefit of the transferee.

de toute nature qu’elle peut alors
avoir sur une chose, sans
garantir l’existence d’aucun de
ces droits. Le cas échéant le
cédant ne doit pas restituer le
prix au cessionnaire en cas
d’éviction, et il ne peut y avoir
rescision pour lésion.
Une telle cession ne donne
pas lieu à une présomption de
mauvaise foi de la part du
cessionnaire et constitue un juste
titre pour les besoins de la
prescription acquisitive.
Lorsque le cédant acquiert la
propriété de la chose après avoir
transféré ses droits sur celle-ci,
le titre acquis a posteriori par le
cédant ne bénéficie pas au
cessionnaire.

Art. 2503. The warranty
against eviction is implied in
every sale. Nevertheless, the
parties may agree to increase or
to limit the warranty. They may
also agree to an exclusion of the
warranty, but even in that case
the seller must return the price to
the buyer if eviction occurs,
unless it is clear that the buyer
was aware of the danger of
eviction, or the buyer has
declared that he was buying at
his peril and risk, or the seller's
obligation of returning the price
has been expressly excluded.
In all those cases the seller is
liable for an eviction that is
occasioned by his own act, and
any agreement to the contrary is
null.
The buyer is subrogated to
the rights in warranty of the
seller against other persons, even
when the warranty is excluded.
[Amended by Acts 1924, No.
116; Acts 1993, No. 841, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1995]

Art. 2503. La garantie
d’éviction existe implicitement
dans toute vente. Néanmoins, les
parties peuvent convenir
d’étendre ou de limiter la
garantie. Elles peuvent aussi
convenir d’une exclusion de
garantie, encore qu’en pareil cas
le vendeur doive restituer le prix
à l’acheteur en cas d’éviction, à
moins qu’il ne soit établi que
l’acheteur était conscient du
danger d’éviction, ou qu’il ait
déclaré qu’il achetait à ses
risques et périls, ou que
l’obligation de restitution du prix
du vendeur ait été expressément
exclue.
Dans tous ces cas, le vendeur
est responsable de l’éviction
causée par ses propres actes,
toute convention contraire étant
nulle.
L’acheteur est subrogé dans
les droits en garantie du vendeur
à l’encontre d’autres personnes,
même lorsque la garantie est
exclue. [Modifié par la loi de
1924, n˚ 116 ; loi de 1993, n˚
841, §1, en vigueur le 1er janvier
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1995.]
Art. 2504-2505. [Reserved]
Art. 2506. A buyer who
avails himself of the warranty
against eviction may recover
from the seller the price he paid,
the value of any fruits he had to
return to the third person who
evicted him, and also other
damages sustained because of the
eviction with the exception of
any increase in value of the thing
lost.
Art. 2507. A seller liable for
eviction must return the full price
to the buyer even if, at the time
of the eviction, the value of the
thing has been diminished due to
any cause including the buyer's
neglect.
Nevertheless, if the buyer
has benefited from a diminution
in value caused by his own act,
the amount of his benefit must be
deducted from the total owed to
him by the seller because of the
eviction.
Art. 2508. [Reserved]
Art. 2509. A seller liable for
eviction must reimburse the
buyer for the cost of useful
improvements to the thing made
by the buyer. If the seller knew at
the time of the sale that the thing
belonged to a third person, he
must reimburse the buyer for the
cost of all improvements.
Art. 2510. [Reserved]
Art. 2511. When the buyer is
evicted from only a part of the
thing sold, he may obtain
rescission of the sale if he would
not have bought the thing
without that part. If the sale is
not rescinded, the buyer is
entitled to a diminution of the
price in the proportion that the

Arts. 2504-2505. [Réservés]
Art. 2506. L’acheteur qui se
prévaut de la garantie d’éviction
peut recouvrer du vendeur le prix
qu’il a payé, la valeur des fruits
qu’il a dû restituer au tiers qui
l’a évincé, ainsi que la charge
des préjudices subis en raison de
l’éviction à l’exception de toute
augmentation de valeur de la
chose perdue.
Art. 2507. Le vendeur
responsable de l’éviction doit
restituer à l’acheteur la totalité
du prix même si, au moment de
l’éviction, la chose vendue se
trouve diminuée de valeur quelle
qu’en soit la cause y compris la
négligence de l’acheteur.
Néanmoins, si l’acheteur a
bénéficié d’une diminution de
valeur causée par son propre
fait, le montant de son bénéfice
doit être déduit du total dû par le
vendeur en raison de l’éviction.
Art. 2508. [Réservé]
Art. 2509. Le vendeur
responsable de l’éviction doit
rembourser à l’acheteur le coût
des améliorations utiles faites
par ce dernier à la chose. Si, au
moment de la vente, le vendeur
savait que la chose appartenait à
un tiers, il doit rembourser à
l’acheteur le coût de toutes les
améliorations.
Art. 2510. [Réservé]
Art. 2511. Lorsque
l’acheteur est évincé d’une partie
seulement de la chose vendue, il
peut obtenir la résolution de la
vente si, sans cette partie, il
n’aurait pas acheté la chose. Si
la vente n’est pas résolue,
l’acheteur a droit à une
diminution du prix
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value of the part lost bears to the
value of the whole at the time of
the sale.
Art. 2512. The warranty
against eviction extends also to
those things that proceed from
the thing sold.
Art. 2513. In a sale of a right
of succession, the warranty
against eviction extends only to
the right to succeed the decedent,
which entitles the buyer to those
things that are, in fact, a part of
the estate, but it does not extend
to any particular thing.
Arts. 2514-2516. [Reserved]
Art. 2517. A buyer
threatened with eviction must
give timely notice of the threat to
the seller. If a suit for eviction
has been brought against the
buyer, his calling in the seller to
defend that suit amounts to such
notice.
A buyer who elects to bring
suit against a third person who
disturbs his peaceful possession
of the thing sold must give
timely notice of that suit to the
seller.
In either case, a buyer who
fails to give such notice, or who
fails to give it in time for the
seller to defend himself, forfeits
the warranty against eviction if
the seller can show that, had he
been notified in time, he would
have been able to prove that the
third person who sued the buyer
had no right.
Arts. 2518-2519. [Reserved]

[Vol. 7

correspondant à la valeur de la
partie perdue par rapport au prix
de l’ensemble au moment de la
vente.
Art. 2512. La garantie
d’éviction s’étend aussi aux
choses qui proviennent de la
chose vendue.
Art. 2513. Dans la vente
d’un droit successoral, la
garantie d’éviction s’étend
seulement au droit de succéder
au défunt, lequel donne à
l’acheteur le droit aux seules
choses qui font effectivement
partie de la succession, sans
s’étendre à une chose en
particulier.
Arts. 2514-2516. [Réservés]
Art. 2517. L’acheteur menacé
d’éviction doit notifier cette
menace en temps utile au
vendeur. Lorsqu’une action en
éviction a été intentée à
l’encontre de l’acheteur, son
appel au vendeur pour venir
défendre le procès équivaut à
une telle notification.
L’acheteur qui choisit
d’intenter une action à
l’encontre d’un tiers qui trouble
sa possession paisible de la
chose vendue doit notifier cette
action en temps utile au vendeur.
Dans l’un ou l’autre cas,
l’acheteur qui manque à notifier
au vendeur, ou qui ne notifie pas
en temps utile afin que ce
dernier se défende, renonce à la
garantie d’éviction si le vendeur
peut démontrer que, s’il avait été
averti à temps, il aurait été en
mesure de prouver que le tiers
qui intentait l’action contre
l’acheteur ne détenait aucun
droit.
Arts. 2518-2519. [Réservés]
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CHAPTER 9. REDHIBITION

CHAPITRE 9. DES VICES
RÉDHIBITOIRES

Art. 2520. The seller
warrants the buyer against
redhibitory defects, or vices, in
the thing sold.
A defect is redhibitory when
it renders the thing useless, or its
use so inconvenient that it must
be presumed that a buyer would
not have bought the thing had he
known of the defect. The
existence of such a defect gives a
buyer the right to obtain
rescission of the sale.
A defect is redhibitory also
when, without rendering the
thing totally useless, it
diminishes its usefulness or its
value so that it must be presumed
that a buyer would still have
bought it but for a lesser price.
The existence of such a defect
limits the right of a buyer to a
reduction of the price.

Art. 2520. Le vendeur
garantit l’acheteur contre les
défauts ou vices rédhibitoires de
la chose vendue.
Un défaut est rédhibitoire
lorsqu’il rend la chose inutile ou
d’un usage tellement incommode
qu’il doit être présumé que
l’acheteur n’aurait pas acheté la
chose s’il avait connu le défaut.
L’existence d’un tel défaut donne
à l’acheteur le droit d’obtenir la
résolution de la vente.
Un défaut est également
rédhibitoire lorsque, sans rendre
la chose totalement inutile, il
diminue son utilité ou sa
valeur de telle sorte qu’il doit
être présumé que l’acheteur
l’aurait tout de même achetée
mais à un moindre prix.
L’existence d’un tel défaut limite
le droit de l’acheteur à une
réduction du prix.

Art. 2521. The seller owes
no warranty for defects in the
thing that were known to the
buyer at the time of the sale, or
for defects that should have been
discovered by a reasonably
prudent buyer of such things.
Art. 2522. The buyer must
give the seller notice of the
existence of a redhibitory defect
in the thing sold. That notice
must be sufficiently timely as to
allow the seller the opportunity
to make the required repairs. A
buyer who fails to give that
notice suffers diminution of the
warranty to the extent the seller
can show that the defect could
have been repaired or that the
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Art. 2521. Le vendeur n’est
tenu d’aucune garantie pour les
défauts de la chose qui étaient
connus de l’acheteur au moment
de la vente ou pour les défauts
qui auraient dû être découverts
par un acheteur raisonnablement
prudent de telles choses.
Art. 2522. L’acheteur doit
notifier au vendeur l’existence
d’un défaut rédhibitoire de la
chose vendue. Cette notification
doit être faite dans un temps
suffisant pour permettre au
vendeur d’effectuer les
réparations nécessaires. À défaut
de notification, l’acheteur
supporte une diminution de la
garantie dans la mesure où le
vendeur peut montrer que le
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repairs would have been less
burdensome, had he received
timely notice.
Such notice is not required
when the seller has actual
knowledge of the existence of a
redhibitory defect in the thing
sold.
Art. 2523. [Reserved]
Art. 2524. The thing sold
must be reasonably fit for its
ordinary use.
When the seller has reason to
know the particular use the buyer
intends for the thing, or the
buyer's particular purpose for
buying the thing, and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment in selecting it,
the thing sold must be fit for the
buyer's intended use or for his
particular purpose.
If the thing is not so fit, the
buyer's rights are governed by
the general rules of conventional
obligations.

Arts. 2525-2528. [Reserved]

[Vol. 7

défaut aurait pu être réparé ou
que les réparations auraient été
moins onéreuses s’il avait reçu la
notification à temps.
Cette notification n’est pas
requise lorsque le vendeur a
véritablement connaissance de
l’existence d’un défaut
rédhibitoire de la chose vendue.
Art. 2523. [Réservé]
Art. 2524. La chose vendue
doit être raisonnablement
adaptée à son usage ordinaire.
Lorsque le vendeur a des
raisons de connaître l’usage
particulier que l’acheteur entend
faire de la chose, ou le but
particulier dans lequel il
l’achète, et que l’acheteur s’en
remet à la compétence ou au
jugement du vendeur pour la
choisir, la chose vendue doit être
adaptée à l’usage que l’acheteur
entend en faire ou à son but
particulier.
Lorsque la chose n’est pas
ainsi adaptée, les droits de
l’acheteur sont régis par les
règles générales relatives aux
obligations conventionnelles.
Arts. 2525-2528. [Réservés]

Art. 2529. When the thing
the seller has delivered, though
in itself free from redhibitory
defects, is not of the kind or
quality specified in the contract
or represented by the seller, the
rights of the buyer are governed
by other rules of sale and
conventional obligations.

Art. 2529. Lorsque la chose
que le vendeur a délivrée, bien
qu’elle soit sans défaut
rédhibitoire, n’est pas de la sorte
ou de la qualité exprimée au
contrat ou décrite par le
vendeur, les droits de l’acheteur
sont régis par d’autres règles
relatives à la vente et aux
obligations conventionnelles.

Art. 2530. The warranty
against redhibitory defects covers
only defects that exist at the time
of delivery. The defect shall be
presumed to have existed at the
time of delivery if it appears

Art. 2530. La garantie contre
les défauts rédhibitoires couvre
seulement les défauts qui existent
au moment de la délivrance. Le
défaut est présumé avoir existé
au moment de la délivrance s’il
se manifeste dans les trois jours
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within three days from that time.

qui l’ont suivie.

Art. 2531. A seller who did
not know that the thing he sold
had a defect is only bound to
repair, remedy, or correct the
defect. If he is unable or fails so
to do, he is then bound to return
the price to the buyer with
interest from the time it was paid,
and to reimburse him for the
reasonable expenses occasioned
by the sale, as well as those
incurred for the preservation of
the thing, less the credit to which
the seller is entitled if the use
made of the thing, or the fruits it
has yielded, were of some value
to the buyer.
A seller who is held liable
for a redhibitory defect has an
action against the manufacturer
of the defective thing, if the
defect existed at the time the
thing was delivered by the
manufacturer to the seller, for
any loss the seller sustained
because of the redhibition. Any
contractual provision that
attempts to limit, diminish or
prevent such recovery by a seller
against the manufacturer shall
have no effect. [Amended by
Acts 1974, No. 673, §1; Acts
1993, No. 841, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1995]

Art. 2531. Le vendeur qui
ignorait que la chose vendue
comportait un défaut est
seulement tenu de le réparer, d’y
remédier ou de le corriger. S’il
en est incapable ou manque à le
faire, il est alors tenu de restituer
le prix à l’acheteur, portant
intérêts à compter du moment où
il a été payé, et de lui
rembourser les frais
raisonnables occasionnés par la
vente, de même que les dépenses
faites pour la conservation de la
chose, déduction faite de la
créance à laquelle le vendeur
peut prétendre dès lors que
l’usage fait de la chose ou les
fruits qu’elle a produits ont eu
une valeur quelconque pour
l’acheteur.
Le vendeur dont la
responsabilité est engagée pour
un défaut rédhibitoire dispose
d’une action à l’encontre du
fabricant de la chose défectueuse
pour toute perte subie par le
vendeur en raison du vice
rédhibitoire, dès lors que le
défaut existait au moment où le
fabricant a délivrée la chose au
vendeur. Toute stipulation
contractuelle qui vise à limiter,
diminuer ou empêcher un tel
recouvrement par le vendeur à
l’encontre du fabricant est sans
effet. [Modifié par la loi de 1974,
n˚ 673, §1 ; loi de 1993, n˚ 841,
§1, en vigueur le 1er janvier
1995.]

Art. 2532. A buyer who
obtains rescission because of a
redhibitory defect is bound to
return the thing to the seller, for
which purpose he must take care
of the thing as a prudent
administrator, but is not bound to
deliver it back until all his

Art. 2532. L’acheteur qui
obtient la résolution en raison
d’un défaut rédhibitoire est tenu
de restituer la chose au vendeur.
À cette fin, il doit prendre soin de
la chose en administrateur
prudent, mais il n’est pas tenu de
la délivrer tant que l’ensemble de
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claims, or judgments, arising
from the defect are satisfied.
If the redhibitory defect has
caused the destruction of the
thing the loss is borne by the
seller, and the buyer may bring
his action even after the
destruction has occurred.
If the thing is destroyed by a
fortuitous event before the buyer
gives the seller notice of the
existence of a redhibitory defect
that would have given rise to a
rescission of the sale, the loss is
borne by the buyer.
After such notice is given,
the loss is borne by the seller,
except to the extent the buyer has
insured that loss. A seller who
returns the price, or a part
thereof, is subrogated to the
buyer's right against third
persons who may be liable for
the destruction of the thing.

Art. 2533. [Reserved]

[Vol. 7

ses demandes ou jugements
résultant du défaut ne sont pas
satisfaits.
Lorsque le défaut
rédhibitoire a causé la
destruction de la chose, la perte
est supportée par le vendeur, et
l’acheteur peut intenter son
action même après que la
destruction soit survenue.
Lorsque la chose est détruite
par cas fortuit avant que
l’acheteur ne notifie au vendeur
l’existence d’un défaut
rédhibitoire qui aurait pu donner
lieu à la résolution de la vente,
la perte est supportée par
l’acheteur.
Une fois cette notification
faite, la perte est supportée par
le vendeur, sauf si l’acheteur a
assuré cette perte. Le vendeur
qui restitue le prix, ou une partie
de celui-ci, est subrogé dans les
droits de l’acheteur contre les
tiers qui peuvent être
responsables de la destruction de
la chose.
Art. 2533. [Réservé]

Art. 2534. A. (1) L’action en
rédhibition
contre le vendeur qui
Art. 2534. A.(1) The action
ignorait
l’existence
du défaut de
for redhibition against a seller
la
chose
vendue
se
prescrit
par
who did not know of the
quatre
ans
à
compter
du
jour
de
existence of a defect in the thing
la
délivrance
de
la
chose
à
sold prescribes in four years from
l’acheteur ou par un an à
the day delivery of such thing
compter du jour où le défaut a
was made to the buyer or one
year from the day the defect was été découvert par l’acheteur, la
première survenance devant être
discovered by the buyer,
prise en compte.
whichever occurs first.
(2) Cependant, lorsque le
(2) However, when the
défaut affecte un bien immobilier
defect is of residential or
commercial immovable property, résidentiel ou commercial,
an action for redhibition against a l’action en rédhibition contre le
vendeur qui ignorait l’existence
seller who did not know of the
existence of the defect prescribes du défaut se prescrit par un an à
in one year from the day delivery compter du jour de la délivrance
du bien à l’acheteur.
of the property was made to the
B. L’action en rédhibition
buyer.
contre le vendeur qui
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B. The action for redhibition
against a seller who knew, or is
presumed to have known, of the
existence of a defect in the thing
sold prescribes in one year from
the day the defect was discovered
by the buyer.
C. In any case prescription is
interrupted when the seller
accepts the thing for repairs and
commences anew from the day
he tenders it back to the buyer or
notifies the buyer of his refusal
or inability to make the required
repairs. [Acts 1995, No. 172, §1;
Acts 1997, No. 266, §1]
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connaissait, ou qui est présumé
avoir eu connaissance, de
l’existence du défaut de la chose
vendue se prescrit par un an à
compter du jour où le défaut a
été découvert par l’acheteur.
C. Dans tous les cas, la
prescription est interrompue
lorsque le vendeur accepte de
réparer la chose ; elle
recommence à courir du jour où
il rend la chose à l’acheteur ou
du jour où il lui notifie son refus
ou son incapacité à effectuer les
réparations requises. [Loi de
1995, n° 172, §1 ; loi de 1997, n°
266, §1.]
Arts. 2535-2536. [Réservés]

Arts. 2535-2536. [Reserved]
Art. 2537. Judicial sales
resulting from a seizure are not
subject to the rules on
redhibition.
Art. 2538. The warranty
against redhibitory vices is owed
by each of multiple sellers in
proportion to his interest.
Multiple buyers must concur
in an action for rescission
because of a redhibitory defect.
An action for reduction of the
price may be brought by one of
multiple buyers in proportion to
his interest.
The same rules apply if a
thing with a redhibitory defect is
transferred, inter vivos or mortis
causa, to multiple successors.
Art. 2539. [Reserved]
Art. 2540. When more than
one thing are sold together as a
whole so that the buyer would
not have bought one thing
without the other or others, a
redhibitory defect in one of such
things gives rise to redhibition
for the whole.

Art. 2537. Les ventes
judiciaires sur saisie ne sont pas
soumises aux règles relatives à la
rédhibition.
Art. 2538. La garantie des
vices rédhibitoires est due par
chacun des multiples vendeurs en
proportion de son intérêt.
Les acheteurs multiples
doivent prendre part à l’action
en résolution fondée sur un
défaut rédhibitoire. L’action en
réduction du prix peut être
intentée par l’un des acheteurs
multiples en proportion de son
intérêt.
Les mêmes règles
s’appliquent lorsque la chose
comportant un défaut
rédhibitoire est transférée, entre
vifs ou à cause de mort, à des
ayants droit multiples.
Art. 2539. [Réservé]
Art. 2540. Lorsque plusieurs
choses sont vendues ensemble
comme un tout de sorte que
l’acheteur n’aurait pas acheté
une chose sans l’une ou les
autres, le défaut rédhibitoire de
l’une de ces choses donne lieu à
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Art. 2541. A buyer may
choose to seek only reduction of
the price even when the
redhibitory defect is such as to
give him the right to obtain
rescission of the sale.
In an action for rescission
because of a redhibitory defect
the court may limit the remedy of
the buyer to a reduction of the
price.
Arts. 2542-2544. [Reserved]
Art. 2545. A seller who
knows that the thing he sells has
a defect but omits to declare it, or
a seller who declares that the
thing has a quality that he knows
it does not have, is liable to the
buyer for the return of the price
with interest from the time it was
paid, for the reimbursement of
the reasonable expenses
occasioned by the sale and those
incurred for the preservation of
the thing, and also for damages
and reasonable attorney fees. If
the use made of the thing, or the
fruits it might have yielded, were
of some value to the buyer, such
a seller may be allowed credit for
such use or fruits.
A seller is deemed to know
that the thing he sells has a
redhibitory defect when he is a
manufacturer of that thing.
[Amended by Acts 1968, No. 84,
§1; Acts 1993, No. 841, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1995]

[Vol. 7

rédhibition pour l’ensemble.
Art. 2541. L’acheteur peut
choisir de demander la seule
réduction du prix même lorsque
le défaut rédhibitoire est tel qu’il
lui donne le droit d’obtenir la
résolution de la vente.
Dans une action en
résolution en raison d’un défaut
rédhibitoire, le juge peut limiter
le recours de l’acheteur à une
réduction du prix.
Arts. 2542-2544. [Réservés]
Art. 2545. Le vendeur qui sait
que la chose qu’il vend comporte
un défaut mais qui omet de le
déclarer, ou le vendeur qui
déclare que la chose a une
qualité en sachant qu’elle ne la
possède pas, est tenu envers
l’acheteur à la restitution du prix
avec intérêts à compter du
moment où il a été payé, au
remboursement des dépenses
raisonnables occasionnées par la
vente et à celles encourues pour
la préservation de la chose, de
même qu’aux dommages et
intérêts et aux frais d’avocat
pour autant qu’ils soient
raisonnables.
Lorsque l’usage fait de la
chose, ou les fruits qu’elle a pu
produire, ont eu une valeur
quelconque pour l’acheteur, ce
vendeur peut disposer d’une
créance sur cet usage ou ces
fruits.
Le vendeur est réputé savoir
que la chose qu’il vend comporte
un défaut rédhibitoire lorsqu’il
est le fabricant de cette chose.
[Modifié par la loi de 1968, n°
84, §1 ; loi de 1993, n° 841, §1,
en vigueur le 1er janvier 1995.]
Arts. 2546-2547. [Réservés]

Arts. 2546-2547. [Reserved]

Art. 2548. Les parties
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Art. 2548. The parties may
agree to an exclusion or
limitation of the warranty against
redhibitory defects. The terms of
the exclusion or limitation must
be clear and unambiguous and
must be brought to the attention
of the buyer.
A buyer is not bound by an
otherwise effective exclusion or
limitation of the warranty when
the seller has declared that the
thing has a quality that he knew
it did not have.
The buyer is subrogated to
the rights in warranty of the
seller against other persons, even
when the warranty is excluded.

peuvent s’accorder sur
l’exclusion ou la limitation de la
garantie des défauts
rédhibitoires. Les termes de
l’exclusion ou de la limitation
doivent être clairs et non
équivoques et doivent être portés
à la connaissance de l’acheteur.
L’acheteur n’est pas lié par
une exclusion ou une limitation
de la garantie qui serait
autrement efficace, lorsque le
vendeur a déclaré que la chose a
une qualité en sachant qu’elle ne
la possède pas. L’acheteur est
subrogé dans les droits en
garantie du vendeur contre
d’autres personnes, même
lorsque la garantie est exclue.

CHAPTER 10. OF THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE
BUYER

CHAPITRE 10. DES
OBLIGATIONS DE
L’ACHETEUR

Art. 2549. The buyer is
bound to pay the price and to
take delivery of the thing.

Art. 2549. L’acheteur est
tenu de payer le prix et de
prendre délivrance de la chose.

Art. 2550. Payment of the
price is due at the time and place
stipulated in the contract, or at
the time and place of delivery if
the contract contains no such
stipulation.

Art. 2550. Le paiement du
prix est dû au moment et au lieu
stipulés dans le contrat ou au
moment et au lieu de la
délivrance si le contrat ne
contient pas de telle stipulation.

Arts. 2551-2552. [Reserved]

Arts. 2551-2552. [Réservés]

Art. 2553. The buyer owes
interest on the price from the
time it is due.
Art. 2554. [Reserved]
Art. 2555. A buyer who fails
to take delivery of the thing after
a tender of such delivery, or who
fails to pay the price, is liable for
expenses incurred by the seller in
preservation of the thing and for
other damages sustained by the
seller.
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Art. 2553. L’acheteur doit les
intérêts du prix à compter du
moment où celui-ci est dû.
Art. 2554. [Réservé]
Art. 2555. L’acheteur qui
manque à prendre délivrance de
la chose après une offre de
délivrance, ou qui manque à
payer le prix, est tenu des
dépenses faites par le vendeur
pour la conservation de la chose
et pour les autres dommages
subis par ce dernier.
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Art. 2556. [Réservé]

Art. 2557. A buyer who is
evicted by the claim of a third
person may withhold payment of
the price until he is restored to
possession, unless the seller
gives security for any loss the
buyer may sustain as a result of
the eviction.
A seller who, in such a case,
is unable or unwilling to give
security may compel the buyer to
deposit the price with the court
until the right of the third person
is adjudged. Also the buyer may
deposit the price with the court,
on his own initiative, to prevent
the accrual of interest.
A buyer may not withhold
payment of the price when the
seller is not liable for a return of
the price in case of eviction.

Art. 2557. L’acheteur qui est
évincé par l’action d’un tiers
peut retenir le paiement du prix
jusqu’à ce que le trouble ait
cessé, à moins que le vendeur ne
constitue une sûreté pour toute
perte que peut subir l’acheteur
suite à l’éviction.
Le vendeur qui, dans un tel
cas, ne peut ou ne veut pas
constituer de sûreté a le droit de
contraindre l’acheteur à déposer
le prix auprès du tribunal
jusqu’à ce qu’il soit statué sur le
droit du tiers. L’acheteur peut
aussi, de sa propre initiative,
déposer le prix auprès du
tribunal pour prévenir
l’accumulation des intérêts.
L’acheteur ne peut pas
retenir le paiement du prix
lorsque le vendeur n’est pas tenu
de restituer le prix en cas
d’éviction.

Arts. 2558-2559. [Reserved]

Arts. 2558-2559. [Réservés]

Art. 2560. A buyer who paid
the price before being evicted of
the thing may not demand that
the seller return the price or give
security for it.

Art. 2560. L’acheteur qui a
payé le prix avant d’être évincé
de la chose ne peut demander, ni
que le vendeur lui restitue le
prix, ni qu’il lui donne caution.

Art. 2561. If the buyer fails
to pay the price, the seller may
sue for dissolution of the sale. If
the seller has given credit for the
price and transfers that credit to
another person, the right of
dissolution is transferred together
with the credit. In case of
multiple credit holders all must
join in the suit for dissolution,
but if any credit holder refuses to
join, the others may subrogate
themselves to his right by paying
the amount due to him.
If a promissory note or other
instrument has been given for the
price, the right to dissolution
prescribes at the same time and

Art. 2561. Lorsque l’acheteur
manque à payer le prix, le
vendeur peut demander la
résolution de la vente. Lorsque le
vendeur a accordé un crédit pour
le prix et transfère cette créance
à une autre personne, le droit de
résolution est transféré avec la
créance. En cas de multiples
titulaires de la créance, tous
doivent se joindre à l’action en
résolution, mais si l’un d’entre
eux refuse, les autres peuvent se
subroger dans ses droits en
payant le montant qui lui est dû.
Lorsqu’un billet à ordre ou
autre instrument a été remis en
paiement du prix, le droit à
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in the same period as the note or
other instrument. [Amended by
Acts 1924, No. 108; [Acts 1993,
No. 841, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995]

Art. 2562. When an action is
brought for the dissolution of the
sale of an immovable and there is
no danger that the seller may lose
the price and the thing, the court,
according to the circumstances,
may grant the buyer an extension
of time, not in excess of sixty
days, to make payment, and shall
pronounce the sale dissolved if
the buyer fails to pay within that
time. When there is such a
danger, the court may not grant
the buyer an extension of time
for payment.
Art. 2563. When the contract
of sale of an immovable
expressly provides for
dissolution in case of failure to
pay the price, the buyer still has
the right to pay, in spite of the
express dissolution clause, for as
long as the seller has not given
the buyer notice that he avails
himself of that clause or has not
filed suit for dissolution.
Art. 2564. If the thing is
movable and the seller chooses to
seek judicial dissolution of the
sale because of the failure of the
buyer to perform, the court may
not grant to the buyer any
extension of time to perform.
Arts. 2565-2566. [Reserved]
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résolution se prescrit au même
moment et dans la même période
que ces instruments. [Modifié
par la loi de 1924, n˚ 108 ; loi de
1993, n˚ 841, §1, en vigueur le
1er janvier 1995]
Art. 2562. Lorsqu’une action
est intentée pour la résolution de
la vente d’un immeuble et qu’il
n’y a pas de danger que le
vendeur perde le prix et la chose,
le juge, suivant les circonstances,
peut accorder à l’acheteur un
délai supplémentaire, n’excédant
pas soixante jours, pour effectuer
le paiement. Il doit prononcer la
résolution de la vente si
l’acheteur manque à payer dans
ce délai. Lorsqu’un tel danger
existe, le juge ne peut pas
accorder à l’acheteur de délai
supplémentaire pour le paiement.
Art. 2563. Lorsque le contrat
de vente d’un immeuble prévoit
expressément la résolution pour
faute de paiement du prix,
l’acheteur conserve le droit de
payer, malgré la clause expresse
de résolution, tant que le vendeur
n’a pas notifié à l’acheteur qu’il
se prévaut de ladite clause ou
qu’il n’a pas engagé d’action en
résolution.
Art. 2564. En matière de
vente d’effets mobiliers, lorsque
le vendeur choisit de demander
la résolution judiciaire de la
vente en raison du défaut
d’exécution de l’acheteur, le juge
ne peut pas accorder à ce
dernier de délai supplémentaire
pour l’exécution.
Arts. 2565-2566. [Réservés]

CHAPTER 11. OF THE SALE
WITH A RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION

CHAPITRE 11. DE LA VENTE
AVEC FACULTÉ DE RÉMÉRÉ
OU DE RACHAT

Art. 2567. The parties to a

Art. 2567. Les parties au
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contract of sale may agree that
the seller shall have the right of
redemption, which is the right to
take back the thing from the
buyer.

contrat de vente peuvent
convenir que le vendeur a une
faculté de rachat, par laquelle il
se réserve le droit de reprendre
la chose vendue.

Art. 2568. The right of
redemption may not be reserved
for more than ten years when the
thing sold is immovable, or more
than five years when the thing
sold is movable. If a longer time
for redemption has been
stipulated in the contract that
time must be reduced to either
ten or five years, depending on
the nature of the thing sold.

Art. 2568. La faculté de
rachat ne peut être stipulée pour
un terme qui excède dix ans
lorsque la chose vendue est un
immeuble, ou cinq ans
lorsqu’elle est un meuble. Si elle
a été stipulée pour un terme plus
long, elle est réduite à dix ou
cinq ans, selon la nature de la
chose vendue.

Art. 2569. A sale with right
of redemption is a simulation
when the surrounding
circumstances show that the true
intent of the parties was to make
a contract of security. When such
is the case, any monies, fruits or
other benefit received by the
buyer as rent or otherwise may
be regarded as interest subject to
the usury laws.
Art. 2570. If the seller does
not exercise the right of
redemption within the time
allowed by law, the buyer
becomes unconditional owner of
the thing sold.

Art. 2569. Il y a simulation
de vente avec faculté de rachat
lorsque les circonstances
montrent que l’intention
véritable des parties était de
conclure un contrat de sûreté.
Dans ce cas, toutes sommes,
fruits ou autres bénéfices perçus
par l’acheteur, notamment sous
forme de loyer, peuvent être
considérés comme des intérêts
soumis aux lois usuraires.
Art. 2570. Faute par le
vendeur d’avoir exercé la faculté
de rachat dans le terme prescrit
par la loi, l’acheteur demeure
propriétaire irrévocable.

Art. 2571. The period for
redemption is peremptive and
runs against all persons including
minors.
It may not be extended by
the court.

Art. 2571. Le délai d’exercice
de la faculté de rachat est
péremptoire et court contre
toutes personnes, même contre le
mineur.
Il ne peut être prolongé par
le juge.

Art. 2572. When the thing is
immovable, the right of
redemption is effective against
third persons only from the time
the instrument that contains it is
filed for registry in the parish

Art. 2572. Lorsque la chose
est un immeuble, la faculté de
rachat n’est opposable aux tiers
qu’à compter du moment où
l’acte qui la contient est déposé
pour l’enregistrement dans la
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where the immovable is located.
When the thing is movable,
the right of redemption is
effective against third persons
who, at the time of purchase, had
actual knowledge of the
existence of that right.
Art. 2573. [Reserved]
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paroisse 3 où l’immeuble se situe.
Lorsque la chose est un
meuble, la faculté de rachat est
opposable aux tiers qui, au
moment de la vente, avaient une
connaissance effective de
l’existence de cette faculté.
Art. 2573. [Réservé]

Art. 2574. A buyer under
redemption may avail himself of
the right of discussion against
creditors of the seller.

Art. 2574. En cas de rachat,
l’acheteur peut opposer le
bénéfice de discussion aux
créanciers de son vendeur.

Art. 2575. The fruits and
products of a thing sold with
right of redemption belong to the
buyer.

Art. 2575. Les fruits et
produits de la chose vendue avec
faculté de rachat appartiennent à
l’acheteur.

Art. 2576. [Reserved]
Art. 2577. The buyer is
entitled to all improvements he
made on the thing that can be
removed when the seller
exercises the right of redemption.
If such improvements cannot be
removed, the buyer is entitled to
the enhancement of the value of
the thing resulting from the
improvements. The buyer is also
entitled to the enhancement of
the value of the thing resulting
from ungathered fruits and
unharvested crops.
If the thing sold under right
of redemption is naturally
increased by accession, alluvion,
or accretion before the
redeeming seller exercises the
right, the increase belongs to the
seller.
Art. 2578. During the time
allowed for redemption, the
3

Art. 2576. [Réservé]
Art. 2577. Lorsque le
vendeur exerce la faculté de
rachat, l’acheteur a le droit de
reprendre toutes les
améliorations apportées à la
chose dès lors qu’elles peuvent
être enlevées. Si elles ne peuvent
l’être, il a le droit de se faire
indemniser de l’augmentation de
valeur résultant des
améliorations. L’acheteur a
également le droit de se faire
indemniser de l’augmentation de
valeur résultant des fruits non
collectés et des cultures non
récoltées.
Si la chose vendue avec
faculté de rachat est augmentée
naturellement par accession,
alluvion ou relais 4 avant que le
vendeur n’exerce son droit,
l’augmentation lui appartient.
Art. 2578. Pendant le délai

NdT : La Louisiane a conservé la paroisse comme division territoriale. Celle-ci est l’équivalent du comté dans les
autres états.
4
NdT : L’art. 499, révisé en 1980, utilise “dereliction” pour désigner les relais, terme que l’on s’attendrait à trouver
dans le présent article qui fait ici référence aux moyens d’acquérir la propriété par accession naturelle. Le C. CIV.
QUÉBEC art. 966 traduit les relais par “accretion” (voir aussi C. CIV. Fr. art. 557). La traduction par “accroissement,”
généralement acceptable pour “accretion” (voir aussi “engraissement”) doit être rejetée car elle désigne un type
particulier d’alluvion (C. CIV. Fr. Art 556).
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buyer must administer the thing
sold with the degree of care of a
prudent administrator. He is
liable to the redeeming seller for
any deterioration of the thing
caused by the lack of such care.

d’exercice de la faculté de
rachat, l’acheteur doit apporter
à la chose vendue tous les soins
d’un administrateur prudent. Il
est responsable envers le
vendeur exerçant la faculté de
rachat pour toute détérioration
résultant d’un manque de soins.

Arts. 2579-2583. [Reserved]

Art. 2579-2583. [Réservés]

Art. 2584. If more than one
seller concurred in the sale with
right of redemption of an
immovable, or if a seller has died
leaving more than one successor,
the exercise of the right of
redemption is governed by the
rules provided for the division of
the action for lesion among
multiple sellers, or among
successors of the seller or of the
buyer.
Arts. 2585-2586. [Reserved]

Art. 2584. Lorsque plusieurs
vendeurs ont procédé à la vente
d’un immeuble avec faculté de
rachat ou lorsqu’un vendeur a
laissé plusieurs héritiers,
l’exercice de la faculté de rachat
est régi par les règles
applicables à la division de
l’action en rescision pour lésion
entre plusieurs vendeurs ou entre
les héritiers du vendeur ou ceux
de l’acheteur.
Art. 2585-2586. [Réservés]

Art. 2587. A seller who
exercises the right of redemption
must reimburse the buyer for all
expenses of the sale and for the
cost of repairs necessary for the
preservation of the thing

Art. 2587. Le vendeur qui
exerce la faculté de rachat doit
rembourser à l’acheteur tous les
frais de la vente et le prix des
réparations nécessaires à la
conservation de la chose.

Art. 2588. The seller who
exercises the right of redemption
is entitled to recover the thing
free of any encumbrances placed
upon it by the buyer.
Nevertheless, when the thing is
an immovable, the interests of
third persons are governed by the
laws of registry.

Art. 2588. Le vendeur qui
exerce la faculté de rachat
reprend la chose exempte de
toutes les charges dont
l’acheteur l’aurait grevée.
Néanmoins, lorsque la chose est
un immeuble, les intérêts des
tiers sont régis par les lois sur la
publicité foncière.

CHAPTER 12. RESCISSION
FOR LESION BEYOND
MOIETY

CHAPITRE 12. DE LA
RESCISION POUR LÉSION
D’OUTRE-MOITIÉ

Art. 2589. The sale of an
immovable may be rescinded for
lesion when the price is less than
one half of the fair market value
of the immovable. Lesion can be
claimed only by the seller and

Art. 2589. La vente d’un
immeuble peut être rescindée
pour lésion lorsque le prix est
inférieur à la moitié de la valeur
marchande de l’immeuble
justement appréciée. Seul le
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only in sales of corporeal
immovables. It cannot be alleged
in a sale made by order of the
court.
The seller may invoke lesion
even if he has renounced the
right to claim it.
Art. 2590. To determine
whether there is lesion, the
immovable sold must be
evaluated according to the state
in which it was at the time of the
sale. If the sale was preceded by
an option contract, or by a
contract to sell, the property must
be evaluated in the state in which
it was at the time of that contract.
[Amended by Acts 1950, No.
154; Acts 1993, No. 841, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1995]
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vendeur d’un bien immobilier
corporel peut se prévaloir de la
lésion. Elle ne peut être invoquée
lors d’une vente judiciaire.
Le vendeur peut invoquer la
lésion quand bien même il aurait
renoncé à la faculté de s’en
prévaloir.
Art. 2590. Pour savoir s’il y
a lésion, il faut estimer
l’immeuble vendu suivant son
état au temps de la vente. Si la
vente a été précédée d’une option
contractuelle ou d’une promesse
synallagmatique de vente, il faut
estimer le bien suivant son état
au temps de ce contrat. [Modifié
par la loi de 1950, n˚154 ; loi de
1993, n˚ 841, §1, en vigueur le
1er janvier 1995]

Art. 2591. When a sale is
subject to rescission for lesion
the buyer may elect either to
return the immovable to the
seller, or to keep the immovable
by giving to the seller a
supplement equal to the
difference between the price paid
by the buyer and the fair market
value of the immovable
determined according to the
preceding Article. [Amended by
Acts 1871, No. 87; Acts 1993,
No. 841, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995]

Art. 2591. Lorsque la vente
est sujette à rescision pour
lésion, l’acheteur a le choix, ou
de rendre l’immeuble au
vendeur, ou de le garder en
payant un supplément à hauteur
de la valeur marchande de
l’immeuble justement appréciée
conformément à l’article
précédent. [Modifié par la loi de
1871, n˚87 ; loi de 1993, n˚ 841,
§1, en vigueur le 1er janvier
1995]

Art. 2592. If the buyer elects
to return the immovable he must
also return to the seller the fruits
of the immovable from the time a
demand for rescission was made.
In such a case, the seller must
return to the buyer the price with
interest from the same time.
If the buyer elects to keep the
immovable he must also pay to
the seller interest on the
supplement from the time a
demand for rescission was made.

Art. 2592. Lorsque l’acheteur
choisit de rendre l’immeuble, il
doit aussi rendre les fruits du
jour de la demande en rescision.
Dans ce cas, le vendeur doit
rendre à l’acheteur le prix
portant intérêt à compter du
même jour.
Lorsque l’acheteur opte de
garder l’immeuble, il doit
également l’intérêt du
supplément, du jour de la
demande en rescision.
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Art. 2594. When the buyer
has sold the immovable, the
seller may not bring an action for
lesion against a third person who
bought the immovable from the
original buyer.
In such a case the seller may
recover from the original buyer
whatever profit the latter realized
from the sale to the third person.
That recovery may not exceed
the supplement the seller would
have recovered if the original
buyer had chosen to keep the
immovable.

[Vol. 7

Art. 2593. [Réservé]
Art. 2594. Lorsque l’acheteur
a vendu l’immeuble, le vendeur
ne peut agir en rescision pour
lésion contre un tiers l’ayant
acquis de l’acheteur initial.
En pareil cas, le vendeur
peut obtenir de l’acheteur initial
une somme égale au profit que ce
dernier a tiré de la vente au tiers.
Cette somme ne peut être
supérieure au supplément que le
vendeur aurait perçu si
l’acheteur initial avait décidé de
garder l’immeuble.

Art. 2595. The action for
lesion must be brought within a
peremptive period of one year
from the time of the sale.

Art. 2595. L’action en
rescision pour lésion doit être
exercée dans un délai
péremptoire d’un an à compter
du temps de la vente.

Art. 2596. When the buyer
has granted a right on the
immovable to a third person,
rescission may not impair the
interest of that person. The seller
who receives back the
immovable so encumbered is
entitled to recover from the buyer
any diminution in value suffered
by the immovable because of the
right of the third person. That
recovery may not exceed the
supplement the seller would have
recovered if the buyer had not
encumbered the immovable and
had decided to keep it.

Art. 2596. Lorsque
l’acheteur a accordé à un tiers
un droit sur l’immeuble, la
rescision ne saurait nuire aux
intérêts de ce dernier. Le
vendeur qui reprend l’immeuble
ainsi grevé a le droit de
recouvrer de l’acheteur toute
diminution de valeur de
l’immeuble résultant du droit du
tiers. Cette somme ne saurait
excéder le supplément que le
vendeur aurait recouvré si
l’acheteur n’avait pas grevé
l’immeuble et avait décidé de le
garder.

Art. 2597. When rescission is
granted for lesion the seller must
take back the immovable in the
state it is at that time. The buyer
is not liable to the seller for any
deterioration or loss sustained by
the immovable before the
demand for rescission was made,
unless the deterioration or loss
was turned into profit for the
buyer.
The seller must reimburse
the buyer for the expenses of the

Art. 2597. Le vendeur doit
reprendre l’immeuble dans l’état
où il se trouve lors de la
rescision pour lésion. L’acheteur
n’est pas tenu des détériorations
ou pertes subies par l’immeuble
avant la demande en rescision, à
moins que la détérioration ou la
perte n’ait profité à l’acheteur.
Le vendeur doit rembourser
à l’acheteur les frais de vente et
les frais d’amélioration de
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sale and for those incurred for
the improvement of the
immovable, even if the
improvement was made solely
for the convenience of the buyer.
Art. 2598. [Reserved]
Art. 2599. The buyer may
retain possession of the
immovable until the seller
reimburses the buyer the price
and the recoverable expenses.
Art. 2600. If more than one
seller concurred in the sale of an
immovable owned by them in
indivision, or if each of them
sold separately his share of the
immovable, each seller may
bring an action for lesion for his
share.
Likewise, if a seller died
leaving more than one successor,
each successor may bring an
action for lesion individually for
that share of the immovable
corresponding to his right.
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l’immeuble, même si
l’amélioration était de pur
agrément pour l’acheteur.

Art. 2598. [Réservé]
Art. 2599. L’acheteur a le
droit de rester en possession de
l’immeuble jusqu’à ce que le
vendeur lui ait rendu le prix qu’il
a payé et remboursé ses
impenses.
Art. 2600. Si plusieurs
vendeurs ont procédé à la vente
d’un immeuble dont ils sont
propriétaires indivis ou si
chacun a vendu séparément sa
part de l’immeuble, chaque
vendeur peut agir en rescision
pour lésion pour sa part.
De même, si un vendeur a
laissé plusieurs héritiers, chaque
successeur peut agir en rescision
pour lésion pour la part de
l’immeuble lui revenant.

CHAPTER 13. SALES OF
MOVABLES

CHAPITRE 13. DE LA VENTE
DES BIENS MOBILIERS

Art. 2601. An expression of
acceptance of an offer to sell a
movable thing suffices to form a
contract of sale if there is
agreement on the thing and the
price, even though the
acceptance contains terms
additional to, or different from,
the terms of the offer, unless
acceptance is made conditional
on the offeror's acceptance of the
additional or different terms.
Where the acceptance is not so
conditioned, the additional or
different terms are regarded as
proposals for modification and
must be accepted by the offeror
in order to become a part of the
contract.

Art. 2601. L'expression de
l'acceptation d'une offre de vente
d'une chose mobilière suffit à la
formation du contrat de vente
s'il y a accord sur la chose et sur
le prix, et ce même si
l'acceptation contient des termes
supplémentaires ou différents de
ceux de l'offre, à moins que
l'acceptation ne soit rendue
conditionnelle par l'acceptation
de l'offrant des termes
supplémentaires ou différents.
Lorsque l'acceptation n'est pas
ainsi conditionnée, les termes
supplémentaires ou différents
sont considérés comme des
propositions de modification et
doivent être acceptés par
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Between merchants,
however, additional terms
become part of the contract
unless they alter the offer
materially, or the offer expressly
limits the acceptance to the terms
of the offer, or the offeree is
notified of the offeror's objection
to the additional terms within a
reasonable time, in all of which
cases the additional terms do not
become a part of the contract.
Additional terms alter the offer
materially when their nature is
such that it must be presumed
that the offeror would not have
contracted on those terms.
Art. 2602. A contract of sale
of movables may be established
by conduct of both parties that
recognizes the existence of that
contract even though the
communications exchanged by
them do not suffice to form a
contract. In such a case the
contract consists of those terms
on which the communications of
the parties agree, together with
any applicable provisions of the
suppletive law.
Art. 2603. The seller must
deliver to the buyer things that
conform to the contract.
Things do not conform to the
contract when they are different
from those selected by the buyer
or are of a kind, quality, or
quantity different from the one
agreed.
Art. 2604. The buyer has a
right to have a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the things,
even after delivery, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether
they conform to the contract.
Art. 2605. A buyer may
reject nonconforming things

[Vol. 7

l'offrant afin de faire partie du
contrat.
Cependant, entre
commerçants, les termes
supplémentaires font partie du
contrat à moins qu'ils n'altèrent
sensiblement l'offre, ou que
l'offre ne limite expressément
l'acceptation à ses termes, ou
que le destinataire de l'offre ne
soit avisé de l'objection de
l'offrant dans un délai
raisonnable. Dans tous ces cas,
les termes supplémentaires ne
font pas partie du contrat. Les
termes supplémentaires altèrent
sensiblement l'offre lorsque leur
nature est telle qu'il doit être
présumé que l'offrant n'aurait
pas contracté sur cette base.
Art. 2602. Le contrat de
vente de meubles peut être établi
par le comportement des deux
parties lorsqu'il révèle l'existence
de ce contrat, même si la
communication échangée est
insuffisante à sa formation. En
pareil cas, le contrat est
constitué des termes concordants
dans la communication
échangée, ainsi que de toute
disposition supplétive applicable.
Art. 2603. Le vendeur doit
délivrer à l'acheteur des choses
conformes au contrat.
Les choses ne sont pas
conformes au contrat lorsqu'elles
sont différentes de celles choisies
par l'acheteur ou sont de nature,
qualité ou quantité différente de
celle convenue.
Art. 2604. L'acheteur doit
avoir la possibilité raisonnable
d'inspecter la chose vendue,
même après délivrance, afin de
déterminer sa conformité au
contrat.
Art. 2605. L'acheteur peut
refuser la chose non conforme
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within a reasonable time. The
buyer must give reasonable
notice to the seller to make the
rejection effective. A buyer's
failure to make an effective
rejection within a reasonable
time shall be regarded as an
acceptance of the things.

dans un délai raisonnable.
L'acheteur doit informer le
vendeur de son refus de manière
raisonnable afin de le rendre
effectif. L'absence de refus
effectif de la part de l'acheteur
dans un délai raisonnable vaut
acceptation de la chose.

Art. 2606. A buyer who, with
knowledge, accepts
nonconforming things may no
longer reject those things on
grounds of that nonconformity,
unless the acceptance was made
in the reasonable belief that the
nonconformity would be cured.

Art. 2606. L’acheteur qui, en
connaissance de cause, accepte
une chose non conforme, ne peut
la refuser pour non-conformité, à
moins que l'acceptation n'ait été
faite en croyant raisonnablement
qu'il y serait remédié.

Art. 2607. Out of a quantity
of things delivered by the seller,
the buyer may accept those
things that conform to the
contract and form a commercial
unit and may reject those that do
not conform.
The buyer must pay at the
contract rate for any things that
are accepted.
Art. 2608. When the seller
has no agent or business office at
the place of delivery, a buyer
who is a merchant and has
rejected the things must follow
any reasonable instructions
received from the seller with
respect to those things. If the
seller gives no such instructions,
and the things rejected are
perishable or susceptible of rapid
decline in value, the merchant
buyer must make reasonable
efforts to sell those things on the
seller's behalf.
In all instances of rejection, a
buyer who is a merchant must
handle the rejected things as a
prudent administrator.
Art. 2609. When the seller
fails to render the performance
required by a contract of sale of
movable things, the buyer may

Art. 2607. Parmi les choses
délivrées par le vendeur,
l'acheteur peut accepter celles
qui sont conformes au contrat et
qui constituent une unité
commerciale, et refuser celles
qui sont non conformes.
L'acheteur doit payer les choses
acceptées au taux prévu au
contrat.
Art. 2608. Lorsque le
vendeur n'a ni agent ni bureau
au lieu de délivrance, l'acheteur
qui est commerçant et a refusé la
chose doit suivre les instructions
raisonnables reçues du vendeur
la concernant. En l'absence de
telles instructions, si la chose
refusée est périssable ou
susceptible de perdre rapidement
de sa valeur, l'acheteur
commerçant doit faire ce qui est
raisonnable pour la vendre au
nom du vendeur.
En cas de refus, l'acheteur
qui est commerçant doit gérer la
chose refusée en administrateur
prudent.
Art. 2609. Faute, par le
vendeur, d'exécuter l'obligation
prévue au contrat de vente de
meubles, l'acheteur peut, en toute
bonne foi et dans un délai
raisonnable, acheter des choses
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purchase substitute things within
a reasonable time and in good
faith. In such a case the buyer is
entitled to recover the difference
between the contract price and
the price of the substitute things.
The buyer may recover other
damages also, less the expenses
saved as a result of the failure of
the seller to perform.

de remplacement. L'acheteur a
alors le droit de recouvrer la
différence entre le prix stipulé et
le prix des choses de
remplacement. L'acheteur peut
aussi recevoir des dommages et
intérêts additionnels, déduction
faite des dépenses évitées du fait
de l'inexécution de l'obligation
par le vendeur.

Art. 2610. Upon rejection of
nonconforming things by the
buyer, the seller may cure the
nonconformity when the time for
performance has not yet expired
or when the seller had a
reasonable belief that the
nonconforming things would be
acceptable to the buyer. In such a
case the seller must give
reasonable notice of his intention
to cure to the buyer.

Art. 2610. Lors du refus de la
chose non conforme par
l’acheteur, le vendeur peut
remédier à la non-conformité
lorsque le délai d'exécution n'est
pas expiré ou lorsque le vendeur
croyait raisonnablement que la
chose non conforme serait
acceptable pour l'acheteur. Dans
ce cas, le vendeur doit informer
l'acheteur de manière
raisonnable de son intention d'y
remédier.

Art. 2611. When the buyer
fails to perform a contract of sale
of movable things, the seller,
within a reasonable time and in
good faith, may resell those
things that are still in his
possession. In such a case the
seller is entitled to recover the
difference between the contract
price and the resale price. The
seller may recover also other
damages, less the expenses saved
as a result of the buyer's failure
to perform.
Unless the things are
perishable or subject to rapid
decline in value, the seller must
give the buyer reasonable notice
of the public sale at which the
things will be resold, or of his
intention to resell the things at a
private sale.

Art. 2611. Lorsque l'acheteur
n'exécute pas le contrat de vente
de choses mobilières, le vendeur
peut, dans un délai raisonnable
et de bonne foi, revendre les
choses qui sont encore en sa
possession. Le vendeur a alors le
droit de recouvrer la différence
entre le prix contractuel et le
prix de revente. Le vendeur peut
également recouvrer des
dommages et intérêts
additionnels, déduction faite des
dépenses évitées du fait de
l'inexécution de l'obligation par
l'acheteur.
À moins que les choses ne
soient périssables ou susceptibles
de perdre rapidement de leur
valeur, le vendeur doit informer
l'acheteur de manière
raisonnable de la vente publique
à laquelle les choses seront
vendues, ou de son intention de
les revendre dans une vente
privée.
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Art. 2612. When the buyer
neglects to take delivery of
movable things that are the
contractual object the seller may
request court authority to put the
things out of his possession and
at the buyer's risk. The seller
must give the buyer notice of the
time at which the things will
leave possession of the seller.
Art. 2613. When, according
to the terms of the contract, the
seller sends the things to the
buyer through a common carrier,
the form of the bill of lading
determines ownership of the
things while in transit.
When the bill of lading
makes the things deliverable to
the buyer, or to his order,
ownership of the things is
thereby transferred to the buyer.
When the bill of lading
makes the things deliverable to
the seller, or to his agent,
ownership of the things thereby
remains with the seller.
When the seller or his agent
remains in possession of a bill of
lading that makes the things
deliverable to the buyer, or to the
buyer's order, the seller thereby
reserves the right to retain the
things against a claim of the
buyer who has not performed his
obligations.
Art. 2614. The seller may
stop delivery of the things in the
possession of a carrier or other
depositary when he learns that
the buyer will not perform the
obligations arising from the
contract of sale or is insolvent.
Art. 2615. In an action for
judicial dissolution of a sale of
movable things the court must
grant dissolution, upon proof of
the defendant's failure to
perform, without allowing that
party any additional time to
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Art. 2612. Lorsque l'acheteur
néglige de prendre livraison des
choses mobilières objet du
contrat, le vendeur peut
demander au juge d'ordonner sa
dépossession, au risque de
l'acheteur. Le vendeur doit
donner avis à l'acheteur du
moment auquel les choses
quitteront la possession du
vendeur.
Art. 2613. Lorsque,
conformément aux termes du
contrat, le vendeur expédie les
choses à l'acheteur au moyen
d'un transporteur, le formulaire
de connaissement maritime
détermine la propriété des
choses durant le transport.
Lorsque le connaissement
maritime est à l'ordre de
l'acheteur, la propriété des
choses lui est dès lors transférée.
Lorsque le connaissement
maritime est à l'ordre du vendeur
ou de son mandataire, le vendeur
en reste dès lors propriétaire.
Lorsque le vendeur ou son
mandataire reste en possession
d'un connaissement maritime à
l'ordre de l'acheteur, le vendeur
se réserve le droit de retenir les
choses, résistant ainsi à la
demande de l'acheteur qui n'a
pas exécuté ses obligations.
Art. 2614. Le vendeur peut
arrêter la livraison des choses en
la possession d'un transporteur
ou d’un autre dépositaire
lorsqu'il apprend que l'acheteur
n'exécutera pas ses obligations
contractuelles ou est insolvable.
Art. 2615. Lors d'une action
en résolution judiciaire d'un
contrat de vente de meubles, le
juge doit accorder la résolution,
sur preuve du défaut d'exécution
du défendeur, sans concéder à ce
dernier un délai supplémentaire.
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render performance.
Art. 2616. When the contract
requires the seller to ship the
things through a carrier, but does
not require him to deliver the
things at any particular
destination, the risk of loss is
transferred to the buyer upon
delivery of the things to the
carrier, regardless of the form of
the bill of lading.
When the contract of sale
requires the seller to deliver the
things at a particular destination,
the risk of loss is transferred to
the buyer when the things, while
in possession of the carrier, are
duly tendered to the buyer at the
place of destination.
When the parties incorporate
well established commercial
symbols into their contract, the
risk of loss is transferred in
accordance with the customary
understanding of such symbols.
Art. 2617. In all cases where
the parties have agreed that the
seller will obtain a document
showing that the things have
been delivered to a carrier or a
depositary the buyer must make
payment against tender of that
document and others as required.
The seller may not tender, nor
may the buyer demand, delivery
of the things in lieu of the
documents.

[Vol. 7

Art. 2616. Lorsque le contrat
prévoit que le transport doit être
effectué par un transporteur,
mais n'impose aucune
destination précise pour la
délivrance de la chose, le risque
de perte est transféré à l'acheteur
dès sa remise au transporteur,
quelle que soit la forme du
connaissement maritime.
Lorsque le contrat impose au
vendeur de délivrer la chose à
une destination précise, le risque
de perte est transféré à l'acheteur
lorsque la chose, bien qu’en
possession du transporteur, est
dûment offerte à l'acheteur au
lieu de destination.
Lorsque les parties intègrent
des signes commerciaux bien
établis dans leur contrat, le
risque de perte est transféré
conformément à l'interprétation
coutumière desdits signes.
Art. 2617. Dans tous les cas
où les parties ont convenu que le
vendeur obtiendra un document
attestant que la chose a été
délivrée à un transporteur ou à
un dépositaire, l'acheteur doit
payer sur remise de celui-ci et
d’autres documents s’ils sont
requis. Le vendeur ne peut offrir,
ni l'acheteur réclamer la
délivrance de la chose en lieu et
place des documents.
Arts. 2618-2619. [Réservés]

Arts. 2618-2619. [Reserved]
CHAPTER 14. AGREEMENTS
PREPARATORY TO THE
SALE

CHAPITRE 14. DES CONTRATS
PRÉPARATOIRES À LA VENTE

SECTION 1. OPTION

SECTION 1. DE L’OPTION

Art. 2620. An option to buy,
or an option to sell, is a contract
whereby a party gives to another
the right to accept an offer to

Art. 2620. L'option d'achat
ou l'option de vente est un
contrat par lequel une partie
confère à une autre le droit
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sell, or to buy, a thing within a
stipulated time.
An option must set forth the
thing and the price, and meet the
formal requirements of the sale it
contemplates.

d'accepter une offre de vente, ou
d'achat, dans un délai convenu.
L'option doit préciser la
chose et le prix, et remplir les
conditions de forme requises
pour la vente envisagée.

Art. 2621. The acceptance or
rejection of an offer contained in
an option is effective when
received by the grantor. Upon
such an acceptance the parties
are bound by a contract to sell.
Rejection of the offer
contained in an option terminates
the option but a counteroffer
does not. [Amended by Acts
1960, No. 30, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1961; Acts 1993, No. 841, §1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1995]

Art. 2621. L'acceptation ou le
refus de l'offre contenue dans
l'option prend effet dès la
réception par l’auteur de
l’option. Suite à l'acceptation, les
parties sont liées par une
promesse synallagmatique de
vente.
Le refus de l'offre contenue
dans l'option met fin à l'option. Il
n'en va pas ainsi de la contreoffre. [Modifié par la loi de
1960, n° 30, §1, en vigueur le 1er
janvier 1961 ; loi de 1993, n°
841, §1, en vigueur le 1er janvier
1995].

Art. 2622. The assignor of an
option to buy a thing warrants
the existence of that option, but
does not warrant that the person
who granted it can be required to
make a final sale.
If, upon exercise of the
option, the person who granted it
fails to make a final sale, the
assignee has against the assignor
the same rights as a buyer
without warranty has against the
seller.

SECTION 2. CONTRACT TO
SELL
Art. 2623. An agreement
whereby one party promises to
sell and the other promises to
buy a thing at a later time, or
upon the happening of a
condition, or upon performance
of some obligation by either
party, is a bilateral promise of
sale or contract to sell. Such an
agreement gives either party the
right to demand specific

Art. 2622. Le cédant d'une
option d'achat garantit que
l'option existe, sans pour autant
garantir qu'il puisse être exigé de
l’auteur de l’option de procéder
à la vente.
Lorsque l’auteur de l’option
ne procède pas à la vente à la
levée de l'option, le cessionnaire
a les mêmes droits à l'encontre
du cédant que l'acheteur sans
garantie contre le vendeur.
SECTION 2. DE LA PROMESSE
SYNALLAGMATIQUE DE
VENTE
Art. 2623. La convention par
laquelle une partie promet de
vendre et l'autre d'acheter une
chose à une date ultérieure, ou à
la réalisation d'une condition, ou
à l'exécution d'une obligation par
l'une des parties, est une
promesse bilatérale de vente ou
promesse synallagmatique de
vente. Cette convention donne à
chaque partie le droit d'exiger
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performance.
A contract to sell must set
forth the thing and the price, and
meet the formal requirements of
the sale it contemplates.

l'exécution forcée.
La promesse
synallagmatique de vente doit
préciser la chose et le prix, et
remplir les conditions de forme
requises pour la vente envisagée.

Art. 2624. A sum given by
the buyer to the seller in
connection with a contract to sell
is regarded to be a deposit on
account of the price, unless the
parties have expressly provided
otherwise.
If the parties stipulate that a
sum given by the buyer to the
seller is earnest money, either
party may recede from the
contract, but the buyer who
chooses to recede must forfeit the
earnest money, and the seller
who so chooses must return the
earnest money plus an equal
amount.
When earnest money has
been given and a party fails to
perform for reasons other than a
fortuitous event, that party will
be regarded as receding from the
contract.

Art. 2624. La somme remise
par l'acheteur au vendeur dans le
cadre d'une promesse
synallagmatique de vente est
considérée comme un acompte
sur le prix, à moins que les
parties n'en aient expressément
convenu autrement.
Lorsque les parties stipulent
qu'une somme remise par
l'acheteur au vendeur constitue
des arrhes, chacune des parties
est maître de s'en départir.
L'acheteur qui choisit de s'en
départir perd les arrhes, et le
vendeur qui choisit de même doit
les rendre au double.
Lorsque la promesse a été
faite avec des arrhes et qu'une
partie manque à exécuter ses
obligations en l'absence de cas
fortuit, il doit être considéré
qu'elle se départit du contrat.

SECTION 3. RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL

SECTION 3. DU DROIT DE
PRÉEMPTION

Art. 2625. A party may agree
that he will not sell a certain
thing without first offering it to a
certain person. The right given to
the latter in such a case is a right
of first refusal that may be
enforced by specific
performance.

Art. 2625. Une partie peut
stipuler qu'elle ne vendra pas
une chose déterminée sans
l'offrir préalablement à une
personne déterminée. Le droit
accordé à cette dernière est un
droit de préemption qui peut
donner lieu à l'exécution forcée.

Art. 2626. The grantor of a
right of first refusal may not sell
to another person unless he has
offered to sell the thing to the
holder of the right on the same
terms, or on those specified when
the right was granted if the
parties have so agreed.

Art. 2626. L’auteur du droit
de préemption ne peut vendre à
une autre personne à moins qu'il
n'ait déjà offert de vendre la
chose au titulaire du droit de
préemption aux mêmes termes,
ou aux termes spécifiés par les
parties lors de la constitution du
droit.
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SECTION 4. EFFECTS

SECTION 4. DES EFFETS

Art. 2627. Unless otherwise
agreed, an offer to sell the thing
to the holder of a right of first
refusal must be accepted within
ten days from the time it is
received if the thing is movable,
and within thirty days from that
time if the thing is immovable.
Unless the grantor concludes
a final sale, or a contract to sell,
with a third person within six
months, the right of first refusal
subsists in the grantee who failed
to exercise it when an offer was
made to him.

Art. 2627. Sauf stipulation
contraire, une offre de vente
destinée au titulaire du droit de
préemption doit être acceptée
dans les dix jours de réception de
la chose lorsqu’elle est
mobilière, et dans les trente jours
lorsqu’elle est immobilière.
À moins que l’auteur du
droit de préemption ne conclue
une vente, ou une promesse
synallagmatique de vente, avec
une tierce personne dans les six
mois, ce droit subsiste dans le
chef du bénéficiaire qui a
manqué de l'exercer lorsque
l'offre lui a été faite.

Art. 2628. An option or a
right of first refusal that concerns
an immovable thing may not be
granted for a term longer than ten
years. If a longer time for an
option or a right of first refusal
has been stipulated in a contract,
that time shall be reduced to ten
years. Nevertheless, if the option
or right of first refusal is granted
in connection with a contract that
gives rise to obligations of
continuous or periodic
performance, an option or a right
of first refusal may be granted
for as long a period as required
for the performance of those
obligations. [Acts 1993, No. 841,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995; Acts 2003,
No. 1005, §1, eff. July 2, 2003;
see Acts 2003, No. 1005, §2,
relative to application; Acts
2004, No. 24, §2 and §3, relative
to application]
Art. 2629. An option, right of
first refusal, or contract to sell
that involves immovable
property is effective against third
persons only from the time the
instrument that contains it is filed

Art. 2628. L'option ou le
droit de préemption portant sur
une chose immobilière ne peut
être consenti pour une durée
supérieure à dix ans. Lorsqu'une
durée supérieure est stipulée au
contrat, cette durée doit être
réduite à dix ans. Néanmoins,
lorsque l'option ou le droit de
préemption sont consentis dans
un contrat à exécution continue
ou périodique, ils peuvent l'être
pour une période égale à celle
nécessaire à l'exécution du
contrat. [Loi de 1993, n° 841, §1,
en vigueur le 1er janvier 1995 ;
loi de 2003, n° 1005, §1, en
vigueur le 2 juillet 2003 ; voir loi
de 2003, n° 1005, §2, sur
application et loi de 2004, n° 24,
§2 et §3, sur application]
Art. 2629. L'option, le droit
de préemption ou la promesse
synallagmatique de vente portant
sur un bien immobilier n'est
opposable aux tiers qu'à compter
de l'enregistrement de
l'instrument le contenant dans la
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for registry in the parish where
the immovable is located.
An option, right of first
refusal, or contract to sell that
involves movable property is
effective against third persons
who, at the time of acquisition of
a conflicting right, had actual
knowledge of that transaction.
Art. 2630. The right to
exercise an option and the right
of first refusal are indivisible.
When either of such rights
belongs to more than one person
all of them must exercise the
right.
Arts. 2631-2641. [Reserved]
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paroisse 5 où l’immeuble se situe.
L'option, le droit de
préemption ou la promesse
synallagmatique de vente portant
sur un bien mobilier est
opposable aux tiers qui, à
l’époque de l’acquisition d'un
droit concurrent, avaient une
connaissance effective de cette
transaction.
Art. 2630. Le droit de lever
l'option et le droit de préemption
sont indivisibles. Lorsque l'un ou
l'autre de ces droits appartient à
plusieurs personnes, elles
doivent toutes l'exercer.
Arts. 2631-2641. [Réservés]

CHAPTER 15. ASSIGNMENT
OF RIGHTS

CHAPITRE 15. DE LA CESSION
DE CRÉANCES

Art. 2642. All rights may be
assigned, with the exception of
those pertaining to obligations
that are strictly personal. The
assignee is subrogated to the
rights of the assignor against the
debtor.

Art. 2642. Toutes les
créances peuvent être cédées, à
l'exception de celles relatives
aux obligations strictement
personnelles. Le cessionnaire est
subrogé dans les droits du cédant
à l'encontre du débiteur.

Art. 2643. The assignment of
a right is effective against the
debtor and third persons only
from the time the debtor has
actual knowledge, or has been
given notice of the assignment.
If a partial assignment
unreasonably increases the
burden of the debtor he may
recover from either the assignor
or the assignee a reasonable
amount for the increased burden.
[Acts 1984, No. 921, §1; Acts
1985, No. 97, §1; Acts 1993, No.
841, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995]

Art. 2643. La cession de
créances n'est opposable au
débiteur et aux tiers qu'à
compter du moment où le
débiteur en a une connaissance
effective ou qu’il lui en a été
donné notification.
Lorsqu'une cession partielle
accroît de manière
déraisonnable la charge de
l'obligation, le débiteur peut
recouvrer du cédant ou du
cessionnaire une somme
raisonnable pour la charge ainsi
accrue. [Loi de 1984, n° 921, §1;
loi de 1985, n° 97, §1; loi de
1993, n° 841, §1, en vigueur le
1er janvier 1995]

5

NdT : La Louisiane a conservé la paroisse comme division territoriale. Celle-ci est l’équivalent du comté dans les
autres états.
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Art. 2644. When the debtor,
without knowledge or notice of
the assignment, renders
performance to the assignor, such
performance extinguishes the
obligation of the debtor and is
effective against the assignee and
third persons.

Art. 2644. Lorsque le
débiteur s'exécute entre les
mains du cédant sans avoir
connaissance de la cession ou
sans en avoir été informé, cette
exécution éteint l'obligation du
débiteur et est opposable au
cessionnaire et aux tiers.

Art. 2645. The assignment of
a right includes its accessories
such as security rights.

Art. 2645. La cession d'un
droit comprend ses accessoires,
tels que les sûretés.

Art. 2646. The assignor of a
right warrants its existence at the
time of the assignment.
The assignor does not
warrant the solvency of the
debtor, however, unless he has
agreed to give such a warranty.

Art. 2646. Le cédant d'un
droit garantit son existence au
temps de la cession.
Cependant, le cédant ne
garantit la solvabilité du
débiteur que lorsqu'il s'y est
engagé.

Art. 2647. [Reserved]
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Art. 2647. [Réservé]

Art. 2648. An assignor who
warrants the solvency of the
debtor warrants that solvency at
the time of the assignment only
and, in the absence of agreement
to the contrary, does not warrant
the future solvency of the debtor.

Art. 2648. Lorsque le cédant
garantit la solvabilité du
débiteur, cette garantie ne
s'entend que de la solvabilité au
temps de la cession et, sauf
convention contraire, ne s'entend
pas de la solvabilité future.

Art. 2649. When the assignor
of a right did not warrant the
solvency of the debtor but knew
of his insolvency, the assignee
without such knowledge may
obtain rescission of the contract.

Art. 2649. Lorsque le cédant
n'a pas répondu de la solvabilité
du débiteur mais savait qu'il était
insolvable, le cessionnaire n'en
ayant pas eu connaissance peut
obtenir l'annulation du contrat.

Art. 2650. A person who
assigns his right in the estate of a
deceased person, without
specifying any assets, warrants
only his right of succession as
heir or legatee.

Art. 2650. Celui qui cède une
hérédité sans en spécifier la
teneur, ne garantit que sa qualité
d'héritier ou de légataire.

Art. 2651. [Reserved]
Art. 2652. When a litigious
right is assigned, the debtor may
extinguish his obligation by
paying to the assignee the price
the assignee paid for the
assignment, with interest from
the time of the assignment.
A right is litigious, for that

Art. 2651. [Réservé]
Art. 2652. Lorsqu'un droit
litigieux est cédé, le débiteur
peut éteindre son obligation en
payant au cessionnaire le prix
payé par ce dernier pour la
cession, avec les intérêts à
compter de celle-ci.
Un droit est litigieux, au sens
de cet article, lorsqu'il est
contesté dans un procès déjà
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purpose, when it is contested in a
suit already filed.
Nevertheless, the debtor may
not thus extinguish his obligation
when the assignment has been
made to a co-owner of the
assigned right, or to a possessor
of the thing subject to the
litigious right.
Art. 2653. A right cannot be
assigned when the contract from
which it arises prohibits the
assignment of that right. Such a
prohibition has no effect against
an assignee who has no
knowledge of its existence.
Art. 2654. The assignor of a
right must deliver to the assignee
all documents in his possession
that evidence the right.
Nevertheless, a failure by the
assignor to deliver such
documents does not affect the
validity of the assignment.
When a right is assigned
only in part, the assignor may
give the assignee an original or a
copy of such documents.

CHAPTER 16. OF THE
GIVING IN PAYMENT

[Vol. 7

engagé.
Néanmoins, le débiteur ne
peut ainsi éteindre son obligation
lorsque le cessionnaire est
copropriétaire du droit cédé ou
possesseur de la chose sujette au
droit litigieux.
Art. 2653. Un droit ne peut
être cédé lorsque le contrat dont
il résulte en interdit la cession.
Une telle interdiction est
inopposable au cessionnaire qui
n'en connait pas l'existence.
Art. 2654. Le cédant doit
délivrer au cessionnaire tous les
documents en sa possession
constatant le droit. Néanmoins,
le défaut de délivrance de tels
documents n'affecte pas la
validité de la cession.
Lorsqu'un droit n'est cédé
qu'en partie, le cédant peut
donner au cessionnaire un
original ou une copie de tels
documents.

CHAPITRE 16. DE LA DATION
EN PAIEMENT

Art. 2655. La dation en
Art. 2655. Giving in payment
paiement est un contrat par
is a contract whereby an obligor
gives a thing to the obligee, who lequel un débiteur donne une
chose au créancier, qu'il accepte
accepts it in payment of a debt.
en paiement d'une dette.
Art. 2656. Delivery of the
Art. 2656. La délivrance de
thing is essential to the perfection
la chose est essentielle à la
of a giving in payment.
perfection de la dation en
Art. 2657. An obligor may
paiement.
give a thing to the obligee in
An. 2657. Le débiteur peut
partial payment of a debt.
donner une chose au créancier
A giving in partial payment
en paiement partiel de la dette.
extinguishes the debt in the
amount intended by the parties.
La dation en paiement
If the parties' intent concerning
partiel éteint la dette à hauteur
the amount of the partial
du montant convenu par les
extinguishment cannot be
parties. Lorsque la volonté des
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ascertained, it is presumed that
they intended to extinguish the
debt in the amount of the fair
market value of the thing given
in partial payment.
Art. 2658. [Reserved]
Art. 2659. The giving in
payment is governed by the rules
of the contract of sale, with the
differences provided for in this
Chapter.

TITLE VIII. OF EXCHANGE
[Acts 2010, No. 186, §1, eff.
Aug. 15, 2010]
Art. 2660. Exchange is a
contract whereby each party
transfers to the other the
ownership of a thing other than
money.
Ownership of the things
exchanged is transferred between
the parties as soon as there is
agreement on the things, even
though none of the things has
been delivered.
If it is the intent of the
parties that the transfer of
ownership will not take place
until a later time, then the
contract is a contract to
exchange.
Art. 2661. Each of the parties
to a contract of exchange has the
rights and obligations of a seller
with respect to the thing
transferred by him and the rights
and obligations of a buyer with
respect to the thing transferred to
him.
Art. 2662. A person evicted
from a thing received in
exchange may demand the value
of the thing from which he was
evicted or the return of the thing
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parties concernant ce montant ne
peut être déterminée, elles sont
présumées avoir voulu éteindre
la dette à hauteur de la valeur
marchande justement appréciée
de la chose donnée en paiement
partiel.
Art. 2658. [Réservé]
Art. 2659. Sauf disposition
contraire du présent chapitre, la
dation en paiement est régie par
les règles relatives au contrat de
vente.

TITRE VIII. DE L’ÉCHANGE
[Loi de 2010, n° 186, §1, en
vigueur le 15 août 2010]
Art. 2660. L'échange est un
contrat par lequel chaque partie
transfère à l'autre la propriété
d'une chose autre que de
l'argent.
La propriété des choses
échangées est transférée dès qu'il
y a accord sur les choses, même
si aucune d'entre elles n'a été
délivrée.
Lorsque l'intention des
parties est de reporter le
transfert de propriété à un
moment ultérieur, il s'agit d'une
promesse d'échange.
Art. 2661. Chaque partie au
contrat d'échange a les droits et
obligations d'un vendeur à
l'égard de la chose qu'il transfère
et les droits et obligations d'un
acheteur à l'égard de la chose
qui lui est transférée.
Art. 2662. La personne
évincée d'une chose reçue en
échange peut réclamer la valeur
de cette chose ou la restitution de
la chose qu'il a lui-même donnée,
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he gave, with damages in either
case.

avec des dommages et intérêts
dans un cas comme dans l'autre.

Art. 2663. A party giving a
corporeal immovable in
exchange for property worth less
than one half of the fair market
value of the immovable given by
him may claim rescission on
grounds of lesion beyond moiety.

Art. 2663. La partie donnant
un immeuble corporel en
échange d'un bien valant moins
de la moitié de la valeur
marchande de l'immeuble
justement appréciée peut agir en
rescision pour lésion d'outremoitié.

Art. 2664. The contract of
exchange is governed by the
rules of the contract of sale, with
the differences provided in this
Title.
Art. 2665-2667. [Repealed
Acts 2010, No. 186, §1, eff. Aug.
15, 2010]

Art. 2664. Sauf disposition
contraire du présent titre, le
contrat d'échange est régi par les
règles relatives au contrat de
vente.
Art. 2665-2667. [Abrogés, loi
de 2010, n° 186, §1, en vigueur
le 15 août 2010]
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Spanish colonial period. Private law in Argentina, as in other civil
law jurisdictions of the Americas, experienced significant
developments in recent decades, when, for example, efforts were
undertaken to leave behind patriarchal standards and to give equal
standing to all members of society. 2 Those developments,
however, did take place within a broader context, and were
therefore also experienced in public law.
Three developments are of paramount importance and must be
included in this report. The first development deals with ongoing
efforts towards the adoption of a second generation civil code in
Argentina. Those recent efforts reflect that the Argentine legal
community is still seeking for a text that would better serve current
needs. This report will focus on the reception of the doctrine of
abuse of rights within the different revision and re-codification
projects of the civil code, illustrating, by means of that example,
the shift from a liberal conception towards a social conception of
rights. The second development deals with a fundamental pillar of
family law: marriage. The report will address the adoption of
legislation recognizing same-sex marriages in Argentina, which
took place in 2010, and placed Argentina as a regional forerunner
in that respect. The report will show how Argentina shifted from
religious to civil marriage, and recently welcomed same-sex
marriages. The third development deals with the right to access to
justice and its interplay with vulnerable groups. The report will
focus on two groups (i.e., women victims of violence and
immigrants) and reflect how recent regulations aimed at those
groups incorporated international law principles and stressed the
importance of access to justice as a means to exercise all other

1. The terms Civil Law, Romano-Germanic, and Continental European can
be used indistinctly in this report to refer to the prevailing system of private law
that applies in Argentina.
2. See the references to the patriarchal elements in Haiti, El Salvador, and
Honduras in Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana
and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1157-1159 (2009).
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rights. Furthermore, it will address the reception of access to
justice within the ongoing efforts towards the adoption of a second
generation civil code. These three developments will show readers
that the law of Argentina is far from being dormant or static.
II. CIVIL LAW CODIFICATION:
SEEKING A GENERATION SHIFT
Civil law jurisdictions in the Americas are divided between
those having first generation civil codes and those having second
generation civil codes. 3 The current scenario enables the grouping
of jurisdictions into clusters, though not all jurisdictions are clearcut examples of a particular generation. 4
A group of jurisdictions resists the adoption of second
generation codes. 5 This resistance, as is the case in Argentina, may
be motivated because of veneration of the existing first generation
codes, which were avant-garde at the time of enactment. 6 The
resistance of members of this group may be also motivated due to a
lack of consensus on what steps should be followed at the time of
alteration or because of a limitation in the allocation of the
required resources. 7 Jurisdictions that still preserve their first
generation codes were able to update the texts through revision and
de-codification, however. Several decades ago, some of those
jurisdictions began to feel a need to adopt second generation codes.
3. This paragraph and the two that follow borrow part of their exposition,
sometimes drawing verbatim, from the previously mentioned work of Moréteau
& Parise and from Agustín Parise, Civil Law Codification in Latin America:
Understanding First and Second Generation Codes, in TRADITION,
CODIFICATION AND UNIFICATION 183-193 (M. Milo et al. eds. 2014).
4. The U.S. state of Louisiana provides an example of one of the latter
jurisdictions. Some may claim that Louisiana adopted a second generation civil
code, which resulted from the ongoing revision of the first generation civil code;
while others may claim that the ongoing re-codification process has not yet
reached a second generation status. See Moréteau & Parise, supra note 2, at
1112-1120.
5. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Haiti, and Uruguay.
6. E.g., Civil Code of Argentina and Civil Code of Chile.
7. E.g., Ecuador and Dominican Republic.
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Even if their codes may be far from experiencing a generation
shift, they are currently undergoing a thorough revision or entering
into a de-codification process, especially, as already mentioned,
with regards to family law and the prevailing patriarchal systems.
The civil code of Argentina belongs to this first group, because it
still does not surrender to replace its current code by one of second
generation.
Another group of jurisdictions welcomed second generation
codes. 8 The texts of first generation codes, however, had been
previously updated through partial revisions and de-codification,
and ultimately led to the adoption of texts with second generation
status. Many of these new texts incorporated social aspects of law, 9
and their sources were more eclectic. The typifying characteristic
of these codes is that they were able to incorporate local elements
that distinguished them from codes of other jurisdictions, while
also distinguishing them from the texts of their previous generation
codes. Second generation codes found a more mature society and
were able to highlight their own identity.
Argentina still applies its first generation code, which has been
subject to revision and de-codification. That first generation civil
code, which dates from 1871 and was drafted by Dalmacio Vélez
Sarsfield (hereinafter, Vélez), may be subject to veneration, having
been avant-garde at the time of enactment, and is still generating
resistance to replacement. 10 However, Argentina undertook several
attempts to adopt a second generation civil code, which can be
traced back to the first decades of the twentieth century and are
still ongoing. Argentina indeed offers a fertile ground for revision

8. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Québec, and Venezuela.
9. E.g., Civil Code of Mexico, 1932.
10. For more information on generations of civil codes, see generally
Parise, supra note 3.
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efforts, 11 and holds a unique record of aborted re-codification
attempts. 12
A. First Generation Civil Code
The first attempts towards civil law codification 13 in Argentina
were undertaken in 1852. 14 At that time, the head of the executive
power delivered a decree ordering the appointment of drafters that
would work on the civil, commercial, criminal, and procedural
codes. 15 That effort did not advance, however. 16 One year later, the
Argentine Constitution further stated that the national legislative
branch should deliver civil, commercial, criminal, and mineral
codes. 17
The completion of a civil code was delayed until the following
decade. In 1864, Vélez was appointed to draft a project, 18 and his
resulting work was approved without parliamentary debate 19 by the
National Congress on September 25, 1869, taking effect as the
Código Civil de la República Argentina (hereinafter, Argentine
Code) on January 1, 1871. 20 The Argentine Code had 4051 articles
and was divided into two preliminary titles and four books: Book I
11. Agustín Parise, Jimena Andino Dorato, Jean-Frédérick Ménard et
Lionel Smith (dir), Le droit civil et ses codes: parcours à travers les Amériques,
4:2012 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 1027, 1028 (2012).
12. Moréteau & Parise, supra note 2, at 1146.
13. Previous efforts were undertaken in the area of commercial law in 1824,
with the drafting of a project of a Commercial Code. See VÍCTOR TAU
ANZOÁTEGUI, LA CODIFICACIÓN EN LA ARGENTINA (1810-1870): MENTALIDAD
SOCIAL E IDEAS JURÍDICAS 125 (1977).
14. ABELARDO LEVAGGI, 2 MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ARGENTINO 265 (1987).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See the text of the Constitution of 1853 at Constitución de la
Confederación Argentina, in ANALES DE LEGISLACIÓN ARGENTINA:
COMPLEMENTO AÑOS 1852-1880 9-33 (1954). See, TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra
note 13, at 319.
18. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 266.
19. Id. at 269. See also the complete study by JORGE CABRAL TEXO,
HISTORIA DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO 156-178 (1920).
20. Law 340, Sept. 29, [I] A.D.L.A. 496-905. See Moréteau & Parise, supra
note 2, at 1143-1145; and LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 266.
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of persons (de las personas), Book II of personal rights in civil
relations (de los derechos personales en las relaciones civiles),
Book III of real rights (de los derechos reales), and Book IV of
real and personal rights-dispositions in common (de los derechos
reales y personales - disposiciones communes). The Argentine
Code overruled all related prior laws that had developed during the
Spanish colonial period and the early independent period (e.g.,
Indiano and Patrio laws). 21 As other nineteenth-century codes, the
Argentine Code did not welcome explicitly the doctrine of abuse of
rights.
Vélez had an eclectic approach to law, 22 and therefore
identified materials from many sources. He worked with legislative
acts, drafts of codes, codes, and doctrine that served him as
guides. 23 Similar to other drafters, he used the ideas and codes that
existed at the time. 24 He was especially interested—as were, for
example, Andrés Bello in Chile and Louis Moreau-Lislet in
Louisiana—in the jurists and works that theorized on modern law
while building from Roman law principles. 25 Finally, Vélez added
to those materials the identification of local customs. 26 It can be
claimed that the resulting text of the Argentine Code was tinted
with an individualistic and liberal conception, as most nineteenthcentury civil codes that found a precedent in the Code Napoléon.
The Argentine Code was never replaced, though its text was
subject to many alterations that were introduced mainly through

21. Law 340, supra note 20, at 496-905.
22. ALEJANDRO GUZMÁN BRITO, LA CODIFICACIÓN CIVIL EN
IBEROAMÉRICA: SIGLOS XIX Y XX 453 (2000).
23. Agustín Parise, Legal Transplants and Codification: Exploring the
North American Sources of the Civil Code of Argentina (1871), 1.2 ISAIDAT
LAW REVIEW 1, 7 (2010). See also Raymundo Salvat, El Código Civil Argentino
(Estudio General): Historia, Plan o Método y Fuentes, VII REVISTA ARGENTINA
DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS 420, 436 (1913).
24. ABELARDO LEVAGGI, DALMACIO VÉLEZ SARSFIELD, JURISCONSULTO
180 (2005).
25. Id.
26. RAYMUNDO SALVAT, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO 132
(1950).
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revisions. 27 For example, secular laws were enacted in the 1880s
in Argentina. Accordingly, a law on civil marriage was adopted in
1888, 28 together with laws on civil registry that were adopted in
1884 and 1898. 29 The first decades of the new century also brought
new legislation that affected the civil code. For example, the
national congress adopted a law on agricultural leases in 192130
and a law on the rights of women in 1926. 31 Most partial reforms,
however, dealt with specific areas of the civil code 32 and lacked a
comprehensive approach.
B. Towards a Second Generation Civil Code
Several major revision and re-codification efforts were
undertaken in Argentina starting at the turn of the twentieth
century. Three of those efforts were undertaken in 1936, 1954, and
1968, and they paved the way for the formal reception of the
doctrine of abuse of rights. Those efforts assisted in leaving behind
the liberal conception that had characterized the first generation
code.
At the break of the twentieth century scholarly writings
indicated a need to harmonize the civil code with the new
context. 33 Accordingly, a first re-codification effort was started in
1926 with the appointment of a codifying commission. 34 The latter
27. JORGE JOAQUÍN LLAMBÍAS, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL PARTE
GENERAL 199-203 (6th ed. 1975).
28. For more information on the 1888 law, see infra note 90 and
accompanying text. ABEL CHÁNETON, 2 HISTORIA DE VÉLEZ SÁRSFIELD 335
(1937).
29. Id. at 336.
30. Id. at 335.
31. Id. at 336.
32. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 271.
33. See generally Agustín Parise, La comisión de reformas al Código Civil
(1926). Aproximación histórico-jurídica a su proyección, IUS HISTORIA, Sept.
2006, http://www.ijeditores.com.ar/articulos.php?idarticulo=62005&print=2.
34. Through the ten years of existence, the commission was composed by
Juan A. Bibiloni, César de Tezanos Pinto, Mariano de Vedia y Mitre, José A.
Gervasoni, Héctor Lafaille, Enrique Martínez Paz, Julián V. Pera, Juan Carlos
Rébora, Roberto Repetto, Rodolfo Rivarola, Raymundo M. Salvat, and Gastón
Federico Tobal. See ENRIQUE R. AFTALIÓN & FERNANDO GARCÍA OLANO,
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delegated to one of its members—Juan A. Bibiloni—the drafting
of a pre-project 35 that did not welcome the doctrine of abuse of
rights. The pre-project was revised by the commission, and Héctor
Lafaille and Gastón Tobal undertook the final drafting of a
project 36 that was completed in 1936, was notably brief, and was
ultimately never adopted by the legislature. 37 Lafaille indicated
that the commission had preferred to work with, amongst others,
the Brazilian, Spanish, and Swiss civil codes, and had not excluded
from their work the Chilean code and the Code Napoléon. 38 The
project welcomed the doctrine of abuse of rights, differently from
its predecessor. The concrete applications of the doctrine were
increased within the code, and the limitations for its application
were removed. 39
In the 1950s, scholars claimed that there was a need to change
civil code provisions to make them reflect current standards. 40
Within that scenario, a second re-codification effort was
undertaken in 1950 by the Civil Law Institute of the Ministry of
Justice, under the leadership of Jorge Joaquín Llambías. 41 The

INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO 454 (1939); and Juan Carlos Rébora, Nota e
informe presentados por el profesor Dr. Juan Carlos RÉBORA al Honorable
Consejo Académico de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales de la
Universidad de La Plata, con motivo de su actuación dentro de la Comisión de
Reformas del Código Civil, 5 LA LEY 66, 69 (1937).
35. AFTALIÓN & GARCÍA OLANO, supra note 34, at 454. See generally JUAN
ANTONIO BIBILONI, 1-7 ANTEPROYECTO DE REFORMAS AL CÓDIGO CIVIL
ARGENTINO (1929).
36. See GUILLERMO A. BORDA, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL PARTE
GENERAL 148 (9th ed. 1987); and Moréteau & Parise, supra note 2, at 1145.
37. PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO 523-537 (1938). See also
AFTALIÓN & GARCÍA OLANO, supra note 34, at 454; and LEVAGGI, supra note
14, at 272.
38. Parise, supra note 33.
39. Héctor Lafaille, Hacia el nuevo Código Civil, 58 JURISPRUDENCIA
ARGENTINA 21, 26 (1937).
40. Susana T. Ramella, Propiedad en función social en la constitución de
1949. Una “mentalidad” del Antiguo Régimen representada en el
constitucionalismo social de la época, 35 REVISTA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
297, 308 (2007).
41. ANTEPROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL DE 1954 PARA LA REPÚBLICA
ARGENTINA 7 (1968); and LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 272.
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work resulted in a pre-project that welcomed the developments of
the national jurisprudence, and was inspired by the codes of Italy,
Peru, Switzerland, and Venezuela. 42 The pre-project was also brief,
and was completed in 1954, though never adopted by the
legislature. 43 The work included an article that expressly
welcomed the doctrine of abuse of rights. That article, numbered
235, read in part that “the law does not tolerate the abuse of rights”
and that “the exercise of a right will be deemed abusive when it
contradicts the requirements of good faith or the ends towards its
recognition.” 44 The note to that article indicated a thorough review
of foreign scholarly writings and legislation, and a survey of
Argentine precedents. 45 The proposals of the pre-project paved the
way for the formal reception of the doctrine in the subsequent
revision effort. 46
A third major revision effort was completed in 1968. That
effort, however, did not aim to achieve re-codification, and was
limited to achieve revision of 204 articles. 47 The new texts were
adopted by Law 17711 of 1968, 48 and drafted by José F. Bidau,
Abel M. Fleitas, and Roberto Martínez Ruiz, with the decisive
participation of Guillermo A. Borda. 49 Their revision work
introduced principles of social solidarity in a code that had been

42. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 272; and Moréteau & Parise, supra note 2, at
1145.
43. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 272.
44. Luis Moisset de Espanés, Introducción al abuso del derecho, 89
ACTUALIDAD JURÍDICA 47 (2001), also available at http://www.acaderc.org.ar/
doctrina/articulos/introduccion-al-abuso-del-derecho/ at_download/file, at 18.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 19.
47. BORDA, supra note 36, at 143; Guillermo Antonio Borda, La Reforma
de 1968 al Código Civil Argentino in 2 EL CÓDIGO CIVIL DEL SIGLO XXI (PERÚ
Y ARGENTINA) 1445 (Muñiz Ziches et al. Coord., 2000). See also LUIS M.
VALIENTE NOAILLES, COMENTARIOS A LAS REFORMAS AL CÓDIGO CIVIL 7-9
(1968); and GUILLERMO A. BORDA, LA REFORMA DE 1968 AL CÓDIGO CIVIL
(1971).
48. See the text of Law 17711, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g31-11000scanyel&title=
reformas-al-codigo-civil-.
49. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 271.
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known as individualistic. 50 The 1968 revision introduced the
doctrine of abuse of rights, mainly in article 1071, 51 which in its
previous wording had defended that the exercise of one’s rights
could not turn any act illegal. 52 The new text, in radically different
lines, rephrased the original wording and added a second paragraph
indicating that: “the law does not protect the abusive exercise of
rights. It will be deemed abusive the exercise that contradicts the
aims that the law had when recognizing them or the exercise that
exceeds the limits imposed by good faith, morals, and good
customs.” 53
More recent major revision and re-codification efforts were
undertaken since the 1980s in Argentina. Projects of new codes
were completed in 1987, 1992, 1993, and 1998, though never took
force of law. 54 The most recent re-codification attempt 55 was
presented before the executive power on February 24, 2012, 56 and
is currently subject to debate before the National Congress. Parts
of the proposed text encountered opposition from different groups
and members of society, 57 and have also motivated the
50. Id.; and Moréteau & Parise, supra note 2, at 1145.
51. MANUEL I. ADROGUÉ, EL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD EN LA ACTUALIDAD.
INTRODUCCIÓN A SUS NUEVAS EXPRESIONES 119 (1991).
52. Law 340, supra note 20, at 614-615.
53. See the current text of the civil code, available at
http://www.infojus.gob.ar/legislacion/ley-nacional-340-codigo_civil.htm.
54. Graciela Medina, Argentina on the Eve of a New Civil and Commercial
Code in THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF CIVIL CODES 43, 58 (Julio César Rivera
ed. 2013). About some of those drafts, see Fernando J. López de Zavalía,
Reflexiones sobre el actual Proyecto de unificación civil y comercial, in
ESTUDIOS SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO UNIFICADO DE 1998 25-70 (Roberto
H. Brebbia dir. 2001); Julio César Rivera, El Proyecto de Código Civil para la
República Argentina, 35 REV. JURÍDICA U. INTER. P.R. 381 (2001); and
Proyecto de Código Civil de la Repúblcia Argentina in VII ANTECEDENTES
PARLAMENTARIOS 149-546 (2d ed. 2000).
55. All relevant information regarding the ongoing re-codification effort is
available at http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com.
56. Modificaciones del poder ejecutivo nacional al anteproyecto de reforma
del código civil elaborado por la comisión de reformas decreto 191/2011,
available
at
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/pdf/Fundamentos-de-loscambios-introducidos-por-el-PEN.pdf at 1.
57. See, e.g., Debate por la reforma del Código Civil, LA NACIÓN, March 7,
2012 at 15; and CONFERENCIA EPISCOPAL ARGENTINA, REFLEXIONES Y APORTES
SOBRE ALGUNOS TEMAS VINCULADOS A LA REFORMA DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL (2012).
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development of copious literature commenting on its virtues and
weaknesses. 58 The codifying commission was led by Elena
Highton de Nolasco and Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci, under the
presidency of Ricardo Lorenzetti. 59 That re-codification effort

58. The most comprehensive study on the 2012 code project is
COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN
2012 (Julio César Rivera dir., 2012).
The authors of this report have identified, since 2012, no less than 200 scholarly
articles published in Argentine law journals that address the 2012 code project.
The main legal databases are those of the journals La Ley, El Derecho,
Jurisprudencia Argentina, and Eldial. The following selection of articles, not
mentioned in other parts of this report, address some of the main reforms in the
code project: Liliana Abreut de Begher, La propiedad comunitaria indígena.
Comentario del Anteproyecto de Código, LA LEY 06.07.2012; Atilio Aníbal
Alterini, Soluciones del Proyecto de Código en materia de responsabilidad civil,
LA LEY 07.30.2012; Juan Manuel Aparicio, Contratos en general.
Observaciones al Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 12.05.2012; Carlos Arianna,
Notas al Proyecto de Código Unificado en materia de recompensas, LA LEY
09.14.2012; Agustín Bender, Validez probatoria del correo electrónico en la
jurisprudencia y en el Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
ELDIAL 04.10.2013; Alberto Biglieri, Tensión entre la Reforma del Código y la
ley de responsabilidad del Estado proyectada, LA LEY 05.09.2014; Alberto J.
Bueres, La responsabilidad por daños en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY
02.18.2013; Manuel Gonzalo Burgueño Ibarguren, La cuantificación del daño
moral en el Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación del año 2012,
ELDIAL 12.18.2013; Bernardo P. Carlino, Libros de Comercio y Proyecto de
Código, LA LEY 07.11.2013; Juan Carlos Cassagne, Responsabilidad del Estado
y de los funcionarios y empleados públicos en el Código Civil y Comercial
proyectado, LA LEY 10.01.2012; María Victoria Famá, Desplazamiento filial en
el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 02.26.2013; Sara L. Feldstein de Cárdenas &
Luciane Klein Vieira, El Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación
Argentina y la protección del consumidor transfronterizo, ELDIAL 03.28.2014;
María G. Iglesias, Capacidad jurídica: restricciones a la capacidad en el
Anteproyecto de Código Civil. Entre la incapacidad y los apoyos,
JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 06.20.2012; Marcelo J. López Mesa, La gestión de
negocios ajenos, en el marco del Proyecto de Reforma al Código Civil, ELDIAL
08.10.2012; Rafael M. Manóvil, Las sociedades de la seccíón IV del Proyecto
de Código, LA LEY 10.24.2012; Osvaldo J. Marzorati, Contrato de distribución
en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 03.25.2014; Jorge O. Perrino, Maternida
subrogada, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 04.11.2012; Ramón D. Pizarro, La
mora del deudor en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 09.03.2012; Julio César
Rivera, El arbitraje en el Proyecto de Código sancionado por el Senado.
Prejuicios y errores, LA LEY 12.17.2013; Agustín Sojo, Efectos de la pretendida
regulación de las uniones convivenciales, ELDIAL 07.10.2012; Rubén S. Stiglitz,
La teoría del contrato en el Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
LA LEY 06.13.2012; and Daniel R. Vítolo, Los contratos asociativos en el
proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, EL DERECHO 08.08.2012.
59. See the text of Decree 191/2011, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-191-0000-1102soterced.
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unified the civil and commercial codes into a single body. The
resulting code project 60 had 2671 articles and was divided into a
preliminary title and six books: Book I of the general part (parte
general), Book II of family relations (relaciones de familia), Book
III of personal rights (derechos personales), Book IV of real rights
(derechos reales), Book V of mortis causa transmission of rights
(transmisión de derechos por causa de muerte), and Book VI of
dispositions in common for real and personal rights (disposiciones
comunes a los derechos personales y reales). 61 Each book was
divided into titles and chapters, and when necessary, into sections
and paragraphs. The new project placed the doctrine of abuse of
rights in a paramount position within the preliminary title of the
code, continuing with the path taken since 1936 towards the
adoption of a less individualistic conception of rights. That
doctrine clearly outgrew all different parts of the code and it now
applies to all private law. 62 The to-be article 10 reproduced without
major alterations the two paragraphs of current article 1071, and
added a third paragraph stating that the judge must order the
necessary measures to prevent the effects of an abusive use of
rights, and if necessary, procure the retrocession to the previous
status, determining a compensation. 63

60. The resulting text was referred to as pre-project by the codifying
commission in its exposé des motifs, though in the front page of the proposed
code it reads project. Earlier versions of the proposed code indeed referred to it
as pre-project.
61. See the complete text of the project, available at
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/pdf/Texto-del-Proyecto-de-Codigo-Civil-yComercial-de-la-Nacion.pdf [hereinafter Texto del Proyecto].
62. Ricardo L. Lorenzetti, Aspectos valorativos y principios preliminares
del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, LA LEY
04.23.2012.
63. Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61, at 3-4. See also Graciela Medina, La
contractualisation de la famille / Contractualisation of family law in INFORMES
DE LA ASOCIACIÓN ARGENTINA DE DERECHO COMPARADO AL XIX CONGRESO
DE LA ACADEMIA INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO COMPARADO 385, 394 (2014).

2014]

ARGENTINA

249

The 2012 code project suggested numerous alterations to the
existing law. According to Lorenzetti, 64 the codifying commission
respected the Roman, Spanish, and French traditions that had an
impact on Argentine legal history, yet they also aimed to provide a
text immersed in a Latin American cultural identity. 65 The
codifying commission also benefited from analyzing all previous
major revision and re-codification efforts that had taken place in
Argentina. 66 Alterations were proposed for almost all areas of
private law (e.g., property law, commercial law), yet it is relevant
to highlight the following: (i) incorporation of a title dealing with
private international law, 67 in similar lines with modern codes,
such as the one of Louisiana, that added a fourth book on that
subject; 68 (ii) incorporation of protection of inalienable personal
rights (derechos personalísimos), which had already found their
way into Argentine domestic legislation by means of the adoption
of international conventions, and which were yet not expressly
addressed in the Argentine Code; 69 (iii) incorporation of prenuptial
agreements, which are currently not included in the Argentine
Code; 70 (iv) incorporation of several changes when facing divorce,
i.a., the elimination of the impossibility to file for divorce within

64. See the complete text of the exposé des motifs of the 2012 code project,
available
at
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/pdf/Fundamentos-delProyecto.pdf [hereinafter Fundamentos del Proyecto].
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Book IV, Title IV, arts. 2594-2671 (Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61,
at 572-592). On this topic, see Cristina Britos, Principios del Derecho
Internacional Privado en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 02.13.2014.
68. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the Louisiana
Civil Code: Civilian, American, or Original, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (2009).
69. Inalienable personal rights are addressed, i.a., in arts. 17, 55, 59, 646,
paragraph c, and 1738 of the project. See also Fabio Fidel Cantafio, La salud y
los derechos personalísimos en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 11.16.2012.
70. See Book II, Title II, Section 1, arts. 446-450 and art. 2625 (Texto del
Proyecto, supra note 61, at 112-113 and 579). On this topic, see Ana Ortelli, Las
convenciones matrimoniales y los convenios reguladores de crisis
matrimoniales en el proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, ELDIAL
07.11.2012.
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the first three years from the celebration of the marriage; 71 and (v)
incorporation of provisions on assisted reproductive technologies
within the civil code. 72
It seems clear that Argentine jurists and society at large sense a
need to reach a generation shift. The first generation civil code
needs a refurbishment that may no longer be achieved by means of
revision or de-codification, while the fate of the Argentine Code is
now in the hands of the legislature. 73
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
AN AVANT-GARDE PILLAR FOR FAMILY LAW
Argentina experienced in 2010 a very significant change in the
area of family law, more precisely in the dispositions dealing with
marriage. Law 26618 74 of that year welcomed same-sex marriage,
being the second civil law jurisdiction from the Americas—after

71. See Book II, Title I, Chapter 8, Section 2, arts. 436-438 (Texto del
Proyecto, supra note 61, at 109). See also Fundamentos del Proyecto, supra note
64, at 64; Eduardo A. Sambrizzi, El divorcio en el anteproyecto de reforma al
Código Civil, ELDIAL 04.12.2012; Lidia B. Hernández et al, Matrimonio y
divorcio en el Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 05.30.2012;
and Luis María López del Carril, El divorcio en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY
09.12.2012.
72. The provisions are spread throughout the draft (i.a, arts. 19, 529, and
2631), though the general rules dealing with that type of filiation are included in
Book II, Title V, Chapter 2, arts. 560-564 (Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61, at
138-140). See Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci et al, El embrión no implantado.
Proyecto de Código unificado. Coincidencia de la solución con la de los países
de tradición comun, LA LEY 07.10.2012; Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci et al, El
embrión no implantado. El Proyecto de Código y su total consonancia con la
CIDH, LA LEY 12.28.2012; Fernando López de Zavalía, Técnicas de
reproducción humana asistida y el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 08.23.2012; and
Úrsula C. Basset, Incidencia en el derecho de familia del proyecto de Código
con media sanción, LA LEY 12.16.2013.
73. At the time this Report was submitted for publication (August 12, 2014)
the National Congress had not taken yet a decision on the fate of the 2012 code
project. See also Julio César Rivera, The effects of financial crises on the
binding force of contracts: renegotiation, rescission or revision in INFORMES DE
LA ASOCIACIÓN ARGENTINA DE DERECHO COMPARADO AL XIX CONGRESO DE
LA ACADEMIA INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO COMPARADO 285, 295 (2014).
74. See the text of Law 26618, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
legislacion/ley-nacional-26618-matrimonio_entre_personas_mismo.htm?5#.
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Québec—to do so. 75 Those changes are part of a more
comprehensive shift, which also provides for recognition of gender
identity, as established in Law 26743 76 of 2012. 77 Accordingly,
gender identity might differ from that assigned at the time of birth
and should reflect the internal and individual experience of each
person. 78 The principle of equality was also welcomed by the
democratic conception of family as assured by the constitutional
reform of 1994, granting constitutional standing to a series of
international Human Rights conventions. 79
The Argentine Code, as other nineteenth-century civil codes,
did not welcome same-sex marriage, and followed a model of the
patriarchal family. 80 In addition, its text, as adopted in 1871, did
not follow the Code Napoléon conception of marriage as a mere
civil contract. 81 Vélez’s code ratified authority to Canon law, and
regulated marriage amongst Catholics, 82 and also regulated
marriage with 83 and without 84 authorization of the Catholic
Church. There were no specific provisions for marriages amongst
non-believers, yet it was interpreted that the code dispositions on
75. A decision of the Court of Appeals of Québec, in the case Ligue
catholique pour les droits de l'homme c. Hendricks, resulted in the legalization
of same-sex marriages in Québec. See http://citoyens.soquij.qc.ca/
php/decision.php?ID=78C475AD045B50A084375C394E0B74DB&page=1;
and Donald G. Casswell, Same-Sex Marriage: Equality for Lesbian and Gay
People, 62 ADVOCATE VANCOUVER 709, 716 (2004).
76. See the text of Law 26743, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
legislacion/ley-nacional-26743-ley_identidad_genero.htm?7.
An implementation decree for Law 26743 was also adopted. See Decree
1007/2012, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/documentDisplay.jsp?guid=
123456789-0abc-700-1000-2102soterced.
77. Article 1 of the new law established that every person has the right to
recognition of its gender identity, to freely develop according to that gender
identity and to be treated according to his gender identity. Id.
78. Id. at art. 2.
79. Graciela Medina, Matrimonio y disolución in COMENTARIOS AL
PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 2012 259, 261 (Julio
César Rivera dir., 2012).
80. Medina, supra note 63, at 390.
81. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 131.
82. Arts. 167-179 (Law 340, supra note 20, at 524-525).
83. Arts. 180-182 (Law 340, supra note 20, at 525-526).
84. Art. 183 (Law 340, supra note 20, at 526).
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public instruments in general applied. 85 Article 167 of the code
provided the basic tenets by indicating that marriage amongst
Catholics should be celebrated according to the canons and
solemnities of the Catholic Church. 86 Vélez had indicated in his
note to that article that:
Catholics, such as the people of Argentina, 87 could not
celebrate civil marriage. For them it would be a perpetual
concubinage, condemned by their religion and by the
customs of the country. A law authorizing such marriages,
according to the current state of our society, would disavow
the mission of the laws to sustain and increase the power of
customs and not to enervate and corrupt them. Such a law
would encourage Catholics to ignore the precepts of their
religion, with no favorable results for people and families. 88
The 1871 text also referred explicitly to husband and wife
throughout its articles, not taking a neutral stand by means of the
generic term spouse. 89
Argentine society experienced several changes towards the end
of the nineteenth century. 90 For example, the 1895 Argentine
census indicated that the country had 4.1 million inhabitants, 91 of

85. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 132.
86. Law 340, supra note 20, at 524.
87. The 1895 Argentine census indicated that in that country “991 out of
1000 are Catholics, seven are Protestant, and two are Israelites.” SEGUNDO
CENSO DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA. MAYO 10 DE 1895. TOMO II POBLACIÓN
cxxii (1898) [hereinafter SEGUNDO CENSO].
88. The text of the note, in its relevant part, read in Spanish:
Las personas católicas, como las de los pueblos de la República
Argentina, no podrían contraer el matrimonio civil. Para ellas sería un
perpetuo concubinato, condenado por su religión y por las costumbres
del país. La ley que autorizara tales matrimonios, en el estado actual de
nuestra sociedad, desconocería la misión de las leyes que es sostener y
acrecentar el poder de las costumbres y no enervarlas y corromperlas.
Sería incitar a las personas católicas a desconocer los preceptos de su
religión, sin resultado favorable a los pueblos y a las familias.
Law 340, supra note 20, at 524. See also LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 131.
89. See, e.g., arts. 185-193 (Law 340, supra note 20, at 526).
90. For a comprehensive view on Argentina during the turn of the century
and until the 1930s, see THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA VOLUME
V C. 1870 TO 1930 327-452 (Leslie Bethell ed. 1998).
91. SEGUNDO CENSO, supra note 87, at cxlix.
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which 24.5% were foreigners, 92 mainly migrants from Europe. 93
The period 1901-1910, alone, resulted in the arrival of 1.1 million
permanent immigrants. 94 No other civil law jurisdiction of the
Americas received more immigrants than Argentina. 95 In addition,
early industrialization resulted in new interaction amongst actors,
many of them being immigrant workers. 96 That new interaction
lacked economic and normative frameworks, and eventually
triggered social unrest and strikes. 97 Agnostic ideas had also
developed at that time in Argentina, and there were controversies
between Catholics and Liberals, triggered by several governmental
measures against the former. 98 Within that context, the already
mentioned secular laws were enacted in the 1880s in Argentina.
Accordingly, civil marriage was introduced by means of Law
2393, which took effect on November 11, 1888. 99 Since then, only
civil marriage was recognized by the state. 100 Furthermore, the
new law stated that ministers of the Church would be prosecuted if
they celebrated religious marriages without a copy of the civil

92. Id. at cliii.
93. Ernesto Cerro, La migración en la República Argentina y especialmente
en Tucumán entre 1869 y 1914 in LA INMIGRACIÓN EN LA ARGENTINA 81, 81-82
(Universidad Nacional de Tucumán 1979).
94. Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of
U.S. Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and
the Argentine Elite’s Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483, 1541 (1997).
95. DONALD S. CASTRO, THE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICS OF ARGENTINE
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1852-1914: TO GOVERN IS TO POPULATE 4 (1991). See
also the relevant statistics in id. at 267.
On the current immigration policies of Argentina, see Agustín Parise, Migration
and Law. Report on the Republic of Argentina in INFORMES DE LA ASOCIACIÓN
ARGENTINA DE DERECHO COMPARADO AL XIX CONGRESO DE LA ACADEMIA
INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO COMPARADO 225-283 (2014).
96. Nora Pérez Vichich, Los trabajadores migrantes en la nueva ley de
migraciones: De objeto de normas a sujetos de Derecho in MIGRACIÓN: UN
DERECHO HUMANO 137, 140 (Rubén Giustiniani ed. 2004). See also, Marcela
Aspell, La Ley 4144 “de residencia”: antecedentes - sanción - aplicación, 25
REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO RICARDO LEVENE 11, 12
(1979).
97. Pérez Vichich, supra note 96, at 140.
98. LEVAGGI, supra note 14, at 134.
99. Id. at 136.
100. Id.
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marriage act being produced before them. 101 The law on civil
marriage did not welcome unions of same-sex spouses.
The current century saw the emergence of legislation that
aimed to grant similar rights to different- and same-sex couples.
The path towards same-sex marriage was paved by at least two
precedents from as early as 2003, when the city of Buenos Aires 102
and the province of Río Negro 103 introduced the possibility of
registering civil unions amongst same-sex couples. 104A
fundamental change, that was avant-garde for the entire region,
took place in 2010 with the enactment of Law 26618 on Same-sex
Marriage. It took effect on July 22, 2010, and incorporated changes
to the civil code; to two special laws (i.e., Law 18248 and Law
26413); and to the entire Argentine legal framework dealing with
the requirements, rights, duties, and effects of marriage.
Law 26618 implemented a first set of changes that were
introduced exclusively to the civil code. The texts of thirty-four
articles from the Argentine Code were replaced by new wordings,
which aimed to guarantee full recognition to same-sex
marriages. 105 A first example is found in article 172, being the
leading article for the chapter dealing with marital consent. It
added a second paragraph that clearly eliminated any distinction by
stating that “marriage will have the same requirements and effects,
not depending on weather the spouses are of the same or different
101. Id.
102. The changes were implemented by means of Law 1004. See the
complete text of the law available at http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/areas/
educacion/recursos/ed_sexual/pdf/ley1004.pdf.
103. The changes were implemented by means of Law 3736. See the
complete text of the law by searching “Ley 3736” in the search engine available
at http://www.legisrn.gov.ar/LEGISCON/conleystanwp.php.
104. Gerard-René de Groot, Private International Law Aspects Relating to
Homosexual Couples in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 325, 332 (Katharina BoeleWoelki & Sjef van Erp eds. 2007).
105. The text of the following civil code articles was replaced: 172; 188;
206; 212; 220, par. 1; 264, par. 1; 264 ter; 272; 287; 291; 294; 296; 307; 324;
326; 332; 354; 355; 356; 360; 476; 478; 1217, par. 1; 1275, par. 2; 1299; 1300;
1301; 1315; 1358; 1807; 2560; 3292; 3969; and 3970.
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sex.” 106 Another example of change is found in new article 206,
which indicated that, regardless the age of the child, in same-sex
marriages, the judge considers the best interest of the child at the
time of granting custody to one of the parents. 107 In similar lines,
article 307 indicated that parental rights (patria potestad) may be
lost by parents, regardless of their sex, when the security, physical
or psychic health, or morality of the child is jeopardized due to bad
behavior, pernicious examples, or delinquent miscount. 108 The
changes in the law, therefore, also contemplated the other members
of the family, not focusing exclusively on the spouses.
The new law implemented a second group of changes that were
introduced in two national laws that regulate fundamental aspects
of personality: name and legal capacity of persons. First, the new
law implemented a change in the wording of five articles of Law
18248 109 on Names, aiming to eliminate any distinctions between
the effects of different- and same-sex marriages. 110 Second, a
modification was implemented to article 36, paragraph C of Law
26413 111 on the Registry of Civil Status and Capacity of Persons.
That article deals with the registration of birth, and according to
the new text, the registration of birth for children born from samesex spouses requires the name and surname of the mother and its
spouse. 112
Article 42 of Law 26618 implemented a final and overreaching
provision that affected the entire domestic legal framework. That
article stated in its first paragraph that every reference to marriage
106. The article read in Spanish: “El matrimonio tendrá los mismos
requisitos y efectos, con independencia de que los contrayentes sean del mismo
o de diferente sexo.” Law 26618, supra note 74.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See the text of Law 18248, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g02-01000scanyel.
110. Law 26618 replaced arts. 4, 8-10, and 12 of Law 18248. Law 26618,
supra note 74.
111. See the text of Law 26413, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g65-45000scanyel.
112. Id. at art. 36, par. C.
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within the internal legal framework should be understood as being
applicable both to different- and same-sex spouses. 113 The second
paragraph extended that understanding to all family members. It
therefore stated that family members from different- and same-sex
marriages have identical rights and obligations. 114 Finally, the third
paragraph of that article stated that no disposition of the Argentine
legal framework should be interpreted or applied in a way that
limits, restricts, excludes, or eliminates the enjoyment of the same
rights and obligations for different- and same-sex marriages. 115
Regardless of this overreaching statement, an imminent re-drafting
of many other dispositions of the domestic legal framework would
be well received.
Same-sex marriage was also welcomed in the 2012 code
project. Lorenzetti had indicated at the time of presenting the 2012
code project that the work had aimed to elaborate a code for a
multicultural society, and that in the area of family law important
decisions had been made to attend some social conducts that could
no longer be ignored. 116 He also defended that taking those
decisions did not imply that certain conducts were encouraged or
subject to value judgment, because taking those decisions had
aimed to regulate options for life in a pluralistic society. 117 It has
been claimed, however, that the proposed changes in family law
implicitly canceled the role of Argentine legal tradition as a source
for that area of law, because of the radical changes proposed,
which would result in the need to “discard entire libraries.” 118 A
number of proposed articles refer to same-sex marriage and
couples. For example, article 402, being fundamental for the
interpretation and application of provisions, reproduced almost
113. Law 26618, supra note 74.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Presentación del Proyecto, available at http://www.nuevo
codigocivil.com/pdf/Presentacion-de-Dr-Ricardo-Lorenzetti.pdf at 5.
117. Id.
118. Úrsula C. Basset, El matrimonio en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY
09.05.2012.
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verbatim the third paragraph of article 42 of Law 26618. 119 That
wording could serve to solve any unattended conflicts between the
scope of rights and duties of different- and same-sex spouses. The
location of the article within the 2012 code project was also
relevant, because it was placed as the second and final article in
Book II, Title I, Chapter 1 dealing with the general principles of
freedom and equality. The project also dealt with the effects of
same-sex marriage in article 69, paragraph C, regulating the
instances when surnames can be changed, again a fundamental
aspect of personality. 120 Another reference was found in article
509, which highlighted that the provisions on cohabitation unions
(uniones convivenciales) applied equally to different- and samesex couples. 121 Finally, the 2012 text eliminated all references to
husband and wife throughout its articles.
Marriage in Argentina has changed drastically in a 140 year
period. Those changes (i.e., from religious to civil, and welcoming
same-sex marriage) provide an example of how partial revisions
and de-codification may pave the way for a shift in generation
status. In Argentina, the first generation code status is preserved,
even when fundamental changes took place in the area of family
law. One wonders how many of these fundamental changes can
occur until the generation shift eventually takes place.

119. The article read in Spanish:
Interpretación y aplicación de las normas. Ninguna norma puede ser
interpretada ni aplicada en el sentido de limitar, restringir, excluir o suprimir la
igualdad de derechos y obligaciones de los integrantes del matrimonio, y los
efectos que éste produce, sea constituido por dos personas de distinto o igual
sexo.
Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61, at 97.
120. Art. 69, par. C (Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61, at 19).
121. Art. 509 (id. at 128).
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IV. IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL
Access to justice is the vehicle whereby other rights are
conveyed. 122 Recent legislation and the 2012 code project have
addressed that fundamental right by including provisions towards
assuring access to justice for all. Special attention was given to
those groups more vulnerable to achieve access to their rights. The
inclusion of special provisions to assure that right for vulnerable
groups reinforced the idea that individual freedoms are seen, in
recent legal developments, as social commitments and not as selfresponsibility.
Argentina aims to achieve a judicial value of “equality” that
materializes in values of non-discrimination and equal
opportunities. 123 Access to justice is considered in a broad sense,
thus allowing justice to be granted by different mechanisms, not
limited to the traditional access to courts: “it means access to a
solution to a conflict, and not access to trial.” 124 Innovations in
mechanisms of access to justice were welcomed in the creation of
institutions and enactment of laws that tended to eliminate
common obstacles to reach the law and available mechanisms to
make use of the law and of the judicial system.
Changes in private law were accompanied by changes in public
law in Argentina. These changes shaped a new context on access to
justice where that right was largely extended by means of the
previously mentioned Human Rights conventions that gained
constitutional supremacy in 1994. Argentina hence reinforced the
right to a fair trial as a necessary step to obtaining an effective and

122. See, e.g., the interview of Santiago Otamendi, available at
http://www.fiscalias.gob.ar/informacion/canal-de-videos.
123. Ricardo Lorenzetti, Acceso a la Justicia de los Sectores Vulnerables in
DEFENSA PUBLICA: GARANTIA DE ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA 61, 62 (2008); and
MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975). For a reflection on the
introduction of these principles in the law, see Eduardo José Cárdenas, La
familia en el Proyecto de Código Civil, LA LEY 08.15.2012.
124. Lorenzetti, supra note 123, at 70.
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enforceable remedy. 125 International conventions also extended the
responsibility of the state to make access to justice achievable. 126
Equal opportunity to access to justice for all members of
society was recently addressed in Argentina. The regulations took
a holistic approach on the issue, considering the particularities of
different groups. Accordingly, laws were tailor-made for these
groups, as illustrated by Law 25871 of 2003, 127 addressing the
right of immigrants; and by Law 26485 of 2009, 128 addressing the
right of women to live free of violence. In addition, access to
justice was addressed in the provisions on procedures regarding
family matters within the 2012 code project.
A. Law 25871 on Migration Rights
Argentina is a country with a strong tradition of welcoming
immigrants. 129 Law 25871 of 2003 provided the main legal
framework for immigration 130 and aimed to harmonize the internal
normative framework with the international conventions

125. See the text of article 18 of the Constitution of 1994, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html; and the
text of article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, avilable at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html.
126. See, e.g., the reception in arts. 8, 10 and 22 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, available at, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr; and in
arts. 2(3) and 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
127. See the text of Law 25871, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g94-84000scanyel.
An implementation decree for Law 25871 was also adopted. See Decree
616/2010, available at http://www.infojus.gov.ar/legislacion/decreto-nacional616-2010-decreto_reglamentario_ley_25871.htm?4.
128. See the text of Law 26485, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g31-55000scanyel.
An implementation decree for Law 26485 was also adopted. See Decree
1011/2010, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/documentDisplay.jsp?guid=
123456789-0abc-110-1000-0102soterced.
129. See, e.g., Parise supra note 95.
130. See, generally, Law 25871, supra note 127; and Barbara Hines, The
Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration Law,
43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 471, 474 (2010).
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subscribed to by the country. 131 Some scholars considered that
Law 25871 went further in the recognition of international rights to
immigrants and hence defended that the right to migrate in
Argentina should be regarded as a human right. 132
Law 25871, a prime example of a tailor-made law, also
accorded the right of immigrants to access to justice. Immigrants
and their families now enjoy the right to be informed of their
obligations and rights, together with the right to be informed of the
requirements needed to be admitted, to stay, and to leave
Argentina. 133
The new law also considered access to justice in a broad sense,
not limiting it to access to courts. Legal aid offices were
incorporated as important intermediary institutions to assure
immigrants exercise their right to access to justice. They must
provide aid free of charge and, when possible, in a language the
immigrant understands. Language interpreters should be appointed
to assist non-Spanish speaking immigrants that face administrative
or judicial proceedings. 134 There are several offices that render
legal aid in Argentina, and they cannot deny legal aid, even when
immigrants have an irregular status. 135 For example, the University
of Buenos Aires (UBA), CELS, and Comisión de Apoyo a
Refugiados y Migrantes (CAREF) sponsor, since 2002, a legal

131. Alejandro O. Tazza, Ley 25.871. Extranjeros. Política migratoria,
2004-E ANALES DE LEGISLACIÓN ARGENTINA (2004).
132. Hines, supra note 130, at 509. Several works have compared the
innovative approach of this new legislation to that existing in other countries,
such as the U.S. (see, e.g., Victoria Slater, “To Govern Is To Populate”:
Argentine Immigration Law and what it can suggest for the United States, 31
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 693 (2009)).
133. Law 25871, supra note 127, at art. 9; and Decree 616/2010, supra note
127, at art. 9 (provides implementation requirements).
134. Law 25871, supra note 127, at art. 86; and Decree 616/2010, supra note
127, at art. 86 (provides implementation requirements). See also Saideh Saleh
Ebrahimi, El derecho constitucional a ser oído y la asistencia lingüística a los
extranjeros, LA LEY SUPLEMENTO ACTUALIDAD 05.24.2011.
135. Decree 616/2010, supra note 127, at art. 56 (provides implementation
requirements). See also Ebrahimi, supra note 127.
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clinic for the protection of rights of immigrants and refugees.136
Similar legal clinics were established in other universities across
Argentina. 137 Legal aid was also encouraged by Decree 836 of
2004, which advocated for the creation of an office to assist and
inform immigrants within the scope of the National Migration
Office. 138
In 2007, the public sector opened offices to aid immigrants and
refugees, facilitating access to justice to those groups. 139 Those
efforts were also addressed by the creation of public offices,
commissions, and institutes. For example, the National Institute
against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI) 140 also
offers protection to immigrants, having already been created in the
late 1990s. Other efforts were implemented in 2008, when a
Commission of Migrants was created within the scope of the
National Public Defenders’ Office. 141
Argentina is a pioneer in granting a human right status to
migration. 142 Many changes took place in the Argentine legislation
on immigration, and the last decades proved to be fruitful in the
adoption of tailor-made changes for immigrants. However, a gap
between the law and the existing reality for immigrants in
136. FIDH & CELS, ARGENTINA: AVANCES Y ASIGNATURAS PENDIENTES EN
LA CONSOLIDACIÓN DE UNA POLÍTICA MIGRATORIA BASADA EN LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS 34-35 (No. 559e, Feb. 2011). This is a very complete work by
Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (FIDH) and Centro de
Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS).
137. Id. at 35.
138. See
the
text
of
Decree
836/2004,
available
at
http://www.infojus.gov.ar/legislacion/decreto-nacional-836-2004-declaracion_
emergencia_administrativa_en.htm?28.
139. FIDH & CELS, supra note 136, at 35.
140. For more information on the National Institute against Discrimination,
Xenophobia, and Racism, see http://inadi.gob.ar/promocion-y-desarrollo/
publicaciones/documentos-tematicos/migrantes/.
141. For more information on the Commission of Migrants see
http://defenpo3.mpd.gov.ar/defenpo3/def3/direcciones/comisiones/migrante.htm
. See generally Ivanna Opacak & Matías Eidem, “Ningún ser humano es ilegal”
Un paso adelante respecto de la cuestión migratoria, ELDIAL 08.16.2011.
142. J. Brian Johns, Felling the Void: Incorporating International Human
Rights Protections into United States Immigration Policy, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 541,
571 (2013); and Hines, supra note 130, at 472.

262

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

Argentina is perceived. 143 It is now the time to implement specific
public policies that will assist in bridging the gap, e.g., human
resources will be needed to continue with the implementation (and
improvement) of services for access to justice. 144 The immigration
scheme in Argentina should certainly accompany the most
vulnerable groups, defending the already two-hundred-year-old
fundamental notion that in Argentina the constitutional rights are
applicable to all men [and women] of the world who wish to dwell
on Argentine soil. 145
B. Law 26485 on Violence against Women
Eradication of violence against women requires that access to
justice is granted in an effective and suitable way according to the
specificities of each group. 146 Argentina experienced an early start
in that respect by dealing with access to justice in situations of
family violence. Law 24417 of 1994 147 was the first federal and
comprehensive regulation against family violence. This law
defined domestic violence as that which occurred within family
members without differentiating genders. The law established the
procedural baseline and judicial competency. 148 Article 1 stated
that judges with competency to hear family matters could receive
petitions, written or oral, related to family violence.
Law 26485 of 2009 reassured and extended the previous
statements towards access to justice. The new law included a
143. Enrique Oteiza, Hacia una nueva Política Migratoria Argentina:
Inmigración. Integración y derechos humanos in MIGRACIÓN: UN DERECHO
HUMANO 87, 105 (Rubén Giustiniani ed. 2004).
144. Gabriel B. Chausovsky, Apuntes jurídicos sobre la nueva Ley de
Migraciones in MIGRACIÓN: UN DERECHO HUMANO 159, 171 (Rubén Giustiniani
ed. 2004); and FIDH & CELS, supra note 136, at 23.
145. Preamble
of
the
Constitution
of
1994,
available
at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html.
146. GENERAL SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 122 (2007).
147. See the text of Law 24417, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
documentDisplay.jsp?guid=123456789-0abc-defg-g37-93000scanyel.
148. Id. at art. 1.
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gender perspective to violence at large, and violence within the
family. It extended the points of access to submit a claim and
allowed all judges, even those without competency, to hear
domestic violence cases, to receive the petition, and to grant
preventive measures (e.g., restraining orders). 149
Human Rights conventions played a key role when addressing
access to justice to vulnerable groups. Two international
documents were especially relevant for Argentina when
implementing public policies to eradicate violence against women:
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) 150 and the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women (Convention of Belém do Pará). 151 These international
documents specifically addressed the role of the state in procuring
accurate mechanisms for victims to benefit from a judicial system
that deals with the specificities of their problems. 152
Law 26485 found inspiration in CEDAW and the Convention
of Belém do Pará. This was the first tailor-made law adopted in
Argentina at a federal level to prevent, punish, and eradicate
violence specifically against women. The law stated the
importance to promote and assure access to justice to those women
who suffer from violence. 153 Access to justice was understood in a
broad sense, not limited to access to courts. 154 The laws called for
the implementation of public policies by the three branches, at
federal and provincial level, to assure a free, expeditious,
transparent, and efficient process to access to justice.155
149. Law 26485, supra note 128, at art. 22.
150. See the text of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (hereinafter, CEDAW), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.
151. See the text of the Convention of Belém do Pará, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html.
152. Id. at arts. 7(d) and 8(d); and CEDAW, supra note 150, at arts. 13 and
25.
153. Law 26485, supra note 128, at art. 2(f).
154. Id. at art. 11(5.1.a).
155. Id. at arts. 7(c) and 20.
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Furthermore, it promoted the creation of services to provide free,
specialized, and holistic assistance. 156 The executive branch called
for the cooperation, through the celebration of agreements,
amongst sectors from different jurisdictions, including the
Attorney General Office, bar associations, law faculties, and other
governmental and non-governmental institutions. 157 Law 26485
incorporated procedural aspects under Title III, to set a baseline for
the federal and provincial regulations of minimal rights and
guarantees in the judicial and administrative procedures. 158
The new law instructed the Ministry of Justice to implement
measures to facilitate access to justice to women, and to create and
improve information centers and programs providing legal
assistance and representation. 159 Women can submit a complaint
(civil or criminal) without legal representation and before any
tribunal. 160 However, legal representation is an important element
for the right to access to justice and to achieve a judicial
remedy. 161 Furthermore, the law stated that access to justice for
victims should be free regardless of their economic situation.162
This inclusion was in line with the particularities of the problem
because many times, even when victims have economic resources,
they may not have free disposition.
Access to justice for women victims of violence improved
significantly during the last decade in Argentina, by the creation of

156. Id. at arts. 9(d) and 16(a).
157. Decree 1011/2010, supra note 128, at art. 16(a).
158. Law 26485, supra note 128, at arts. 16-40.
159. Id. at art. 11(5.a).
160. Id. at art. 21.
161. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion, Oc-11/90, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of
Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(A) And 46(2)(B) American Convention On
Human Rights) 08.10.1990, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
index.php/en/advisory-opinions; and Federico Andreu-Guzmán & Christian
Courtis, Comentarios sobre las 100 Reglas de Brasilia sobre Acceso a la
Justicia de las Personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad in DEFENSA PÚBLICA:
GARANTÍA DE ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA 51, 54 (2008).
162. Law 26485, supra note 128, at art. 3(i).
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public funded institutions, such as legal aid offices. 163 For
example, in the city of Buenos Aires, women victims of violence
can now claim their rights at the Domestic Violence Office, 164 the
Attorney General Office, 165 the Access to Justice Office, 166 police
stations, 167 and courts. 168 The creation of these offices, together
with the recent developments in the law, offered victims new
options to claim for rights, beyond the traditional forums (i.a.,
family courts). The implementation of the new institutional
structure resulted in an increase of submission of complaints,
though the overall impact is yet to be assessed. 169
C. Procedures on Family Matters in the 2012 Code Project
The 2012 code project included the principle of equality by
recognizing human diversity. 170 Equality and diversity had been
previously welcomed in multiple legislations. For example, at the
international level, it was welcomed by the American Convention
on Human Rights; 171 and at the domestic level, article 19 of the
163. For a study on how legal aid offices can improve accessibility to rights,
see UN Secretary-General, Legal Empowerment of the Poor and Eradication of
Poverty, Report A/64/133, 07.13.2009.
164. For a description on the operation of the office, see
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/ovd/.
165. For a description on the operation of the office, see
http://www.fiscalias.gob.ar/.
166. For a description on the operation of the office, see
http://www.jus.gob.ar/accesoalajusticia/caj/centros.aspx.
167. Law 26485, supra note 128, at art. 36.
168. Id. at art. 22.
169. For a perception on the number of cases filed, see the statistics collected
by the Domestic Violence Office and the Attorney General Office, available at
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/docus/documentos/cons_temaovd.jsp?temaID=K186;
and
http://www.fiscalias.gob.ar/al-habitante/acerca-de-mpf/ofavyt-oficina-deasistencia-a-la-victima-y-testigo.
170. For an understanding on the reception of the concept of equity in the
2012 code project, see Fundamentos del Proyecto, supra note 64, at 4; and
Lorenzetti, supra note 62.
171. See the text of the American Convention on Human Rights, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm.
For a note on the constitutional aspects introduced in the 2012 code project, see
Marcela I Basterra, Aspectos constitucionales del Proyecto de Código, LA LEY
12.14.2012; and Alberto M. García Lema, Interpretación de la Constitución
reformada y el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 06.02.2014. On the
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Argentine Code addressed one of its dismemberments: the
principle of privacy. 172
Principles and rights can only be achieved by suitable
processes. 173 The 2012 code project therefore incorporated Title
VIII on the general principles for family procedures, which
includes articles 705-710. These general principles established the
standards for the procedures on family matters. The articles were
inspired by the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice
for Vulnerable People. 174 Article 706, being the main provision for
that section, read that:
The process in family matters should respect the principles
of effective judicial protection, immediacy, good faith and
procedural fairness, officiousness, oral proceeding, and
limited access [only for parties] to the file.
The rules governing the procedure must be applied to
facilitate access to justice, especially for vulnerable people,
and to achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts. Judges
before whom these cases must be filed should be
specialized and obtain multidisciplinary support…. 175

constitutionalization of the civil code, see Andrés Gil Domínguez, Estado
constitucional de derecho y proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY
08.07.2012.
172. The text of the article 19, in its relevant part, reads in Spanish: “La
renuncia general de las leyes no produce efecto alguno; pero podrán
renunciarse los derechos conferidos por ellas, con tal que sólo miren al interés
individual y que no esté prohibida su renuncia.” Article 19, Argentine Code,
available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/legislacion/ley-nacional-340-codigo_
civil.htm.
173. Graciela Medina, El Proceso de Familia in COMENTARIOS AL
PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 2012 437, 440-449
(Julio César Rivera dir., 2012).
174. Id. at 441. See also Fundamentos del Proyecto, supra note 64, at 97-98.
See the text of the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for
Vulnerable People, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/68082?download
=true.
175. The text of the article, in its relevant part, read in Spanish:
El proceso en materia de familia debe respetar los principios de tutela
judicial efectiva, inmediación, buena fe y lealtad procesal, oficiosidad,
oralidad y acceso limitado al expediente.
Las normas que rigen el procedimiento deben ser aplicadas de modo de
facilitar el acceso a la justicia, especialmente tratándose de personas
vulnerables, y la resolución pacífica de los conflictos.
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The inclusion of Title VIII enabled the 2012 code project to
recognize the particularities of family procedures, and the need to
regulate resulting specificities. 176 Furthermore, it served as another
example of the interplay between private and public law, 177
including vulnerable groups in the text of the seminal private law
regulation. Lastly, it shifted the view on conflicts amongst people,
placing in a paramount position the characteristics of those facing
conflicts. 178 The latter is considered a requirement to assure access
to justice for all.
A change in paradigm on accessibility to rights is perceived in
the private law of Argentina, and the 2012 code project is no
exception. The project changed the traditional paradigm where the
subject of private rights is “the person,” to a paradigm that
addresses that person in an egalitarian way, without
discriminations based on gender, religion, place of birth, or
wealth. 179 The proposed text made specific references to different
groups of society, amongst others, women, children, persons with
disabilities, consumers, and original communities, turning them all
into specific recipients of rights. 180 Within family law, the project
went even further, with the inclusion of procedural standards,
showing a specific interest towards access to justice and dispute
resolution for family members. 181

Los jueces ante los cuales tramitan estas causas deben ser
especializados y contar con apoyo multidisciplinario….
Texto del Proyecto, supra note 61, at 174.
176. Medina, supra note 173, at 440-449; Angelina Ferreyra de De la Rúa, El
procedimiento de familia en el Proyecto, LA LEY 06.21.2012; and Gabriel
González Da Silva, Inconstitucionalidad de las disposiciones procesales
contenidas en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 05.16.2013.
177. Fundamentos del Proyecto, supra note 64, at 4.
178. Id. at 4-6.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id.
181. The 2012 code project did not provide a conceptualization of what
“family procedures” encompass. For a note on this point, see Medina, supra
note 173, at 440-449.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Argentine law cannot be considered dormant or static. The
report addressed three main developments that took place in the
law of Argentina. The first development dealt with the ongoing
efforts towards the adoption of a second generation civil code, with
special focus on the resulting 2012 code project that aimed to unify
the civil and commercial law provisions into a single-fabric text.
The second development dealt with the adoption of same-sex
marriages in Argentina, which took place in 2010, and placed that
jurisdiction as a regional forerunner. The third and final
development dealt with the right to access to justice, with a special
focus on two vulnerable groups (i.e., women victims of violence
and immigrants) and on the reception of that right in the 2012 code
project. All developments addressed in this report share common
links, being part of a broader policy that aims to give equal
standing to all members of Argentine society.
The report helped illustrate that in Argentina, as in other
jurisdictions, the division of law into private and public tends to
fade. The different areas of law now form part of a broader context
that benefits from the interaction of provisions emanated from
different areas. That broader context can be sensed, for example,
by the constitutionalization of private law as experienced in the
inclusion of general principles (i.a., equality) within the new
regulations of the 2012 code project. In addition, tailor-made laws
also merged private and public law components that provided an
integral approach to the daily challenges of society members.
Argentina is pursuing a generation shift in code status, building
from previous revision and de-decodification experiences. That
shift will ultimately also reflect that private and public law are no
longer watertight compartments.
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POST SCRIPTUM
On October 1, 2014, the Argentine Congress adopted Law
26994, which approved the text of the 2012 code project. 182
The Argentine President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner,
promulgated the above-mentioned law on October 7 of that
same year. According to article 7 of the law, the new code
will take effect on January 1, 2016.
J.M. and A.P.

182. See the text of Law 26994, available at http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
26994-nacional-cdigo-civil-comercial-nacin-lns0005965-2014-1001/123456789-0abc-defg-g56-95000scanyel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands the close corporation (besloten
vennootschap, BV) is one of the most important business forms for
small and medium sized businesses, next to partnerships. Different
from these partnerships, the BV has limited liability, meaning that
in principle its directors and shareholders are not personally liable
for the debts of the corporation. 1 Another important factor is that
BVs underlie a different tax regime than partnerships.

∗ Assistant Professor of Private Law, Maastricht University. I thank my
colleagues Stephan Rammeloo and Kid Schwarz for their valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this report.
1. In a nutshell, the partnership as such is not taxed, while partners are
subject to taxation. A BV, however, is indeed taxed.
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On October 1, 2012 new legislation came into force which
made the Dutch rules on BVs more flexible and attractive. Among
other things, the minimum capital requirement was abolished. The
new regime is often called the “flex BV.” As a result of these
changes, the BV, which developed out of the public company
limited by shares (naamloze vennootschap, NV), differs more from
the parent regime that applies to the NV, which remained
unaffected by the changes. There was growing criticism on the
rigid regime of the BV and the requirement of a minimum capital.
A number of other European jurisdictions did not demand a
minimum capital for close corporations. Moreover, under EU law
it became possible to use corporations (e.g., BV) established in
another EU Member State to do business in the Netherlands.
Foreign corporations could be used to circumvent the stringent
Dutch regime on BVs. This became the catalyst that made
legislative changes even more urgent. 2
In order to understand the position of the BV in Dutch law we
will first have a look at the historical developments since the early
seventeenth century. Paragraph III will discuss the abolition of
prior governmental approval, a requirement which has recently
been abolished for both the NV and the BV. Paragraph IV will
give an overview of some of the most important changes in the
legal regime of BVs. Paragraph V will discuss the use in the
Netherlands of companies established in other EU Member States.
Finally, the report will end with a very short note on the proposed
EC Regulation on a European close corporation.

2. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31058, nr. 3, at 1; and HARM-JAN DE
KLUIVER ET AL., VEREENVOUDIGING EN FLEXIBILISERING VAN HET
NEDERLANDSE BV-RECHT, RAPPORT VAN DE EXPERTGROEP INGESTELD DOOR DE
MINISTER VAN JUSTITIE EN DE STAATSSECRETARIS VAN ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN,
6-7, 88 (2004).
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 3
The Dutch East India Company and the later West India
Company, both set up in the early seventeenth century, are often
regarded as the earliest company type in modern history. The
directors and shareholders were not personally liable for the debts
of the company. 4 Yet, it would be misleading to see them as the
earliest form of NV, in the strict sense of the word. It lacked an
important feature of a modern company, which is a general
shareholder meeting. Moreover, the government’s influence on the
company was so great that the company could be seen as half
private law, half a public entity, with far-reaching public powers,
such as police and military powers, and public administrative
powers. 5 The States General (i.e., the Dutch government) used the
company for the financing of their warfare against the Spanish and
the Portuguese, and for governing the overseas settlements. The
shareholders had only limited influence on the company, and their
financial interests were not always the primary interests of the
company. There is no straight clear line of development from these
companies to the modern company types.
During the eighteenth century the Dutch company developed
more and more in the direction of a modern company type. There
was no legislation giving any structure to companies, enabling the
company to develop freely. Next to the Dutch East India Company
and the Dutch West India Company, which had strong
governmental influence, a new type of company developed which
had no governmental influence. It was set up purely for
3. See JOHAN MATTHIJS DE JONGH, TUSSEN SOCIETAS EN UNIVERSITAS. DE
BEURSVENNOOTSCHAP EN HAAR AANDEELHOUDERS IN HISTORISCH PERSPECTIEF
(2014). Much of the historical information in this paragraph is based on this
book. A summary of the book is available in English at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368748 (Last visited August 20, 2014). See also
HENDRIK MARTIJN PUNT, HET VENNOOTSCHAPSRECHT VAN HOLLAND, ZEELAND
EN WEST-FRIESLAND IN DE RECHTSPRAAK VAN DE HOGE RAAD VAN HOLLAND,
ZEELAND EN WEST-FRIESLAND (2010).
4. DE JONGH, supra note 3, at 69, 72.
5. Id. at 63-67, 102-10.
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commercial reasons, but which in some cases retained some form
of personal liability of directors and supervisors. 6 For that reason
they had more similarity with partnerships than with companies.
During this period only thirty-nine companies were set up, mainly
insurance companies. Some of these companies were the first to
issue bearer shares. Whereas the Dutch East India Company had
already issued bearer bonds, its shares were not on bearer but
registered in the name of its holder. 7
A major change in Dutch legislation was caused by the
annexation of the Netherlands by the French Empire in 1810. Not
only the French Code civil of 1804, but also the Code de commerce
of 1807, became applicable in the Netherlands from 1811 onwards.
It introduced the French société anonyme into Dutch law, a
company type based on contract 8 and called “anonymous” because
the names of the participants were not mentioned in the company
name. 9 Its structure hardly differed and was not any clearer than
that of the Dutch private law companies of the late eighteenth
century. Moreover, the Code de commerce introduced a form in
between the société en commandite and the société anonyme by
acknowledging the société en commandite par actions, 10 a
company form that was not adopted in the Dutch Commercial
Code (Wetboek van Koophandel) of 1838. The shares in this type
of company could even be bearer shares, according to French case
law. 11
The Netherlands have had their own legislation on companies
since the enactment of the Dutch Commercial Code in 1838. The
relevant provisions on companies were updated in 1929, when new
6. Id. at 161-164.
7. EGIDIUS J. J. VAN DER HEIJDEN, HANDBOEK VOOR DE NAAMLOOZE
VENNOOTSCHAP NAAR NEDERLANDSCH RECHT nr. 6-7 (3d ed. 1936); and PUNT,
supra note 3, at 112, 212.
8. Article 18 Code de commerce (1807). See also FRANÇOIS MALEPEYRE
& CHARLES JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DES SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES nr. 265 (1836).
9. Article 29 Code de commerce (1807).
10. Id. at art. 38.
11. Cour Royale de Paris (02.07.1832), XXIV JOURNAL DU PALAIS 682 (3d
ed. 1841). See also MALEPEYRE & JOURDAIN, supra note 8, at nr. 235.
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provisions on companies with a smaller number of shareholders
were introduced, welcoming a more private form of company. In
1971, a separate regime for BVs was introduced into Dutch law. A
few years later, in 1976, the provisions on limited companies were
removed from the Commercial Code and were made part of a new
Book 2 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW). 12
III. GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL
Since the early nineteenth century, governmental approval for
the incorporation of a company has been controversial. The French
Code de commerce, which was introduced in the Netherlands in
1811, required royal (governmental) approval in order to protect
the company’s shareholders against misuse of the company. 13 At
first the royal approval was little more than a formality, 14 but from
around 1828 the requirements for royal approval became much
stricter. The government actively demanded changes in various
articles of association in order to protect creditors and to strengthen
the position of minority shareholders against larger shareholders. 15
In the Dutch Commercial Code of 1838 the requirement of
governmental approval was maintained, but the approval could
only be withheld if the articles of association violated the law or
were contrary to the public order or good morals (article 37). The
12. This was part of a trend that developed since the end of the nineteenth
century to remove the differences between commercial law and civil law. It also
aimed to eliminate the need for a separate commercial code. However, the
commercial code is still partly in existence. Large parts have already been
removed (e.g., the law of bankruptcy, which since 1895 forms a separate
bankruptcy statute). Some of the remaining parts of the commercial code, such
as the law of commercial partnerships, will remain in existence for many years
to come. Civil partnerships (societas) are still governed by provisions from the
1838 BW.
13. Michel Louis Étienne Regnaud, Procès-verbal du Conseil d’État,
Séance du 15 janvier 1807, nr. 4 in JEAN-GUILLAUME LOCRÉ, XI LÉGISLATION
CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE 99-100 (1837); Michel Louis Étienne
Regnaud, Exposé des motifs in JEAN-GUILLAUME LOCRÉ, XI LÉGISLATION
CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE 163-66 (1837); and MALEPEYRE &
JOURDAIN, supra note 8, at nr. 273, n. 1.
14. DE JONGH, supra note 3, at 181.
15. Id. at 185.
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requirement survived the 1929 changes in the Commercial Code,
the introduction of the BV into Dutch law in 1971, and the renewal
of both the regime on public companies limited by shares and on
BVs in 1976, when the current Book 2 of the Civil Code was
enacted. Gradually, the reason for governmental approval had
changed into the prevention of defrauding creditors (bankruptcy
fraud), more recently also money laundering and, very recently, the
financing of terrorist activities.
As a result of continued criticism, the system of governmental
approval was finally abolished on July 1, 2011. It was replaced
with a system of permanent supervision by the Ministry of Safety
and Justice. 16 The new supervision system is based on linking
information from various electronic databases. At the time of
drafting this report the system still did not function adequately as a
result of technical problems.
IV. NEW REGIME FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS 17
A. Capital Requirements
Minimum capital requirements for NVs and for BVs were
introduced in 1978. 18 As a result of the second EEC Directive on
company law of 1976, 19 the introduction of minimum capital
requirements had become necessary for public companies limited
by shares, but the Dutch legislator voluntarily also introduced a
16. Wet controle op rechtspersonen (Statute on Supervision of Legal
Persons).
17. See also for a recent overview of the new Dutch regime on BVs:
Stephan Rammeloo, The Law of Close Corporations in NETHERLANDS REPORTS
TO THE NINETEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Lars
van Vliet ed. 2014).
18. As from June 1, 1978, a BV or NV could only be set up with a
minimum capital of 35.000 guilders. As from September 1, 1981, the minimum
capital for the NV was raised to 100.000 guilders. The minimum capital for the
BV was raised to 40.000 guilders on January 20, 1986. Before 1978, there was
indeed no minimum capital requirement, yet directors of the company could be
held personally liable for all acts taken place before at least 10% of the share
capital had been contributed to the company (art. 36g Dutch Commercial Code).
19. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13, 1976, as
amended by EU Directive 2012/30.
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minimum capital requirement for BVs. The main reason for
introducing such a requirement was to protect creditors of the
company. 20 However, it appears that a minimum capital
requirement is not a very effective way of protecting creditors,
because it only demands a certain minimum for setting up a
company. It does not guarantee that after incorporation the
minimum capital will be maintained. 21 Moreover, it does not
require corporations to file for bankruptcy once the capital sinks
below the minimum threshold.
Until the 2012 amendment, a minimum capital of €18,000 was
needed for the incorporation of a BV. Under the new regime, that
minimum capital requirement has been abolished. The legislature
preserved the requirement of a minimum capital of €45,000 for
NVs because EU law 22 requires all Member States to set a
minimum capital requirement for public companies limited by
shares, such as the NV.
B. Capital Controls
To compensate for the abolition of the minimum capital
requirement for BVs, the new regime introduced two capital
controls. The first one is a balance-sheet test: according to article
2:216(1) BW, the general meeting of shareholders can only agree
on paying out the profits exceeding the reserves prescribed by law
and by the articles of incorporation.
The second capital control is called the payment test. Article
2:216(2) BW provides that a decision of the general meeting of
shareholders to pay out profits has no consequences unless the
20. See the preamble of the Directive. See also, generally, PAUL L. DAVIES,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW 75 (2d ed. 2010); and PETRI MÄNTYSAARI,
III THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EU LAW 14547 (2010).
21. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 88; and REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET
AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH §5.2.2 (2d ed. 2009).
22. Article 6 of Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13,
1976.
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board of directors has given its permission. The next sentence of
the provision adds that this permission shall only be withheld if the
board of directors knows or reasonably can foresee that after the
payment the corporation will no longer be able to pay the debts
that are due.
Article 2:216(3) BW adds a severe sanction to this. If, after a
payment, the corporation is no longer able to pay its debts that are
due, and at the time of payment the directors knew or should
reasonably have foreseen that consequence, the directors are
personally and jointly liable. A director, however, who proves that
he cannot be blamed for the payment and that he has tried to
counteract the consequences of the payment, will not be held
liable. The persons who accepted the payment, and who at the time
of payment knew or should reasonably have foreseen that the
corporation would no longer be able to pay its debts that are due,
should pay the shortage of the corporation’s capital to a maximum
of the amount received by them. If the directors already paid the
shortage, the recipients of the payment should make this payment
to these directors.
C. New Types of Shares
Since 2012, the BV may have shares without voting rights and
shares with multiple or limited voting rights, and shares that give
no right or only a limited right to the profits and reserves of the
company (e.g., right to payment of dividends), as prescribed in
articles 2:228(4)-(5) and 2:216(7) BW. The new law introduces,
for example, the possibility of issuing non-voting shares, 23
conditional voting shares and preferred non-voting shares. It
allows, for instance, founders of businesses to issue and transfer
23. The need for introducing non-voting shares had already been
demonstrated a long time before by Schwarz. See CHRISTIAAN ANTON
SCHWARZ, AANDELEN ZONDER STEMRECHT (1990). Whereas he advocated nonvoting shares for both the NV and the BV, it has now been introduced only for
the BV.
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shares to members of their families without giving them voting
rights at the same time. To give another example: if two
companies, A and B, set up a joint venture with equal voting
rights, but A invests more capital into the joint venture than B, the
joint venture corporation can issue non-voting rights to A to reflect
the larger investment by A. 24 A similar result can be achieved by
issuing to A and B an equal amount of shares with equal voting
rights, and by attaching to the A-shares a larger right to profits and
reserves.
In addition, the new legislation allows the company to stipulate
in the articles of incorporation that the shareholder is subjected to a
duty in his capacity as a shareholder in such a way that the duty
passes on to a new shareholder in the case of sale and transfer of
the share. For example, the articles of incorporation may oblige the
shareholder to make an additional contribution to the corporation’s
capital when the capital sinks under a certain threshold of
solvability, 25 or a duty to buy goods or supply goods to the
company, a duty to buy shares in the company from another
shareholder or a non-competition clause. 26 It is also possible to
stipulate, for example, that if the shares are inherited, the heirs
should sell and transfer their shares to the other shareholders
(article 2:192(1)(c) BW). That article reads as follows:
The articles of incorporation may as to all shares or as to shares
of a certain sort or denomination:
a) stipulate that obligations, as against the company or third
parties or between shareholders, are connected to the status of
shareholder;
b) subject the status of shareholder to certain requirements;

24. For practical examples see Najat Rachak, Het stemrechtloze aandeel:
een interessant instrument, 5 VENNOOTSCHAP & ONDERNEMING 79-82 (2013).
25. CHRISTIAAN ANTON SCHWARZ, INLEIDING TOT HET NIEUWE BV-RECHT
13 (2012).
26. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 49-50.
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c) stipulate that the shareholder is in certain cases, mentioned
in the articles of incorporation, under a duty to offer and transfer
his shares or a part thereof.
The Minister of Justice indicates that the obligations mentioned
in article 2:192 BW are not connected to the shares but rather to
the status of shareholder. The reason for the remark is as follows:
if the obligation is introduced into the articles of incorporation
already in existence and the shareholder voted against the change
of the articles of incorporation, or at least did not agree to the
change, the shareholder is not bound by the obligation, even if
afterwards the shareholder acquires additional shares in the
company. For that reason the Minister regards the freedom of this
obligation personal. 27 If, however, this free shareholder transfers
his or her shares to a bound shareholder or a third party (who is not
yet a shareholder) the transferee will be bound by the obligation.
We can, therefore, conclude that the obligation burdens and runs
with the share. 28 Yet, in that case, the Minister’s remark that the
obligation is not linked to the share but rather to the status of
shareholder is misleading.
In property law it is sometimes said that owners of property are
bound in their quality of owners of that property. For example, in
the case of servitudes, the owners of servient tenements are bound
to an obligation in their quality of owners. Another way of
expressing the same situation is saying that the obligation burdens
the servient tenement. Both expressions are regarded as equivalent.
In the law of servitudes, often only negative duties are permitted
(duties to tolerate or not to act) and positive duties cannot run with

27. GERARD VAN SOLINGE & MARCO
HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET

NIEUWE WEME, 2-IIa ASSER'S
NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT

nr. 298 (2013).
28. Kamerstukken II 2008/2009, 31058, nr. 6, at 38; Kamerstukken II
2006–2007, 31 058, nr. 3, at 4 and 47. It also follows from art. 2:192a BW,
which mentions exceptional cases in which the third party, like the transferor, is
not bound to the obligation.
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the land. This Roman law principle 29 is still valid in many modern
jurisdictions, although Dutch law recognizes a few minor
exceptions. However, the new regime for the flexible BV allows
positive duties to run with the shares in the company, something
which historically has been regarded as unacceptable in property
law.
D. Transfer Restriction
Under the old regime, every BV had to have a transfer
restriction for the voluntary transfer of the shares (e.g., upon sale).
The new regime, however, allows the articles of association to
stipulate that there will be no transfer restriction (article 2:195(1)
BW). Another innovation is that the articles of association may
also provide that (a certain class of) shares in the corporation
cannot be transferred for a certain time. In the past these lock-up
rules were often laid down in shareholder agreements, but it was
uncertain whether they were valid. 30 Similarly, it was uncertain
whether a lock-up time could be validly laid down in the articles of
association. A lock-up time is especially important for jointventures with large initial investments. 31
Under the new regime, the default rule is still that there will be
a transfer restriction. If the articles of association do not provide
otherwise, there will be a transfer restriction demanding that
shareholders who plan to transfer their shares should first offer
these shares to the other shareholders (article 2:195(1) BW). The
articles of association can also impose a different form of transfer
restriction in which any transfer should be approved by a body
mentioned in the articles of association, e.g., the general meeting

29. D. 8.1.15.1. There was an exception to the rule in the form of the
servitus oneris ferendi: the duty to maintain or rebuild a wall that gives support
to a neighboring building (D.8.5.6.2).
30. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 35-36.
31. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 54-56.
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of shareholders. Any transfer in contravention of the transfer
restriction will be void (article 2:195(4) BW).
It should be noted that the possibility to subject the status of the
shareholder to certain requirements (article 2:192(1)(b) BW) may
also restrict the transferability of the shares by limiting the number
of parties to whom the shares may be offered. An example is a BV
which owns an electricity plant and whose shareholders should all
be certain public bodies, like city councils or provinces. 32 Another
example, which is especially relevant for joint-ventures, is the
requirement that all shareholders should be a party to a certain
shareholder agreement. This ensures that the contractual rights and
duties from the shareholder agreement, which do not run with the
shares automatically, pass to any new shareholder.
A transfer of the shares to heirs does not fall within the scope
of article 2:195 BW. A transfer restriction, therefore, cannot block
a transfer to the heirs. However, as mentioned earlier, the articles
of association may stipulate that heirs who inherit shares should
offer them to the other shareholders (article 2:192(1)(c) BW).
Indirectly, it has a somewhat similar effect of restricting the free
transferability.
V. NUMERUS CLAUSUS AND THE USE OF FOREIGN COMPANY TYPES
IN THE NETHERLANDS
Dutch company law as laid down in the BW has a numerus
clausus of legal persons. This means that Dutch law only awards
legal personality to those structures recognized in the civil code as
legal persons. Similarly to the numerus clausus in Dutch property
law, Dutch law not only limits the types of legal persons under
national law but also made the rules applicable to these types, in
principle, mandatory.
As a result of case law of the European Court of Justice,
however, this numerus clausus has been watered down
32. HR January 21, 2011, NJ 2011/97; JOR 2011/112 (Essent v. Delta).
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considerably. One can run a business in the Netherlands making
use of a legal person established in another EU member state or
one of the European Economic Area states according to the law of
that other EU member state or EEA state. Dutch private
international law applies the so-called incorporation principle,
according to which corporations are governed by the law of the
state in which the corporation was established (the seat mentioned
in the contract of partnership or the articles of incorporation). 33
The Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act 34 indeed does form a
hurdle, but in the case Inspire Art, the European Court of Justice35
held that this statute is contrary to the principle of freedom of
establishment as laid down in articles 49 and 54 TFEU. 36 As a
result, this hurdle has almost completely been removed for
corporations with a registered seat in another EU or EEA member
state. The ECJ held, among other things, that:
The reasons for which the company was formed in that
other Member State, and the fact that it carries on its
activities exclusively or almost exclusively in the Member
State of establishment, do not deprive it of the right to
invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the
Treaty, save where abuse is established on a case-by-case
basis. 37
The Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act has been changed so
that, apart from article 6, it no longer applies to corporations from
other EU and EEA member states (article 1(2)). 38

33. Paul Vlas, Groene Serie, Rechtspersonen, artikel 118 Boek 10 BW, note
1 (2013); and STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-127 (2001).
34. Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen.
35. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-10195. See Stephan
Rammeloo, Vrij verkeer van rechtspersonen in Europa na HvJ EG Inspire Art
Ltd.: zetelleercontroverse beslecht!, 3 NIPR 283-95 (2004).
36. Paul Vlas, Groene Serie, Rechtspersonen, regeling Wet op de formeel
buitenlandse vennootschappen, note 3 (2013).
37. 2003 E.C.R. I-10226, § 105.
38. Via art. 6 (liability for annual account and report) some of the liability
provisions from Book 2 of the BW are applicable.
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One of the aims of the numerus clausus of legal persons is the
protection of creditors. In some cases, the directors of a NV or BV
can be held liable in person for the debts of the company.
In the area of liability the relaxation of the numerus clausus by
EU law is compensated by the standardization of the liability
regime in insolvency. Articles 2:138 and 2:149 BW—which deal
respectively with liability of executive directors and liability of
non-executive directors—apply via article 10:121 BW, and are
applicable in the bankruptcy proceedings of a “corporation” that
has been declared bankrupt in the Netherlands. 39 This article
covers, among other things, NVs and BVs (article 10:117 BW).
Moreover, creditors of a company seated in the Netherlands, but
set-up in a foreign state, can hold the directors of the company
liable in tort, according to article 6:162 BW, which applies via
article 4(1) Rome II. 40
The uniform regime of liability is not even pierced by the
introduction of the European Company (Societas Europaea, SE).
Article 51 of the EC Regulation 2157/2001 provides that internal
liability (liability as against the legal person) is subject to national
law. As the external liability (liability against creditors) is not
covered by the EC Regulation, it is equally subject to national law
under articles 9 and 10 of the EC Regulation. 41
VI. THE EUROPEAN CLOSE CORPORATION
The recent changes in Dutch company law aim at making
Dutch company forms, especially the BV, more attractive. As
foreign company types can be used in the Netherlands, especially
39. See, for example, Rb Dordrecht December 19, 2012,
ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2012:BY7080 (Circus).
40. “Rome II” is the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of July 11, 2007 on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations. Paul Vlas and Marek Zilinsky,
Drie jaar Rome II in de rechtspraktijk, 60 ONDERNEMINGSRECHT § 2 (2012).
41. Hylda Esther Boschma & Johanna Neeltje Schutte-Veenstra, Tekst &
Commentaar, Ondernemingsrecht, artikel 51 SE-verordening, note 1 (2012); and
Friedemann Eberspächer, SE-VO Art 51 Haftung, Rn 1 in 2 AKTIENGESETZ
(Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stilz eds., 2d ed. 2010).
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but not only company forms of other EU and of EEA member
states, there is international competition of company forms. In
2008, the European Union proposed a Regulation introducing a
European close corporation, called the European private company,
also referred to as SPE (Societas Privata Europaea). 42 The aim is,
among other things, to lower the costs of incorporating a close
corporation and the costs of operating throughout the European
single market. This new European close corporation should
facilitate small and medium sized businesses. The proposed
regulation should also complement the SE, which was already
introduced in 2001. 43
VII. CONCLUSIONS
One of the age-old problems of company law is the danger that
companies are used to defraud creditors and the danger that large
shareholders act against the interests of minority shareholders. In
protecting the interests of creditors and minority shareholders the
legislator often runs the risk of making the mandatory rules of
company law too rigid. However, under EU law it is now possible
to do business in the Netherlands with a corporation set up
according to the laws of another EU or EEA member state and, by
doing so, evade the Dutch regime on BVs. This scenario was the
catalyst for the 2012 changes. In order to make the Dutch BV less
rigid and thus more attractive to businesses, the Dutch legislator
enacted a new regime which abolished the minimum capital
requirement and instead introduced a different way of protecting
the interests of creditors.
The changes also introduced new types of shares, such as
shares without any voting rights and shares with multiple or
limited voting rights, and also shares that give no right or only a
limited right to the profits and reserves of the company (e.g., the
42. Proposal for a Regulation COM (2008) 396 on the Statute for a
European Private Company.
43. Regulation 2157/2001 of October 8, 2001.
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right to payment of dividends). Close corporations now have the
possibility of issuing non-voting shares, conditional voting shares
and preferred non-voting shares. In addition, it is now possible to
link obligations to shares so that they run with the shares upon
their sale and transfer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Switzerland is a federal state with a civil law tradition. Like in
all civil law jurisdictions, the law is highly codified, and legislation
is the authoritative backbone of the law. The major centerpieces of
Swiss private law are the Civil Code and the Code of Obligations,
in force since 1912. 1 Swiss private law belongs to the Germanic
legal tradition, but French law has also had an impact on its
development, in particular in the southwest of the country. In
recent decades, Switzerland has reformed its law in many areas
(such as consumer protection) in order to make it more EUcompatible. However, Switzerland is not a Member State of the
European Union and its legal system is still largely independent. 2
The present Chronicle covers recent legislative developments
in Switzerland for the years 2012–2014. The first part will be
devoted to the revision of the Loi contre la concurrence déloyale
(LCD), which was related to the law of antitrust, but also had
effects on the whole of Swiss contract law. The second part will
focus on family law, and on two distinct revisions: the first
concerning the issue of forced marriage, the second concerning the
procedure of changing names for marrying spouses. 3

1. Available in English at www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/210/ (Civil Code) and
www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c220.html (Code of Obligations) (last visit on the March
27, 2014).
2. For an introduction to Swiss law in English, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 167-79 (3rd ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1998); Pascal Pichonnaz, Switzerland in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 702-708 (Jan M. Smits ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2006);
FRANÇOIS DESSEMONTET & TUĞRUL ANSAY, INTRODUCTION TO SWISS LAW
(3rd ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2004).
3. For further recent developements in Swiss law not covered here, see
Pascal Pichonnaz, Le point sur la partie générale du droit des obligations /
Entwicklungen im Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 109 REVUE SUISSE DE
JURISPRUDENCE 189-194 (2013).
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II. THE REVISION OF THE “LOI CONTRE LA CONCURRENCE DÉLOYALE”
A. Introduction
The LCD, or Loi contre la concurrence déloyale (Law against
unfair competition) 4 is one of the two federal laws dealing with
issues of unfair competition and antitrust law. The second law, the
LCart, or Loi sur les cartels (Law on cartels), 5 which deals with
monopolies and illegal price agreements, will not be discussed in
this article as it was not part of the reform.
In order to better understand the multiple aims of this
legislative endeavor, the basic tenets of the LCD need to be
explained. As mentioned above, this law deals with acts that, when
committed by commercial businesses in the course of their
dealings, are considered as “unfair competition”. The Article 2 of
the LCD 6 states that such acts can be recognized by three
distinctive negative effects on the economic marketplace: first,
they distort the relationship between competitors vying for the
same market(s); second, they tend to mislead and weaken the
position of buyers, a term which includes consumers; and third,
they reduce the general sense of trust in the economy, and in the
concept of fair dealing. 7 Any act that falls under this definition,
and thus under the ambit of article 2 of the LCD, can form the
basis of a legal civil action, which can be brought before the Swiss
courts by any private entity whose interests were affected by that
act. 8

4. Recueil Systématique (RS) 241. Translation by the authors.
5. RS 251. Translation by the authors.
6. Article 2 of the LCD states that “any commercial behavior or practice
which is misleading or which is contrary to the principle of good faith, and
which affects the relationship between competitors or between business entities
and their clients” (translation by the authors).
7. Conseil Fédéral, Message concernant la modification de la loi fédérale
contre la concurrence déloyale (Message related to the modification of the
federal law on unfair competition), FF 2009 5539, p. 5544 (all translations of the
titles of the Swiss legislative documents are done by the authors).
8. Article 9 LCD.
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The Article 2 of the LCD is a “catch-all” provision that deals
with any case falling into its definition. 9 Nonetheless, the law
provides in the following articles a non-exhaustive list of acts that
constitute unfair competition. For example, demeaning competitors
in the course of marketing communications, 10 publishing
misleading advertising about the merits of one’s products, 11 or
ignoring a consumer’s stated wish not to be presented with
advertisement 12 constitute such infringements of the LCD. As the
original version of the current LCD dates from 1986, it has
sometimes been deemed necessary to update this list in order to
better include emerging unfair practices. For example, in 2006, the
act of e-mail spamming has been included in the list of unfair acts,
subject to an “opt-in” principle. 13
The reform discussed in this contribution entered into force on
April 1, 2012. It is a major update of the law regarding four
sensitive areas of today’s business landscape: the validity of
clauses contained in general terms and conditions (B), the
description of goods and prices in electronic commerce (C), the
practice of directory listing frauds (D), and, finally, the issue of
pyramid (“Ponzi”) schemes (E). Alongside these substantive
points, the new text of the law also provides a new procedural
scope, as it now allows the Swiss Federal State to bring both penal
and civil claims (F). Each of these points will be dealt separately in
the following paragraphs.
B. Validity of Clauses Contained in General Terms and Conditions
The new version of the LCD first deals with the validity of
certain clauses that are inserted into general terms and conditions.
9. Article 2 LCD.
10. Article 3, §1.a LCD.
11. Article 3, §1.b LCD.
12. Article 3, §1.u LCD.
13. Article 3, §1.o LCD. According to the “opt in” principle, spam is illegal
as long as the recipient has not expressly agreed to receive commercial offers
from that professional.
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Since general terms and conditions are often drafted in advance
and included into a contract by the way of a general reference, it is
often assumed that these clauses have not been negotiated by the
parties. Because of the risk that commercial businesses might
insert unfair clauses into their general conditions, and because this
risk is even more acute in cases of consumer contracts, the LCD
has, since its original 1986 version, contained a provision banning
such unfair clauses. However, this rule has been regarded as
largely ineffective in practice, a conclusion which prompted its
rewriting in the reform discussed here. In order to better frame the
pros and cons of this reform, both the old and the new provision
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Under the old article 8 of the LCD, in order to be considered as
unfair, a clause inserted into general terms and conditions had to
meet two conditions. First, it had to be misleading; second, the rule
it contained either had to notably diverge from the standards of the
otherwise applicable law, or to impart rights and obligations to the
parties in such a way that would notably diverge from the usual
conduct of that type of contract. Only if these two conditions were
met, would a clause be considered as unfair, and thus
unenforceable. This proved to be too restrictive: in particular, the
requirement of a “misleading” clause was almost never fulfilled in
practice, as even the most egregiously unbalanced clause is usually
written clearly and plainly. Thus, in practice, article 8 of the LCD
fell short of its intended goal. 14 As a consequence, until the reform
of the LCD, Swiss law has been quite tolerant towards businesses
which rely on general terms and conditions. 15
14. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5566. See also Nicolas Kuonen, Le
contrôle des conditions générales: l’envol manqué du phénix, SJ 2014 II 1, 23;
Sylvain Marchand, Art. 8 LCD: un léger mieux sur le front des intempéries,
REAS 328, 328 (2011).
15. This does not mean that, prior to the reform of the LCD, Swiss law
allowed all standard terms. While art. 8 LCD was largely ineffective, a judgemade rule, called the exception of the unusual clause or clause insolite, struck
down terms which greatly diverged from usual contractual clauses and which
were not specifically brought to the attention of the other contractual party. For
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This long standing position—which endured from 1986 to
2012—also needs to be put into the perspective of European law,
which opted for a far more efficient (and restrictive) regime. Under
the Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 16 any
terms that have not been individually negotiated and have been
inserted in a consumer contract, and which cause a significant
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of
the consumer, are regarded as unenforceable. 17 The Directive also
includes a list of terms that are deemed unfair; for example, a
clause completely excluding liability in cases of non-performance,
or a clause allowing its drafters to alter the terms of the contract
unilaterally and without a valid reason, fall into this definition.18
Furthermore, some European countries, such as France, have
devoted significant resources to inform consumers of their rights
when considering standard terms. 19 All these foreign developments
have been noted by the Swiss legislature, and have indeed been a
basis for the reform of article 8 of the LCD—as they are directly
mentioned in the motives of the Federal Council (Conseil
Fédéral). 20
According to the new version of article 8 of the LCD, a
contractual clause contained in standard terms is deemed unfair if,
under the principle of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance
in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the

more details, see the Federal Court cases: ATF 119 III 334, §1a); ATF 109 II
457, §4; Kuonen, Le contrôle des conditions générales, supra note 14, at 23-26.
16. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts, O.J. L 95/29.
17. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 16, at art. 1, §1.
18. See annex to the Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 16, in particular
letters (a), (b) and (j), (k).
19. See the official French website on unfair clauses, which offers a list of
clauses deemed unfair, and includes related case law, at http://www.clausesabusives.fr/ (last visit on March 27, 2014).
20. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5561. The Conseil Fédéral, which is
composed of seven members, is the government of Switzerland. For its current
members, see http://www.admin.ch/br/org/index.html?lang=en (last visit on
March 27, 2014).
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consumer. The new formulation eliminates the requirements of a
“misleading” term that “notably diverges from the otherwise
applicable law,” thus allowing for a stronger legal basis against
unfair clauses. 21
That being said, some elements of this new regime remain
unclear. 22 First, while the new formulation is inspired by the
European Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts 23, it has
not yet been determined to what extent European law will have an
impact on the practice under the LCD. Most notably, it is not sure
that the list of unfair terms may be imported into Swiss law.
Second, one can question the scope of the new article 8 of the
LCD, as it is now exclusively applicable to consumer contracts, as
opposed to the more general regime of the old article 8 of the LCD.
Given that the LCD does not provide a definition of the consumer,
the exact effect of the new regime thus remains unknown. Finally,
the revised text relies on the principle of good faith, a reference
which gives some grounds for uncertainty, when considering the
rather unclear boundaries of this concept.
C. Rules for E-commerce
The second topic covered by the reform of the LCD—that is,
electronic commerce—has for a long time been a sticking point for
Swiss lawmakers. Efforts made to adapt Swiss law to this field can
be traced as far back as thirteen years ago. Indeed, in 2001, the
legislature envisioned a thorough revision of general Swiss
contract law in order to adapt it to the emerging online landscape. 24
21. Supra note 7, at 5565-5568.
22. For comments on this new article, see Kuonen, Le contrôle des
conditions générales and Marchand, Art. 8 LCD, supra note 14.
23. Article 8 LCD (current) is inspired by Art. 1, §1 of the 93/13/EEC
Directive, supra note 16.
24. Projet de loi fédérale sur le commerce électronique (révisions partielles
du code des obligations et de la loi sur la concurrence déloyale) (Draft of the
federal law on electronic commerce (partial revision of the code of obligations
and the law on unfair competition)), Janvier 2001; Rapport explicatif sur le
projet de loi fédérale sur le commerce électronique (révisions partielles du code
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This ambitious proposal, had it been accepted, would have
clarified the relationship between the traditional rules of Swiss
contract law and e-commerce, and it would also have strengthened
the protection of e-consumers by offering them a right of
withdrawal from the contract. 25 However, due to a lack of support,
the project failed in 2005 when the Federal Council (Conseil
Fédéral) signaled its abandonment. 26 The same fate befell a
parliamentary motion made shortly thereafter, which also aimed at
strengthening the consumer’s rights in e-commerce. 27 Because of
this legislative reluctance, Swiss law did not, until the reform of
the LCD, contain any specific rule regarding electronic commerce.
As a matter of fact, the issue of electronic commerce was not
even part of the initial project submitted by the Conseil Fédéral. 28
It is only during the Parliamentary debates that the idea of using
the ongoing revision to fill this gap in Swiss law came up. 29 As
such, the LCD now contains a new provision specifically aimed at
businesses operating through the Internet. Under the revised law, 30
any e-commerce website offering goods or services now has to: (1)
clearly indicate the identity of its operator, including its full name,
address, and e-mail; (2) describe in detail the different steps
leading to the conclusion of the contract; (3) detect input errors,
and allow its users to correct them; and (4) send a confirmation e-

des obligations et de la loi sur la concurrence déloyale) (Explanatory report on
the draft of the federal law on electronic commerce (partial revision of the code
of obligations and the law on unfair competition)), Janvier 2001.
25. For more information on this project, see Michel Jaccard, Le législateur
Suisse à l’épreuve d’Internet : aperçu de l’avant-projet de loi fédérale sur le
commerce électronique, SJ 2003 II 209 (2003).
26. La protection des consommateurs ne sera pas étendue, Communiqué
DJPF, 09.11.05.
27. Initiative parlementaire Simonetta Sommaruga, 15.12.05, Amélioration
de la protection des consommateurs, contrats conclus à distance et garantie
(Enhancing consumer protection, distance contracts and warranty), 05.458.
28. See Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7. The document does not mention ecommerce at all.
29. Conseil des Etats, Session d’automne 2010, 29.09.10, Loi contre la
concurrence déloyale, modification, BO 2010, p. 930.
30. Article 3, §1.s LCD.
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mail at the moment of the users’ final assent. If a website does not
respect these requirements, it is deemed to commit an act of unfair
competition.
These four elements are embedded in European Union law, as
they are required by the Directive on e-commerce. 31 However, this
incorporation is only partial, as the Swiss legislature chose not to
adopt other more stringent requirements found in the European
regime. For example, the aforementioned directive also requires
website owners to provide any code of conduct they are required to
respect, and to provide a printable version of their terms and
conditions. 32 Furthermore, under the Directive on consumer
rights, 33 European consumers are also granted a right of
withdrawal, which allows them to terminate the contract within a
period of fourteen days without giving any reason for doing so. 34
As these elements are currently absent from Swiss law,
Switzerland retains a more favorable regime for e-commerce
businesses than its neighboring countries. 35
D. Scams Involving Directory Listings
The third element of the revision of the LCD concerns
directory listing scams. They involve documents, sent by mail or
by fax, offering business companies the opportunity of being
31. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on electronic
commerce”), O.J. L 178/1. These obligations can be found at article 5, art 10.a,
art. 10.c, and art. 11, §2.
32. Id. at art. 10 al. 2 and 10 al. 3.
33. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC
and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, O.J. L 304/64.
34. Id. at art. 9–16.
35. For a comparison between the Swiss and European regimes regarding
electronic commerce, see Sylvain Marchand, Commerce électronique: la
manifestation de volonté au bout du doigt, in DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION ET
DE LA DISTRIBUTION: LES NOUVEAUX DÉFIS 1-31 (Blaise Carron ed., Helbing
Lichtenhahn 2013).
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included in a “yellow pages”-style directory listing. These offers
—which are more often than not directed towards young, start-up
companies — are misleading as they seemingly only ask for a
confirmation of the business’ contact information, but in reality
provide for a long-term, expensive service which is contracted into
once the offeree responds. Other forms of this scam involve the use
of pre-printed payment forms, closely modeled after the ones used
by the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, sent to
companies having recently registered for an IP to mislead them
into paying for a nonexistent supplementary registration service;
instead of forms, some scams use fraudulent representatives who
claim that the contract that the victim accepted is completely free
of charge. 36
Directory listing scams have been recognized as a considerable
problem in Switzerland. In 2008, no less than 940 cases were
reported by the official authorities. 37 Their prevalence at that time
can be explained by the absence of any specific legal regulation,
effectively forcing the companies that were victims of these
practices to rely on the slow and expensive judicial court system in
order to terminate one of these fraudulent contracts. In order to
curb these practices, their inclusion in the list of acts deemed unfair
competition in the sense of the LCD was one of the key points of
the reform.
The new version of the law now requires that any
advertisement that contains a firm offer should clearly mention its
character as a binding offer, and detail the length, the cost, and the
specifics of the directory service agreed to. 38 Furthermore, the act
of sending a payment form, devoid of any prior contact with the

36. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5545-5546. See also an informative
brochure on this topic, published by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs,
http://www.seco.admin.ch/dokumentation/publikation/00035/00038/02243/?lan
g=fr (last visited: March 12, 2013).
37. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5579.
38. Article 3, §1.p LCD.
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addressee, is now also, in itself, considered an act of unfair
competition under the LCD. 39
This development is to be welcomed, as it strengthens the
position of Swiss business companies against a practice which
undoubtedly has no redeeming qualities whatsoever. It is
interesting to note, however, that this does not mirror any similar
movement found in the European Union: as the Conseil Fédéral
noted in its legislative project, EU law as a whole does not contain
any specific rule against directory listing scams. 40
E. Pyramid Schemes
The last substantive point included in the revision concerns socalled pyramid or “Ponzi” schemes. While some definitional issues
still exist regarding them, pyramid schemes can be generally
described as fraudulent, hierarchical business schemes in which the
participants are expected to pay an entry fee upon their inclusion in
the scheme’s structure, and from which revenue is generated
through the upward flow of these fees through the pyramidal
structure, rather than through any legitimate business activity. Due
to their high risk of collapsing when no more participants can be
recruited, and due to the disastrous financial consequences suffered
by the victims, these schemes are widely acknowledged as illegal
— both in the United States 41 and in the European Union. 42

39. Article 3, §1.q LCD. For more detail on these provisions, see Conseil
Fédéral, Message concernant la modification de la loi fédérale contre la
concurrence déloyale, FF 2009 5539, 5562-5563.
40. The Conseil Fédéral drew, however, inspiration from the national law
of Liechtenstein, which, along with Belgium, is one of the few European
countries with a specific position on this issue. See Conseil Fédéral, supra note
7, at 5560.
41. In re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979).
42. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in
the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council, O.J. L 149/22.
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Swiss law is no different in this regard, as pyramid schemes
have been banned since 1938. 43 Two points, however, have been
addressed by the revision of the LCD. The first point is merely
formal. Because the LCD itself did not exist back in 1938, the legal
provision banning pyramid schemes was included in a secondary
law attached to the Federal Law on lotteries. The law reform thus
moved it from this text to the LCD. 44
The second point concerns the issue of defining what a
pyramid scheme is. The regime in force before the revision of the
LCD contained a restrictive definition of pyramid schemes, as it
defined them as organizations which derive their revenue only
through the recruitment of new members. The new rule broadens
this definition, and only requires that the revenue be derived
principally through these means. This allows the LCD to be
effective against structures which engage in some business activity,
such as the supply of goods and services, but in which the
underlying pyramidal structure remains the principal source of
revenue. This change also allows for better interaction with the
rules currently in force in the European Union, which retain a
similar, open-ended definition of illegal pyramid schemes. 45
F. Right of Action by the Federal State
Under the previous regime, the right to bring an action against
a business entity that was in violation of the LCD was reserved to
private entities whose interests were affected by the illegal act. In
contrast, the Swiss Federal State could only bring an action against
a business entity whose violation of the LCD was so severe that the
country’s international reputation would be at stake. 46

43. See Ordonnance relative à la loi fédérale sur les loteries et les paris
professionnels (executive order related to the federal law on lotteries and
professional betting), RS 935.511, état au 1er Août 2008, art. 43, num. 1.
44. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5547.
45. Id. at 5564-5565.
46. Article 10, §2.c LCD (former version).
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The old system thus mostly relied on an effort of selfregulation on the part of the private sector, as the task of exposing
and pursuing unfair business practices was left to entities such as
competitors, business consortiums and consumer groups. 47 This
meant, however, that the LCD was effectively used only when
private interests so required, and only when these interests were
strong enough to justify the cost of litigation. In practice, this
system was unsatisfactory, because important public interests were
not sufficiently represented and enforced. When addressing this
issue during the reform, the Conseil Fédéral expressly
acknowledged that the goal of the LCD, which is to protect the
market at large, was not reached. 48
Consequently, the recast contains a provision which broadens
the scope of action of the Swiss Federal State. The right of action
in cases where national reputation is at stake is retained, and a new
cause of action is created, allowing it to bring action in cases
where collective interests are affected by acts of unfair
competition. 49 The term “collective interests” is to be interpreted
broadly, and can include the interests of a certain age range, of a
certain type of professionals, or even of the market at large. 50 Also
included in the reform is a specific choice-of-law clause that
guarantees the application of the LCD to all judicial proceedings
brought by the Federal State under these provisions, even in cases
where the unfair act has been committed abroad. All in all, the new
LCD both broadens and strengthens the role of the Swiss public
authorities in maintaining a healthy marketplace. 51

47. Article 10, §2 LCD (former version).
48. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5548-5549.
49. Article 10, §2 LCD.
50. Conseil Fédéral, supra note 7, at 5568-5570.
51. This does not, however, change the nature of the LCD as a tool of
private law. Even with this extended outreach to public authorities, any claim
made by them will be a civil one, rather than criminal or public one. Under art.
23.c LCD, the Swiss Federal State can join both a civil claim under the LCD and
a claim in criminal law against the same unfair activity.
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Finally, the reform also reviews some minor points related to
procedure, such as the right for the Federal State to warn the public
of ongoing unfair acts, 52 and its cooperation with foreign states in
matters of antitrust. 53
III. FAMILY LAW
Both reforms discussed in the following chapter deal with
aspects of the institution of marriage. They extend, mutatis
mutandis, to the institution of registered partnership (partenariat
enregistré) for same-sex couples. 54
A. New Measures against Forced Marriages
The first development in family law worth mentioning
concerns the topic of forced marriages. On June 15, 2012, the two
chambers of Parliament adopted several changes of the law with
the aim of hardening Switzerland’s position on this practice. 55 The
reform, which entered into force on July 1, 2013, was the result of
a longstanding effort by the Swiss legislature to curb such
marriages, whether they are concluded domestically or abroad.
After a short summary of the events leading to this reform (1), the
new legal provisions will be presented (2, 3).
1. Legislative History
The phenomenon of forced marriages — understood as the
marriage of a person against his or her own will by the way of
coercion or duress 56 —is a considerable problem in Switzerland.
52. Article 10, §4 LCD.
53. Article 21 and 22 LCD.
54. See Loi sur le Partenariat du 18 juin 2004, RS 211.231.
55. For a transcript of the parliamentary debates, see the following link:
http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20110018
(last visited: February 21, 2014).
56. See also art. 23 al. 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and point 1.3.2.2 of the 2005 Resolution on forced marriages and child
marriages of the Council of Europe for similar definitions. The definition of a
forced marriage has been a sticking point during the legislative process of the
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According to a study conducted in 2010 by the University of
Neuchâtel, around 1300 to 1900 individuals per year are either
forced into, or forced to remain in marriage; around 90% of these
cases are directed against women, and around 30% against children
of less than 18 years of age. 57 Tragic examples of this unfortunate
reality have been numerous and well-publicized by the press. To
cite just two notorious cases: in 2001, a young Turkish woman
who fled to Switzerland to avoid being married against her will
was murdered by agents of her family; in 2006, a Pakistani man
murdered his wife when she filed for divorce in order to escape
their forced union. 58 Needless to say, the public outcry against this
practice has been strong.
Aware of this sentiment, and considering that current Swiss
law was too lenient on this matter, Parliament filed several motions
in favor of a stricter regime. 59 In 2008, the Conseil Fédéral
published a report laying the groundwork for reform. The project
envisaged a thorough modification of Swiss law, which would
affect civil law but also related fields such as private international

reform, as the initial proposal concerned both forced marriages and arranged
marriages, i.e., marriages that are organized and helmed by another member of
the family or a third party. It was finally considered that these marriages would
not be targeted by the reform, as they did not per se lead to coercion or duress
towards one of the spouses. See Conseil Fédéral, Répression des mariages forcés
et des mariages arrangés ; Rapport du Conseil fédéral en exécution du postulat
05.3477 du 9.9.2005 de la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil
national (Repression of forced and arranged marriages ; Report of the Conseil
Fédéral according to postulate 05.3477, formulated on the 9.9.2005 by the
Commission of political institutions of the Conseil National), 9-10 and 17-18;
Conseil Fédéral, Message relatif à une loi fédérale concernant les mesures de
lutte contre les mariages forcés du 23 février 2011 (Message related to a federal
law on measures against forced marriages of the 23th of February 2011), FF
2011 2045, 2075.
57. Anna Neubauer & Janine Dahinden, “Mariages forces” en Suisse:
causes, formes et ampleur 32-45 (Office fédéral des migrations 2010).
58. Conseil Fédéral, Répression des mariages forcés et des mariages
arrangés ; Rapport du Conseil fédéral en exécution du postulat 05.3477 du
9.9.2005 de la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national, 6-7.
59. Id. at 7-9. See also, for example, the transcript one of these motions:
http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20053477
(last visited: February 21, 2014).
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law, criminal law and immigration law. This law “package” was
accepted by the two chambers of Parliament without major
changes. In the following paragraphs, only the topics that fall
under the ambit of the present chronicle, civil law and private
international law will be covered.
2. Changes in Civil Law
In regard to civil law, the reform mostly addressed the grounds
for the annulment of a marriage. 60 Under Swiss law, a marriage
can only be annulled if there is either an absolute ground 61 or a
relative ground for annulment. 62 Both sets of grounds are
exhaustive, meaning that any marriage falling outside the scope of
these two provisions cannot be annulled at all.
The absolute grounds 63 cover situations in which there is a
strong public interest in the annulment of the marriage; for
example, if one of the spouses was already married at the time of
the wedding celebration, or if he or she lacked capacity of
judgment at that moment, or if the marriage is prohibited because
of kinship, article 105 of the Civil Code will apply. Marriage
annulment procedures resting under an absolute ground may be
initiated at any time by any interested party. In particular, the
60. While the rules concerning the preparatory procedure preceding the
marriage have also been amended by the reform, the modification made thereof
was mostly of a formal, rather than substantial, nature. Indeed, even before the
advent of this reform, the civil register office was bound to refuse the
celebration of any marriage which was affected by coercion or duress. Since
2011, it also had the duty of reminding the spouses that consent is the
cornerstone of marriage. These rules, however, were not directly set out in the
civil code: the first being deduced from the general rules of marriage formation
(art. 35 par. 2 CC) and the second being contained in art. 65 par. 1bis of the
ordonnance sur l’état civil (executive order on civil status) (RS 211.112.2),
which is a supplement to the Civil Code focused on the functioning of the civil
register office. The reform thus allowed for the inclusion of these rules into the
code itself (art. 99 al. 1 n. 3 CC). See Message relatif à une loi fédérale
concernant les mesures de lutte contre les mariages forcés du 23 février 2011,
FF 2011 2045, 2053.
61. Article 105 CC.
62. Article 107 CC.
63. Article 105 CC.
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Swiss civil authority of the current domicile of the spouses may
bring such an action by its own accord (ex officio).
The relative grounds 64 cover situations where the interest of
only one of the spouses is affected. These include cases where one
of the spouses was deceived or induced into an error by the other
spouse, or if he or she temporarily lacked capacity of judgment
during the wedding celebration. Only the afflicted spouse may
bring an action for annulment under relative grounds, and it is
subject to two time limits. It will be time barred if not made within
six months starting from the moment of the discovery of the
grounds, and within five years starting from the wedding
celebration. Once either of the delays expires, the only recourse
left is an action for divorce.
Before the reform, the fact that a marriage was concluded
without the consent of one of spouses was, in itself, not considered
as a ground for annulment. Only in cases of qualified coercion—
i.e., if the spouse proves the marriage was concluded under a clear
threat against his or her physical integrity, life, or the well-being of
his or her relatives—would a relative ground for annulment be
given. 65 This was deemed to be insufficient by the legislator,
because the standard of qualified coercion was difficult to prove
for the victim, and because the relative nature of this ground made
it subject to the two time limits discussed above. In practice, it was
extremely difficult for the victim of an arranged marriage to
achieve an annulment. 66
In response to this situation, the reform introduced three major
changes. First, it eliminated the problematic concept of qualified
coercion. 67 Second, it added a new absolute ground for annulment
concerning situations in which a spouse has not married out of his
64. Article 107 CC.
65. Article 107, n° 4 CC.
66. Conseil Fédéral, Message relatif à une loi fédérale concernant les
mesures de lutte contre les mariages forcés du 23 février 2011, FF 2011 2045,
2053-2054.
67. Article 107, n° 4a CC was removed.
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or her own free will. 68 Third, it introduced another absolute
ground, addressing cases where one of the spouses is a minor.69
These changes not only allow victims of forced marriage to bring
an annulment action regardless of any time limit, they also
strengthen the position of the Swiss civil authorities, which will
now be able to annul, ex officio, any forced marriage or any
marriage in which one of the spouses is a minor. 70
3. Changes in Private International Law
Other changes were made in the field of Private International
Law. The reform addressed a) the law applicable to marriages
celebrated in Switzerland, and b) the procedure of marriage
annulment.
In regard to the law applicable to marriages celebrated in
Switzerland, the system in force at the time of the reform allowed,
under certain circumstances, for the application of foreign
marriage laws. While the conditions of admissibility of a marriage
celebrated in Switzerland were, in principle, to be found in
domestic law, 71 it also allowed the application of a foreign law if
the two spouses were foreign nationals and if Swiss law did not
permit their union. 72 This exception was however still subject to
the general exception of public policy. The goal was to favor the
conclusion of marriage (favor matrimonii). It allowed for the
celebration of marriages that would otherwise not have been
accepted under the Swiss Civil Code, namely, marriages involving
minors. 73
68. Article 105, n° 5 CC.
69. Article 105, n° 6 CC.
70. Conseil Fédéral, Message contre les mariages forcés, supra note 66, at
2073-2076.
71. Article 44, §1 of the Federal Act on Private International Law (LDIP),
RS 291.
72. Article 44, §2 of the Federal Act on Private International Law (LDIP),
RS 291.
73. Other cases which were envisaged as relevant for the purposes of art. 44
par. 2 were marriages concluded with a nephew or a niece, marriages with the
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Because of the (high) risk that a marriage involving a minor
would be concluded against his or her own will, the legislature
considered that these cases would no longer be compatible with
Swiss public policy. As a result, the exception contained in article
44 §2 of the LDIP was abolished. Under the new rules, all
marriages celebrated in Switzerland must conform to Swiss law. 74
Finally, the reform addressed the issue of marriage annulment,
which was previously not specifically covered by the Private
International Law Act. Indeed, prior to the reform, one had to look
under the rules of divorce in order to find both the rules on
international jurisdiction and on the applicable law to an action for
annulment. The legislature introduced a new provision in the
Private International Law Act. 75 At the same time, the rules
themselves were reformed: while the rules on divorce open a
forum at the Swiss domicile of each spouse, the new rule on
annulment adds a new forum, located at the place of the wedding
celebration, in order to give more options to a victim of a forced
marriage; and while foreign law may be applicable to a divorce
concluded in Switzerland under certain conditions, actions for
annulment are governed by Swiss law exclusively. 76

child of one’s spouse, and marriage between adopted brothers and sisters.
However, due to a modification of the civil code, the first two cases are not
anymore an obstacle for marriage in Switzerland, see Conseil Fédéral, Message
contre les mariages forcés, supra note 66, at 2077.
74. This stricter stance about marriages involving minors brought about by
the reform also signaled the disappearance of another rule, formerly contained in
art. 45a LDIP, which allowed a minor to reach majority when successfully
married under foreign law. See Conseil Fédéral, Message contre les mariages
forcés, supra note 66, at 2068-2069.
75. The legislature introduced a new article 45a in the Private International
Law Act.
76. Conseil Fédéral, Message contre les mariages forcés, supra note 66, at
2077-2078.
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B. Revision of the Rules Governing the Name(s) of Marrying
Couples
The second development in family law concerns the name of
married couples. The new regime applies to all marriages and
partnerships concluded after January 1, 2013. It is designed to
comply with the principle of gender equality and to offer spouses a
large degree of independence in the choice of their post-marital
surname. 77 The reform responded to severe criticism of the
previous system by supranational entities. We will thus first
provide a short description of the circumstances leading to this
reform (1). Then, the new rules will be presented (2).
1. Legislative History
Since the entry into force of the Civil Code of 1907, under
Swiss law, the wife of a marrying couple automatically took the
surname of her husband. 78 There were two exceptions: first, the
wife could choose to retain her last name as a component, which
would then be followed by the couple’s common surname; 79
second, the couple could instead choose to use the surname of the
wife as their shared surname. This last option, however, required
both parties to take part in a name-changing procedure, and
required that they had a legitimate interest in doing so. 80 Children
would also automatically be given the surname of the father,

77. The reform also touched on the issue of droit de cité (citizenship),
which determines the canton of origin of a given person. Given that this topic is
rather peculiar to Switzerland, it will not be covered in this article.
78. Article 160 al. 1 CC (previous version, dated 01.01.12, hereafter
“aCC”). For a summary of the legislative history of the reform, see also
Commission des affaires juridiques du Conseil national, Initiative parlementaire,
Nom et droit de cite des époux, Egalité, Rapport de la Commission des affaires
juridiques du 22 Août 2008 (Parliamentary motion, Name and citizenship of
spouses, Equality, Report of the Commission of legal affairs of the 22nd of
August 2008), FF 2009 II 365, 368-370 [hereinafter “Nom et droit de cite des
époux”].
79. Article 160, §2 aCC.
80. Article 30, §2 aCC.
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except if they were born out of marriage, in which case they would
take the mother’s surname. 81
While obviously inappropriate with respect to gender equality,
this rule was for a long time maintained in legislation because of
its strong link with the traditional depiction of marriage, which
promoted family unity through a shared name. In 1984, during an
otherwise thorough revision of matrimonial law aimed at
promoting gender equality, the Conseil Fédéral decided to keep
the rules on family names as they were, explaining that it would be
too difficult to alter such well-accepted rules. While the Conseil
Fédéral was well-aware of its clear bias in favor of the husband, it
added that reaching complete gender equality on this topic was
impossible as no other option was viable: choosing the name of the
wife would only reverse the inequity, and introducing a new,
alternative system of shared, hyphenated names would be too
complicated to maintain in situations of multiple, successive
marriages. 82
This position, however, was hardly defendable under
international law. The situation ultimately led to the landmark
judgment Burgharz of the European Court of Human Rights. 83
The case concerned a Swiss couple who had married in
Germany. Under German law, they chose the common surname
“Burgharz”, which was the maiden name of the wife. The husband
chose to keep his own surname as a middle component, as
“Schnyder Burgharz”. However, the Swiss registry office recorded
the husband’s surname, “Schnyder”, as their joint surname. The
couple then motioned to have their choice approved by the Swiss
81. Article 270, §1 and 2 aCC.
82. Message concernant la révision du code civil suisse (effets généraux du
mariage, régimes matrimoniaux et successions) du 11 juillet 1979 (Message
related to the revision of the Swiss Civil Code (general effects of marriage,
matrimonial regimes and inheritances) of the 11th July 1979), FF 1979 II 1179,
1227-1229. The Parliament, however, used this revision to introduce the
exception contained in article 160, §2 of the aCC. See Nom et droit de cité des
époux, Egalité, supra note 78, at 369.
83. Burgharz v. Switzerland, no. 16213/90, ECHR 1994.
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authorities. Their request was denied at first, as they could not
point out any inconvenience arising from the “Schnyder” name. On
appeal, the Federal Court (Tribunal Fédéral) accepted “Burgharz”
as their joint surname, using a general clause permitting a name
change when justified under the circumstances. The husband’s
request to retain the double name “Schnyder Burgharz”, however,
was denied on the ground that only the wife was permitted to retain
her previous name as a middle particle; as the system was
deliberately lopsided to safeguard familial unity, the husband could
not benefit from an exception which was available for wives
only. 84 This part of the judgment led to the appeal before the
ECHR.
Reasoning in two steps, the European Court concluded that
Swiss law was breaching the Convention. The Court held that a
person’s name falls under the ambit of the protection of family and
personality rights granted by article 8 of the Convention. It also
held that the name-changing regime for marrying couples in
Switzerland was discriminatory and that the arguments of family
unity and tradition fell short before the need for an equal treatment
of both sexes. At the very least, Swiss law could have allowed for
husbands to take on a double-barreled name without seriously
compromising these values. 85
Following the ECHR judgment, the Swiss legislature added, in
an executive regulation, the possibility for a husband to keep his
previous name as a component when both spouses decide to
undergo the procedure to designate the wife’s name as the shared
surname. The Parliament, not satisfied with this “tacked-on”
solution, introduced the system that is now in force in Switzerland.

84. Tribunal Fédéral, 08.06.89, Burgharz Schnyder und Schnyder gegen
Kanton Basel-Stadt, ATF 115 II 193.
85. Burgharz v. Switzerland, no. 16213/90, § 22- 30, ECHR 1994.
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2. Changes Introduced by the Reform
Under the new system, each spouse keeps his or her previous
name after the marriage. 86 In other words, marriage has now no
bearing upon one’s surname. However, a couple may decide to
share a common surname, which can be the birth name of either of
the spouses. This requires no specific procedure, as just a
declaration to the civil registrar will suffice. 87
Some complications arise with respect to the surname of
children. 88 If the parents are married and share the same surname,
then the child will have this name as well. 89 If the parents decide to
keep their previous names, then, at the moment of their marriage,
they will need to decide in advance on which one of their birth
names they will pass on to their children. 90 Should they change
their mind in the meantime, they can still opt for the surname of
the other spouse, within one year starting from the birth of their
first child. 91 Lastly, if, at the moment of the marriage, they do not
manage to decide on which name to pass on, they then can request
the civil registrar to choose in their stead. One interesting feature
of this new system is that it can lead to discrepancies when one or
both of the spouses have kept a surname acquired through a
previous marriage, as only a birth surname, and not an acquired
one, can be passed on to their children. 92
Children born out of marriage acquire the birth name of the
mother; they can nonetheless acquire the surname of their father,

86. Article 160, §1 CC.
87. Article 160, §2 CC.
88. The issue of which of the spouse’s names would pass on to the children
was indeed one of the sticking points of the reform, and the cause of the failure
of the 1998 effort. See Nom et droit de cité des époux, supra note 78, at 370.
89. Article 160, §3 and 270, §3 CC.
90. Article 270, §1 CC.
91. Article 270, §2 CC.
92. See example 2 of the explanatory note for families established by the
department
of
justice
and
explaining
the
new
system,
at
https://www.bfm.admin.ch/content/dam/data/gesellschaft/gesetzgebung/
namensrecht/anwendungsbeispiele-f.pdf (last visited on March 12, 2014).
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even without a marriage, if the child protection authority assigns
parental care to both parents. 93
IV. CONCLUSION
This brief survey of the changes made in Swiss law in the last
two years allows us to make two observations.
First, while Swiss law is undeniably affected by foreign law,
and most notably by the law of the European Union, one cannot
say that Switzerland has been moving towards full harmonization
with its EU neighbors. The reform of the LCD shows that the
Swiss legislature still prefers to adopt the rules of foreign law that
it deems necessary, while discarding others. Furthermore, the
reform on forced marriages shows that Switzerland is not reluctant
to rely exclusively on its lex fori to tackle issues of controversial
nature.
Second, a look at the legislative history of all of the reforms
described in this Chronicle shows that the Swiss legislature heavily
relies on a comparative law methodology when making its own
choices and shaping its own rules. Consequently, the existing
differences with the EU law are the result of an informed,
calculated choice, leading to a selective and soft harmonization of
the law while preserving some specific features and characteristics
of Swiss law.

93. Article 270a, §1-3 CC.
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON THE TRANSLATORS’ PREFACE TO LAS
SIETE PARTIDAS
Agustín Parise *
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana has welcomed translations of legal materials for over
200 years. The long-lasting tradition has helped both to promote
the unique Louisiana civil law heritage and to benefit the state with
the developments that took place in other civil law jurisdictions.
The Center of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana State University is
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LL.D., Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina); LL.M., Louisiana State
University (USA).
The author thanks Jennifer Lane for her editorial work and suggestions.
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currently undertaking a translation project of the Louisiana Civil
Code into French. 1 This project will help promote the civil law of
the southern state amongst French-speaking civil law jurisdictions.
The Louisiana Civil Code is applicable in a mixed jurisdiction, and
it is drafted in the English language. This interaction of systems
may be valued by jurists and businessmen who intend to
implement continental European principles while undertaking their
practices in the common law and vice versa. 2 In addition, scholars
both of continental European and common law systems may look
to Louisiana for civil-law terminology in English. It must be
acknowledged that Louisiana civil law scholars have important
know-how, and the more than two hundred-year old tradition of
English language civil-law codification in Louisiana should be
valued. 3
The current translation project of the Louisiana Civil Code may
be placed within a Louisiana translating tradition. 4 For example,
from the same Center of Civil Law Studies, French works were
translated into English, starting in 1972, with a translation by
Michael Kindred of a seminal work by René David. 5 Bachir
Mihoubi, Roger K. Ward, and David W. Gruning completed
another set of translations in the years that followed, led by Alain
Levasseur. 6 Earlier translations were undertaken by the Louisiana
State Law Institute in the period 1959 to 1972. 7 The Institute
1. Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An
Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012).
2. Agustin Parise, Report on the State of Louisiana to the Second Thematic
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, 31 MISS. C. L.
REV. 397, 403 (2013).
3. Id. See also Alain Levasseur & Vicenc Feliu, The English Fox in the
Louisiana Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English
Language; Comparativists Beware, 69 LA. L. REV. 715, 735-39 (2009); and
Olivier Moréteau, Les frontières de la langue et du droit, REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 695 (2009).
4. See generally Alexandru-Daniel On, Making French Doctrine
Accessible to the English-Speaking World: The Louisiana Translation Series, 5
J. CIV. L. STUD. 81 (2012).
5. Id. at 91.
6. Id. at 91-92.
7. Id. at 83.
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devoted efforts to translate European legal materials that
encapsulated the tenets of the civil law, and translations were
directed by, amongst others, Carlos E. Lazarus and Jaro Mayda. 8
Those efforts included translations of the works by Charles Aubry
and Charles Rau, Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie, François Gény, and
Marcel Planiol. 9 Those translations from French into the English
language are still useful tools for judges in Louisiana, when
interpreting the civil law. 10
Louisiana legal history provides a very early translation effort
that aimed to make the civil law available to the legal community.
That translation effort, however, was not from French or into the
French language. One of the first examples of civil law translations
in Louisiana was provided by the English translation of the
Spanish Partidas of Alfonso X. That translation work, which
motived this new introduction, was undertaken in the early
nineteenth century by Louis Moreau-Lislet and Henry Carleton,
and predated by more than a century the well circulated 1931
English translation by Samuel Parsons Scott. 11
This new introduction is followed by a transcription of the
Translators’ Preface and is divided into two parts. First, it
provides an historic evolution of the laws applicable in Louisiana.
This aims to explain why the Partidas were used in Louisiana, and
why an English translation was beneficial for the local legal
community. Second, it provides information on the two English
translations of the Partidas that were produced in Louisiana during
the first decades of the nineteenth-century. This part also welcomes
biographical information about the authors of the translations, and
8. Id. at 83-90. See generally Joseph Dainow, Use of English Translations
of Planiol by Louisiana Courts, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 68 (1965).
9. See John H. Tucker, Tradition and Technique of Codification in the
Modern World: The Louisiana Experience, 25 LA. L. REV. 698, 710 (1965); and
the detailed account in Joseph Dainow, Civil Law Translations and Treatises
Sponsored in Louisiana, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 521 (1975).
10. See, for example, the recent reference by the Louisiana Supreme Court
to the translation of the work of Aubry and Rau in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc.
v. Amerada Hess Corporation, et al., 79 So.3d 246, 286 (2011).
11. SAMUEL PARSONS SCOTT, LAS SIETE PARTIDAS (1931).
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analyses the content of the preface to the 1820 translation. The
entire content of the new introduction aims to place the translation
of the Partidas within the legal and social context of early
nineteenth-century Louisiana.
II. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR TRANSLATIONS IN LOUISIANA
France ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762. 12 Seven years later,
the Spanish Governor, Alejandro O’Reilly, 13 implemented the
Spanish Colonial system of government and replaced the French
laws (v.gr., Coutume de Paris) with the Spanish-Indiano laws. 14
Hence, Spanish laws were since then the law in Louisiana. 15
Amongst the new provisions were the Ordinances and
Instructions 16 and the Instructions as to the Manner of Instituting
Suits, 17 both of November 25, 1769, which regulated procedure in
the region.
Napoléon Bonaparte secured the return of Louisiana to France
on October 1, 1800. 18 During that second French period, the
12. See PAUL E. HOFFMAN, LUISIANA 60-64 (1992). See generally 2
CHARLES GAYARRÉ, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (1903); and EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS,
LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 66-113 (1978).
13. For additional readings on O’Reilly, see BIBIANO TORRES RAMÍREZ,
ALEJANDRO O’REILLY EN LAS INDIAS (1969).
14. See the analysis in Rodolfo Batiza, The Unity of Private Law in
Louisiana under the Spanish Rule, 4 INTER-AM. L. REV. 139 (1962).
15. Alain Levasseur, La Réception du Système de la Common Law par le
Système Législatif Français en Louisiane in LA RÉCEPTION DES SYSTEMES
JURIDIQUES: IMPLANTATIONS ET DESTINS 381, 382 (Doucet & Vanderlinden eds.
1994); and Rodolfo Batiza, The Influence of Spanish Law in Louisiana, 33 TUL.
L. REV. 29, 30 (1958).
There is some debate on the abrogation of French law. See Gustavus Schmidt,
Were the Laws of France, which Governed Louisiana prior to the Cession of the
Country to Spain Abolished by the Ordinances of O’Reilly?, 1:4 LA L.J. 23
(1842); and ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUIS CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET:
FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 8-12 (1996). The memoirs of Laussat
(Papeles de Cuba, Legajo, 220. 5 Luisiana) include a document that seems to put
an end to the debate. Id. 34-35.
16. Text available in English in Gustavus Schmidt, Ancient Jurisprudence
of Louisiana, 1:2 LA L.J. 1-27 (1841).
17. Text available in English in Schmidt, supra note 16, at 27-60.
18. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD 286 (1975) (1827).
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applicable law was still Spanish and no significant changes were
made to the jurisprudence of the region. 19 The territory would live
briefly under French domain, because during the first days of May
1803, the Treaty of Paris took place, resulting in the Louisiana
Purchase. 20 The first proclamation of W.C.C. Claiborne, then
Commissioner, was to preserve the laws that applied at the time of
the Purchase 21 (i.e., Spanish laws and the French Code noir).
Louisiana adopted a digest of its laws in 1808. Two years
before, James Brown and Moreau-Lislet were appointed to draft a
project of a civil code. 22 According to the resolution, the “two
jurisconsults shall make the civil law by which this territory is now
governed, the ground work of said code.” 23 In February 1808, the
different books of the projected text were presented by the
committee before the local legislature for debate. 24 On March 31,
1808, the Legislature promulgated the Digest of the Civil Laws
now in force in the territory of Orleans (Digest of 1808). 25 The
Digest of 1808 was drafted in French and then translated into
English. 26

19. A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana in 1 WEST’S
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE li, liii (Yiannopoulos ed. 2008); and Elizabeth Gaspar
Brown, Law and Government in the Louisiana Purchase: 1803-1804, 2 WAYNE
L. REV. 169, 186-187 (1955).
20. The documents were dated April 30, 1803. See THOMAS MAITLAND
MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 1819-1841 at 7-8 (1914).
21. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 319.
22. 1806 La. Acts 214.
23. Id. at 214.
24. GEORGE DARGO, LEGAL CODIFICATION AND THE POLITICS OF
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT IN JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA, 1803-1808 at 321
(1970).
25. 1808 La. Acts 122. See generally A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN
FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS
ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1808). The text of the
Digest of 1808 is available at www.law.lsu.edu/digest (last visited December 6,
2013).
26. E.B. Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals Written in French;
Errors of Translation, LA. BAR ASSN. ANN. REP. 143 (1924); and John M.
Shuey, Civil Codes-Control of the French Text of the Code of 1825, 3 LA. L.
REV. 452 (1941).
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The Spanish laws were not abrogated with the enactment of the
Digest of 1808 or with the enactment of the Civil Code of 1825
that followed. The former had no general abrogation clause of
Spanish laws. 27 In addition, the Act of March 31, 1808 stated that
“whatever in the ancient civil laws of this territory, or in the
territorial statute, is contrary to the dispositions contained in the
said digest, or irreconcilable with them, is hereby abrogated.” 28
Pierre Derbigny addressed the derogation of previous laws in the
1817 case of Cottin v. Cottin. 29 He decided that the laws that were
not contrary to the Digest of 1808 were not repealed with its
enactment. Therefore, the Digest of 1808 had not completely
repealed the civil laws that had existed in Louisiana. Consequently,
a state of uncertainty was generated concerning the laws that
should be applied by the courts. The Digest of 1808 was replaced
by the Civil Code of 1825, the predecessor of the current Louisiana
Civil Code. That code tried to terminate, by including article
3521, 30 the debate on the application of Spanish laws. Article
3521, however, could be read as not repealing all previous laws but
only those “for which it has been especially provided in this
Code.” 31 That language opened the door to different
interpretations, allowing some lawyers and members of the
judiciary to interpret this as an open door in cases of lacunae, and

27. The work of Vernon V. Palmer (Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Death of
a Code - The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221, 244-245 (1988)) was
especially influential for the drafting of this paragraph.
28. 1808 La. Acts 126.
29. Cottin v. Cottin, 1819, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93.
30. Article 3521 of the Civil Code of 1825 read:
From and after the promulgation of this Code [of 1825], the Spanish,
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State, when
Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the acts of the
Legislative Council, of the Legislature of the Territory of Orleans, and
of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, be and are hereby repealed
in every case, for which it has been especially provided in this Code,
and that they shall not be invoked as laws, even under the pretense that
their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this Code.
CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 1112 (1825).
31. Id.
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hence, limiting the express repeal. 32 Therefore, when faced with
silence in the code, it would have been admissible to look for
solutions in the previous laws. 33 To end interpretation problems,
the Legislature of Louisiana enacted two acts 34 that were intended
to achieve a great repeal. 35 There is still debate on the effects of
both acts, especially since the Louisiana Supreme Court claimed
that the acts only repealed the previous positive law and not the
principles derived from them, which had been acquired by the
practice of the courts. 36
Louisiana courts relied on Spanish sources during the period
1809 to 1828.37 The Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans and
the Louisiana Supreme Court “cited Spanish codes, customs or
ordinances four times more frequently than French codes, customs
or ordinances.” 38 Those same courts cited “Spanish statutes twelve
times more frequently than French statutes.” 39 However, French
treatises and commentaries were cited “only slightly more
frequently than Spanish treatises and commentaries.” 40 The
references to Spanish materials focused mainly in the Partidas, the
Librería de Escribanos, and the Curia Filípica. 41 These works
represented 60% of citations to Spanish texts. 42 The Curia
Filípica, by Juan de Hevia Bolaños, had a strong presence in Spain

32. Palmer, supra note 27, at 246.
33. Id.
34. 1828 La. Acts 66; and 1828 La. Acts 160.
35. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (2003).
36. Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193, 198 (1839). Id. See also John T. Hood,
The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 TUL. L. REV. 7,
18 (1958).
37. See generally Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and
Treatises on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana: 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485
(1982).
38. Id. at 1504.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1505.
42. Id.
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and Spanish America. 43 For example, Gustavus Schmidt, who
owned one of the most complete law libraries in the southern
United States, had a copy in his library. 44 The work of José
Febrero, Librería de Escribanos é instrucción jurídica teórica
práctica de principiantes, was also well circulated in America
(from Louisiana to Río de la Plata 45) and played an important role
in the practice before courts. 46
III. TWO LOUISIANA TRANSLATIONS OF THE PARTIDAS
The nineteenth-century interest for Spanish law demanded a
translation of the Partidas into the English language. 47 Courts and
practitioners would benefit from the availability of an English
translation of that seminal Spanish body of law. The Partidas are
traditionally attributed to the reign of Alfonso X, being drafted
during 1256-1265. 48 They were subject to several text alterations
through time, and the most circulated edition is the one of 1555,
containing glosses by Gregorio López. 49 The name derives from
their division into seven parts—and not into books—as was the
case with other legal bodies that predated their publication. 50 The
Partidas, different from other corpus of that time, were
systematical and integral. 51 Each partida, or part, was divided into
titles and laws, and dealt with an area of the law: (i) sources of law,
43. José M. Castán Vázquez, Vélez Sársfield, Jurista Bibliófilo in IV
HOMENAJE A DALMACIO VÉLEZ SÁRSFIELD 519, 526 (2000).
44. MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH & LOUIS V. DE LA VERGNE, THE 1877 SALE
CATALOGUE OF GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT'S LIBRARY 53 (2005).
45. For example, the Argentine codifier had a copy of the book in his
library (CATÁLOGO DE LA DONACIÓN DE VÉLEZ SARSFIELD 48 (Biblioteca
Mayor ed. 1980)).
46. José M. Castán Vázquez, Los Libros Jurídicos Españoles consultados
por Vélez Sarsfield in ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL DR. GUILLERMO A. BORDA
73, 81 (1984).
47. See John H. Tucker, Louisiana Civil Law Literature, 34 REP. LA. BAR
ASSN. 26, 29 (1942).
48. ABELARDO LEVAGGI, 1 MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ARGENTINO 89 (2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 90.
51. Id.
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Catholic faith, and church; (ii) kings, royal officials, and war; (iii)
administration of justice and rights on things; (iv) marriage and
persons; (v) contracts and other civil institutions; (vi) successions;
and (vii) crimes and punishments. 52
A first translation of a selection of titles of the Partidas was
dated 1818. 53 Louis Moreau-Lislet and Henry Carleton translated
the titles of the Partidas that dealt with promises and obligations
(Partida V, Title XI), sale and purchase (Partida V, Title V), and
exchange (Partida V, Title VI). That work was published in New
Orleans by Roche Brothers. The single volume filled 197 pages,
placing the original Spanish text on the verso and the English
translation on the recto. That first translation included a short
preface 54 that started by summarizing the contents of the work by
Alfonso X. The translators further stated that the “Partidas may
then be considered as the principal code of the Spanish laws.”55
They also stated that:
[M]any important provisions of the ancient laws of the land
[i.e., Louisiana] still in force are not to be found in that
code [i.e., Digest of 1808], and as its principles and maxims
are delivered in a manner so succinct as not to be easily
understood in their application without mounting to the
sources whence they are derived, we hope we have
undertaken a work useful to the public and to those who
frequent the bar. 56
Moreau-Lislet and Carleton acknowledged that the structure,
terms, and orthography of the Spanish language they translated
were 500 years old, and even difficult to understand by a
nineteenth-century native Spanish speaker. 57 They tried to follow
the order of the Digest of 1808 when dealing with contracts, and
52. Enumeration translated from the work of Levaggi. Id.
53. LOUIS MOREAU & HENRY CARLETON, A TRANSLATION OF THE TITLES
ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE FROM
THE SPANISH OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS (1818).
54. Id. at iii-vi.
55. Id. at iv.
56. Id. at v.
57. Id. at v-vi.
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annotated the Spanish laws with the articles of the Digest of
1808, 58 while providing Roman laws that related to each title of the
Partidas, 59 together with modern Spanish texts.60
A second translation of other titles of the Partidas was dated
1820. 61 On March 3, 1819, the Legislature of Louisiana decided,
upon the proposal of Moreau-Lislet and Carleton, to translate the
remaining parts of the Partidas that were considered to have force
of law in the state. 62 The Legislature stated in that occasion that:
“it is of great importance to the citizens of this State, not only that
the copies of the laws by which they are governed should be
multiplied, but also that they should have them in a language more
generally understood than the Spanish.” 63 The legislature aimed to
allow the legal community to gain “knowledge of this important
branch of our civil jurisprudence contained in the said works.” 64
The second translation, also by Moreau-Lislet and Carleton,
included titles from six of the seven partidas, neglecting attention
to the second partida, which dealt mainly with matters related with

58. See, for example, the reference in the English translation to Book III,
Title VI, Article 1 of the Digest of 1808. The text in the English translation
reads “c.1, 344” (i.e., article 1, page 344 of the Digest of 1808). Id. at 87.
59. See, for example, the reference to Book III, Title XXIV of the Institutes
of Justinian in the English translation. The text in the English translation reads
“Institutes lib. 3. tit. 24. De emptione et venditione.” Id. at 80. The translators
probably followed the English text of the Institutes by Thomas Cooper, which
Moreau-Lislet had in his library. See Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward
Livingston and of Moreau Lislet, 15 TUL. L. REV. 401, 408 (1941).
60. See, for example, the reference to sale in Part I, Chapter X, Section I of
the work of Febrero. The text in the English translation reads “Febrero libreria
de escribanos, part. 1. chap. 10, § 1. De las ventas.” Id.
n.b., the 1783 edition of Febrero deals with sale in Chapter VII, Section
I. (JOSEF FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS, PARTE PRIMERA, TOMO SEGUNDO
406 (3d ed. 1783).
61. 1-2 LOUIS MOREAU LISLET & HENRY CARLETON, THE LAWS OF LAS
SIETE PARTIDAS WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1820).
The legislative history indicates that the translation work, especially for
volume 2, was not completed by 1820 (1820 La. Acts 20 and 1821 La. Acts 22;
and LEVASSEUR, supra note 12, at 141-143).
62. 1819 La. Acts 44.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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the king. 65 That work was published in New Orleans by James
McKaraher. The translation was presented in two volumes,
continuously paginated until page 1248, 66 included an index of
titles for each volume, included a general index, 67 and did not
include the original Spanish text. The first volume also included a
Translators’ Preface, 68 which motivated this new introduction. In
the Act of 1819, the Legislature also appointed Pierre Derbigny,
Étienne Mazureau, 69 and Edward Livingston to examine the
“manuscript of the translation, and to compare it with the original
language and see that it is faithfully done and contains all such
parts of the laws of the Partidas as are considered to have the force
of law in this state.” 70 The legislator was therefore not only aiming
to asses the language but also the substance of the translation. In
that same Act, the payment to the translators was set in the amount
of 7000 dollars. 71 The editio princeps of the translation would be
of 500 copies as stated by the Legislature, 72 and the copyright
would be assigned to the governor for the use of the state. 73
The English translations of the Partidas had an impact in the
legal community of Louisiana. In February 1822, the Legislature
instructed the distribution of copies of the 1820 translation. Copies
were to be sent to, amongst others, the judges of the different
Louisiana state courts, to the US district court for Louisiana, and to
65. Headings for the titles of the second partida were included in the
English translation. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at 17-19.
66. Volume one included the translator’s preface, included the text of
partidas I, III, and IV, and reached page 605; volume two included the text of
partidas V to VII, and included a general index.
67. The general index was not part of the continuous pagination, extending
for 73 pages, and followed an alphabetical order for entries.
68. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at iii-xxv.
69. The English text of the Act referred erroneously to S. Mazureau (1819
La. Acts 44).
70. Id.
71. The 1819 Act described the procedure to follow when settling the
payment (id.). The 1821 supplementary Act allowed for a further sum to be paid
to the translators (1821 La. Acts 22). See also John W. Cairns, The de la Vergne
Volume and the Digest of 1808, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 31, 76 (2009).
72. 1819 La. Acts 44.
73. Id.
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the Legislature. 74 Copies were also to be distributed beyond
Louisiana, being sent to the executive branches of other US state
and to the US President. 75 A number of copies were to be
preserved by the office of the secretary of state, and the remaining
copies were to be sold to the general public. 76 The aim was, as
originally stated in the 1819 Act, to allow the legal community to
gain “knowledge of this important branch of our civil
jurisprudence.” 77 A study shows that, after the publication of the
translations, there was an increase of 100% in the frequency with
which the Partidas were cited by courts in Louisiana. 78 For
example, Justice George Mathews of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, stated in a case that “it may not be improper to advert to
a note in the translation of the Partidas, by Moreau & Carleton.” 79
The English translation also reached other U.S. states, being cited
by courts beyond the borders of Louisiana. 80
A. Authors of the Second Translation
Five jurists, at least, were involved in the second translation
project of the Partidas in Louisiana. The English translations,
dated 1818 and 1820, indicated that the authors were MoreauLislet and Carleton, and there was no individual claim of
authorship for the different parts of that translation work. Edward
Livingston, Pierre Derbigny, and Étienne Mazureau were also
involved in the translation project, being appointed examiners of
the second translation by the Legislature. They had to produce a
74. 1822 La. Acts 20. See also KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA
LAW 214 (2d ed. 1960).
The author of the new introduction is indebted to Mr. Alexandru-Daniel
On for facilitating the copy of abovementioned act.
75. 1822 La. Acts 20.
76. Id.
77. 1819 La. Acts 44.
78. Rabalais, supra note 37, at 1505.
79. Copelly v. Deverges, 11 Mart. (o.s.) 641 (1822) at 10.
80. See, for example, Peter L. Reich, Siete Partidas in My Saddlebags: The
Transmission of Hispanic Law from Antebellum Louisiana to Texas and
California, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.79, 82 (2007).
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general certificate determining if “the translation, in their opinion,
ha[d] been correctly and faithfully made.” 81
Moreau-Lislet indicated an early interest in translating the
Partidas. In April 1813, he made public his intention of
translating, together with Étienne Mazureau, the Partidas into
French language. 82 Louis Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet 83 was
born on October 7, 1766 in the island of Saint-Domingue. 84 He
studied law in France and moved to New Orleans due to the French
Revolution. He was a successful lawyer who acted as judge,
attorney general, and senator for Louisiana. 85 He also played an
important role as editor. 86 He spoke the three fundamental
languages for a Louisiana jurist: English, French, and Spanish.87
Those skills helped him participate of the drafting of, amongst
others, the Digest of 1808, the Civil Code of 1825, and the Code of
Civil Procedure of 1825. Moreau-Lislet died in Louisiana on
December 3, 1832. 88
Henry Carleton Cox was the co-author of the two translations.
He was born in Virginia in 1785. 89 He graduated from Yale
University in 1806, after having attended two years at the
University of Georgia. 90 He settled in New Orleans in 1814, and
read law in the law offices of his brother-in-law, 91 Edward
81. 1820 La. Acts 20.
82. Cairns, supra note 71, at 51. See also LEVASSEUR, supra note 12, at 130131, 189-191.
83. For additional readings on Moreau-Lislet, see the complete study by
LEVASSEUR, supra note 12, at 69-166.
84. There is some debate; however, that is the most probable date. Id. at 80
and 83.
85. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A HUMANISTIC
APPRAISAL 25 (1981).
86. René Nicaud, The French Colonists from St. Domingue and, in
Particular, Louis Moreau Lislet, 20 LA BAR JNL. 285, 291 (1973).
87. LEVASSEUR, supra note 12, at 114.
88. Id. at 83.
89. 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 491 (Allen Johnson & Dumas
Malone eds. 1964).
90. A DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA BIOGRAPHY: TEN-YEAR SUPPLEMENT
1988-1998 at 34 (Carl A. Brasseaux & James D. Wilson Jr. eds., 1999).
91. Henry Carleton (1785-1863), available at http://www.lasc.org/
Bicentennial/justices/Carleton_Henry.aspx (last visited December 6, 2013).
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Livingston. 92 He was a U.S. district attorney from 1832 to 1837,93
and associate justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court from 1837 to
1839. 94 He is also known for his writings of a biblical,
metaphysical, and philosophical nature, 95 such as Liberty and
Necessity (1857) and Essays on the Will (1863). 96 He died in
Pennsylvania on March 28, 1863. 97
Edward Livingston may be included amongst the most brilliant
minds in the legal history of the U.S. 98 He was born in New York
on May 26, 1764, 99 and was brother of Robert Livingston
(negotiator during the Louisiana Purchase). 100 He studied at
Princeton University and read law with Judge Lansing, being
admitted to practice in 1785. 101 He moved to New Orleans in
1804, 102 where he became a successful lawyer. While in Louisiana,
he also drafted key legislative provisions, such as the projected
Commercial Code of 1825, 103 the Code of Civil Procedure of 1825,
and the Civil Code of 1825. Livingston was appointed senator for
Louisiana to the U.S. Congress in 1828, and was appointed
Secretary of State in 1831 by President Andrew Jackson. 104
Livingston died in New York 105 on May 23, 1836. 106

92. 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 89, at 491.
93. Id.
94. A DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA BIOGRAPHY, supra note 90, at 34.
95. Id.
96. 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 89, at 491.
97. Henry Carleton (1785-1863), supra note 91.
98. For additional readings on Edward Livingston, see CHARLES HAVENS
HUNT, LIFE OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON (1864); Carleton Hunt, Life and Services of
Edward Livingston, LA. BAR ASSN. ANN. REP. 7 (1903); and Franklin, supra note
59.
99. HAVENS HUNT, supra note 98, at 15.
100. Carleton Hunt, supra note 98, at 50.
101. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW 160
(1921).
102. Id. at 161.
103. RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE
ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 34 (1980).
104. HICKS, supra note 101, at 168-169.
105. Carleton Hunt, supra note 98, at 50.
106. HAVENS HUNT, supra note 98, at 432.
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Pierre Auguste Bourguignon Derbigny was born on June 30,
1769, in France and studied law at Saint Geneviève. 107 He went
into exile to the Caribbean during the French revolutionary period,
and from there immigrated to the US. 108 After living in several
regions of the country, he settled in Louisiana. 109 His ability with
the English and French languages helped explain his appointment
as official interpreter of Governor Claiborne. 110 Throughout his
life he acted on the three branches of government in Louisiana,
being, amongst others, member of the legislative council, 111 Justice
of the Supreme Court, 112 and Governor. 113 He confronted his
colleague Livingston in several judicial cases, most notably the
Batture 114 case. 115 He was also involved in the drafting of the Civil
Code of 1825 and the Code of Civil Procedure of 1825. 116
Derbigny died in Louisiana on October 6, 1829. 117
Étienne Mazureau was born in France in 1777. 118 He had early
contact with the law, being employed at a French law office at age

107. Pierre Auguste Bourguignon Derbigny 1828-1829, available at
http://www.sos.la.gov/HistoricalResources/AboutLouisiana/LouisianaGovernors
1812-1861/Pages/PierreAugusteBourguigonDerbigny.aspx
(last
visited
December 6, 2013).
108. 2 APPLETON'S CYCLOPÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 146 (Wilson &
Fiske eds. 1888).
109. Id.
110. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY
FOR THE UNITED STATES 60 (1993).
111. 2 APPLETON'S CYCLOPÆDIA, supra note 108.
112. HERMAN, supra note 110, at 60.
113. Pierre Auguste Bourguignon Derbigny 1828-1829, supra note 107.
114. The positions of Livingston and Derbigny were included in a
proclamation of October 21, 1808. See EDWARD LIVINGSTON, ADDRESS TO THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE MEASURES PURSUED BY THE
EXECUTIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE BATTURE AT NEW-ORLEANS (1808). For
more information on the Batture, see Gustavus Schmidt, The Batture Question,
1:2 LA L.J. 84 (1841).
115. Ira Flory, Edward Livingston’s Place in Louisiana Law, 19 LA. HIST. Q.
3, 7 (1936).
116. John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law II, 7 TUL. L. REV. 82,
84 (1932).
117. Pierre Auguste Bourguignon Derbigny 1828-1829, supra note 107.
118. Dictionary
of
Louisiana
Biography,
available
at
http://www.lahistory.org/site30.php (last visited December 6, 2013).
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thirteen. 119 While in Europe, he gained knowledge of Spanish law
and language. 120 He moved to Louisiana at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, where he was admitted to practice law in
1805. 121 Mazureau was a successful lawyer in the region, who
practiced law in partnership with Edward Livingston, acted as
attorney general for three terms, and served as Secretary of State of
Louisiana. 122 He had command of the English, French, and
Spanish languages. 123 Mazureau is known also for delivering in
1836 a speech in honor of the prominent Justice George
Mathews. 124 Mazureau died in Louisiana on May 30, 1849. 125
The background of the five jurists involved in the translation
project is a clear example of the rich Louisiana legal culture.
Jurists not only occupied prominent positions as practitioners or
judges, but also occasionally occupied alternatively positions as
members of the legislative and executive powers. In addition, they
represented both continental European and common law doctrines,
some being trained in the common law, others receiving a civil law
education, while others being proficient in both systems. The
jurists were also familiar with several languages, mainly the ones
used in Louisiana legal discourse. The different skills and
characteristics of jurists were valuable assets at the time the
translation project was pursued.

119. Tara Lombardi, The Great Advocate: Étienne Mazureau: Accomplished
Attorney & Statesman (1777-1849), 7:2 DE NOVO 6 (2009).
120. 12 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 469 (Dumas Malone ed.,
1933).
121. Lombardi, supra note 119, at 6.
122. Id. at 6-7.
123. Id. at 6.
124. The speech was translated into English and later published in Henry
Plauché Dart, Mazureau’s Oration on Mathews, 4:2 LA. HIST. Q. 155 (1921).
125. Obituary of Étienne Mazureau in New Orleans, Louisiana in 1849,
available at http://louisdl.louislibraries.org/cdm/ref/collection/LWP/id/5304
(last visited December 6, 2013).
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B. Translators’ Preface to the Second Translation
The Translators’ Preface is a very rich document. It helps
reflect the legal context of the time when it was drafted. The
preface addressed various topics, while it also referred to the work
of several jurists and cited court decisions and legislation.
Moreover, it was related to other legal works that were elaborated
at that time in Louisiana.
The Translators’ Preface was also included in a 1978-reprint
of the translation of the Partidas. That reprint of the 1820
translation was undertaken in Baton Rouge by Claitor’s Publishing
Division, 126 and included an Introduction by Mitchell Franklin. 127
The law professor explored the struggle in Louisiana between
adopting Spanish feudal Romanism or French bourgeois Roman
law, and claimed that Moreau-Lislet and Carleton had produced an
embourgeoisified English translation of the Partidas. The
translation, according to Franklin, was of institutional value,
because English was not the historical Roman and civil law
language, and the translation would assist the English-speaking
legal discourse. 128 He also indicated that the Translators’ Preface
did not include references to the Project of 1806. This was an
important document he identified in the National Archives in
1942, 129 and that reflected an early example of the struggle for the
adoption of the civil law or the common law systems in Louisiana.

126. 1-2 THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN
STATE OF LOUISIANA 1, 8-11 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton, trans.,
1978) (1820).
127. Mitchell Franklin, Introduction to 1 THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS
WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 1, 8-11 (L. Moreau
Lislet & Henry Carleton, trans., 1978) (1820).
128. Id.
129. In May 1806, the Legislature adopted a bill, also referred to as the
Project of 1806, by which the pre-existing Spanish and Roman laws would
govern the Territory of Orleans. Governor Claiborne, however, vetoed the bill.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 19, at liv. See also Mitchell Franklin, Some
Considerations on the Existential Force of Roman Law in the Early History of
the United States, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 69-70 (1972); and Mitchell Franklin,
THE
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1. Content
The Translators’ Preface can be divided into several parts.
Initially, the authors stated the auspices received by the
Legislature, and indicated that they translated the laws they
considered as “having force of law” 130 in the state.
The preface continued with a historic sketch of Spanish
legislation. It extended from pre-Roman times 131 until the
eighteenth century. 132 The narrative described seminal legislative
bodies and compilations, amongst others, the Leyes de Toro
(1505) 133 and the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias (1680),
which applied in the Americas. 134 Spanish compilations resulted in
a unique body that made access possible to all rules and included
all dispositions in a chronological order. 135 Although the compiled
laws maintained their independence and substance within the
compilations, 136 confusion resulted from the variety and disorder
of existing legislation. 137 Practitioners, scholars, and courts
welcomed literature that would succeed in making the law
accessible, and historic outlines aided in achieving that common
objective. For example, the Instituciones de Derecho Civil de
Castilla (1771), by Ignacio Jordán de Asso and Miguel de Manuel,
included a useful historic outline, which was translated into

The Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana: Talleyrand and the Spanish Medieval
Legal System of 1806, 16 TUL. L. REV. 514, 516 (1942).
130. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at iii.
131. Id. at iv.
132. Id. at xv.
133. Id. at xiii.
134. Id. at xv. The Translators’ Preface incorrectly indicated that the
Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias was published in 1661.
135. Agustin Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic
Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the Comments to the Spanish Civil Code
Project of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 835 (2008).
136. GUILLERMO GARCÍA VALDECASAS, PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO
CIVIL ESPAÑOL 41 (1983).
137. Rafael Altamira, Spain in 1 A GENERAL SURVEY OF EVENTS, SOURCES,
PERSONS AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY 694 (John Henry
Wigmore trans., 1912).
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English by Lewis Johnston, a judge of the island of Trinidad, and
published in London in 1825. 138 A second example was provided
by the Teatro de la Legislación Universal de España e Indias
(1791-1798), by Antonio Javier Pérez y López. The Teatro
included an extensive historic introduction (within the Discurso
Preliminar) 139 that was used by Moreau-Lislet and Carleton. 140 A
third example, this time from Louisiana, was provided by The Civil
Law of Spain and Mexico (1851), by Gustavus Schmidt. That work
included an historic outline, and also circulated in other US
states. 141 Approximately 2000 years of history and legislation were
therefore included in those useful historical sketches. 142
The historic account, as expected, dealt with the Partidas and
their content. 143 The authors worked with the glossed edition by
Gregorio López, 144 and stated that the Partidas were the “most
perfect system of Spanish laws, and [could] be advantageously
compared with any code published in the most enlightened ages of
the world.” 145 The content of the different parts of the Partidas
was also addressed by Moreau-Lislet and Carleton. 146 They even
indicated that the principles of natural law, as contained in the
Partidas, were still applicable, not having been modified by
particular laws. 147
The Translators’ Preface also dealt with matters of
jurisdiction. Firstly, it acknowledged that maritime and

138. Johnston translated the sixth edition of the Institutes, which was
published in 1805. LEWIS F. C. JOHNSTON, INSTITUTES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF
SPAIN BY DOCTORS D. IGNATIUS JORDAN DE ASSO Y DEL RÍO, AND D. MIGUEL
DE MANUEL Y RODRÍGUEZ (1825).
139. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at i-lviii.
140. Cairns, supra note 71, at 73 & 80.
141. See generally Agustin Parise, Book Review, 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 183
(2009).
142. Id.
143. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at vii-xii.
144. Id. at xxiii.
145. Id. at vii.
146. Id. at ix.
147. Id. at x.
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commercial matters should be decided by local courts. 148 That
statement indicated that the codes included in the historic sketch
did not apply to that area of law. Appropriate references were
made to the Spanish Ordenanzas del Consulado de Bilbao (1737),
which had applied in the territory when dealing with commercial
matters. 149 Secondly, it addressed the use that Louisiana courts
should make of the Partidas and of the different codes. 150 The
authors mainly relied on the work of Pedro Murillo Velarde when
dealing with that issue. Thirdly, it aimed to explain why the laws
of Spain were still in force in Louisiana. 151 Starting with the first
French period, and reaching the decision of Cottin v. Cottin,
Moreau-Lislet and Carleton explained why they considered that
Spanish laws applied in Louisiana. 152 They claimed that the second
French period “did not for a moment, weaken the Spanish laws”153
in Louisiana. They further stated that after Cottin “it thus appeared
that a much greater portion of the Spanish laws remained in force
than had been at first supposed,” 154 and that it was “then doubtless
the desire of the legislature to spread generally the knowledge of
such of these laws.” 155
The plan pursued by the translators aimed to relate the Partidas
with the Digest of 1808, as well as to relate them with other
Spanish and Roman texts.156 Each title of the Partidas was

148. Id. at xvi.
149. See the study by Jesús Motilla Martínez, Las Ordenanzas del Consulado
de Bilbao, interesante fuente histórica del derecho mercantil (versión
paleográfica y notas sobre fragmentos del texto), 15 JURÍDICA. ANUARIO DEL
DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD IBEROAMERICANA 189
(1983).
150. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at xvi-xviii.
151. Id. at xviii-xxiii.
152. When dealing with the Spanish period, the translators provided an early
translation of part of the Ordinances of O’Reilly (id. at xx). Compare with the
translation by Schmidt, supra note 16.
153. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at xxi.
154. Id. at xxiii.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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therefore associated with the titles of those other three sources. 157
Notes were also added to different laws of the Partidas, linking
them with Spanish, 158 Roman, 159 or Louisiana 160 sources.161
Moreau-Lislet and Carleton did not translate the laws of Partidas
that had been expressly repealed by the Legislature and those that
conflicted with the US and Louisiana constitutions. 162 Finally, the
translators explained the criteria they followed when facing
difficulties in providing accurate translations of Spanish terms. 163
2. References to Other Works
Multiple editions of the existing laws had appeared in Spain by
the nineteenth century, while auxiliary literature developed to
assist readers in the interpretation of the existing laws.
Encyclopedias and analytical works, such as the Teatro by Pérez y
López, excelled in assisting the legal community in the
interpretation of the laws; while they provided the legal
community with small libraries of the multiple volumes of Spanish
legislation. The Translators’ Preface clearly reflected that
nineteenth-century Spanish legislation was in a state of confusion,
and even identified early origins for that confusion. They
expressed, for example, that before the Partidas were drafted,

157. Id. For example, Partida III, Title V was related to, amongst others:
Book II, Title XIII, Code of Justinian; Book II, Title III, Fuero Juzgo; and Book
III, Title XIII, Digest of 1808 (id. at 108).
158. See, for example, the reference to the work of Juan Sala in the note to
Partida III, Title II, Law 32 (Id. at 52); and the reference to the work of Febrero
in the note to Partida III, Title XIX, Law 9 (id. at 251).
159. There were very few references to Roman law that related to the
individual laws of the Partidas. See, for example, the reference to Book XXIV,
Title I, Law I of the Digest of Justinian in the note to Partida IV, Title XI, Law
3 (id. at 510-511).
160. See, for example, the reference to Book III, Title XVII of the Digest of
1808 in the note to Partida III, Title IV, Law 24 (id. at 94); and the reference to
Pierce v. Curtis, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 418, in the note to Partida III, Title XXX, Law 8
(id. at 398).
161. Id. at xxiii-xxiv.
162. Id. at xxiv.
163. Id. at xxiv-xxv.
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“disorder rose to such a height” 164 that the king had to indicate
clearly which body of law prevailed in Castile. They also stated
that Alfonso X found the laws of Spain in a “distracted state.” 165
Moreau-Lislet and Carleton referred in their preface to
Louisiana court decisions and Spanish legislation. Regarding the
former, the translators referred, in the body of the text, to the
already mentioned 1817 decision of Cottin v. Cottin. 166 They also
cited, though in a footnote, the 1813 decision in Pizerot et al. v.
Meuillon's Heirs. 167 Spanish legislation was also cited in the
Translators’ Preface. For example, there are references to the
Autos Acordados (since 1723), 168 a work that was also available in
the library of Moreau-Lislet. 169
The preface was drafted after consulting the works of several
jurists, surely benefiting from the contents of the library of
Moreau-Lislet. 170 The translators explicitly mentioned the works of
jurists within the text of the preface. For example, Juan Sala 171 and
Pedro Murillo Velarde 172 were mentioned in the body of the text,
while Domenico Alberto Azuni 173 and Alonso de Azevedo 174 were
mentioned in the footnotes. Other jurists were not explicitly
mentioned in the text of the preface, though their work was
influential for the translators. For example, John Cairns indicated
that the translators relied on the extensive historic introduction
included in the Teatro by Pérez y López. 175 The name of the author
of the Teatro was not explicitly mentioned in the preface. His
164. Id. at vii.
165. Id. The Translators’ Preface incorrectly referred to Alfonso IX.
166. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
167. Id. at xvii. 3 Mart. (o.s.) 97.
168. Id. at v & xviii. The Translators’ Preface correctly referred, in the first
footnote, to Book II, Title I, Auto 1. See TOMO TERCERO DE AUTOS ACORDADOS
68 (1772).
169. Franklin, supra note 59, at 406.
170. Id. at 405-409.
171. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at iv & xiii.
172. Id. at xvii-xviii.
173. Id. at xvi. The Translators’ Preface incorrectly referred to Azum.
174. Id. at xvii.
175. Cairns, supra note 71, at 73.
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work, however, was indeed mentioned, when Moreau-Lislet and
Carleton referred in their preface to the “author of the theatre of
Spanish legislation.” 176
3. Relations with Other Works
The Translators’ Preface related to other legal works that were
elaborated at that time in Louisiana. That connection was identified
recently by Cairns, 177 and helps better describe and understand the
legal and social context of early nineteenth-century Louisiana. The
southern state, as previously mentioned, offered a context in which
an interest for Spanish laws was welcomed.
The work of Moreau-Lislet and Carleton was related to two
copies of the Digest of 1808 that included manuscript notes. The
latter legal body did not include an exposé des motifs.178
Nevertheless, there are an uncertain number of copies of the editio
princeps of the Digest of 1808 that contain interleaves between the
French and English texts. Even though there are some copies with
interleaves that have no annotations, 179 other copies of the Digest
of 1808 contain manuscript notes that seem to have been dictated
by Moreau-Lislet, or in some cases, even written by him. 180 One of
these manuscripts, referred to as the de la Vergne copy, 181 included
an Avant-Propos that was closely linked to the Translators’
Preface. 182 The 1820 preface, mainly when describing the different
Spanish legislative bodies, built upon the shorter 1814 AvantPropos. 183 Cairns also indicated that the de la Vergne copy and the
Avant-Propos were concurrently related to the Teatro by Pérez y

176. 1 MOREAU LISLET & CARLETON, supra note 61, at xiv.
177. See generally Cairns, supra note 71.
178. See Joseph Dainow, Moreau Lislet's Notes on Sources of Louisiana
Civil Code of 1808, 19 LA. L. REV. 43, 43 (1958).
179. The LSU Law Library holds such a copy.
180. Cairns, supra note 71, at 74.
181. Cairns developed an exhaustive study on that copy. See generally, id.
182. Id. at 73.
183. Id. at 73, 79-80.
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López, 184 and that the translators 185 found in the introduction of the
Teatro a rich source for their historic account. 186 Another
manuscript, though with no interleaves, is referred to as the LSU
Copy. It was probably drafted before the de la Vergne copy, 187 and
it was found by Robert A. Pascal in May 1965 in the LSU
Library. 188 Cairns stated that Moreau-Lislet and Carleton used the
annotations of that manuscript when drafting the list of sources and
annotations to their translation of the Partidas. 189
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The need for translations of legal materials in Louisiana can be
explained by looking at its legal history. This new introduction
provided an historic evolution of the laws applicable in Louisiana,
and explained why the Spanish Partidas were welcomed in
Louisiana. The new introduction also provided information on the
1818 and 1820 English translations of the Partidas, together with
biographical information about the jurists involved in those
translation projects. Special attention was devoted to the
Translators’ Preface to the 1820 translation. Its content, its
sources, and its connection with other legal materials were
explored.
There has always been, and should always be, a connection
between Louisiana and other civil law jurisdictions. Louisiana is an
isolated “Civil Law island” partially surrounded by a “sea of
Common Law.” 190 However, Louisiana must build bridges with
184. Id. at 73.
185. Cairns indicated that the participation of Carleton in the drafting of the
Translators’ Preface could be challenged. Id. at 79-80.
186. Id. at 73, 80.
187. Id. at 64.
188. Robert A. Pascal, A Recent Discovery: A Copy of the ‘Digest of the Civil
Laws’ of 1808 with Marginal Source References in Moreau-Lislet’s Hand, 26
LA. L. REV. 25 (1965).
189. Cairns, supra note 71, at 65 & 72.
190. Agustin Parise, Non-Pecuniary Damages in the Louisiana Civil Code
Article 1928: Originality in the Early Nineteenth Century and Its Projected Use
in Further Codification Endeavors 14 (May 18th, 2006) (unpublished LL.M.
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other civil law territories to keep developing its civil law heritage.
It must benefit from developments in other jurisdictions, and it
must share its own developments with the world-wide civil law
discourse. The translations of the Partidas provided an early
example of that bridge-building activity, in that case with Spain
and its legislation. Translations of other materials, such as the
Louisiana Civil Code, may lay down new bridges.

thesis, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center) (on file with the
LSU Law Library).
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TRANSLATORS’ PREFACE TO THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE
PARTIDAS †
Louis Moreau-Lislet & Henry Carleton *
THIS work has been undertaken under the patronage of the
legislature of Louisiana, which passed a law on the 3d of March,
1819, authorising it to be executed at the expense of the state. It
contains a translation of all that portion of Las Siete Partidas,
which is considered as having the force of law in Louisiana. Those
parts which relate to the Catholic faith, and to matters of a criminal
nature having been repealed, are therefore entirely omitted.
The translators have compiled the following short historic
sketch of Spanish legislation, hoping that it may afford some
gratification to those who have not an opportunity of consulting the
authors from which it is taken.
The laws of Spain are contained in various codes, the most
complete of which is that known under the name of Las Siete
Partidas. The other codes are the Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Viejo and
Fuero Real; to which may be added the laws regulating the practice
of courts, the Royal Ordinances, and those of Alcala; the laws of
Toro, the Recopilacion de Castilla, and the Recopilacion de las
Indias. We will notice these codes in the order in which they were

† The text of the Translators’ Preface was proof-read, for purposes of
publication in the Journal of Civil Law Studies, by Mr. Shane Büchler. It was
further revised by the author of this introduction. See Agustín Parise,
Introductory Essay on the Translators’ Preface to Las Siete Partidas, above.
The transcribed text tried to preserve as close as possible the form of the
original text, including typographical errors. Footnotes in the original text were
restarted on every page, and shifted from numbers to letters. The transcribed text
does not follow that criteria, and adopted a continuous numbering for footnotes.
The transcribed text, however, indicates by means of square brackets, the
number or letter and page of the corresponding footnote within the original text.
* First published as Translators’ Preface to the work of Moreau-Lislet
and Carleton in New Orleans by James McKaraher, 60 Chartres Street, in 1820.
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made and published, and the degree of authority ascribed to them
in Spain, and the countries under her dominions.
Spain and Portugal, before they submitted to the power of the
Romans, were governed by no other laws, than their customs and
usages, traces of which are still to he found in the codes
subsequently enacted by the kings of Spain. But after these
countries were rendered tributary to the Roman empire by
Augustus Cæsar, they were governed by the civil law alone, until
the Romans themselves were expelled by the Goths, about the year
466 of the Christian æra. These barbarians, more devoted to arms
than to science, suffered several years to elapse before they
substituted a system of their own laws to those of the Romans
Several Spanish authors who have treated this subject, and
among others Don Juan Sala 1 pretend that the Goths for some time
after their conquest, permitted the Spaniards to preserve the civil
law, to which they had been accustomed, and which was then
contained in the Theodosian Code, or in an abridgement, (el
Breviario), made from it, from the Gregorian and Hermogenian
codes, and from the decrees and institutes of Paul and Caius, by the
Gothic jurisconsult Anien, about the year 506, under the reign of
king Alaric. 2
All these authors, however, agree that Euric who died about the
year 483, and the first king of that dynasty, established a small
number of laws, which were the first that could be called Spanish.
But under his successors, and particularly Leogivilde, they
multiplied so fast, that Resevinde, desirous of effacing every
vestige of Roman power, prohibited the use of the civil laws, by
imposing a fine of thirty pounds upon every person who should
cite them in court, and the judge who should found his judgments
upon their authority. This barbarous severity was afterwards
1. In the abridged history of Spanish laws, entitled Illustracion del Derecho
de Espana [note 1, at iv].
2. The Pandects of Justinian had already disappeared in Italy, at the period
of the incursions of the barbarians [note 2, at iv].
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pushed so far as to inflict the punishment of death for that
offence. 3
Yet literature began early to make progress among the clergy,
and the intimate union that prevailed at that time between them and
the government, soon produced divers rules and regulations in the
national councils, upon subjects both of a spiritual and temporal
nature: these together with others, enacted by the Gothic kings,
formed the Fuero Juzgo which was published about the year 693.
This code, the first made by the Spanish nation, is divided into
twelve books, and each book into different, titles. It was first
published in Latin under the title of Forum Judicum, and was not
translated into Spanish until the reign of Ferdinand III in the
thirteenth century. It was originally called tbe Book of the Judges,
(El Fuero de los Juécés) which name has been changed by a
corruption of words, into Fuero Juzgo, the title under which it was
printed in Madrid in the year 1600.
But about the year 714, soon after the publication of this code,
its authority was almost entirely overthrown by the invasion of the
Moors, who conquered with incredible rapidity, the whole of
Spain, except the Asturias, whither the Spaniards who had escaped
their fury, fled under Don Pelage, a descendant of the Gothic
kings. These invaders were not driven from the kingdom, until
about the year 1492, when Grenada, their last refuge, was taken
after eight centuries of almost continual warfare.
During this bloody struggle, the kings of Spain, having
frequent need of the nobles and grandees who followed them in the
field, were under the necessity of granting them many important
privileges, and of establishing a code in their favour. Hence the
origin of El Fuero de los hijos dalgos, the code of the nobles. So
likewise, in order to encourage those who fought the enemy under
their banners, or to people the conquered countries, they granted to
various towns and surrounding territories, the enjoyment of certain
3. Auto 1. Tit. 1. lib. 2 of the Autos Accordados, make mention of
this law [note 1, at v].

2014]

PREFACE TO LAS SIETE PARTIDAS

339

particular customs, and usages, from which great confusion often
arose in the construction and application of the laws. In order to
remedy this evil and establish a uniform mode of judicial
procedure in civil matters, El Fuero Viejo the ancient code was
published in the year 992. This code is divided into five books,
containing the ancient customs and usages of the Spanish nation,
and rules and regulations concerning the administration of justice.
But its promulgation, far from affording a remedy to the evil it was
intended to cure, served only to increase the confusion which
distracted all the tribunals of the kingdom; some of them taking for
the rules of their decision, the laws of the Fuero Juzgo, and others
those of the Fuero Viejo, and others again deciding according to
the ancient customs.
In this state of things, the disorder rose to such a height, that
Ferdinand the III. was under the necessity of directing that the
Fuero Juzgo should prevail in the kingdom of Castille; while the
Fuero Viejo should remain in force in the kingdom of Leon. Such
was the distracted state of the laws of Spain, when Alphonso the
IX. generally called the wise, or the learned; wishing to establish a
uniform system of jurisprudence in all his dominions, published a
third code under the name of the Fuero Real, the Royal Law. 4 This
code may be considered as the precursor of the laws of the Partidas
which we have translated, and which that prince had already
ordered to be compiled. The Fuero Real is divided into four books,
each of which contains several titles.
The Partidas, of which we will now speak, is the most perfect
system of Spanish laws, and may be advantageously compared
with any code published in the most enlightened ages of the world.
These laws, the unceasing subject of the praise and admiration of
every jurist acquainted with them, were compiled in imitation of
the Roman Pandects, and may be considered as the digest of the
laws of Spain, containing in addition to the canonical ordinances,
4. The Fuero Real is, to the Partidas, what the institutes are to the Digest of
Justinian [note a, at vii].
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all the civil laws in force in that kingdom at the time of their
promulgation. Ferdinand the III. had projected that great work, in
order to prevent confusion and diversity in the jurisprudence of the
empire, by establishing uniform rules of legal decision. But the
sudden death of that monarch prevented the execution of a project
which was afterwards accomplished by the wisdom of Alphonso,
his son and successor. Alphonso nominated four Spanish
jurisconsults to whom he committed the execution of the intended
work.— These enlightened men, whose names have not come
down to us, entered upon this arduous task in the year 1256, and
actually accomplished it, in the space of seven years. They
borrowed from the canonical laws of Spain, all those parts of the
new code which relate to matters of a religious nature. Those
which relate to civil and criminal matters, were taken from those
usages and customs which the lawgiver thought fit to preserve, but
principally from the Roman laws, which the compilers freely
translated almost literally, although they carefully avoid confessing
that fact. 5
Owing to the perpetual wars and revolutions by which Spain
was agitated, the laws of the Partidas were not promulgated until
the year 1343, during a session of the Cortez held at Alcala de
Henares, under the reign of Alphonso the XI. And even after their
promulgation, the death of that prince prevented them from going
into full operation until the year 1505, when Ferdinand and Joanna
gave them their sanction, at the Cortez held that year in the city of
Toro.
The laws of the Partidas are divided into seven parts, Siete
Partidas: from this division, this code takes its name. Each part is
divided into titles, and each title subdivided into laws. The first
contains the canonical laws and liturgy of the Catholic church. The
second is a summary of the ancient usages and customs of the
5. The compilers often speak of the ancient sages, Sabios Antiguos, whose
maxims they borrowed, and by refering to the Civil laws, it is evident that the
sages alluded to, are the Roman jurists [note a, at viii].
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Spanish nation, and of the rules of its government, and political
administration. 6 The 3d, 5th and 6th Partidas, contain an
abridgement of all the principles and maxims of the Roman laws,
on the subject of actions, suits, judgments, contracts, successions,
testaments, minority, and tutorship; together with decisions on
points which had been considered as doubtful, by the
commentators on the civil law. The 4th is a compendium of the
laws relative to betrothings and marriages, and of those which treat
of the social relations of man, as regards paternal power, legitimate
and illegitimate filiation, freedom, slavery, and enfranchisement.
The 7th treats of crimes, offences, and punishments, and
concludes, as do the Pandects, by two titles, the one, on the
signification of words, and the other on the rules of law.
Since the promulgation of the Partidas, some of its provisions
have been abrogated, or amended by subsequent laws, particularly
by the laws of the Recopilacion of Castille, of which we shall
presently speak. But these alterations have not, in any way,
changed the great principles of natural law, contained in the
Partidas. They relate to certain laws only of a positive nature,
which nations establish, modify, and repeal, as their wants,
interests, or situation may require. 7
The Partidas may therefore be considered as containing the
fundamental principles of the laws of Spain. And when we reflect
that they were compiled amid the tumult of arms and almost
perpetual wars waged by that kingdom against the Moors, and in
an age when most of the states of Europe were without any regular
systems of jurisprudence, our admiration of this code is raised to
the highest pitch. Yet we should reflect that even at that time, the
Spaniards were preparing themselves to act the wonderful part they
sustained under the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the still
6. As these two first parts have no relation to our system of government,
they have not been translated [note a, at ix].
7. As we proceed with the translation of the laws of the Partidas, we shall
point out the alterations they have undergone, from laws of a subsequent date [note a,
at x].
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more brilliant one of Charles V; that the spirit of chivalry had
already softened the asperity of early manners; that the Moors had
introduced in Spain, the arts, and the love of letters, which they
had brought over with them from Africa, and that the pandects of
Justinian had, some time before, been found at Amalfi, and were
everywhere studied, so as greatly to facilitate the execution of this
work.
A learned writer 8 speaking of the Partidas observes,
“we find in every page of that work the highest wisdom, and
the most stern justice. It gave to the monarch under whose auspices
it was executed, titles more just to the epithet of wise, bestowed
upon him by his contemporaries, than his astronomical researches,
and physical knowledge, however surprising the one and the other
may have been considered, in an age, when all studies were so
much disregarded. It is in that precious code, that we must seek the
early treasures of the Spanish language; there we shall find the
characteristic features of that idiom, at a time when it retained, yet
a simplicity, and turn, and form of expression, which gave it more
freedom and ease than it now possesses, though written in an age,
when the language yet unpolished, preserved much of its primitive
rudeness. We however perceive in the stile of the work, a grace, a
facility, worthy the elevated sentiments that pervade it; and in spite
of some defects, we believe, that the Spanish language, such as it
was, when the Partidas were compiled, had already arrived to a
degree of perfection which the Italian writers did not attain till
many years after.”
In the Partidas are contained these remarkable words:
“despotism tears the tree up by the roots; a wise monarch prunes its
branches.”
We shall pass rapidly over the different laws and ordinances
promulgated in Spain after the appearance of the Partidas, until the

8. Dictionnaire Historique, edition of 1810, vol. 1, p. 237, verb. Alphonso
[note a, at xi].
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promulgation of the Recopilacion of Castille, as all those laws and
ordinances are to be found in that work.
During the period which elapsed from the commencement of
the Partidas, to their first publication in the Cortes of Alcala in the
year 1348, the laws relative to the forms of legal proceedings (del
Estilo) made their appearance in the year 1310. That work contains
two hundred and fifty laws, not divided however, into books or
titles. Most of them relate to suits civil and criminal; to those who
are parties to them; to the proofs to be given, as well as to the
formalities to be observed in conducting them. It is for that reason
they are called the laws of judicial proceedings, because they relate
to the usages and customs of courts, and to the manner of
conducting causes in them.
Since the publication of the laws of the Partidas, at the Cortes
held at Alcala, and particularly since the Cortes of Toro in 1505,
several laws and rescripts were published, as circumstances
required. When their numbers increased, they were, at several
epochs collected in one or more volumes, in virtue of a royal
ordinance which gave them a legislative sanction. It was then that
the ordinance of Alcala, the laws of Toro, and the royal ordinance
were published.
The ordinance of Alcala (El ordinamiento de Alcala) appeared
in 1348, the very year the Partidas were first published. This
ordinance is divided into 32 titles, and each title is subdivided into
laws, relating to the manner of proceeding in courts; regulating
certain contracts and wills; and providing for the suppression of
crimes, and their punishment by adequate penalties.
The laws of Toro, (Las leyes de Toro) eighty in number, were
published at the Cortes held in the city of Toro, in 1505, with a
view to regulate the forms to be observed in making wills; to
establisd rules relative to testamentary successions, and
successions ab intestato; to fix the donations of the third and fifth
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parts; 9 the manner of succeding to estates by the law of
primogeniture in Spain, and the alimony due from the father to his
illegitimate children. These laws are inserted in the Recopilacion
of Castille, in the titles in which they are classed, according to their
order.
The Royal Ordinance (El ordinamiento real) made in imitation
of that of Alcala, was sanctioned, and published by Ferdinand and
Isabella in 1496. Don Juan Sala 10 pretends that this ordinance has
never received the royal sanction, though it appears to have been
drawn up in obedience to the order of the sovereign. But this
opinion is not embraced by other Spanish writers, among whom
the author of the theatre of Spanish legislation, positively asserts,
that the Royal Ordinance was authorised and published by
Ferdinand and Isabella.
Without deciding this controversy, it will suffice to observe,
that all the Spanish jurists agree that in the tribunals of Spain, this
ordinance, of which the greatest part has been inserted in the
Recopilacion of Castille, is received as the highest authority. It is
divided into eight books, which are again divided into titles.
We have now arrived at the code of laws, the Recopilacion of
Castille (Las leyes de Recopilacion) which completes the system of
Spanish legislation. It was published in the year 1567, under the
authority of Philip II, who gave it the legislative sanction, and
caused to be inserted in it the laws of the ordinance of Alcala, and
those of the Royal Ordinance, which had not been repealed as well
as the whole of the laws of Toro, and those which had been
promulgated in the intervening period. From the year 1567 to
1777, several new editions of the Recopilacion have appeared, to

9. Donations which a father or mother might make of a part of their estate,
to some of their children, to the prejudice of the others—these were called
donations of the third and fifth part, because they could not exceed these
proportions [note a, at xiii].
10. Illustracion del derecho Espana. Preliminry remarks, vol. 1, p. 12 [note
b, at xiii].
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which the different laws, edicts and recripts published since its first
promulgation, have been added at different times.
The title of Recopilacion (compilation) was equally given to
the (Autos Accordados); that is to say the edicts and orders in
council, which the king sanctioned and caused to ho published by
virtue of a Royal Decree, in one volume, divided into books and
titles, in the same order which had been observed in the publication
of the Recopilacion of Castille. This work was published for the
first time, in the year 1745, and now forms the last volume of the
Recopilacion, with which it has been incorporated, in the 4th
edition, with some unimportant additions. The two works are each
composed of nine books, divided into various titles.
The most important book of the Recopilacion is the 5th, which
treats of marriage and dowry; of the single and married life; of
wills and successions; of the mode of dividing estates; of donations
of the third and fifth parts; of the property and gains acquired by
the husband and wife during marriage, and of the cession of goods
by debtors.
Spain possessing immense dominions in North and South
America, felt the necessity of regulating the government of those
provinces, and of securing, by general and permanent laws, the
obedience and welfare of the nations who inhabited them. The
scattered laws therefore which had been promulgated for that
purpose, at different periods, were collected, and digested by order
of Phillip IV. in the same form as the Recopilacion of Castille,
under the title of the Recopilacion of the Indies, (La Recopilacion
de las Indias) and published in the year 1661.
We have thus given a concise view of the history of Spanish
jurisprudence, as relates to spiritual and temporal matters. It is,
however, proper to remark that the different codes, of which we
have spoken, contain only general principles of law, leaving all
questions which arise, concerning commercial and maritime
affairs, to be decided by local laws. The Consulado del Mare,
governs in all those ports in Spain, which are situated on the
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Mediterranean sea, where also the Capitulations of Barcelona are
observed in all matters relating to insurance; while the Ordinance
of Bilbao is the law in all maritime causes arising on the shores of
the Atlantic. Commercial and maritime controversies, arising in the
Indies, form a third class, and are governed by what is called the
Contractacion, or Consulate of Seville and Cadiz, and by the
ordinances and regulations of the Supreme Council of the Indies. 11
After this short account of the several codes of the laws
existing in Spain, it is now proper to say something of the degree
of authority, they respectively enjoy, in the tribunals of that
country; and especially in what manner they are to be received, and
inforced in the courts of this state, in matters of a civil nature.
The third law, title 1st, book 2d, of the Recopilacion of
Castille, prescribing the manner in which the laws of that code, of
Partidas and of other codes, are to be observed, declares that the
first in order, are the laws of the Recopilacion of Castille, and
those that have been subsequently enacted: next the laws of the
Fuero Real, and the municipal customs; and finally, the laws of
Las Siete Partidas. This law does not speak of the Recopilacion of
the Indies, which was not compiled until long after the
promulgation of the Recopilacion of Castille.
Murillo, an able Spanish law writer, speaking on that subject in
his treatise entitled Cursus Juris canonici, Hispani et Indici, after
having repeated what is said in law 3d, title 1, book 2 of the
Recopilacion of Castille, says that the laws of the Recopilacion, of
Toro, and the Partidas, ought to he enforced by judges, in all
causes submitted to their decisions, even when it is alledged, that
they have not been usually observed in the place. But that when the
authority of the Fuero Real and of the laws of Estilo is invoked, it
is necessary to prove that they are conformable to the usages of the

11. Azum’s Maritime Law, vol 1, p. 404, No. 5 [note 1, at xvi].
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place, unless they be found in the Recopilacion; for then it is only
necessary to plead them. 12
Murillo speaks likewise of the manner in which the Spanish
laws ought to he received in both Indies. On that subject he says,
that in the Spanish dominions in the Indies, courts of justice should
first have recourse to the Royal and Special Edicts (Cedulas,)
which may have been directed to the chancery of the city or place
where the cause is pending; and if there are none, they should then
decide according to the common law, which is to be found in the
laws of the Recopilacion of the Indies: and where these last are
silent, recourse must be had to the Recopilacion of Castille and the
Partidas. This author also observes, that the rescripts, or Royal
Ordinances, are of no authority in the Indies, unless they have been
directed to Supreme Council of these countries: and finally he
thinks (what must be considered as a general rule for all the
Spanish dominions, either in Europe or in the Indies) that when all
the royal laws are silent, it is better for judges to have recourse to
the commercial than the civil or Roman laws; because it was
formerly enacted in Spain, that whoever would cite in court the
Imperial or Roman laws, should suffer death; 13 and that therefore,
the civil law could not be cited, as a law, but only as written
reason. Murillo, Vol. 1, No. 23, p. 9.
It remains now to state, how it happened, that the laws of
Spain, are still in force in Louisiana, since its transfer to the United
States of America.

12. Such is the opinion of Azevedo, in his commentaries on the
Recopilacion of Castille. This appears to be now a settled point, notwithstanding
there are some authors who support the contrary doctrine. So likewise it has
been determined, by the supreme court of this state, in the case of Pizerot vs. the
heirs of Meuillon, 3. Mart. Rep. page 120 [note a, at xvii].
13. It appears that much of the rigor of the ancient laws of Spain on this
subject, has ceased, as the study of the civil law, was tolerated in the
Universities of that kingdom, even previous to the Edict in Council (Auto) of the
24th May 1774, which ordered, that the Royal Code, or Statute, should be taught
in the Universities, together with the Roman laws. Auto 3, tit. 1, book 2, of Los
Autos Accordados [note a, at xviii].
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The customs of Paris and the ordinances of the kingdom, were
observed in Louisiana, while it remained under the dominion of
France, and by them all civil and criminal suits wer determined.
Justice was administered by a Supreme Tribunal composed of
several judges, called the Superior Council, (Le Conseil Superiur)
and one attorney general. This state of things, existed until the
month of August 1769, when count O’Reilly took possession of
that country, in the name of the king of Spain, in virtue of the
treaty of cession, which France had made to that power. It is well
known, that this treaty, though concluded and signed on the 3d of
November 1762, was not made public before the 23d of April
1764; and that Spain did not take actual possession of the country
before the year 1769, when count O’Reilly arrived, vested with
extraordinary powers, and at the head of three thousand regular
troops. The disaffection which the inhabitants of the country manifested when they heard of the treaty of cession, and that they were
to pass under a foreign government; and the opposition which they
intended to make, as it was supposed, to the landing of the Spanish
troops when they arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi, gave rise
to excessively rigorous measures against them, on the part of
O’Reilly; one of which was to cause to be arrested, twelve of the
most respectable citizens of New Orleans, six of whom paid with
their lives, for the affection which they had shown for their mother
country, 14 while the others were thrown into dungeons at Havana.
It was under these circumstances that O’Reilly issued a
proclamation, changing the form of the government of Louisiana,
abolishing the authority of the French laws, and substituting those
of Spain, in their stead. 15 This proclamation which was
14. The father of James Villere, the present governor of this state was
among the number of the victims [note a, at xix].
15. As this proclamation has become very scarce, we here insert a
translation of it.
“Don Alexander O’Reilly, Commander of Benfagan of the Order of Alcantara,
Lieutenant-General of the Armies of his Majesty, Inspector General of the
Infantry, and by Commission, Captain General of the Province of Louisiana.
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accompanied by an ordinance, establishing the several branches of
the new government of Louisiana, and defining their respective
powers, appears to have been published on the 26th November
1769. From the time of its promulgation until now, the French laws
ceased to have any authority in this country, and all controversies
were tried and decided conformably to the Spanish laws, by a

“Whereas, the prosecution which took place in consequence of the rebellion
raised in this colony, have fully proved, the part and the influence the council
had therein, by supporting contrary to their duty, acts of the greatest attrocity,
while it was incumbent on them, to have used their endeavours, to maintain the
people in that fidelity and subordination, which they owe to their sovereign; for
these reasons, and wishing to prevent such evils for the future; it has become
indispensable, to abolish said council, and to establish in its stead, the form of
the political government, and administration of justice, which our wise laws
prescribe, and by all which all the states of his majesty in America, have ever
been maintained in the most perfect tranquility, content, and subordination. For
these considerations using the powers, which the king our Lord; (whom may
God preserve) has confided in us by a patent, issues as Aranjuez the 16th of
April of this year, to establish in the army, the police, and in the administration,
of justice, and of his finances, that form of government, dependance and
subordination, which is consonant with his service and the happiness of his
subjects in the colony; we do hereby establish in his royal name a city council or
cabildo, composed of six perpetual regidors, agreeably to the law 2d. tit. 10,
book 5, of the Recopilacion of the Indies, and among whom shall be distributed
the offices of Alfarez Royal, Alcalde, Mayor Provincial, Alguazil Mayor,
depositary general, and receiver of the Penas de Camara or fines accruing to the
Fisc: and these shall elect on the first day of every year, two judges who shall be
called, ordinary alcaldes, a syndic, attorney-general, and an administrator of the
city rents, and taxes, such as they are established by our laws, for the good
government, and administration of justice. And whereas the want of lawyers in
this country, and the little information these new subjects have of the laws of
Spain, may render their faithful observance very difficult, which would be
entirely contrary to the intention of his majesty, we have thought it useful, and
even necessary, to cause an abstract of these laws, to be formed, in order to
serve for the instruction of the public, and as elementary rules for the
administration of justice, and municipal government of this city, until the
knowledge of the Spanish language can be introduced, and thereby afford to
every one, by the reading of these laws, the means of extending their
information in that matter; and therefore, and under the good pleasure of his
majesty, we do order and command, that all judges, cabildoes, and their officers,
do comply punctually with that, which is prescribed in the following articles.
(here follows the ordinance establishing the new government, and their powers,
all terminating with this subscription.)
“At New Orleans, on the 25th of November 1769.
“Signed) DON ALEXANDRE O’REILLY,
“Printed by order of his excellency Francois Xavier Rodriguez, secretary to the
expedition.” [note a, at xx].
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tribunal; of which the governor was the only judge, though he was
bound to take the advice of a lawyer (lettrado) appointed and
commissioned to that effect, by the king of Spain, and called the
Auditor of War. From all the judgments of the governor’s tribunal,
there was an appeal to the Royal Audience, sitting at Puerto
Principe, in the Island of Cuba, and presided by the capt. general of
that Island.
The return of Louisiana under the dominion of France, and its
transfer to the United States, did not for a moment, weaken the
Spanish laws in that province. The French, during the short
continuation of their power, from the 30th November to the 20th
December 1803, made no alteration in the jurisprudence of the
country; and the government of the United States, left the task of
legislation to the people of Louisiana themselves, giving to them,
the right to make whatever changes they might deem necessary in
the existing system of their laws, (see sect. 11, of the act to divide
Louisiana into two territories, passed by Congress on the 26th of
March 1804, and the fourth section of another act passsed the 2d
March 1805, to provide for the government of the territory of
Orleans. See likewise sect. 4 of the schedule annexed to the
constitution of this state.)
However the legislature of the territory of Orleans, as early as
the year 1807, considering that the ancient laws secured to the
inhabitants of Louisiana by the acts of Congress, were written in a
foreign language, and contained in books difficult to be procured,
ordered a digest of those laws to be made and prepared in the
English and French languages, by two jurisconsults. This digest
was adopted, by an act passed the 31st March 1808, but was not
promulgated before the month of November of the same year,
when printed copies of it were officially sent to all the tribunals of
the territory of Orleans. This code commonly known under the
name of the Civil Code, is therefore become a part of our statute
laws. But it is easy to perceive, that a work of that nature, however
excellent it may be, can only contain general rules and abstract
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maxims, still leaving many points doubtful in the application of the
law; hence the necessity of going back to the original source, in
order to obtain new and additional light. It was moreever perceived
that the Civil Code did not contain many and important provisions
of the Spanish laws still in force, nor any rules of judicial
proceedings; that the statutes regulating these proceedings had
proved insufficient; and that the Superior Court had in divers
instances, and particularly in the case of Cottin vs. Cottin, Martin’s
Rep. vol. 5, p. 93, determined that the Spanish laws “must he
considered as untouched, whenever the alterations and
amendments introduced in the digest do not reach them; and that
such parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary to,
or incompatible with the provisions of the code.” It thus appeared
that a much greater portion of the Spanish laws remained in force
than had been at first supposed. It was then doubtless the desire of
the legislature to spread generally the knowledge of such of these
laws, as are not to be found in the Civil Code, or in the digest of
our statutes, that induced them to make provisions for the printing
of this translation. They felt the force and justice of that
acknowledged rule of reason that in order to inforce obedience to
the laws, it is necessary that they should be fully understood by the
people.
The plan pursued by the translators in this work is very simple.
Each title of the Partidas, is preceded by a list of the titles of the
Roman and Spanish laws, and of the Civil Code, relative to the
subject it treats of, together with an index of the articles therein
contained.
Each law is accompanied by a note, referring to the
corresponding laws of the Recopilacion, and of the Autos
Accordados according to the quotations contained in the edition of
the Partidas, published with the commentaries of Gregorio Lopez.
The Recopilacion of Castille will be designated by the letter R,
followed by Arabic ciphers, the first designating the law, the
second the title, the third the book referred to. The Autos
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Accordados, will be designated by the word Auto, followed by the
number of the law, title, and book, cited.
The laws in accordance, or at variance, with those of the Civil
Code, are likewise accompanied by notes, referring to the
provisions of the latter, which treat of the same subject. The Civil
Code will be designated by the letter C, followed by ciphers, the
first designating the law, the second the title, and the third the
book. When no reference is made to the Civil Code, it is to be
inferred, that it contains no law similar to that of the Partidas.
As it is often a difficult task, even for lawyers, to determine,
whether a law is in force or not, the translators have thought proper
to give the translation of all those laws which have not been
expressly repealed by the legislature, or which are not repugnant to
the constitution of the United States, or to that of this state, leaving
to the proper tribunals to determine whether they are in force or
not.
When a proper term could not be found in the English
language, to render the legal sense of a Spanish word, the
translators have made use of the Spanish word itself, after giving
an explanation of it, whenever its meaning is not set forth in the
law, in which it is used. And when the term could not be translated
by one precisely equivalent in English, the word in Spanish is
given between parenthesis, in order that the reader may determine
for himself.
When the notes found in various parts of this translation, are
quoted from Spanish authors, the names of such authors are given.
Those which are not accompanied by any name, are the notes
of the translators themselves.
Such is the plan adhered to in this translation, which will be
terminated by a general index of all the matters contained in the
two volumes of which it will consist. The particular care and
attention which the translators have bestowed, in order to render
this work as perfect as possible, will, they hope, secure to them, the
praise of having faithfully discharged the honorable task imposed
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on them by the legislature. They will consider themselves as fully
rewarded for their labour, if they are so happy as to have been the
means of making the public acquainted with the justly celebrated
code of the Partidas, which, if it is not the best, is certainly equal to
any the world has ever seen.

